Can we make a slightly smaller Fulmar as an improved carrier fighter?

[Shortround6]

I've seen estimates for the SBD-3 as much as 1,345 miles range. Actual strike range is always much less, but the numbers I see for SBD are about 250 miles with a 1,000 lb bomb or 325 miles with a 500 lb bomb. I think that is what Lundstrom said IIRC

There is a manual for the SBD-3 from 1941, However it seems that they changed the max gross weight after than manual was printed.
The Manual gives fuel capacities for both unprotected tanks and protected tanks. With protected tanks the fuel capacity was as high at 260 US gallons, unprotected was 310 gallons.
Bombloads came out of the fuel allowance which is why they changed the max gross weight.
The 1200hp engines don't show up until SBD-5 and that is over a year after they were putting the same engines in F2A-3s and some Hawk 75s.
The SBD-6 got about the same engine as the FM-2. Maybe they changed magnetos something.

The SBDs got the higher gross weight, it didn't shorten the take-off run with more fuel and the same size bomb.

 

[Admiral Beez]

At Midway the IJN lost 4 carriers to unescorted SBDs.

Yes, that's what I'm referring to. Lack of effective CAP can put your carriers at great risk from unescorted bombers. But I'll say no more on that, and not contribute further to taking us off topic, so will return to the topic at hand, getting a smaller single seat Fulmar.

 

[RCAFson]

Yes, that's what I'm referring to. Lack of effective CAP can put your carriers at great risk from unescorted bombers. But I'll say no more on that, and not contribute further to taking us off topic, so will return to the topic at hand, getting a smaller single seat Fulmar.

The IJN had the A6M2 Zero, so it wasn't performance that prevented interception, but the lack of a perfected (radar) GCI that could be effective given sufficient warning. Ditto for the USN carriers in 1942.
Outright fighter performance isn't the issue here rather the overall capability, organization and combat doctrine of the naval AFs involved.

If we grant the Skua fighter status, then the FAA received a folding wing fighter almost 4 years before anyone else and with the Fulmar, about 18 months before anyone else. The only way to get a lightweight single seat folding wing fighter by 1939/40, would be to order a single seat Skua (7000lb? No SS tanks and minimal armour. ), but performance will suffer in comparison to equivalent land based aircraft. If we omit the folding wing, then the Sea Hurricane 1B could have been supplied from early 1940ish, if someone had arranged for deck landing trials in early 1939 and then pushed for navalization.

A Fulmar II with rear seat and associated gear removed, might get down to ~9000lb and with a Merlin III (16lb boost) would be on a rough par with a 1942 folding wing Martlet II/IV, in terms of speed and climb; better than historical but still down in performance from land based fighters.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If we grant the Skua fighter status, then the FAA received a folding wing fighter almost 4 years before anyone else and with the Fulmar, about 18 months before anyone else.

I don't know when the prewar folding Dewoitine D.373/6 entered service, but I'll take your word for it.

 

[Deadtrooper]

Now we are talking. What kind of superchargers were available for the Taurus? Low alt only? They were used in the (British) Beauforts too. As some of those were re-engined for the Aussies with P&W R-1830, I would assume that also might be an option for the Gloster, which would bump it up to ~1200 hp, plus the possibility of a two speed or even two stage supercharger.

How fast does the F.5/34 go with an extra 260 - 360 hp? It starts at 316 mph with 840 hp. I bet if you had a two speed supercharger and a higher critical altitude that alone would boost the speed by 20 mph or so. But an extra hp ought to boost it into the 340-350 mph range I would guess.

Conservatively c.355mph. Cube the original speed and divide by the original horsepower. Take the sum and divide the cube of your desired speed by it. You'll get a consistent result that is on the conservative side (or someone is lying!). It gives you a good enough ballpark figure; but you'd need something more accurate for actual aeronautical engineering.

 

[Deadtrooper]

Supermarine had a proposal pre-war that would have been built by Fairey. And Supermarine were very busy a) trying to ramp up Spitfire production and b) trying to improve the Spitfire.

