Could the FAA have been better prepared for WW2?

[Acheron]

Question: on her fatal voyage, Hurricanes landed on the HMS Glorious? I didn't know that and I wonder, where were they stored? If they staid on the flight deck, might their presence have interfered with normal flight operations?

 

[RCAFson]

Question: on her fatal voyage, Hurricanes landed on the HMS Glorious? I didn't know that and I wonder, where were they stored? If they staid on the flight deck, might their presence have interfered with normal flight operations?

Glorious was selected to receive the Hurricanes because her elevators were wide enough to handle the fixed wing Hurricane and consequently the Hurricanes and RAF Gladiators were stowed in the hangars.

 

[Acheron]

I know. The sh#tshow that was Glorious' sinking is covered nicely here.

Fascinating video. Something else that it brings to my mind: now, the theory that Glorious was low on fuel is described as false. However, am I understand that it is only false insofar as Glorious was not critically short on fuel? Given that some of her boilers were shut down, may we assume that she still was at least somewhat low on fuel?

If so, might this be the reason why there were no CAPs? I understand that carriers had to turn into the wind and get to as high speed as possible so that the planes will have enough lift to take off. Might such a maneuver have consumed too much fuel in the eyes of a captain more worried about the fuel stores than the presence of strong enemy units that he did not expect?

 

[Admiral Beez]

If so, might this be the reason why there were no CAPs? I understand that carriers had to turn into the wind and get to as high speed as possible so that the planes will have enough lift to take off. Might such a maneuver have consumed too much fuel in the eyes of a captain more worried about the fuel stores than the presence of strong enemy units that he did not expect?

To launch monoplane carrier aircraft like the Fulmar or Wildcat, yes you need the ship to go to full speed and turn into the wind. But not for Glorious' Sea Gladiator and Swordfish biplanes. I bet you with a reasonable cross wind one could take off in a Sea Gladiator starting from a dead stop and fly across the 81 ft wide flight deck and make it into the air. Glorious also had two hydraulic catapults.

 

[Shortround6]

That is a general rule of thumb but varies with aircraft and carrier. Turning into the wind is usually done not only to increase wind speed over the deck but to eliminate any crossword as much as possible.
Escort carriers were able to launch Spitfires in the Med on near windless days so launching Gladiators at a similar speed doesn't seem like a big deal.

Ships will often cruise with some boilers shut down to save fuel. How many are shut down or what percentage of full power the boilers that are lit is another question.

 

[Acheron]

Glorious was selected to receive the Hurricanes because her elevators were wide enough to handle the fixed wing Hurricane and consequently the Hurricanes and RAF Gladiators were stowed in the hangars.

Thank you, if I may ask, how did you come by such a rather specific and virtually obscure piece of information?

To launch monoplane carrier aircraft like the Fulmar or Wildcat, yes you need the ship to go to full speed and turn into the wind. But not for Glorious' Sea Gladiator and Swordfish biplanes. I bet you with a reasonable cross wind one could take off in a Sea Gladiator starting from a dead stop and fly across the 81 ft wide flight deck and make it into the air. Glorious also had two hydraulic catapults.

So, may I take from this that biplanes had considerably shorter take-off distances than most monoplanes? Or do I misunderstand the relevant physics?

That is a general rule of thumb but varies with aircraft and carrier. Turning into the wind is usually done not only to increase wind speed over the deck but to eliminate any crossword as much as possible.
Escort carriers were able to launch Spitfires in the Med on near windless days so launching Gladiators at a similar speed doesn't seem like a big deal.

Ships will often cruise with some boilers shut down to save fuel. How many are shut down or what percentage of full power the boilers that are lit is another question.

My thanks to you, too.

Surely you can answer me another question: how long would it have taken to launch at least the Glosters or better of course the Swordfishes from Glorious? I am of course wondering if these could have been launched once the German battlecruiers were spotted, though it seems the time between "there are German battlecruisers on the horizon" and "there are German shells around us" was quite short, (27 minutes?) by which time the distance between the ships was about 15 km. Does anyone know about the weather? Since it was June, the sun should still have been up well enough, no?

