Could the Allies defeat Germany only with air power?

[Balljoint]

There were a lot whose asses were in as deep into these human rights atrocities as Hitler's was, Balljoint. I could be being naive but it just stands to reason to me that there were a lot more than just Hitler who knew it was too late for them to turn back. That I'd think hindered the efforts of these conspirators probably the most.

Nazis and SS had a lot to answer for. But still most walked even after Germany was unconditionally defeated. Query; would they have done even better if they would have negotiated, for instance, a withdrawal to Germany's after Hitler's demise? After all, it had happened under Hitler's orders. And the Crimes Against Humanity theory was a bit ex post facto and in the future.

There's some evidence that Himmler was losing faith in the cause. An English bishop was approached by Germans during May, 1942 in Stockholm with assurances of increasing doubts about Hitler. A plot involving the overthrow of Hitler by the SS and, in turn, the overthrow of the SS by the army was reported. The Brits didn't bite because of concern about the Nazis keeping power and loot. However, Stalin was both bleeding and feeling abandoned during this period. If he could be turned in a separate peace, the sans-Hitler German "reform" government would be in a strong bargaining position for, say, withdrawal to old borders and inspected reforms. On balance, this would have saved lives both on the battlefield and in the death camps. And maybe round three in another twenty years.

I'm not advocating this. But the pieces were in place so that it could have played out so had Hitler been taken out.

 

[VBF-13]

Our good ally, Stalin, murdered more than Hitler. How could I forget that? I hear you, now. Good insights into this.

 

[parsifal]

There's a bit of a wild card in the Hitler assignation possibility. The Casablanca understanding was Roosevelt's idea with Churchill going along with reservations. The objective was to bind Stalin to the effort in view of efforts by Japan and Italy to broker a separate peace between the Soviets and Germany.

This I find very hard to believe. I agree that the initial concept was suggested by Rossevelt, but given that Casablanca was a conference in which the british almost totally dominated the discussions, and came away with virtually everything they were looking for, and Churchill had always strongly advocated the principal of "no surrendder, no negotiation" it seems very unlikely that the british were reluctant to the concept

Chapter I: Casablanca -- Beginning of an Era: January 1943

While the unconditional surrender ultimatum did consolidate internal support for Hitler, the generals on the Russian front continued their assignation efforts. General von Tresckow widely and successfully recruited officer support, including Kluge -who didn't participate but neither did he report the plotting. By the end of 1943 six serious attempts on Hitler's life were made, including the wine bomb on his plane that failed when the detonator exploded but the plastic explosive failed to follow on.

Most of the Germans officers didnt believe the Casaablanca ultiatum was serious. They believed that with Hitler gone, the western allies would join them in a crusade in the East. They didnt seem to realize that it was they, not Hitler, not the Russians, it was the germans themselves that were the enemy.

Getting on to my take on this, the generals recognized that the war was lost and were concerned about protecting Germany. Hitler likewise recognized that the war was lost and wanted to take Germany down with him, which he largely did though not to the extent ordered since his order were ignored.

In 1943 hitler had had the stuffing knocked out him at Stalingrad and Alamein/North Africa, but he and most generals were far from defeatist. People like Guderiann believed that with proper rebuilding the German Army could bounce back and defeat the Russians, and after that, the western allies. Consistently the German intelligence services predicted the Russians were at the end of their manpower tethers. After Kursk, the Germans consoled themselves that would be able to wear down the Russians by onesided attrition. they were also caught short a little, because they mis-judged the Russian capabilities (the Russians began attacking, and kept attacking summer or winter). unlike the German offensives, that had been punctuated by ling breaks during the winter, the Russians never let up on the Germans after Kursk. This caught the Germans a littler by surpise, and wore down their reserves at an unsustainable rate. They were never able to recover after Kursk, never allowed to.

Hitler also deluded himself, and a lot of other people that his new terror weapons would turn the corner for the Axis. The new technologies....Type XXI tanks, Me 262s, V1s, V2s, you name it were supposed to get back the initiative and halt the offensives against Germany. They did nothing of the sort, but that was not known in 1943....

Had the assignation been successful, the army would still have to deal with entrenched Nazis and the SS divisions, though there was an approach during 1942 that suggested even these groups were onboard. However, during 1943 a separate peace would have been attractive to Stalin as he would gain most of Eastern Europe, Casablanca be damned. Having split the allies, Germany would be in a rather strong position to treaty for Western Europe.

What is the basis of assuming that Stalin was amenable to a separate peace. There had been some talk of a separate peace immiediately after Stalingrad. After Kursk, no such feelers were ever put out. Stalin could be trusted to the extent that he was a barbarian driven by base emotion. His primary emotion after june 1941 was revenge. you could rely on that. Later, as victory became more certain, you can add greed to revenge. He wanted the control of Eastern Europe and meant to have it. This was a centuries old Russian objective.....


The peace feelers that were put out after Stalingrad were very low level, and really not intended to come to anything. The Russians made it very clear that they wanted full control of the Balkans and Poland to the dfemarcation line. this would have completely imasculated the Germans, as they would have to give up Rumanian oil. It simply was never going to happen, and Stalin knew it.

Getting rid of Hitler would have solved nothing. it simply would have made the germans more isolated, after they realized they faced total defeat with or without him.

 

[Jenisch]

Most of the Germans officers didnt believe the Casaablanca ultiatum was serious. They believed that with Hitler gone, the western allies would join them in a crusade in the East.

Parfisal, I'm not so certain of this. War was declared on Hitler just as he started the expansion to the East. The West just wanted the Russians as out as possible, as well as any German nation with agressive capability.