Gloster were busy building Hurricanes, then Typhoons, then working on jet powered aircraft.

de Havilland were busy making the Mosquito, in part so they didn't have to build other manufacturer's designs. Also, they were busy making trainers.

Fairey had capacity, that's why the proposed navalised Spitfire would have been built by them. But they preferred to make their own designs.

Richard Fairey came around to the idea as I recall. I'll try and locate the details again.

 

[Deadtrooper]

I don't know when the prewar folding Dewoitine D.373/6 entered service, but I'll take your word for it.

Withdrawn from service a couple of months before the Fulmar's first flight.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The IJN had the A6M2 Zero, so it wasn't performance that prevented interception, but the lack of a perfected (radar) GCI that could be effective given sufficient warning. Ditto for the USN carriers in 1942.
Outright fighter performance isn't the issue here rather but the overall capability, organization and combat doctrine of the naval AFs involved.

It was wave after wave of torpedo bomber attacks, and a lot of bad luck.

If we grant the Skua fighter status, then the FAA received a folding wing fighter almost 4 years before anyone else and with the Fulmar, about 18 months before anyone else. The only way to get a lightweight single seat folding wing fighter by 1939/40, would be to order a single seat Skua (7000lb? No SS tanks and minimal armour. ), but performance will suffer in comparison to equivalent land based aircraft.

Considering where the Skua started that's a pretty steep price to pay...

If we omit the folding wing, then the Sea Hurricane 1B could have been supplied from early 1940ish, if someone had arranged for deck landing trials in early 1939 and then pushed for navalization.

... and considering the dismal record after 1941, and marginal suitability of the Hurricane for carrier service, that's a pretty weak strategy to push

A Fulmar II with rear seat and associated gear removed, might get down to ~9000lb and with a Merlin III (16lb boost) would be on a rough par with a 1942 folding wing Martlet II/IV, in terms of speed and climb; better than historical but still down in performance from land based fighters.

Fulmar II with clipped wings (to the small extent that the ailerons would allow this) would probably help a bit with the speed, though it would still probably make less than 300 mph. HP has a tough time overcoming drag. Look how slow the Barracuda was even with 1640 hp.

 

[Deadtrooper]

I LOVE the Wellesly just for it's sheer ugliness. It competes with the most hideous early to mid 1930s French designs, before their transformation. I have a kit of one I will eventually build... they actually used some in the war in the middle east and east Africa IIRC

It is the Townend Ring that spoils it. Swap it out for an NACA cowling, or similar; that'd do a lot for its looks IMO. I'd build and kit-bash it: I'm a bugger for WIF?s.

 

[Deadtrooper]

So it sounds like at least part of the problem was also at Fairey itself.

I think I've decided. Let's make them build a Gloster F.5/34 with a merlin engine. As a carrier fighter. Start with strait wings then develop folding wings.

Put a Gloster executive on the board to help supervise, in the guise of managing the technology transfer but also holding Fairey's feet to the fire. Sir Charles was getting a bit long in the teeth and was having trouble holding it all together. Also, at least some, if not all of the guys in the commission(s) that created the specs for the Barracuda need to be put into a Crusader tank crew and sent to fight in Second El Alamein.

So let it be written. So let it be done.

Gloster F.5/34 had a one piece wing a la the Zero; don't know how much of a problem that might pose to Glolster; but the Zero never got proper folding wings partly for that reason as I recall. I don't understand this thread, Mogan and Shacklady already pinpointed the problems: Richard Fairey and later Churchill as First Lord. Have someone take Fairey and give him a good shake, have Winston walk under a bus. Navy and nation have much better war. Job jobbed.

 

[Deadtrooper]

The Swordfish and Albacore were good, and ideal for the North Atlantic. I expect the Swordfish sank more submarines than any other single engined aircraft. What the RN needed was more of them. Imagine the Taranto raid not with twenty Swordfish, but sixty. Or Matapan, where a single Swordfish temporarily crippled the battleship Veneto, but with a dozen or more Swordfish. Or, the hunt for Bismarck, with dozens instead of small numbers of aircraft sent to attack her.

