Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
What is this heresy?!
Curtiss-Wright: Loss of Don Berlin and downfall (1 Viewer)
What is this heresy?!
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,776
- Dec 6, 2006
The Battle of Britain was almost over by the time the contract was signed with Packard in September 1940.
drgondog
Major
If they couldn't bury the radiator aft of cockpit a la XP-51B, it would have a nose job like the Typhoon. The XP-60 didn't have the Merlin 61 did it?
I suspect going from 1650-1 to 1650-3 with not only the increased weight of the engine but also a front loaded and increased size of radiator plus intercooler might also compel moving wing forward to restore CG.
Speculatively, Oliver Echols and Wright Field had lost a lot of credibility at AAF-Hq with Curtiss/Wright Field partnership spawning XP-46, XP-60 and A-25.But as we say down home, 'Here, Hold My Beer", Echols teamed up with Berlin for the greatest white elephant of all - the XP-75.
Somebody orrect me if I am wrong. My gut after a lot of research is that Echols was a vindictive man who held grudges when he was upstaged or insulted. Howard Hughes story is well documented, but my belief is that NAA got on the same 'list' when a.) NAA turned down Echols request to produce the P-40 for BPC, and b.) turned him down twice in two months.
Ben Kelsey was both an acolyte and a loyal subordinate. There is no record of Kelsey advocating for the Mustang. His two connections to NAA was as Chief Fighter Projects, he signed DA-140 for the NA-91 Mustang IA - a necessary formality to act as agent for Lend Lease. Had a contract with NAA been deemed desirable for AAC/AAF a separate "AC" contract would have been executed. His second connection wa a January Flight test of XP-51 in which he 'damned with faint praise' noting that is was faster tha the P-40, but no recomendations to 'procure'.
When Gen Muir Fairchild Chief, Planning & Requirements, Planning Division at AAF-HC requested that NAA be granted the FY41 dive bomber funding for the A-36, Echols strongl resisted until compelled to stand down. Echols and Wright Field, then insisted that Mustang producion be converted to B-25 production, while continuing to support Wright A-25 and Brewster XA-32. A-36 Contract executed April 1942
About this time Arnold was in London being briefed by Hitchcock, Ambassador Winant, RAF & R-R concerning expectations for the Merlin/Mustang project. May 1942. NAA began parallel work on XP-78/XP-51B in late May.
Muir Fairchild drove another truck over Echols when in June 1942 he ordered MC to execute a contract for P-51A to replace A-36, and further stipulated that the 51A production order could be replaced with P-51B at AAF discretion.
The question.
Is it probable that Echols was not only pissed at Kindelberger, but also fond of Burdette Wright? He isssued contract for XP-46 without competition and bought the P-40 first production run.
While neither Wright nor Echols were personally cited in the Truman Congressional Report, the Wright Engines and Aircraft companies were (justifyably) roasted.
Thoughts, evidence either way?
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GregP
Major
I have heard from more than one source (all WWII people) that Echols was a real bastard to deal with. I have refrained from posting this because I have no first-hand knowledge of same or info from a truly trusted source.
But, you asked. The negative opinions I heard about Echols come from maybe 3 or 4 guys who I spoke with while at the museum and somehow he came up in the conversation. I never specifically asked about him.
All of which may or may not be accurate opinions. He COULD have been a prince of a fellow. I can't say for sure.
But, you asked. The negative opinions I heard about Echols come from maybe 3 or 4 guys who I spoke with while at the museum and somehow he came up in the conversation. I never specifically asked about him.
All of which may or may not be accurate opinions. He COULD have been a prince of a fellow. I can't say for sure.
BarnOwlLover
Staff Sergeant
Considering what happened over Germany in '43 and how much Hap Arnold championed both the Mustang and long range fighters in general, it seems that Echols was fortunate not to get at least reprimanded, if not flat out court martialed, for insubordination or obstruction of AAF business. Granted, that's from one side of the story of how/why he stonewalled USAAF purchases of the Mustang.
It is an important historical detail that things happened in the reverse order. Arnold championed the long range fighter escort before the Schweinfurt raids took place, the P-51B project was well down the line and not a reaction to losses suffered over Germany. The wheels of a big military project turn very slow indeed.
