British bomber development in regards to long range fighters.

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Shortround6

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Jun 29, 2009
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Picking on the British because most criticisms seems to focus on them (few people wonder why Italy didn't build long range fighters.)

British bomber development, at least to my eyes (I don't have the benefit of air ministry memo's) seems to have been a sort of order everything on the menu, throw it at the wall and see what sticks.

A bit harsh but consider from Jan 1935 to Oct 1939 the RAF had placed in service or flown prototypes of of aircraft that would later enter production 18 different "bomber" aircraft. This does not include FAA aircraft or prototypes that didn't lead to production or even the Henley. I can't think of any other country that had so many designs enter service with at least one squadron. OK few of these are a bit of stretch but here it goes.

Fairey Hendon. 5-6 year old design, went into service Nov 1936
Avro Anson, used to make up numbers and form squadrons to be requiped later. March 1936
Bristol Blenheim entered service March 1937.
Vickers Wellesley also 1937
Bristol Bombay also 1937
Hawker Hector "" ""
Fairey Battle again 1937
A. W. Whitley once again 1937
Vickers Wellington Oct 1938
Westland Lysander June 1938
H.P. Harrow 1937
H.P. Hampden Sept 1938
Bristol Beaufort prototype flew Oct 1938
Blackburn Botha prototype flew Dec 1938
Short Stirling prototype flew March 1939
Avro Manchester prototype flew July1939
Vickers Warwick prototype flew Aug 1939
H.P. Halifax prototype flew Oct 1939

From placement of production order to first squadron getting planes could be 2 years or more.
Throwing out the two army co-operation planes and the the two colonial bomber/transports (or transport-bombers) and the obviously interim Hendon and Anson you still have 12 bombers capable of flying 1000 miles or more. The prototypes flying in 1939 were closer to 2000 miles in max range (although with skimpy bomb loads).
Some like the Whitley were intended to fly at night. At least the Whitley was often referred to as a night bomber in aviation magazines of the day.
Now which bombers are we trying to design/modify an escort fighter for and for what fraction of the bombers potential range?
Yes an escort fighter that could escort bombers over a 300 mile radius would much more useful than one that could only fly 150 radius missions but if you are ordering hundreds of bombers that can fly 400-700 mile radius missions you are in a real mess.
 
Britain had a large aviation industry with every one getting a turn to bat. That was the way it was. That is very wasteful but gives companies work and people jobs.
 
From what I understand -- the thinking was that it was important that firms' design staffs were kept in being and a semblance of continuity in the development of engines/aircraft be kept during peacetime.
 
From what I understand -- the thinking was that it was important that firms' design staffs were kept in being and a semblance of continuity in the development of engines/aircraft be kept during peacetime.
That may be true, and I won't argue that it was not.

However in regards to the thread on early 1000-1200hp escort fighters,
which British bombers should they have planned to escort?
Over what distance?
At what speed?

180mph and over 1000 miles
Vickers_Wellesley_MKI.jpg

in 1938?
206mph and 1700 miles
Handley_Page_Hampden_in_the_air.jpg

in 1939?
Or the prototype Manchester and Halifax flying in 1939 with service use planned for late 1940 or early 1941 (didn't make it).
640px-15_Avro_Manchester%2C_2RR_Vulture_%2815650907300%29.jpg


The "goals" of escort fighter were constantly shifting and it is a lot easier to make a big, slow long ranged airplane than a small, fast long ranged airplane.

We know the Manchester didn't make it but imagine trying to design an escort fighter for it in 1939/40 to be in service in 1941?
I don't know when they knew the Manchester wasn't going to make the planned 275mph cruise :)
 
That may be true, and I won't argue that it was not.

However in regards to the thread on early 1000-1200hp escort fighters,
which British bombers should they have planned to escort?
Over what distance?
At what speed?

180mph and over 1000 miles
View attachment 523427
in 1938?
206mph and 1700 miles
View attachment 523428
in 1939?
Or the prototype Manchester and Halifax flying in 1939 with service use planned for late 1940 or early 1941 (didn't make it).
View attachment 523429

The "goals" of escort fighter were constantly shifting and it is a lot easier to make a big, slow long ranged airplane than a small, fast long ranged airplane.