But the RN did well with the numbers of TSRs they had. What the FAA desperately needed was a competitive single seat fighter in larger numbers. HMS Illustrious and Formidable were crippled and almost lost when unescorted Italian and German bombers flew through the few and slow Fulmars to bomb the crap out of two two British carriers. It's a testament to their design that the armoured carriers survived at all, Illustrious alone in Jan 1941 was hit by eight 250-or-500-kilogram (550 or 1,100 lb) bombs, plus several critically-damaging near misses, all from unescorted Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers. Per the record, the Fulmars were too slow and too few to stop these attacks. An argument could be made that the Fulmars might have done the CAP job well enough if available in greater number, and maybe so.

But a Seafire type fighter takes up less hangar space, and has the high rate of climb and top speed needed to better react to the carrier's FDO radar alert and scramble call. One of the raids that first hit Illustrious consisted of up to thirty-six unescorted Stukas. Can you imagine the glee during the Battle of Britain if a dozen RAF Spitfires found themselves facing a formation of thirty-six unescorted Stukas? It would be a turkey shoot of epic scale. So, give Illustrious a smaller Fulmar (with the Seafire's performance) or an earlier folding Seafire in sufficient numbers and those Jan 1941 Stukas are not getting through.

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HMS Eagle was supposed to have taken part in Op Judgement but was rendered hor's de combat just previous. It was always intended to be a larger strike; Murphy got in the road.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Considering where the Skua started that's a pretty steep price to pay...

I like the Skua. Imagine if after it was removed from the fleet if four or five squadrons of Skuas were transferred to Ceylon in time to join the Blenheims on their unopposed strike on Nagumo's fleet.

 

[PAT303]

Why not let Joe Smith make the Seafire he wanted to make instead of what they got?.

 

[Admiral Beez]

HMS Eagle was supposed to have taken part in Op Judgement but was rendered hor's de combat just previous. It was always intended to be a larger strike; Murphy got in the road.

My understanding is that HMS Eagle's Swordfish were all transferred to Illustrious for the Taranto strike.

 

[EwenS]

See, I'm having a little trouble understanding why most of the planes had to be scrambled. I've read detailed accounts of some of the convoy fights and the CAP seemed very small. If you have an aircraft with say a 4-5 hour endurance, you can fly CAP, with half of your fighters already up at any one time. Assuming fighter direction is pretty good they ought to be able to intercept these raids and you don't need a 4,000 fpm climb rate to scramble them up. Launching fighters when you detect a raid only 50 miles out or so seems like an act of desperation rather than a plan. No matter how fast they climb it takes a while to launch them.

Go back and read some of the material on the Armoured carriers website.

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

The Royal Navy’s first armoured flight deck aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious had been active a mere six months when her design and construction was put to the ultimate test.

www.armouredcarriers.com

Illustrious had 15 Fulmars aboard, but on the morning of 10 Jan 1941 only 12 were serviceable (not clear if any more became serviceable that morning). They had many radar contacts that morning but these were shadowers. Experience had shown if you could down the shadowers it helped to at least delay the attacks if not prevent them altogether while the enemy located you. So the CAP had been chasing these. One shadower was shot down at 0930. By 1120 there were 5 Fulmars airborne which intercepted and shot down another SM79 shadower. One Fulmar lost its canopy and had to return to Illustrious. So then 4 airborne of now maybe 11 serviceable.

1220 first attack comes in. Radar detected them at 6 miles. Why? Because they were TB coming in low under the radar horizon. Of the 4 Fulmars on CAP, Red section (2 Fulmars) expended their ammo on these (they were due to land at 1245 anyway at the end of their time on CAP). The second pair had also been drawn down low by this attack and had expended some of their ammo attacking enemy aircraft seen parked on the Italian Airfield on Linosa island as they flew across it while giving chase.

