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Elmas, I agree with those historians who say the French were capable of stoping the Germans. They just needed more agressivity. The Germans were lucky in the French campaign, not so superior.
About the Nazis and industry, well, something to think (including content for the question I addressed for Parsifal):
On 5 December 1940, Hitler received military plans for the invasion, and approved them all, with the start scheduled for May 1941.[44] On 18 December, Hitler signed War Directive No. 21 to the German High Command for an operation now codenamed "Operation Barbarossa" stating: "The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign."[44][45] The operation was named after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th century. The invasion was set for 15 May 1941.[45] In the Soviet Union, speaking to his generals in December, Stalin mentioned Hitler's references to an attack on the Soviet Union in Mein Kampf, and said they must always be ready to repulse a German attack, and that Hitler thought the Red Army would need four years to ready itself. Hence, "we must be ready much earlier" and "we will try to delay the war for another two years."[46]
Operation Barbarossa - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Elmas, I agree with those historians who say the French were capable of stoping the Germans. They just needed more agressivity. The Germans were lucky in the French campaign, not so superior.
Elmas, I agree with those historians who say the French were capable of stoping the Germans. They just needed more agression. The Germans were luck in the French campaign, not so superior.
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and how about them horses that moved 90% of the WehrmachtHere I disagree fundamental from the military viewpoint.
The French Army/Leadership was thinking in terms of WWI and believed in the Maginot Line. The money and material effort of the Maginot Line was a very huge part of the French military budget. But the Maginot Line was a relict of a static warfare and was totaly useless in a modern armored warfare. The most part of the 1930's the French Army wasted a lot of money for nothing.
Also most parts of the French Armyleadership didn't recognize the importance of modern armored warfare and the new armoured divisions of the French Army were more or less some outsider Divisions with no clear tactical concept.
I agree that the French Army was equal to the Wehrmacht in terms of weapon quality and quantity but years behind from trained modern armored divisions, tactics and strategy. The French Army in the condition of 1940 had no single chance against the Wehrmacht, because the French Army laged fundemental knowledge, concept and training about a modern armoured war!
That the Germans were extremely lucky (beginners luck, I should say...) was already told.
and how about them horses that moved 90% of the Wehrmacht
It is interesting to see how this thread has devolved from a discussion of major influences on the dcline of the Luftwaffe to one of 'which regime and leader' was the most brutal.
I would nominate Stalin as number one because he killed the most of his own people, with Hitler a plausible second. Staling killed because of ideology failures and Hitler because of genetic deficiencies. Anybody care to quibble on this point?
Mussolini was a choir boy in comparison. Hirohito/Tojo slip into third place for me for all the reasons we can bring up in China as well as treatment of POWs.
Folks, we can't discount Churchill, FDR and Truman. If you happened to be a civilian and were in or around a target that was being shelled or bombed, so solly for that. Hamburg and Dresden were high on a list that included Nagasaki and Hiroshima but the night raids on Tokyo may take supreme prizes for most civilians whacked over a span of time and of course 'one bomb kills all' set the tone for MADD during the cold war when all us chillin's were doing nuclear bomb drills at school during the 50's.
I am an American, I lived in Tokyo in 1947-1950 when my father had the 35th FBW. Few stones in Tokyo were stacked on another even though a great rebuilding process occurred. I am not ashamed of what we did - but I am sad that we don't seem to get it right no matter how many illustrations we have of bad behavior in the past. Anybody wondering if the next Flood or Armageddon is just around the corner to sweep it all away and try, try again - or has the Skipper given up?
No nation's leaders or soldiers escaped the brush of 'killers' of innocents.
Now, let us all back away from my soapbox and ask 'so what happened to the Luftwaffe, and why did they move so many of their assets from Ost and Sud to Germany in mid to fall of 1943 when the USSR was advancing in the East?" "Why was the fighter pilot survival rate, per sortie, in the West so much lower than in the East"
Regards,
Bill
Here I disagree fundamental from the military viewpoint.
The French Army/Leadership was thinking in terms of WWI and believed in the Maginot Line. The money and material effort of the Maginot Line was a very huge part of the French military budget. But the Maginot Line was a relict of a static warfare and was totaly useless in a modern armored warfare. The most part of the 1930's the French Army wasted a lot of money for nothing.
Also most parts of the French Armyleadership didn't recognize the importance of modern armored warfare and the new armoured divisions of the French Army were more or less some outsider Divisions with no clear tactical concept.
I agree that the French Army was equal to the Wehrmacht in terms of weapon quality and quantity but years behind from trained modern armored divisions, tactics and strategy. The French Army in the condition of 1940 had no single chance against the Wehrmacht, because the French Army laged fundemental knowledge, concept and training about a modern armoured war!
This is a kind of myth!
At the France Campaign the Wehrmacht had 10 Panzer Divisions and roundabout 8-9 motorized Infantry Divisions out of 76 Divisions, (19 out of 76) hardly 90 percent horse driven.
At the Barbarossa Campaign the Wehrmacht had at the beginning 20 Panzerdivisions and 17 motorized Infantry Divisions out of 150 Divisions. At the beginning of 1942 they had 24 Panzer Divisions and 17 motorized Infantry Division out of 150 Divisions.
(37 out of 150 Divisions) and (41 out of 150 Divisions) are hardly 90 percent horse driven Divisions!
In short: the Le Mond published a series of articles in 2010 - that unfornately I don't have any link at the momment - which says that the Allies overlooked the Ardennes, and there was no such a thing as Blitzkreig (it was a myth), and the final decision for the attack in the Ardennes was taked by Guderian and Manstein when they meet in a acampment by random. The Allied plan was to stabilize the front and cut German from the Swedish iron. The plan is said to have been very well done, even by modern analists, and it's only flaw being really the Ardennes.
Do not forget the logistics tail of these units they were very much horse drawn
I don't understand this argumentation!
1. The Blitzkrieg concept comes in action after you built a focal point at a weak spot at the enemy front and punch through this hole!
There are more weak spots at the French front not only the Ardennes or part of the Ardennes
2. The deployment of the troops at the Ardennes were fundemental part of the "Sichelschnitt Plan". The german strategic plan of the French Campaign.
3. How do you will cut Germany from the Swedish/Norway Iron? The French Campaign started at 10 Mai 1940, Germany had occupied Denmark and Norway at 9 April 1940!
The "Sichelschnitt Plan" from Manstein had nothing to do with luck, it was a custom made plan to the possibilities of the Wehrmacht and it's modern armored warfare strategy and tactic in combination with the Luftwaffe.
I should asked how long did you think you could stop the Wehrmacht at some parts of the Ardennes and how much time the Wehrmacht needed to search the next weak point of the French Army Front to built a focal point to punch through?
To say the French campaign 1940 was luck is to my opinion very adventurous!
Bill
For once I disagree with you, and strongly so. This opinion has all the hallmarks of a Munich style appeasement....