We know the Manchester didn't make it but imagine trying to design an escort fighter for it in 1939/40 to be in service in 1941?
I don't know when they knew the Manchester wasn't going to make the planned 275mph cruise :)

I guess if you're only opposed by slow monoplane or biplane fighters with 2 m/c guns then you don't need a fighter escort. Cannon are a game changer.
 
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I think it may be the British bomber development was coloured by:
"The bomber will always get through" was a phrase used by Stanley Baldwin in 1932 (although the theory was originally developed by Italian General Giulio Douhet), in the speech "A Fear for the Future" to the British Parliament. He and others believed that, regardless of air defences, sufficient bomber aircraft would survive to destroy cities.
Fuller text from the speech:
"I think it is well also for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves… If the conscience of the young men should ever come to feel, with regard to this one instrument [bombing] that it is evil and should go, the thing will be done; but if they do not feel like that – well, as I say, the future is in their hands. But when the next war comes, and European civilisation is wiped out, as it will be, and by no force more than that force, then do not let them lay blame on the old men. Let them remember that they, principally, or they alone, are responsible for the terrors that have fallen upon the earth "
 
Firstly, the number 18 is a tad high. It would also be good to have a tighter definition of what is meant by "bomber". At the very least, we should remove the following from that list:
  • Anson which was procured for maritime reconnaissance.
  • Hector - army co-op.
  • Lysander - army co-op.
  • Bombay which was designed as a transport with a secondary role as a bomber.
  • Botha was designed as a reconnaissance/torpedo bomber to the same spec as the Beaufort and only ever entered service in a maritime reconnaissance role so it's hardly fair to consider it a discrete bomber type.
Some context to the political landscape is also in order. For example, the Battle was procured because of fears of an arms limitation treaty banning the use of heavy bombers. You're also including aircraft in-service and their replacements that were still in prototype form, some of which wouldn't see service for another couple of years.

Given that technology was advancing at an incredibly rapid rate and that the RAF was desperately trying to expand to meet the emerging threat from Nazi Germany, I think it's hardly surprising that we see such a broad spread of types as the RAF sought to catch up both numerically and qualitatively with the threat posed by the emerging global situation.
 
I admit to never really thinking about this. In retrospect I think (guess) that we believed more than other nations that the bomber would always get through and spent a lot of time and money, developing powered turrets carrying two or four guns to ensure that the bomber would get through. Carrying that thought process on, its notable that the UK never considered developing a long range fighter.
Other nations did, notably with the Me110, Fokker G2 and Potez 63.

There was some logic to the British approach. The vast majority of pre war fighters were armed with 4 x LMG and to attack a raid of multiple bombers, each of which is defended by a powered turret with 4 x LMG is a dangerous prospect.

Of course cannons were developed and the fighters became better protected, but that is the wisdom of hindsight, at the time I can see how the belief developed.
 
Frankly, I'm not entirely sure what question is being asked here. Is it "Why did Britain have so many bomber designs?" or is it "Given that Britain put so much effort into bombers, why didn't the Air Ministry invest in a long-range fighter to escort them?"

If it's the latter, I think history proves that long-range, twin-engine fighter escorts were not a success because, at the point in the mission where they became relevant, they were up against more agile, short-range, single-engine fighters. It was not until 1944 that a true long-range escort capability came about in the form of the P-51 but even then the escort mission required relays of several units to maintain coverage over a formation of bombers.

We also need to consider the evolution of thought when it came to bomber missions. The concept of "the bomber will always through" was thoroughly dismembered by the Battle of Britain when 2 clear conclusions became apparent: that bombers of the time in the numbers employed simply couldn't bring about the desired strategic effect promised by Douhet et al, and that a well-organized, short-range fighter defence could successfully blunt an offensive by unescorted bombers.
 
Frankly, I'm not entirely sure what question is being asked here. Is it "Why did Britain have so many bomber designs?" or is it "Given that Britain put so much effort into bombers, why didn't the Air Ministry invest in a long-range fighter to escort them?"