BarnOwlLover
Staff Sergeant
I already knew that. Still no excuse for Echol's dragging his feet on the whole issue and kissing up to Curtiss-Wright and GM. Especially since Arnold had been asking for a long range escort fighter since at least 1940, based on observations from the Spanish Civil War.
drgondog
Major
I'm pretty sure that Echols was shuttled off as Military Governor of Germany post VE Day, rather than a high placed AAF-Hq staff job, based on demonstrating that he wasn't cut out for increased responsibilities for either high staff or operations command.
But IMO he never was insubordinate. By all accounts I have read, he became more passive like when Eglin Field replaced Wright Field for major test responsibilities and the XP-75 was such a disaster. I suspect he was betting a lot of career chips on the XP-75.
I also suspect that when it was obvious how valuable the Mustang became as key to the dream of a Strategic Air Force, that some superior officers were wondering why it took so long to be fielded in combat ops. Arnold tood sole responsibility but research points to his hand, along with Spaatz and Eaker, as the influencer at AAF-Hq tat the Mustang was a very good airplane despite lack of interest by Echols.
drgondog
Major
In fairness to Spaatz, Eaker and Arnold - the Allison powered Mustang was never an 'obvious soluton for LR escort' until the promise of the Merlin mating yielded production quantities... and even when Eaker begged for P-51s and P-38s in June 1943, there would not be Group level operations until six months later.
My post was mainly pointed at any Youtube experts who happened to pass by. In the world of Youtube the UK in 1943 was a land full of commissioned airfields, trained pilots, massive numbers of P-47s and P-38s just waiting for a genius to invent a long range tank and the P-51B
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Trouble is they (British and Germans both) didn't know it at the time. Let alone what the US Military (war planners) knew.
Or depends on who you are listing to/reading.
The Battle of Britain, 10 July – 31 October 1940
Phase 1: 10 July – 12 August 1940 Attacks on Channel Shipping
Phase 2: 13 – 18 August 1940 Attacks on Airfields and Radar Stations
Phase 3: 19 August – 6 September 1940
Phase 4: 7 September 1940 – 31 October 1940
Some authors use 5 or more phases, this list is from Battle of Britain | Bentley Priory Museum
The Night Blitz overlapped starting on Sept 6/7 and ending on May 21st 1941.
There was no assurance that the Luftwaffe would not return to daylight bombing and the British needed engines for nigh fighters and bombers in addition to day fighters.
And as I have said, the Ability of Allison to deliver suitable engines (ones that would pass test) was in serious doubt in Sept 1940.
In 1940 the British had ordered the Typhoon and Tornado and the first jets were ordered. Unlike us today they had no idea what the Germans would do next or were capable of. The Fw 190 and Me 262 are evidence that they were right to pursue all options.
MIflyer
Major
Yes, but to get that far they had to start planning at least a year earlier.
GregP
Major
Not sure where you got the last sentence.
Allison V-1710-33 (V-1710-C15), V-12 Engine.The Allison V-1710-C passed its 150-hour type test in 1937 (via National Air and Space Museum: ). From 1937 to 1940, it never failed a type test, so it would be mystifying to believe they would suddenly start to make sub-standard engines.
MIflyer
Major
By the time the Mustang Mk 1 alias XP-51 flew everybody in the world knew that a single engined fighter with less than, say, 2200 cu in, was not going to cut it. All the future plans for every major power called for Big Cubes. The BF-109E went from 2069 cu in to the BF-109G's 2169 cu in, the new FW-190 had 2562 cu in., Japan went to the copy of the 109E's engine for the Ki61 and Italy stuck it in their Macchi and Reganni fighters to replace the smaller radials. The US went to two V-1710's in the P-38 and planned for fighters with the V-3420. The P-47 and F4U used the R-2800 and the F6F went from the R-2600 to the R-2800. There was no reason to pay attention to the Mustang MkI. But Sir Hooker figured out a way to make The Smallest Front Line Engine Of the War, with LESS than 1700 cu in (smaller than the A6M3 had installed) perform like a much larger engine. And NAA figured out how to build an airplane that gave much better performance than the P-39, P-40, and Spit V, even when limited to the V-1710.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
You misspelled correct and thoughts.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
It has a lot to do with the fact that it took 5 engines to get through the 150 hour test for the V-1710-33 engine during the summer of 1940.
A lot of this was NOT the fault of Allison.
Details are scattered in different parts of "Vee's for Victory"
One of the problems was the change in rating from 1040hp at 14,300ft to 1090hp at 13,200ft at the insistence of the AAF.
