Can we make a slightly smaller Fulmar as an improved carrier fighter?

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I've seen estimates for the SBD-3 as much as 1,345 miles range. Actual strike range is always much less, but the numbers I see for SBD are about 250 miles with a 1,000 lb bomb or 325 miles with a 500 lb bomb. I think that is what Lundstrom said IIRC
There is a manual for the SBD-3 from 1941, However it seems that they changed the max gross weight after than manual was printed.
The Manual gives fuel capacities for both unprotected tanks and protected tanks. With protected tanks the fuel capacity was as high at 260 US gallons, unprotected was 310 gallons.
Bombloads came out of the fuel allowance which is why they changed the max gross weight.
The 1200hp engines don't show up until SBD-5 and that is over a year after they were putting the same engines in F2A-3s and some Hawk 75s.
The SBD-6 got about the same engine as the FM-2. Maybe they changed magnetos something.

The SBDs got the higher gross weight, it didn't shorten the take-off run with more fuel and the same size bomb.
 
At Midway the IJN lost 4 carriers to unescorted SBDs.
Yes, that's what I'm referring to. Lack of effective CAP can put your carriers at great risk from unescorted bombers. But I'll say no more on that, and not contribute further to taking us off topic, so will return to the topic at hand, getting a smaller single seat Fulmar.
 
The IJN had the A6M2 Zero, so it wasn't performance that prevented interception, but the lack of a perfected (radar) GCI that could be effective given sufficient warning. Ditto for the USN carriers in 1942.
Outright fighter performance isn't the issue here rather the overall capability, organization and combat doctrine of the naval AFs involved.

If we grant the Skua fighter status, then the FAA received a folding wing fighter almost 4 years before anyone else and with the Fulmar, about 18 months before anyone else. The only way to get a lightweight single seat folding wing fighter by 1939/40, would be to order a single seat Skua (7000lb? No SS tanks and minimal armour. ), but performance will suffer in comparison to equivalent land based aircraft. If we omit the folding wing, then the Sea Hurricane 1B could have been supplied from early 1940ish, if someone had arranged for deck landing trials in early 1939 and then pushed for navalization.

A Fulmar II with rear seat and associated gear removed, might get down to ~9000lb and with a Merlin III (16lb boost) would be on a rough par with a 1942 folding wing Martlet II/IV, in terms of speed and climb; better than historical but still down in performance from land based fighters.
 
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Conservatively c.355mph. Cube the original speed and divide by the original horsepower. Take the sum and divide the cube of your desired speed by it. You'll get a consistent result that is on the conservative side (or someone is lying!). It gives you a good enough ballpark figure; but you'd need something more accurate for actual aeronautical engineering.
 
Richard Fairey came around to the idea as I recall. I'll try and locate the details again.
 

It was wave after wave of torpedo bomber attacks, and a lot of bad luck.


Considering where the Skua started that's a pretty steep price to pay...

If we omit the folding wing, then the Sea Hurricane 1B could have been supplied from early 1940ish, if someone had arranged for deck landing trials in early 1939 and then pushed for navalization.

... and considering the dismal record after 1941, and marginal suitability of the Hurricane for carrier service, that's a pretty weak strategy to push


Fulmar II with clipped wings (to the small extent that the ailerons would allow this) would probably help a bit with the speed, though it would still probably make less than 300 mph. HP has a tough time overcoming drag. Look how slow the Barracuda was even with 1640 hp.
 
It is the Townend Ring that spoils it. Swap it out for an NACA cowling, or similar; that'd do a lot for its looks IMO. I'd build and kit-bash it: I'm a bugger for WIF?s.
 
Gloster F.5/34 had a one piece wing a la the Zero; don't know how much of a problem that might pose to Glolster; but the Zero never got proper folding wings partly for that reason as I recall. I don't understand this thread, Mogan and Shacklady already pinpointed the problems: Richard Fairey and later Churchill as First Lord. Have someone take Fairey and give him a good shake, have Winston walk under a bus. Navy and nation have much better war. Job jobbed.
 
HMS Eagle was supposed to have taken part in Op Judgement but was rendered hor's de combat just previous. It was always intended to be a larger strike; Murphy got in the road.
 
Go back and read some of the material on the Armoured carriers website.


Illustrious had 15 Fulmars aboard, but on the morning of 10 Jan 1941 only 12 were serviceable (not clear if any more became serviceable that morning). They had many radar contacts that morning but these were shadowers. Experience had shown if you could down the shadowers it helped to at least delay the attacks if not prevent them altogether while the enemy located you. So the CAP had been chasing these. One shadower was shot down at 0930. By 1120 there were 5 Fulmars airborne which intercepted and shot down another SM79 shadower. One Fulmar lost its canopy and had to return to Illustrious. So then 4 airborne of now maybe 11 serviceable.

1220 first attack comes in. Radar detected them at 6 miles. Why? Because they were TB coming in low under the radar horizon. Of the 4 Fulmars on CAP, Red section (2 Fulmars) expended their ammo on these (they were due to land at 1245 anyway at the end of their time on CAP). The second pair had also been drawn down low by this attack and had expended some of their ammo attacking enemy aircraft seen parked on the Italian Airfield on Linosa island as they flew across it while giving chase.

1225 second raid detected on radar at 28 miles. This was the first appearance by Fliegerkorps X. 4 airborne Fulmars sent to intercept but had to climb from low level.

Illustrious had 4 Fulmars already on deck scheduled for take off at 1235 as the replacement CAP. 1230 Captain requests fleet change course to launch them (necessary to keep fleet together and protected from air and submarine threats). Delayed until 1234. Additional 2 Fulmars (only 3 available at that point, although one pilot believed 6 others were serviceable at that point) had to be brought up from the hangar to be readied on the flight deck. Then 1 went U/S and only 4 got off before the bombs started falling.