I am sorry I wasn't clearer in the opening post, I was trying to point out that given the seeming confusion in British purchasing of bombers, that is many bombers of widely varying capabilities, coming up with an escort fighter (or more than one) would be faced with many difficulties in the design stage, as in which bombers do you wish to escort and for how far.
I have held the position in other threads that single escort fighters were not technical possible in 1938-39-40 due to fuel and engines. It was possible to build fighters with longer range/radius than the Spitfire and Hurricane as built (with was somewhere around 110-130 miles?) . However a look at the majority of the bombers on that list will show that a 400 mile radius was pretty much the low threshold if you take out the army co-operation planes (which needed escorts) and the "fillers" (Hendon and Anson) and building single engine fighters with a radius of 400 miles was not easy. Even if the bombers of 1939-41 flew lower and slower than B-17s. Once you get passed the Battle and Blenheim the bomber radius could jump to 500-600 miles or more. If you are going to build escort fighters do you build ones that can only escort part way?
The reason for including the 4 prototype bombers at the end was to show that the capabilities of bombers were about to take a huge leap and this leap was known to the officials in charge. Fighters that could escort Blenheims or Hampdens over most of their ranges might be useless trying to escort Manchesters (had the engines worked correctly)


We also need to consider the evolution of thought when it came to bomber missions. The concept of "the bomber will always through" was thoroughly dismembered by the Battle of Britain when 2 clear conclusions became apparent: that bombers of the time in the numbers employed simply couldn't bring about the desired strategic effect promised by Douhet et al, and that a well-organized, short-range fighter defence could successfully blunt an offensive by unescorted bombers.

I fully agree with this.
 
Firstly, the number 18 is a tad high. It would also be good to have a tighter definition of what is meant by "bomber". At the very least, we should remove the following from that list:
  • Anson which was procured for maritime reconnaissance.
  • Hector - army co-op.
  • Lysander - army co-op.
  • Bombay which was designed as a transport with a secondary role as a bomber.
  • Botha was designed as a reconnaissance/torpedo bomber to the same spec as the Beaufort and only ever entered service in a maritime reconnaissance role so it's hardly fair to consider it a discrete bomber type.
I included the Anson because, had things )combat) started earlier, it might have been pressed into service. A list of British bomber squadron from Jan 1st 1938 has at least 16 squadrons still equipped with Hawker Hinds. How fast they got rid of them I don't know but since they built over 500 of them between 1935 and 1938 (another plane to equip the brand new squadrons that was only suitable as a trainer) it might be a flip of the coin as to going into battle with either one.
Army co-operation planes need fighter escort too, just a different one than long range escort.
The Bombay was ordered into production in 1936 and was pretty much a contemporary of the H.P. Harrow. Due to problems tooling up the Shorts Belfast factory (one of the new shadow factories ) which was the factory to build it and not the Bristol home factory, deliveries were not made until 1939 and the type went directly to the transport squadrons and skipped the medium/heavy bomber squadrons.
Had the Botha actually worked Bomber command would have been foaming at the mouth trying to figure out how to beg , borrow or steal as many Bothas as they could as often as the could for their bomber offensive.
It was also nice for the maritime recon and strike aircraft to have fighter escort when operating close to shore. And they did have it at times, Bristol Blenheims with the 4 gun belly pack provided cover (or acted as alternative targets) for several years as long range escorts for recon and strike aircraft in the Maritime setting.

Some context to the political landscape is also in order. For example, the Battle was procured because of fears of an arms limitation treaty banning the use of heavy bombers. You're also including aircraft in-service and their replacements that were still in prototype form, some of which wouldn't see service for another couple of years.

The Battle also missed the weight requirement by about 10% (and was probably a better airplane for it). The possibility of the treaty weight limit had pretty much gone away before the first production order for the Battle was placed. However the restriction certainly influenced the Battle's design and there wasn't time to go back and do it over again if the desired number of new aircraft to equip the newly formed squadrons was to keep pace. A lot of complaints are placed against the Battle by modern day ACAMs ( Arm Chair Air Marshals) but the alternative at the time was hundreds more Hawker Hinds or some other plane that made the Battle look like a rocket ship. The Battle was responsible for not only training thousands of pilots and thousands of aircrew but tens of thousands of ground crew, without who the early part of the war would have been much much harder.
The reason for including the prototypes that flew in 1939 was to show that the requirements for an "escort fighter" were going to change drastically from the type of airplane that could escort even Hampdens and Pegasus powered Wellingtons. And the Air staff knew it or should have known it as teh designs for the Prototype aircraft were one to two years old when they flew.