1225 second raid detected on radar at 28 miles. This was the first appearance by Fliegerkorps X. 4 airborne Fulmars sent to intercept but had to climb from low level.

Illustrious had 4 Fulmars already on deck scheduled for take off at 1235 as the replacement CAP. 1230 Captain requests fleet change course to launch them (necessary to keep fleet together and protected from air and submarine threats). Delayed until 1234. Additional 2 Fulmars (only 3 available at that point, although one pilot believed 6 others were serviceable at that point) had to be brought up from the hangar to be readied on the flight deck. Then 1 went U/S and only 4 got off before the bombs started falling.

1235 enemy aircraft sighted at 12,000 feet.

1237 last Fulmar leaves the deck. Now 8 airborne, 2 without ammo and reduced to making dummy passes. 6 climbing.

1238 the bombs start falling. The Ju87 had dropped to 7,000ft before beginning their steep dives. Dropping heights 800-1,500ft. Illustrious targeted by 30 Ju87 (others went other ships so splitting the fleet AA defence). This was only 13 minutes from the raid first being detected.

The attack was over in 7 minutes. That attack hit her 6 times including one of the big 1,000kg (2,200lb) bombs.

The Luftwaffe got lucky that day.

1. Illustrious' air warning radar did not prove as effective as it usually did. For an aircraft at 12,000ft the Type 279 should have been capable of detecting the attack at double the range or more. I've never seen any reason why it didn't perform so well that day. But this was still the earliest days of radar and Illustrious was the first carrier fitted with it.
2. The shadower drew the whole CAP down low (a mistake not unique to the RN and one to be repeated in the big carrier battles in the Pacific in 1942 by other navies)
3. The limited airborne CAP available had expended much of its ammo on shadowers and the TB. And given that they were scheduled for replacement around 1235-1245 would have been low on fuel.
4. There were unexplained delays in manoeuvring the fleet to allow launch the 4 extra Fulmars. Not sure if that would have made much difference though.
5. This was still the very earliest days of shipborne fighter control (less than 9 months since it had first been attempted in Ark Royal off Norway). They were still working out how to process radar information into usable plots for the FDO to direct fighters effectively and more importantly quickly. A great deal changed over the following 18 months or so.

 

[EwenS]

HMS Eagle's Swordfish were all transferred to Illustrious for the Taranto strike. That's how they got to twenty one Swordfish.

Not all. Only 6 Swordfish (of about 18 on Eagle) were transferred along with 8 crews. Two Sea Gladiators were also transferred.

The plan, after Eagle dropped out, called for two waves of 12 aircraft. The size of each wave was limited by the available deck run for Swordfish heavy with torpedoes and the extra fuel tank in the observer's cockpit. (Illustrious' long round-down causing the limitation).

When Illustrious departed on Operation Judgement she had 18 of her own Swordfish plus 6 from Eagle. Total 24. 3 were then lost while carrying out anti-submarine patrols on 10 Nov (water in the petrol was suspected). So 21 were available on the night.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Why not let Joe Smith make the Seafire he wanted to make instead of what they got?.

Tell us more, what did Smith propose? Who's responsible for the Seafang, Attacker and Scimitar? None of these three are the FAA's finest hour.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Go back and read some of the material on the Armoured carriers website.

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

The Royal Navy’s first armoured flight deck aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious had been active a mere six months when her design and construction was put to the ultimate test.

www.armouredcarriers.com

Illustrious had 15 Fulmars aboard, but on the morning of 10 Jan 1941 only 12 were serviceable (not clear if any more became serviceable that morning). They had many radar contacts that morning but these were shadowers. Experience had shown if you could down the shadowers it helped to at least delay the attacks if not prevent them altogether while the enemy located you. So the CAP had been chasing these. One shadower was shot down at 0930. By 1120 there were 5 Fulmars airborne which intercepted and shot down another SM79 shadower. One Fulmar lost its canopy and had to return to Illustrious. So then 4 airborne of now maybe 11 serviceable.

