Defeating Bomber Command

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Glider said:
It makes the Blenheim look good
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But when one looks the bomb loads, probably only the max internal for the British Mk IV 454kg/1000lb, not so impressive. FiAF Blenheims could carry max 800kg internally but still far cry from Ju 88 A's max bomb loads. Stirling is entirely different case max 14,000lb/6,350kg internally.

Juha
 
mhuxt said:
And the Stirling too - wouldn't have picked that. Are those 88s really at Notleistung / highest speed? Not trying to stir the pot, but slower than the Stirling?
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There is some dispute as to what the speed of the Ju 88A4 is with external bombs: some sources give 269mph for the Ju 88A4 with 1420hp Jumo 211J the above shows a Ju 88A4 with 1350hp Jumo 211F (different full throttle height) at 255 mph. Another factor is whether the dive brakes are fitted which they would be for an early war maritime attack but not on a Ju 88A4 being used at night over the UK or a Ju 88C6 (Ju 88A4/Jumo 211J with solid nose and 3 x 20mm canon). The 14 mph difference might be accounted for by the dive brakes, 4 removable external bomb shackles and perhaps flame dampers as well as the weaker F instead of J engines.

Clean with no external bombs, no external bomb shackles the speed of a Ju 88A4/Jumo 211J would be 317mph and I suggest the same for the Ju 88C6 fighter variant without radar. In this situation there is a forward bomb bay which can carry 18 x 50kg bombs or a 1280L fuel tank and a rear bomb bay which can carry a 680L tank or 10 x 50kg bombs. Any combination possible. Other loads might include 70kg target makers or 700 x 2kg anti personnel butterfly bombs with time delays and disturbance triggers: a sort of anti personnel and area denial weapon that might be suitable for attacking an Bomber Command Air field during a return mission. There are 4 external bomb shackles that can be fitted, one or two to carry a 900L drop tank wouldn't impair speed by much.

If the Luftwaffe is happy to operate the Ju 88A4 or C6 with only 3100lbs of internal bombs (small ones only) with maybe a drop tank or two the Ju 88 speed will be around 310mph and more like that of the DB7 curve.

Of course this thread started as question about defeating bomber command early in the war which drifted to night harassment operation by Luftwaffe night fighters (Ju 88C) on returning RAF bombers and then drifted into discussion of the speed of the Ju 88 vs the Beufighter. The Ju 88c is more suitable as a night fighter than a bomber if big bombs need to be carried.

The Dornier Do 217E3 with a pair of 1560hp BMW801ML engines is in production from the first month of 1941 starting at about 15/month from January. With this engine the Do 217 can fly at 320mph and carry a full internal bombload, around 4400lbs (say 4 x 500kg bombs) with uncompromised fuel. The 1560hp BMW801ML runs on 87 octane B4 fuel whereas the 1700hp BMW801D2 runs on 96/125 octane C3 fuel. I would suggest that had the Germans committed enough C3 fuel that the Dornier Do 217 equipped with a BMW801D2 would have managed around 330mph max speed and presented the Beaufighter considerable difficulties to intercept. I would suggest that comparing the Ju 88 with externals bombs with the Beaufighter is a bit of a false dilemma since a night intruder, I don't think, would be burdened with that configuration; the Germans would be inclined to use the Do 217 for that roll. Shortages meant that He 111 and Ju 88 soldier on well beyond a desirable use by date.

The BMW801 equipped version of the Ju 88C was the Ju 88R and was available at this time, 1942. I would suggest that without a heavy load of night fighting equipment such as radars this type would manage 344mph (the Speed of the larger Ju 88G1 night fighter), at least one source gives 369mph clean with BMW801D2. Both the BMW801 and C3 fuel was rationed so little of this high quality aircraft was seen in 42. The radial had more power and a little more drag but was thus both faster and moreover less sensitive to external loads.

When comparing the Ju 88C6 and the Beaufighter one is comparing a 2 man 20000lb aircraft with a 3 man 28000lb aircraft. Because of the heavy electronic countermeasures the Luftwaffe found itself under it found a 3 man aircraft essential to operate the large variety of electronic equipment. During the baby blitz the Luftwaffe also used Drupel/Window aluminium foil jamming and closed down part of RAF radar system: had they used larger numbers of aircraft or larger types with more load they might have succeeded but that takes a large scale effort.

I would suggest that should the Luftwaffe had been directed enough of its more advanced types such as the Ju 88R and Do 217E with the BMW801 engine using C3 fuel it could have conducted a technically quite aggressive and advanced fight over Britain at night against RAF bases. If it was understood what a monster bomber command become this might have been perused.

The weakness of the Luftwaffe in offensive operation I think should be understood in terms of the General difficulty of building up production plant and the resources drawn up by the war in the east.