Given that technology was advancing at an incredibly rapid rate and that the RAF was desperately trying to expand to meet the emerging threat from Nazi Germany, I think it's hardly surprising that we see such a broad spread of types as the RAF sought to catch up both numerically and qualitatively with the threat posed by the emerging global situation.

I hope some of the above shows that I am in agreement with you even if I word it a bit different.
 
I included the Anson because, had things )combat) started earlier, it might have been pressed into service. A list of British bomber squadron from Jan 1st 1938 has at least 16 squadrons still equipped with Hawker Hinds. How fast they got rid of them I don't know but since they built over 500 of them between 1935 and 1938 (another plane to equip the brand new squadrons that was only suitable as a trainer) it might be a flip of the coin as to going into battle with either one.

The retirement of older types was done on a strict priority basis, with UK-based squadrons first in line for the latest kit while units in the Empire and Dominions had to soldier on rather longer with older types. That said, even far-flung units like 62 Sqn in India/Burma were re-equipped from Hinds to Blenheims in 1938. Again, the RAF faced a rather different strategic context than either the Luftwaffe or the USAAF given the requirement to police the Empire in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East, which spread resources more thinly (far too thinly in some places) which complicated replacement and actually drove some requirements (eg the Wellesley).


Army co-operation planes need fighter escort too, just a different one than long range escort.

Not sure about this. For the most part, army co-op aircraft performed more isolated, independent functions that didn't align well with providing fighter escort. Communications, signal dropping and battlefield visual reconnaissance typically weren't of sufficient priority to justify fighter escort...and that goes for all combatants. Aircraft like the Henschel Hs126 or Fieseler Storch, which had similar roles to the Lysander, certainly didn't fly around with much in the way of fighter escorts.


The reason for including the prototypes that flew in 1939 was to show that the requirements for an "escort fighter" were going to change drastically from the type of airplane that could escort even Hampdens and Pegasus powered Wellingtons. And the Air staff knew it or should have known it as teh designs for the Prototype aircraft were one to two years old when they flew.

My issue with this statement is that 1939 precedes the Battle of Britain which, as posted earlier, thoroughly debunked the concept of unescorted daylight bombing raids. Without that operational lesson, it would require considerable foresight to develop requirements for a dedicated escort fighter. The USAAF had no concept for a long-range escort fighter until operational experience drove them to that solution after the losses sustained in the latter half of 1942 and into mid-1943. Thus to claim that the Air Ministry "should have known it" is applying too much of the retrospectroscope (IMHO).


I hope some of the above shows that I am in agreement with you even if I word it a bit different.

From my perspective, we're just having a thought-provoking exchange of ideas about an interesting topic. It's certainly worth discussing why the RAF had so many different bomber types. Then again, we could say much the same about other air forces. For example, did the Luftwaffe really need the Do17 and He111? Similarly the number of twin-engine medium bombers developed for the USAAF in a relatively short space of time: Hudson, Ventura, Maryland, Boston/Havoc, B-25, B-26 etc etc.
 
Not sure about this. For the most part, army co-op aircraft performed more isolated, independent functions that didn't align well with providing fighter escort. Communications, signal dropping and battlefield visual reconnaissance typically weren't of sufficient priority to justify fighter escort...and that goes for all combatants. Aircraft like the Henschel Hs126 or Fieseler Storch, which had similar roles to the Lysander, certainly didn't fly around with much in the way of fighter escorts.

The thing is that while you wouldn't use fighters to fly escort missions for planes doing most/all of those duties you might (and should?) assign fighter escort when those planes are performing their ground attack/bombing role.

My issue with this statement is that 1939 precedes the Battle of Britain which, as posted earlier, thoroughly debunked the concept of unescorted daylight bombing raids. Without that operational lesson, it would require considerable foresight to develop requirements for a dedicated escort fighter. The USAAF had no concept for a long-range escort fighter until operational experience drove them to that solution after the losses sustained in the latter half of 1942 and into mid-1943. Thus to claim that the Air Ministry "should have known it" is applying too much of the retrospectroscope (IMHO).