1220 first attack comes in. Radar detected them at 6 miles. Why? Because they were TB coming in low under the radar horizon. Of the 4 Fulmars on CAP, Red section (2 Fulmars) expended their ammo on these (they were due to land at 1245 anyway at the end of their time on CAP). The second pair had also been drawn down low by this attack and had expended some of their ammo attacking enemy aircraft seen parked on the Italian Airfield on Linosa island as they flew across it while giving chase.

1225 second raid detected on radar at 28 miles. This was the first appearance by Fliegerkorps X. 4 airborne Fulmars sent to intercept but had to climb from low level.

Illustrious had 4 Fulmars already on deck scheduled for take off at 1235 as the replacement CAP. 1230 Captain requests fleet change course to launch them (necessary to keep fleet together and protected from air and submarine threats). Delayed until 1234. Additional 2 Fulmars (only 3 available at that point, although one pilot believed 6 others were serviceable at that point) had to be brought up from the hangar to be readied on the flight deck. Then 1 went U/S and only 4 got off before the bombs started falling.

1235 enemy aircraft sighted at 12,000 feet.

1237 last Fulmar leaves the deck. Now 8 airborne, 2 without ammo and reduced to making dummy passes. 6 climbing.

1238 the bombs start falling. The Ju87 had dropped to 7,000ft before beginning their steep dives. Dropping heights 800-1,500ft. Illustrious targeted by 30 Ju87 (others went other ships so splitting the fleet AA defence). This was only 13 minutes from the raid first being detected.

The attack was over in 7 minutes. That attack hit her 6 times including one of the big 1,000kg (2,200lb) bombs.

The Luftwaffe got lucky that day.

1. Illustrious' air warning radar did not prove as effective as it usually did. For an aircraft at 12,000ft the Type 279 should have been capable of detecting the attack at double the range or more. I've never seen any reason why it didn't perform so well that day. But this was still the earliest days of radar and Illustrious was the first carrier fitted with it.
2. The shadower drew the whole CAP down low (a mistake not unique to the RN and one to be repeated in the big carrier battles in the Pacific in 1942 by other navies)
3. The limited airborne CAP available had expended much of its ammo on shadowers and the TB. And given that they were scheduled for replacement around 1235-1245 would have been low on fuel.
4. There were unexplained delays in manoeuvring the fleet to allow launch the 4 extra Fulmars. Not sure if that would have made much difference though.
5. This was still the very earliest days of shipborne fighter control (less than 9 months since it had first been attempted in Ark Royal off Norway). They were still working out how to process radar information into usable plots for the FDO to direct fighters effectively and more importantly quickly. A great deal changed over the following 18 months or so.

It would seem for convoy patrol duty you would want almost all fighters, and just a few Swordfish for ASW. 15 planes seems like a very small number. Cap of 4 when sailing into such a dire threat seems insanely low. I agree catching the shadowers is a good idea but not at the expense of literally all of your overhead cover chasing them... especially when arriving 100 miles from the German bases.

 

[EwenS]

It would seem for convoy patrol duty you would want almost all fighters, and just a few Swordfish for ASW. 15 planes seems like a very small number. Cap of 4 when sailing into such a dire threat seems insanely low. I agree catching the shadowers is a good idea but not at the expense of literally all of your overhead cover chasing them... especially when arriving 100 miles from the German bases.

Between June 1940 & May 1941 the RN fought aggressively in the Med taking the fight to the Axis at every opportunity. The passage of convoys was used as a reason for both Force H and the Med Fleet to go out and hit the enemy throughout the Med & Aegean Seas. And a decent sized torpedo carrying Swordfish force was required in case the Italian Fleet came out to play as well as providing ASW protection to the fleet.

Illustrious' air group at the time was 18 Swordfish & 15 Fulmars. Dictated by the hangar capacity as we have discussed many times. That morning she had about 9 Swordfish airborne both for ASW cover and as part of a search for the enemy. Add to that that Fulmars were in short supply having only entered squadron service around June 1940.