However procurement failures played their part. 1941 should have seen the start of production of the Me 210. This aircraft eventually did become excellent. it was able to fly at 369mph, had a range on internal fuel of 1100 miles and could carry loads such as a single 1000kg/2200lb bomb, 2 x 500kg or 8 x 50kg in its internal bomb bay. It had dive brakes and a computing bomb sight, remote controlled rearward firing guns which could shoot back even while the observer was under heavy g load and if the enemy fighter was behind and below in a turning fight pursuit.

I would suggest this aircraft would have given the RAF real problems in 1941/1942.

What had happened is this: the aircraft was designed by Dr Woldemeir Voigt, Willy Messerschmitt personally intervened in the design process to have the tail shortened and the slats removed (to make the aircraft faster). The RLM with Messerschmitt's agreement then ordered the desperately aircraft into production, factories retooled and all, before the test flight. The handling was disastrous. It took a long time to sort out the issues but by then the Luftwaffe's production program was in disarray. The Me 210 was supposed to replace both Me 110, Ju 88 (in many rolls) and Ju 87 and all these programs were in disarray as well.

The solution turned out to be slats and a lengthened tail (seemingly known by even the test pilot) but production was cancelled, those that were produced however were completed off with the lengthened tail and slats. (there were a few other minor changes eg in wing twist) but the opportunity to tool up and ramp up Me 210 production had been lost. The Me 410 with more powerful DB603 engines and a deeper fuselage turned out to be a fine aircraft.

Messerschmitt went broke over the issue, the company now more or less run by the Government, probably more poorly managed.

The Me 210 fiasco could have been avoided, it was merely poor project/risk management.

The Ju 288 also should have been in production by 1942, it failed because of its Jumo 222A/B engines could not achieve 2500hp and there was no adequate plan B.

The Luftwaffe thus found itself with the wrong kit.
 
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The problem is that the Do 217 would not be flying at its maximum speed. The Beaufighter could run at higher speeds because they have less need to watch their fuel usage, and they are radar directed (from the ground and on-board). The Do 217 does not at that time, as far as I am aware, have electronic warning devices so possibly would not have time to pour on the speed before it was too late.



When and in what format was the Me 210 able to do 369mph?

The Me 410 with DB 603 and substantially more power was only capable of 380mph.
 

Of course you can suggest what you want but the fact is that in a German test Ju 88 C-6 managed to achieve only 460km/h (286mph) at 11,5 tonnes with SN-2 (speed loss 22km/h) but without flame dampers (which would have took of 10-15km/h of the speed), so without the antennes but with flame dampers appr. 470km/h (292mph). And according to Mackay max bomb load of C-6 was 500kg.

Juha
 
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And from where all this C3 would have come, grounding all Fw 190 units or what? During the summer 43 there was not enough C3 for full use of 190s but LW had to limit their use.
 

OK, why would would a 900 liter drop tank have less drag than an 1100lb bomb?




Jumo engines could use .462lb/hp/hr at cruise at sea level. Even using that figure for the climb rating of a 211J (1200hp at 2400rpm/1.25Ata) means you are using about 1100lbs an hour for both engines. About 2.4 hours of flight time on the wing fuel after the the tank/s are dropped. Using full power is going to use fuel even faster and operating at higher altitudes with the supercharger in high gear is going to use more fuel per HP/HR, as does using higher rpm (internal friction) You also take off on the internal tanks, unless there is a system to fill the internals from the drop tanks.

And if you stick on drop tank shackles what happens to the speed?

.

You keep focusing on top speed. Time at top speed is limited by three things. One is the limit in the flight manuals, based of engine life and likelihood of breaking the engine/s. two is fuel consumption, and three, also mentioned in the flight manuals, is the temperature of the engines. Granted in combat "you do what you got to do" but over heating the engine cooks the oil and a lubrication failure ends the mission really quick. Most manuals have a little sentence saying the higher powers (climb and all out) are subject both to the time limit AND temperature. Exceed the temperature limit, even if short of the time limit and you should cut power (or open cooling flaps). Granted if you are being shot at it is a gamble as to which will kill you quicker but planning to cruise at higher than recommended cruise settings to lessen the chance of interception is going to mean shorter overhaul life for the engines and increased engine failures per 100/1000 missions.

While a DO 217E was rated at 320mph TOP speed it was also rated at 258mph cruising speed at the same altitude and 245mph economical cruising speed. With BMW 801 engines not being noted for long life (especially the early ones) running around at even 290mph for very long (without enemy plane in sight) might not be a very good operational plan.


Dive bombing at night is NOT a real good idea, And sending even sorted out Me 210s over England in daylight in 1941/42 is also not a real good idea. Chances of pursuing fighter being behind and below in a turning fight pursuit means the Me 210 was out turning it's pursuer. Me 210 can out turn a Spitfire or Typhoon?
 
Juha said:
And from where all this C3 would have come, grounding all Fw 190 units or what? During the summer 43 there was not enough C3 for full use of 190s but LW had to limit their use.
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Juha, could you expand on this statement with some details please. Thanks
 
Hello Milosh
according to Gen Friedrich Kless, the CoS of the Lfl 6, the lack of C3 hampered the operations of 190s during the Zitadelle (the Kursk operation) and especially during the defence of the Orel bulge in the summer of 43.