It may very well be applying too much of the retrospectroscope, especially as I am trying to point out, unlike the Americans in 1943 in Europe who had two main bomber types that had similar operating envelopes (and kept those operating envelopes for over two years) the British in the pre-war and very early war years had a wide variety of bombers and the mix/performance was in quite a state of flux making our hypothetical escort fighter even harder to write a specification for.


From my perspective, we're just having a thought-provoking exchange of ideas about an interesting topic. It's certainly worth discussing why the RAF had so many different bomber types. Then again, we could say much the same about other air forces. For example, did the Luftwaffe really need the Do17 and He111? Similarly the number of twin-engine medium bombers developed for the USAAF in a relatively short space of time: Hudson, Ventura, Maryland, Boston/Havoc, B-25, B-26 etc etc.

Well, two or even three (Ju 88) German bombers is a far cry from the British collection :)

The US was actually quite simple and the British more complicated than I listed above.

The US ordered for their own use (aside from trainers) only the Boston/Hovac as the A-20, The B-25 and the B-26 at this time.

The Hudson was entirely a British-Lockheed affair starting in 1938, later Hudsons were paid for by the US but supplied (except for small number) under lend lease to the British (and commonwealth).
The Mayland was a French purchase that the British inherited. The Americans had ordered one prototype for test and that concluded the US involvement.
The Baltimore was a stretched/up muscled Maryland that was pretty much all British except for some kept by the Americans for training. I don't believe the Americans ever used them in combat (except coastal patrol?) again early ones were British cash and later ones were lend-lease.

Ventura's were stretched up engined Hudsons and again initial orders were British with the US taking over funding. Early US use was as trainers/ coastal patrol after Pearl Harbor but finally the Navy (and Marines?) got production switched to them in a deal where the navy agreed to give up a Boeing plant slated to make seaplanes for the navy to the army to make B-29s in return for the army agreeing to cancel an agreement limiting the the navy to seaplanes/flying boats for coastal patrol. The Army gave their Lockheed contracts for Venturas to the Navy as part of the deal. first Navy Venturas fly in Nov Dec of 1942.

The USAAF was only interested in the 3 planes listed above. The others were "inherited" or conscripted or funding tricks (lend lease aircraft had to have USAAC or Navy designations and often serial numbers)
 
Okay...now you're being WAY too selective in your selection of USAAF types. If we're going to compare the RAF to the USAAF then let's at least cover the same time period and the same spectrum of types of bombers. If you're brining up aircraft in service in 1935 through to those flying as prototypes in 1939, as well as everything from light bombers thru to heavy bombers, then the USAAF list must be considerably larger. At the very least, we should consider including:
  • B-10 thru B-12 (perhaps a bit early for the time window but it served thru until the end of the 1930s unlike contemporary RAF types)
  • B-15 (arguable since only one was built but it was used for things other than flight tests)
  • B-17
  • B-18 thru B-23
  • B-24
  • B-25
  • B-26
  • A-12
  • A-17
  • A-18
  • A-19
  • A-20
  • A-23
  • A-24
I've excluded from this list a number of types that served later, like the A-25 (Helldiver) and A-28 (Hudson).
 
Not sure the "Lysander" would be considered a bomber? I could toss stuff out of my Supercub too...

The "Bomber always get's through" might be true, at least some of them. Losses be dammed. However the thing not appreciated was the real lack of damage compared to what was expected. Perhaps it was thought a few bombs sprinkled around Berlin or London would cause a clamor for surrender?
 
Not sure the "Lysander" would be considered a bomber? I could toss stuff out of my Supercub too...

The "Bomber always get's through" might be true, at least some of them. Losses be dammed. However the thing not appreciated was the real lack of damage compared to what was expected. Perhaps it was thought a few bombs sprinkled around Berlin or London would cause a clamor for surrender?

Notice the lack of Soviet 'strategic bombers'. This was because the SU wasn't convinced that this 'bombing the civilians' into submission idea would ever work.
 
However the thing not appreciated was the real lack of damage compared to what was expected. Perhaps it was thought a few bombs sprinkled around Berlin or London would cause a clamor for surrender?

Thankfully everyone pulled their punches somewhat and left their mustard, phosgene, tabun, etc. at home.
 
444a446d855bf255185ce2a19b1aee14.jpg


Lysander could carry 8 very little bombs.
 

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