Could the FAA have been better prepared for WW2?

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Admiral Beez

Captain
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Oct 21, 2019
Toronto, Canada
I've moved this over from the best dive bomber thread because I both hate an OT thread jacking and the topic is interesting itself. I'm not positing this as a What'If, but more a discussion of given the will, what was feasible under the economic, industrial and political circumstances of the time.
The FAA was fighting a very hot war from Sept 1939 when the IJNAF was able to expand under near peacetime conditions until Dec 1941.
The FAA also had an opportunity to expand under near peacetime conditions, theirs was the rearmament period 1936-1939, or beforehand. On top of the old and small HMS Argus from 1918, the RN commissioned five carriers between 1924 and 1930.... that should have been the beginning of a period of significant FAA expansion. Why build a fleet of carriers without any means to ensure each has their complete CAG, along with a scalable pipeline of replacement aircraft, aircrew and maintenance personnel?

As for the later pre-war period, the Japanese get criticized for not having adequate aircraft and flight crew replacement pipelines, but the British were just as bad or worse. Why lay down five new fleet carriers between 1935 and 1937 giving you eleven CVs, but neglect the aircraft and personnel pipeline?

HMS Glorious should have 36 Swordfish onboard, not six when she met Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. And if they had a naval aviation focus, the RN would have aviators as their carrier C/Os, not submariners. They had the aircraft carriers, but I'd argue that the RN could have entered WW2 with a much more prepared carrier force.
 
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The IJN picked the time and date to enter the war which was a luxury that the FAA didn't have. Remember also that the RN didn't gain complete control of the FAA until 1939, which meant a reliance on RAF aircrew training. However, the FAA had expansion plans to fill the new carriers with aircraft and aircrew.

Glorious also had two fighter squadrons onboard, including a squadron of fixed wing Hurricanes.
 
Glorious also had two fighter squadrons onboard, including a squadron of fixed wing Hurricanes.
We can't count the RAF Hurricanes and Gladiators that were ferried on Glorious after fleeing Norway (and landing without hooks, a first for the Hurricane).

HMS Glorious had six Swordfish (five operational) and nine Sea Gladiators, for a total of 15 aircraft, or less than 1/3 of her specified CAG. Imagine sending a KGV class battleship to sea with only one of her three turrets operational. Though to be fair the intent was a ferry mission so perhaps Glorious would have normally had a larger CAG onboard. Of course it wouldn't matter if HMS Glorious has her full CAG of 48 aircraft if her ex-submariner captain doesn't deploy any.
 
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Yes the FAA could have been better prepared but the money has to come from somewhere else in the budget. You have to decide what goes short of money and manpower.
My vote is cancel the Singapore naval base project. From about 1929 to its completion in 1938 the Singapore naval base cost £60 million, equal to £ 4 billion today. HMS Ark Royal cost £3 million, excluding the cost of aircraft (in 1938 each Fairey Swordfish cost £5,500, each Sea Gladiator £3,100).

A far east fleet support base is still needed, but for less the existing facilities in Ceylon or even Singapore could be updated for perhaps £10 - 20 million. With the remaining £50 - 40 million the RN could invest in carrier aviation. Treaties do not permit building more carriers, but with £50 - 40 million the FAA could buy:

1) One thousand aircraft for its six carriers and aircrew and maintenance personnel training pipelines - total £5 million
2) Invest in new aircraft development, procurement and aircrew and maintenance personnel training scheme.
3) Upgrades to Hermes to square off the bows, remove round-down, add crash barrier
4) Significant and long-term overseas deployments. Forward deploy three Outrageous class along with Renown, Repulse and Hood, plus a cruiser and submarine squadron to Hong Kong, Singapore and/or Australia. A strong overt position against Japan may force them to reevaluate British resolve and their moves with Germany, etc.

The money wasted on Singapore could have gone a long way towards advancing RN carrier aviation. What about asking Australia to invest in carrier ops? Perhaps loan them a carrier as HMAS Hermes?
 
Singapore to me never seemed very defendable as it relied on water from the mainland. Hong Kong seems to be similar the New Territory provided the water.

Maybe make Trincomalee in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) the big eastern base. An invasion has to sail a long way and India can provide more troops than you can arm plus an arm's industry and shipbuilding industry.

Singapore can be a base for submarines and light vessels. The Straits can be defended better by submarines and light cruisers than battleships.
 
Singapore to me never seemed very defendable as it relied on water from the mainland.
Singapore relied on Malaya. Malaya relied on Britain (from Malaya and Burma) and France from FIC squeezing Thailand into submission on three sides and on the Chinese keeping Japan at bay (was not an issue until 1937). With that in mind, Singapore makes sense, not as your primary or sole base, but certainly as you describe a forward base for the RN.



When France fell in May 1940 both Thailand and Japan began making moves on FIC, eventually putting Japanese forces right on Malaya's doorstep. A more proactive Britain could have, as part of sending the BEF to defend France in 1939 to placing troops in FIC to deter Japan. Or, after the fall of France, Britain should have beat Japan to the punch and invaded FIC, same as it invaded French North Africa and Madagascar. But that's another thread.....