As a result of an accelerated service test that was completed July 17th 1940 by 7 planes and 5 of them completed 150 hours. They had one failed crankshaft (a fault with that individual unit) and one cracked nose case.
At as result of this test and problems with the ongoing test stand problems the engines were rated at 950hp for US use at this time.
Some of the engines used for type testing in 1937 and later used different supercharger gears and made their 1000 or 1150 hp at sea level or very low altitudes, They were intended for turbo charged YP-37, Bell FM-1s and the XP-38.
Many or all of the early engines used magnesium intake manifolds (all the British C-33s got magnesium intake manifolds but the British used a different valve clearance).
Vee's for Victory chronicles' the tests of the 5 engines for the -33 type tests. It takes almost 2 pages in the book. Pages 238 and 239. First attempt was 8-11-39 to 8-12-39 and lasted 10 hours. ( a rag had been left in the oil system) several of the engines were rebuilt and tried again but it took the test (#7?) started on August 15th 1940 make the 150 hour mark.
Allison had to take back 228 engines and rebuild them (16 were still outstanding as of March 31 1941 but they were completed shortly after).
The engines in US service in the summer and early fall of 1940 were being operated at
Take-off...................950hp at 2770rpm
Military....................950hp at 2770rpm at 8,000ft
Normal....................838hp at 2600rpm at 8,000ft
Once the engines were repaired/upgraded they were rated at 1040hp for both take-off and at 14,300ft and 930hp at 2600rpm to 12,800ft.
There were changes in intake manifolds and a few other details over the winter.
But that appears to have been the situation in Aug-Sept of 1940.
Allison made many small improvements during these tests and again, a faulty test cell mounting that did not duplicate the mountings of the service aircraft caused some of the crankcase cracking problems (and cracked crankcases can lead to other failures).
British experience was just about 100% after these troubles even though the most or all of their engines did not have all the upgrades. They did have proper engine mounts, they used different valve clearance (they were also different fuel) and since the Melrin engine was tested at over 100 hours they didn't expect the -33 Allisons to last as long as the Americans did anyway. Now throw in that much of the British early P-40 use was in the dessert and engine life (anybody's) wasn't that good anyway?
Allison was making the 1150hp -39 and -35 engines by the late spring/early summer of 1941 anyway.
This was just a blip on the History of the Allison engine and in no way relates to the ability of the engine at a later date or any other version. It does happen to coincide with efforts to get an American manufacturer for the Merlin in the summer of 1940.
GregP
Major
The long-nose Allison V-1710s were all a bit suspect. As soon as the E and F-series was in production, all that disappeared.
F-series production started in Feb 40 with a few more in Jun 40, but F-series production didn't really start in earnest until Jan 41.
E-series production started in Mar 40, but didn't start in earnest until Jul 40.
F-series production started in Feb 40 with a few more in Jun 40, but F-series production didn't really start in earnest until Jan 41.
E-series production started in Mar 40, but didn't start in earnest until Jul 40.
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drgondog
Major
I'm a one finger typist using two hands with a keyboard that misses strokes.. what can I say.
MIflyer
Major
I think it is Vees for Victory that says that the RAF experience was that the V-1710 lasted longer than Merlins. But while it was clear that the V-1710 theoretically was much better for field maintenance than the Merlin, being "modular" with a removable accessory section and removable reduction gear section, I've never seen any praise from the Brits for that. Given that RR leaned toward the "craftsman" approach maybe they did not do much in the field but swap engines, anyway. After all, if you are based in the U.K. what's point of tearing down Merlins or Sabres when the factory and the air bases are all located in an area about the size of the Carolinas? By the way, the British WASPs were limited to flying in that area.
I wonder why the RAF even sent Hawk 81A's to the Western Desert. It is true that the RAF pilots in the Med were disgusted at getting nothing but Hurricanes for so long, with the Spitfires kept back home for the really important work. As one Hurri pilot put it, "They have 5000 Hurricanes in the British Isles and they have to do something with them." Meanwhile, in India they were making do with Mohawk IV's, not even having the priority to get Hurricanes until well into 1942. The Brits were very pleased with the American Stuart and Grant tanks they got in the Western Desert, since they arrived without "Some Assembly Required," were not full of water from the sea voyage, and had the useful feature of not tending to fall apart when they did a hard turn or hit a bump. Perhaps that was the reason they sent the Tomahawks to the Desert? American stuff was designed to be maintained without the factory being across the street?
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