Convoys?

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steve , i think he means shipping in peacetime. Ships forced to use convoy are much safer, but there is an innefficiency in cargo handling capacity relative to independant sailing.

That is certainly the case.

Cheers

Steve
 
Was there any politics involved in the blackout or lack of it. That is was there a feeling of not wanting to bring the war home to the USA eastern coast?
 
The thing with convoys is that Britain had experience with them during WW1 and they proved a valuable means of tansporting goods from the US to Great Britain, which from the end of Jan 1917 was subject to unrestricted submarine warfare from the Germans. Initially British merchant ship losses were high because of their lack of convoys and it took Lloyd George, the Prime Minister to intervene as the Admiralty, specifically Jellicoe refused to adopt convoys as he believed they were a waste of resources in terms of the use of escort vessels, which he believed could be put to better use.

George, with his "I'm the Prime Minister" name badge on, stormed into the Admiralty one day and demanded that the Lords should adopt convoying. Thus, they did and merchant ship losses dropped considerably afterwards. It's probably the greatest single gift to the war effort that Lloyd George gave the British - apart from attempting to get rid of Haig.
 
There were a number of reasons that the American naval high command did not adopt convoying to the degree they needed. It is true there was a shortage of escorts, but that was partly due to the USNs insistence on prosecuting Blue water strategies, in both hemispheres. At a time when the war may well have been lost in the Atlantic, because convoys were not formed, ostensibly because there was a shortage of escorts, the USN was prancing about in the Pacific getting nowhere and soaking enormous proportions of their precious escort fleets.

Why would they do that? The reason is that, like the Japanese they had been brought up on an unhealthy Mahanist doctrine of seeking the decisive naval battle. thats what the rainbow plans were all about. The decisive battle however, was no longer fought on a single day, midway notwithstanding. it was fought out as a series of smaller battles fought over a wide ranging field of battle and encompassing many smaller battles. this was what the tonnage war was all about. CDonvoys, among many other things are targets, to attract an enemy to a known point. It allows ones own forces to fight a battle around that fixed point and hopefully win. it doesnt always work that way, of course, and for Convoys there is a wider, more important imperative....getting the convoy through.

In the Pacific, the decisive carrier battles did put a different slant on this. they were indeed decisive battles, but none of them, except perhaps phil sea were actually able to claim the total defeat of Japan. Japans sword was not shattered at midway, more it was ground down in the relentless slogging match that was guadacanal and the Owen Stanleys These campaigns were the ones that tore the heart out Japans war making capabilities.

but I digress. King was merely doing as he was trained when he resisted implementing convoys. King hasd been trained not to deviate from the massing of all available resources to fight a decisive Jutland style battle. He saw convoys as a defensive distraction and the calls to protect American shipping as having something to do with the scheming British, whom he detested. Despite having seen first hand the U-Boat menaces in 1917, he simply chose to ignore that bitter lesson, and stick to the idea of seeking a decisive battle with the enemy fleet
 

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