Back to money for RN carrier aviation. It could be had without hindering other important (unlike Singapore) projects, the government and RN just needed the willpower.
 
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Any money invested in the Hermes is wasted.
You are never going to turn it into a first class carrier.

You might get it from the top of 3rd class to the bottom of 2nd class. An extra 4-6 planes or an extra 2-3 days of operations by it's small airgroup isn't going to change any major operation.

Singapore is about 1650 miles by air from Ceylon. add a few hundred for ships?
at any rate it is going to be about 4 days steaming for a 15kt ship.

Most of the British destroyers of the 20s and 30s are going to use nearly 1/2 of their fuel just going to and From Singapore from Ceylon at 15kts. Doesn't leave a lot for operations.

The Leander light Cruisers were good for 5730 NM at 13 kts.

Ceylon might be safer from attack but it does not allow the RN to project power into the South East Asia area like a base at Singapore does. You can forget basing even flying boats of the 1930s in Ceylon and having any effect in the area. Flying 16-18 hours for maintenance doesn't bear thinking about.

The HMS Hermes was good for 5600 nmi at 10 kts. Almost 7 days to go from Ceylon to SIngapore and 7 days back. Yes she can go faster but that burns more fuel per mile.

With the money you save from giving up SIngapore you can by a crap load of tankers, and escorts for the tankers and AA guns for the tankers and...................................................
 
Singapore was considered necessary to complete the defense of the Pacific Rim in event of war. While I agree that the timing of the UK's build-up/failure to build-up Singapore was seriously inept, the RAF/FAA/RN needed a base somewhere in the area in order to protect UK and allied shipping routes in the area, by air and by sea - it was not really possible to project power beyond a certain range at the beginning of the war. The US realized this also, and used about the same ~ranges in their planning for the war against Japan (War Plan Orange). The US went one step further and decided that it was not possible to defend the area (including the Philippines) against a concerted Japanese attack, which is why there was no attempt to rush reinforcements to the Philippines after Pearl Harbor. The distances were just too great. (Incidentally, as I have mentioned in other threads, the US high command did not inform MacArthur that they would leave the Philippines on its own.)
 
-The story of the sinking of HMS Glorious and her escorts is fascinating. I had to do some research after reading the comment about a submariner commanding an aircraft carrier. One of the sources I came across is apparently the proceedings of a House of Commons discussion on the sinking in 1999. The document is, however, inconclusive.(HMS Glorious (Hansard, 28 January 1999))
-First, how did Captain Guy D'Oyly-Hughes come to command HMS Glorious? One article stated that he had been executive officer for almost a year which means his XO posting was done in peacetime. What happened to his predecessor?
-Second, what happened to Commander (Air) J. B. Heath, whose pending court martial appears to be the proximate cause of Captain D'Oyly-Hughes desire to depart Norway? The House of Commons minutes simply state: "Commander Heath was cleared of all charges and continued his distinguished service in other sectors, finishing as Commanding Officer of HMS Heron at Yeovilton."
-Third, what is the film referred to? "I was also a student friend of Tim Slessor who, along with Mr. Harrison, has done so much work on the film. I was very sorry for Captain D'Oyly Hughes's daughter, who was obviously put in a very difficult position over the film, and naturally came to her father's defence."
 
HMS Outrageous.

...and her sister HMS Uproarious! Two of the three Ugly Sisters proposed to Fisher's Baltic Project during the Great War.

The other nicknames I like from the RN are for the two Walther closed-cycle engined submarines built after WW2 based on German technology called HMS Explorer and Excalibur. They were fueled by HTP, the same stuff as the Me 163 Komet, which was kept in open topped tanks - water neutralises its effects. In service they were known as HMS Exploder and Excruciator!
 
A few points

Building an air force in the early 1930s means building a lot of obsolete by 1940 so nuts to that.

The RN was prepared but not prepared for fighting 3 navies. So prepared for Germany? Absolutely. Italy and Japan? All 3 at same time? Er.....nope.

RN did have only about 250 front line aircraft at start of war and 24 Swordfish went down with Courageous.

Naval aviation for most of its life was a wee bit poop. So there would have been not much reason for expansion when your main combat machine is the Fairey III. Carriers were also treaty restricted so not like you can build a ton load of them.

Also nobody knew what a carrier was or how to use them or what they should look like. So in hindsight that's not much to go on.
 
The FAA did have successes in the first year and half of the War, Toronto and the part in sinking Bismark.

Don't forget sinking by dive-bombing of the cruiser Konigsberg and the freighter Barenfels at Bergen. Also the torpedoing of the battleship Vittorio Veneto and the cruiser Pola which allowed the RN fleet to sink 3 heavy cruisers. There was also the sinking of U-boats and a considerable number of small and medium freighters.

The FAA were doing it for 2 years and 3 months before the US and Japanese navies. The Japanese learnt from the Taranto attack about dropping torpedoes in a harbour. Without that lesson Pearl Harbour might have been a bombs only attack.
 
The RN was badly stretched in the 2nd war so yes success but plenty of un-success. So swings and roundabouts.

For every ship sunk by the RN must be tempered by RN losses.
 

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