 

[RCAFson]

Fascinating video. Something else that it brings to my mind: now, the theory that Glorious was low on fuel is described as false. However, am I understand that it is only false insofar as Glorious was not critically short on fuel? Given that some of her boilers were shut down, may we assume that she still was at least somewhat low on fuel?

If so, might this be the reason why there were no CAPs? I understand that carriers had to turn into the wind and get to as high speed as possible so that the planes will have enough lift to take off. Might such a maneuver have consumed too much fuel in the eyes of a captain more worried about the fuel stores than the presence of strong enemy units that he did not expect?

Glorious had been at sea for 8 - 9 days (May 31 - June 8) . Due to the need for flying operations and the danger of U-boats, she had to cruise at 16 knots or better.

8 days = ~200 hours x 16 knots = 3200nm. Her nominal range was 4300nm at 16 knots, so there is absolutely no doubt that she was short of fuel.

 

[RCAFson]

I know. The sh#tshow that was Glorious' sinking is covered nicely here.

Too bad the RAF Hurricanes weren't just refueled and sent on their way. Here's the location where Glorious sank, 487 nautical miles from RAF Scatsta on Shetland, UK, within the 520 nmi range of the Hawker Hurricane on internal fuel. Send a Swordfish to guide them. The RAF Gladiators will have to stay behind. But clearly the idiot ex-submariner in command thought there was no threat, so why fly off your RAF Hurricanes.

Which brings me back to this thread, and preparedness of the RN's carrier force. Since 1917, every RN submarine commander must pass the Perisher, weeding out any candidates who can't make the grade. Perhaps something similar was needed for the RN carrier force? First of all, the C/O should be a former aviator, or must prove that he understands naval aviation, such as the need for a CAP and boiler readiness when you're sailing though hostile waters. Next, the admiral or vice admiral in charge of carriers needs to understand that you don't use your fleet carriers for ASW. These two moves alone save HMS Glorious and Courageous.

487nm is too far for an aircraft with a 520nm range. You have to allow fuel for TO, climb and formation flying. Also there has to be an allowance for adverse winds and visibility. Even 400nm would be risky.

 

[MIflyer]

There is a book I recommend that bears on this subject, "Bombers versus Battleships" written by a fomer RN officer. He describes how the RN happened to have two carriers put in for repairs at Norfolk, VA, and the crews managed to sit down and figure out how to do air defense the way the USN did it. They even got some USN radios that helped a great deal.

 

[Admiral Beez]

There is a book I recommend that bears on this subject, "Bombers versus Battleships" written by a fomer RN officer. He describes how the RN happened to have two carriers put in for repairs at Norfolk, VA, and the crews managed to sit down and figure out how to do air defense the way the USN did it. They even got some USN radios that helped a great deal.

It's too bad the USN and RN carrier fleets didn't war game this out in the 1930s. A Battle of Bermuda or thereabouts; Lexington, Saratoga and Ranger vs. the three Outrageous class.

But US isolationism and perhaps British pigheadedness might have got in the way. The USN's battle squadron learned a lot from the Grand Fleet in WW1.

 

[RCAFson]

There is a book I recommend that bears on this subject, "Bombers versus Battleships" written by a fomer RN officer. He describes how the RN happened to have two carriers put in for repairs at Norfolk, VA, and the crews managed to sit down and figure out how to do air defense the way the USN did it. They even got some USN radios that helped a great deal.

In fact it was the reverse. The USN learned how to do radar GCI from the FAA. A USN liaison pilot testifying to Congress :

"22. Will you describe, briefly, what you knew of the composition and effectiveness of those agencies as they were then operating?

A. Based ashore at Scapa, we were controlled by the Royal Air Force Fighter Command Operations Control. We were never given any information as to how the Fighter Operations received its enemy information, but from the size and general make-up of the radio towers, we more or less guessed that information was received by advance electronics. We knew that there was a network of radio or radar stations along the Coast of England which kept a continual watch for hostile aircraft and reported to a system of Royal Air Force Fighter Command Operations rooms. At sea, we were controlled by what was known as an "anti-aircraft cruiser." We had heard of anti-aircraft cruisers from a Fleet Air Arm Fighter Squadron in the Shetlands which had been controlled by H. M. S. CURLEW. H. M. S. CURLEW was in the task force during the Norwegian Campaign and it was H. M. S. CURLEW which controlled all fighters during operations off the Norwegian Coast. The interceptions were accurate except for height. However, the visibility was good enough so that the error in height made little difference in actually accomplishing interceptions.