In 1943 hitler had had the stuffing knocked out him at Stalingrad and Alamein/North Africa, but he and most generals were far from defeatist. People like Guderiann believed that with proper rebuilding the German Army could bounce back and defeat the Russians, and after that, the western allies. Consistently the German intelligence services predicted the Russians were at the end of their manpower tethers. After Kursk, the Germans consoled themselves that would be able to wear down the Russians by onesided attrition. they were also caught short a little, because they mis-judged the Russian capabilities (the Russians began attacking, and kept attacking summer or winter). unlike the German offensives, that had been punctuated by ling breaks during the winter, the Russians never let up on the Germans after Kursk. This caught the Germans a littler by surpise, and wore down their reserves at an unsustainable rate. They were never able to recover after Kursk, never allowed to.

Indeed, this is an interesting point. The air and sea wars were a question of attrition, but the land battles could be different.

As for Germany being occupied with or without Hitler if continued to fight, I agree. Personally, I think that in determined situations, it's a good idea to let the leadership of a government genocide as the Nazi one went to exile if civilians and the freedom of nations can be saved by doing this. I don't know if the Nazis would accept this, but if a regime change could have occured in Germany in 1944, and Germany surrendered to the West, it would be interesting in humitarian grounds, saving millions of people from the death. The West then perhaps could have helped the WM to secure that the Russians would not grab Poland. In this case, the idea of the Anglo-Americans and Germans fighting the Russians has sense.

 

[tyrodtom]

There might be some western allied generals that would want to take a German surrender only in the west, ( Patton, for one ) and then take the Wehrmacht as allies. But they weren't in charge.
They'd probably find themselves behind bars before the sun set, if they started along that path.

Unconditional surrender meant exactly that, NO favors, or prearranged understandings with the surrendering power. That means you surrender to us, and we'll make ALL the decisions, and you'll obey.

 

[altsym]

Ludwig Beck became a major leader within the conspiracy against Hitler, and would have been provisional head of state had the 20 July plot succeeded. Hitler's death was nessessary to free German soldiers from their oath of loyalty to him, then there would have been a negotiated peace with the Allies. I'm 100% positive the West would have accepted a conditional surrender of Germany. The problem was the Beast in the East, who would have had none of that. At least that's my understanding.

 

[fastmongrel]

After what happened with Versailles and the consequences of the treaty I cannot see anyone in Britain or the French government in exile allowing any conditonal agreement. Why should they, both wanted the problem with Germany sorted once and for all. 3 times in a lifetime German boots were on French soil no one wanted to make it 4.

 

[Tante Ju]

3 times in a lifetime German boots were on French soil no one wanted to make it 4.

One good way of achieving that would be (a) not declaring war on Germany (two times, 1870, 1939), and (b) stopping scheming for nearly half a century (1870-1914) for revanche to make "right" for the last time you declared war on them but it did not end very well for ya at all. The best way of avoiding getting beaten to pulp regularly in bar fights is not going into bars and picking fights with stronger guys in the first place.

 

[Balljoint]

This I find very hard to believe. I agree that the initial concept was suggested by Rossevelt, but given that Casablanca was a conference in which the british almost totally dominated the discussions, and came away with virtually everything they were looking for, and Churchill had always strongly advocated the principal of "no surrendder, no negotiation" it seems very unlikely that the british were reluctant to the concept

My source is TOTAL WAR, a 1972 scholarly work by Calvocoressi and Wint. In the chapter titled Hitler's German Enemies, they write,
"In January 1943 at Casablanca Roosevelt suggested and Churchill hesitantly agreed that they should declare that the only acceptable conclusion of the war was the unconditional surrender of Germany… The most t pressing aim of the declaration was to hold the Grand Alliance together at a time when Stalin was disappointed and angry and both Japan and Italy were working for a separate peace between Germany and USSR…" The concept is attributed to the US State Department.

Most of the Germans officers didnt believe the Casaablanca ultiatum was serious. They believed that with Hitler gone, the western allies would join them in a crusade in the East. They didnt seem to realize that it was they, not Hitler, not the Russians, it was the germans themselves that were the enemy.

"The declaration on unconditional surrender ... may nonetheless done something to consolidate German opinion and discourage hitler's enemies at home." Ibid

In 1943 hitler had had the stuffing knocked out him at Stalingrad and Alamein/North Africa, but he and most generals were far from defeatist. People like Guderiann believed that with proper rebuilding the German Army could bounce back and defeat the Russians, and after that, the western allies. Consistently the German intelligence services predicted the Russians were at the end of their manpower tethers. After Kursk, the Germans consoled themselves that would be able to wear down the Russians by onesided attrition. they were also caught short a little, because they mis-judged the Russian capabilities (the Russians began attacking, and kept attacking summer or winter). unlike the German offensives, that had been punctuated by ling breaks during the winter, the Russians never let up on the Germans after Kursk. This caught the Germans a littler by surpise, and wore down their reserves at an unsustainable rate. They were never able to recover after Kursk, never allowed to.

My take on this is rather mine alone. After Stalingrad, Hitler celebrated the efforts of the Sixth Army and raged at Paulus' surrender rather than the suicide expected of a Field Marshall. Focus on the "honor" of the matter rather than the catastrophic loss of resources suggests to me a shift to the twisted concept of an "honorable defeat" rather than the expectation of victory. This was reinforced by Hitler's refusal to cancel the Kursk attack despite being told that it would fail by several knowledgeable officers including Guderiann. Hitler was openly defeatist in his position that the operation was too far alone to cancel. At war's end, Hitler clearly attempted to destroy Germany –when did this start?

Again, this is my subjective opinion –take it for what it's worth.