1235 enemy aircraft sighted at 12,000 feet.

1237 last Fulmar leaves the deck. Now 8 airborne, 2 without ammo and reduced to making dummy passes. 6 climbing.

1238 the bombs start falling. The Ju87 had dropped to 7,000ft before beginning their steep dives. Dropping heights 800-1,500ft. Illustrious targeted by 30 Ju87 (others went other ships so splitting the fleet AA defence). This was only 13 minutes from the raid first being detected.

The attack was over in 7 minutes. That attack hit her 6 times including one of the big 1,000kg (2,200lb) bombs.

The Luftwaffe got lucky that day.

1. Illustrious' air warning radar did not prove as effective as it usually did. For an aircraft at 12,000ft the Type 279 should have been capable of detecting the attack at double the range or more. I've never seen any reason why it didn't perform so well that day. But this was still the earliest days of radar and Illustrious was the first carrier fitted with it.
2. The shadower drew the whole CAP down low (a mistake not unique to the RN and one to be repeated in the big carrier battles in the Pacific in 1942 by other navies)
3. The limited airborne CAP available had expended much of its ammo on shadowers and the TB. And given that they were scheduled for replacement around 1235-1245 would have been low on fuel.
4. There were unexplained delays in manoeuvring the fleet to allow launch the 4 extra Fulmars. Not sure if that would have made much difference though.
5. This was still the very earliest days of shipborne fighter control (less than 9 months since it had first been attempted in Ark Royal off Norway). They were still working out how to process radar information into usable plots for the FDO to direct fighters effectively and more importantly quickly. A great deal changed over the following 18 months or so.
 
HMS Eagle's Swordfish were all transferred to Illustrious for the Taranto strike. That's how they got to twenty one Swordfish.
Not all. Only 6 Swordfish (of about 18 on Eagle) were transferred along with 8 crews. Two Sea Gladiators were also transferred.

The plan, after Eagle dropped out, called for two waves of 12 aircraft. The size of each wave was limited by the available deck run for Swordfish heavy with torpedoes and the extra fuel tank in the observer's cockpit. (Illustrious' long round-down causing the limitation).

When Illustrious departed on Operation Judgement she had 18 of her own Swordfish plus 6 from Eagle. Total 24. 3 were then lost while carrying out anti-submarine patrols on 10 Nov (water in the petrol was suspected). So 21 were available on the night.
 

It would seem for convoy patrol duty you would want almost all fighters, and just a few Swordfish for ASW. 15 planes seems like a very small number. Cap of 4 when sailing into such a dire threat seems insanely low. I agree catching the shadowers is a good idea but not at the expense of literally all of your overhead cover chasing them... especially when arriving 100 miles from the German bases.
 
Between June 1940 & May 1941 the RN fought aggressively in the Med taking the fight to the Axis at every opportunity. The passage of convoys was used as a reason for both Force H and the Med Fleet to go out and hit the enemy throughout the Med & Aegean Seas. And a decent sized torpedo carrying Swordfish force was required in case the Italian Fleet came out to play as well as providing ASW protection to the fleet.

Illustrious' air group at the time was 18 Swordfish & 15 Fulmars. Dictated by the hangar capacity as we have discussed many times. That morning she had about 9 Swordfish airborne both for ASW cover and as part of a search for the enemy. Add to that that Fulmars were in short supply having only entered squadron service around June 1940.

For one so critical of the RN would the USN have done any better? At this time a US carrier would only have had a single squadron of 18 of something. That something would be culled from amongst the following:-

F3F biplanes,
F2A-1 Buffalo (10 on Saratoga only)
F2A-2 deliveries of a total of 43 began in Sept 1940
(F2A-3 not ordered until Jan 1941 with deliveries July-Dec) and
F4F-3 (only 22 delivered by end of Dec 1940 for squadrons in Wasp & Ranger)
And none of your favourite SBD to use as fighters.

And only Yorktown got a CXAM radar set in 1940 (1 of 6 installed in USN ships that year. It was late 1941 before the other carriers began to receive their radars)

Edit:- I'd recommend the following book to you to read up on FAA ops in the Med.
 
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If I had the limited capacity that those carriers had, I would have loaded 25 Fulmars and 6 or 8 Swordfish (however many would fit.


I actually would rather have this mix of planes than what Illustrious was carrying (especially considering the US carriers could carry more planes) but I don't know if the USN would have done better as training and general preparation for the US forces in 1940-1941 was not very good.

Not sure the reason for the snark, but I also, for the record and to be clear, do not recommend the use of the SBD as a fighter. I think it made a good strike aircraft and a scout, and it could probably shoot down a Ju 87 in a pinch (better chances than a Swordfish, anyway), but you'd be much better off using the fighters for that. I do think F2A is much better as a fighter than a Fulmar, let alone an F4F-3 which would have been a huge improvement.

I would also say that by 1942, when Pedastal was similarly clobbered, a US fleet would have done better, becuase they would have had many more and more effective fighters, and more and better AAA. Sorry if that is irritating to some.

Let me just add, that the whole premise of this thread was the notion that Fulmar, and by extension, Fleet Air Arm aircraft were somewhat lacking and could have been improved upon. This does put is near the notion that the Royal Navy made some mistakes. For the record, let me be clear and acknowledge that the US Navy also made some extremely dire mistakes, including in procurement and weapons production. Does that help any?


Thanks, I'll check it out.
 
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