23. Q. Did you then consider that the fighters of your unit were being effectively directed while they were in the air?

A. Yes. sir, very effectively.

24. Q. Were the results accomplished against the enemy aircraft considerable?

A. We were able to keep all of the German bombers from closing in our Fleet. No ship was bombed or even did we have a near miss during that period. However our aircraft were not fast enough to chase German bombers. The German bombers turned away and jettisoned their bombs before we intercepted them."
Page 366

 

[MIflyer]

No, it was not how to work with the RAF radar system on land but how to do it for carriers at sea. What can I say? Go read the book. He does not get the Battle of Midway quite right but everything else was news to me. For example, the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse would have been easy to avoid, if not for stupidity. And the HMS Glorious was lost because the captain wanted to hurry back to Enland to court martial an officer who refused to use Swordfish against ground targets in Norway.

 

[Admiral Beez]

HMS Glorious was lost because the captain wanted to hurry back to Enland to court martial an officer

It's too bad he didn't survive to account for himself. I suspect he'd have met with Byng's fate.

 

[RCAFson]

No, it was not how to work with the RAF radar system on land but how to do it for carriers at sea. What can I say? Go read the book. He does not get the Battle of Midway quite right but everything else was news to me. For example, the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse would have been easy to avoid, if not for stupidity. And the HMS Glorious was lost because the captain wanted to hurry back to Enland to court martial an officer who refused to use Swordfish against ground targets in Norway.

The included quote in my post, above, discussed the use of radar GCI at sea onboard HMS Curlew, an AA cruiser fitted with Type 280 airwarning/gunnery radar during the Norway campaign. This was the beginning of naval radar GCI which was later expanded after new RN carriers were fitted with radar and radar became common on cruisers and larger ships All the RN's learned lessons were passed onto the USN and the training of USN fighter direction officers, mentioned on page 168 of Bombers vs Battleships, was based upon RN/FAA radar GCI experience.

 

[RCAFson]

There is a book I recommend that bears on this subject, "Bombers versus Battleships" written by a fomer RN officer. He describes how the RN happened to have two carriers put in for repairs at Norfolk, VA, and the crews managed to sit down and figure out how to do air defense the way the USN did it. They even got some USN radios that helped a great deal.

I checked my copy of B vs B and I fear you've misread it. On page 151 the author mentions that 3 RN carriers were at Norfolk Va in late 1941, and that their fighter direction officers consulted with each other, with no mention of the USN. He does mention getting USN voice radio sets, but the FAA (and RAF) had efficient voice radio sets of UK design which were fitted to the Fulmar and Sea Hurricane (and, IIRC, Sea Gladiator) quite independently of the USN or USA.

 

[swampyankee]

In hindsight, the answer to the OP's question is almost certainly "yes," even if budget constraints of the era remain in play.

Since the RN did not have any aircraft until they were returned to the fold in the late 1930s, imitating the USN policy of requiring carrier captains to be aviators would not work: the RN didn't have that stream of expertise available. However, the RN could have had done something like taking the division heads and executive officers (or whatever the RN term for the second in command of a ship was current at the time) of carriers into an aviation (not necessarily aviator) training program so they are more familiar with aviation operations. While this would not be free, the cost would be in the budgetary noise. (As an aside, I don't think the loss of the HMS Glorious was because Captain Guy D'Oyly-Hughes was a submariner; I think it was more because he was out of his professional depth and incapable of seeing that. See Hms Glorious - Hansard. While D'Oyly-Hughes had (at least according to Wikipedia) learned to fly, he was not an aviation professional in any manner. As a totally irrelevant aside, he was actually born in Utah).

Another readiness issue would be for there to be better coordination between the RAF and the RN during the time when the RAF had all the airplanes. I don't know how much antipathy there was between the RN and the RAF, but I suspect, with no evidence, that some portion of it was due to personal antipathies involving ex-RNAS officers who had been moved to the RAF and found RN doors firmly shut in their faces when they tried to maintain collegial contacts with the former fellow RN officers.