For one so critical of the RN would the USN have done any better? At this time a US carrier would only have had a single squadron of 18 of something. That something would be culled from amongst the following:-

F3F biplanes,
F2A-1 Buffalo (10 on Saratoga only)
F2A-2 deliveries of a total of 43 began in Sept 1940
(F2A-3 not ordered until Jan 1941 with deliveries July-Dec) and
F4F-3 (only 22 delivered by end of Dec 1940 for squadrons in Wasp & Ranger)
And none of your favourite SBD to use as fighters.

And only Yorktown got a CXAM radar set in 1940 (1 of 6 installed in USN ships that year. It was late 1941 before the other carriers began to receive their radars)

Edit:- I'd recommend the following book to you to read up on FAA ops in the Med.

Taranto: And Naval Air Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945 eBook : Hobbs, David: Amazon.co.uk: Books

Taranto: And Naval Air Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945 eBook : Hobbs, David: Amazon.co.uk: Books

www.amazon.co.uk

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Between June 1940 & May 1941 the RN fought aggressively in the Med taking the fight to the Axis at every opportunity. The passage of convoys was used as a reason for both Force H and the Med Fleet to go out and hit the enemy throughout the Med & Aegean Seas. And a decent sized torpedo carrying Swordfish force was required in case the Italian Fleet came out to play as well as providing ASW protection to the fleet.

Illustrious' air group at the time was 18 Swordfish & 15 Fulmars. Dictated by the hangar capacity as we have discussed many times. That morning she had about 9 Swordfish airborne both for ASW cover and as part of a search for the enemy. Add to that that Fulmars were in short supply having only entered squadron service around June 1940.

If I had the limited capacity that those carriers had, I would have loaded 25 Fulmars and 6 or 8 Swordfish (however many would fit.

For one so critical of the RN would the USN have done any better? At this time a US carrier would only have had a single squadron of 18 of something. That something would be culled from amongst the following:-

F3F biplanes,
F2A-1 Buffalo (10 on Saratoga only)
F2A-2 deliveries of a total of 43 began in Sept 1940
(F2A-3 not ordered until Jan 1941 with deliveries July-Dec) and
F4F-3 (only 22 delivered by end of Dec 1940 for squadrons in Wasp & Ranger)
And none of your favourite SBD to use as fighters.

And only Yorktown got a CXAM radar set in 1940 (1 of 6 installed in USN ships that year. It was late 1941 before the other carriers began to receive their radars)

I actually would rather have this mix of planes than what Illustrious was carrying (especially considering the US carriers could carry more planes) but I don't know if the USN would have done better as training and general preparation for the US forces in 1940-1941 was not very good.

Not sure the reason for the snark, but I also, for the record and to be clear, do not recommend the use of the SBD as a fighter. I think it made a good strike aircraft and a scout, and it could probably shoot down a Ju 87 in a pinch (better chances than a Swordfish, anyway), but you'd be much better off using the fighters for that. I do think F2A is much better as a fighter than a Fulmar, let alone an F4F-3 which would have been a huge improvement.

I would also say that by 1942, when Pedastal was similarly clobbered, a US fleet would have done better, becuase they would have had many more and more effective fighters, and more and better AAA. Sorry if that is irritating to some.

Let me just add, that the whole premise of this thread was the notion that Fulmar, and by extension, Fleet Air Arm aircraft were somewhat lacking and could have been improved upon. This does put is near the notion that the Royal Navy made some mistakes. For the record, let me be clear and acknowledge that the US Navy also made some extremely dire mistakes, including in procurement and weapons production. Does that help any?

Edit:- I'd recommend the following book to you to read up on FAA ops in the Med.

Taranto: And Naval Air Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945 eBook : Hobbs, David: Amazon.co.uk: Books

Taranto: And Naval Air Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945 eBook : Hobbs, David: Amazon.co.uk: Books

www.amazon.co.uk

Thanks, I'll check it out.