 

[fastmongrel]

It's too bad he didn't survive to account for himself. I suspect he'd have met with Byng's fate.

The more I read about D'Oyly Hughes the more I think he was not mentally stable. I don't think today he would have been put in such a senior position. Even his wife thought he was not stable.

With our modern understanding of mental health I am coming to the conclusion that he should be pitied not pilloried.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The more I read about D'Oyly Hughes the more I think he was not mentally stable.

Perhaps that's why he wasn't commanding a submarine any longer, as that has to be a high pressure, relentless responsibility. The RN lost 79 submarines in WW2, more than the total submarine fleet (60 boats) of September 1939.

 

[MikeMeech]

The included quote in my post, above, discussed the use of radar GCI at sea onboard HMS Curlew, an AA cruiser fitted with Type 280 airwarning/gunnery radar during the Norway campaign. This was the beginning of naval radar GCI which was later expanded after new RN carriers were fitted with radar and radar became common on cruisers and larger ships All the RN's learned lessons were passed onto the USN and the training of USN fighter direction officers, mentioned on page 168 of Bombers vs Battleships, was based upon RN/FAA radar GCI experience.

Hi

To add some information from 'Radar at Sea' by Derek Howse, p 56, on the origins of 'Fighter Direction' it has the following:

"It is agreed by all the founder members of what came to be known as the Fighter Direction Branch that the chief credit for the invention and development of fighter direction at sea belongs to the then Lieutenant-Charles Coke, a specialist observer in the Fleet Air Arm, who was Air Signal Officer in the carrier Ark Royal, which had no radar. Coke relied upon sighting reports from the fleet and on reports from the radar-fitted Sheffield or Curlew when in company, sent by flag signal until it was certainm the enemy knew our position, then by W/T (Morse). He sat in the corner of the bridge wireless office with a telegraphist beside him writing down incoming reports, which Coke plotted on a Bigsworth board - a portable plotting board used by observers in the air - before himself passing messages by W/T to fighters. (Observers were all experts in Morse.)"

Later in 1940 in the Med. HMS Illustrious, fitted with radar moved the system forward, p. 64 states:

"[Commander] Beale acted as the ship's fighter direction officer (FDO), sitting in front of a simple spider's-web plot showing the air situation given by radar, 'told' by telephone from the A-scan in the radar office. Though he sometimes carried out the interceptions himself, he more often delegated this task to others, including, for example, the Torpedo Officer, or Warrant Observer Teddy Wicks, or - most important for the future of the FD Branch - Sub-Lieutenant David Pollock, assistant to the Admirals Staff Officer (Operations). R/T (voice radio) was tried instead of W/T (Morse) but the equipment proved unsatisfactory. A high state of efficiency and professionalism was quickly obtained, enhanced by the intelligent and cooperative attitude of all on board, from Admiral Lyster and Captain D. W. Boyd downwards. Partly because of her new Fulmar fighters, but chiefly because Illustrious had her own radar, she established something near to air supremacy over the eastern Mediterranean, a superiority which she was able to maintain until the Luftwaffe arrived in Sicily at the end of the year."

During these operations various problems were identified, including, 'Radar Security' they were only allowed to transmit for one minute in each hour, 'Radio Security' no communication was allowed with fighters until an unidentified aircraft came within 20 miles, 'Land Echos', 'Height Finding' or rather lack of it, and 'Problems detecting low flying aircraft.

it is also interesting to note (p.74) on the bombing of Illustrious, it mentions that:

"...though her radar gave plenty of warning of the approaching German dive-bombers, had no time to recall fighters then pursuing Italian torpedo-bombers, or to fly off more."

It also mentions that HMS Valiant, also fitted with radar, " detected a second attack on Illustrious and was able to contact three ex-Illustrious Fulmars from Malta and to direct them by wireless to attack and damage three enemy bombers."

P. 74-75 also states that in March 1941 Illustrious, on its way to the USA for repairs, met up with its replacement HMS Formidable at Port Said, here "Commander Beale was able to brief Formidable's Commander (Operations), Philip Yorke, on the progress Illustrious had made in the techniques of fighter direction."

I hope that is of interest.

Mike

 

[SaparotRob]

Yes it is.