Juha


PS I did some rereading and the reasons for not have been able to fully employ 190s, especially during the defence of the Orel bulge were, besides inadequate supply of C3, the scarcity of spare BMW 801s and other spare parts.
 
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Juha said:
It's not because it is not true, level bombing wasn't very effective against moving ships but still sank ships now and then. And stationary ships were sunk from BB Tirpitz downwards.
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Level bombing, while not particularly effective against ships, was effective as a tactic. Such bombing would cause ships to break formation while taking evasive action. This would reduce the effective defense against rather exposed but effective skip bombing by isolating individual ships.
 
Elmas said:
HMS Juno (F 46) of the Royal Navy - British Destroyer of the J class - Allied Warships of WWII - uboat.net
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There is controversy over this. See link below.
Juno
" In a recent email from Rod Wise (Australia) he quotes his uncle (John aka 'Jack' Wise) who was on board a ship with Juno, Rod's uncle says he saw three 'Stukas' which he thought would hit them, but hit the Juno. Rod says that his uncle is no longer alive for him to definitively say that his uncle could recognise a Stuka from a Cantz, but the Stuka had become a familiar shape to servicemen in the Med."

What attack profile would the CANT have followed.
 
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CANT Z1007s were level bombers, see HMS Juno, destroyer for some details of the attack.
Few other ships sunk by level bombers: IJN CL Abukuma, German DD Z1, German TB T13, IJN ammo ship Nichii Maru, ocean liners SS California and Dutchess of York.

Juha
 
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Level bombers most definitely did sink or damage ships at sea, though dive bombing was much more effective.

This table shows the relative success of the various types of bombing on various types of ships in the early part of the war (that'll be pre-war for our American friends).



A successful attack was deemed to be one which a ship was either sunk or forced 'to seek extensive repairs over weeks or months'. It does not include ships at anchorage because it was unclear whether the ships or dock installations were the target and such attacks were further considered 'unrepresentative' for war ships specifically because they would be static. Ships re-fitting were not included as these were not considered to be operational.

We are all familiar with vessels manoeuvring frantically when under air attack but the Admiralty's 'Air Defence Instructions, 1939' forbad fast avoiding action against bombers as it was considered likely to decrease the efficiency, accuracy and concentration of anti aircraft fire. Some Captains thought otherwise and the matter was referred to the director of the Naval Air Division in October 1939. In reply the deputy director G.M.B Langley (later a Vice Admiral) pointed out that the ship displacement during time of fall of the bomb was small but conceded that high speed avoiding action might increase bombing error. He also reiterated that trials had demonstrated the ineffectiveness of low speed avoiding action. Everything depended on the speed and manoeuvrability of the ship and the skill of the pilot. His conclusion was that such action should not be taken at the cost of throwing out the AA fire. Despite this it soon became standard practice for Captains of lighter vessels to undertake high speed evasive action when attacked from the air.

Cheers

Steve
 
This table needs to be considered with certain caveats, and the summary about RN AA tactics, is correct in a very general way only.

Turning to British shipping losses to aircraft, the problem is that the period in which the sample is taken is statistically skewed, and not very representative of the overall axis performance. in that period there were a number of main events or activities that affected allied shipping losses. the first is that in that period the germans were on the attack, and frequently caught enemy ships (mostly those of unprepared neutrals underway but still close to port). then we have a number of major disasters such as Dunkirk and Norway that again, in no way can be seen as typical, or rrepresentative of the true effectiveness of certain types of attacks. Perhaps counterbalancing that are the efforts of the long range attackers like the FW200. lastly it is worthwhile to note, that until well into 1942, the germans did not possess any meaningful or effective air launched torpedo force which again skews the reult considerably. by 1942, the torpedo had become a favoured anti-shipping weapon in the German repoitoire

The overwhelming air launched weapon that did by far the most damage to allied shipping was the mine, and this by far was delivered by level bombing.

in 1939, just 10 ships were sunk or damaged by aircraft, all of them from mines. In 1940, this figure shot up to 192 vessels lost, of which 80 were lost to level bombing and mining attacks delivered by the Condor group. this immediately throws into question the accuracy of that table, though my figures are losses, not just attacks, so the results of the table and the results of my statisitcs are not really comparable.

It is worth mentioning as well, that level bombing compared to divebombing was a relatively safe method of delivery for the aircraft, and this safety or survivability increased as the war progressed. two reasons accounted for this. asllied countermeasures ended up being most effective against divebombing, which by 1943 was considered an obsolete method of attack because of the risks it posed. this was accentuated by the introduction of stand off weaponry such as Fritz by the Germans.

As far as tactics and countermeasures are concerned, Allied light ships were unable to fulfil area defence very effectively because of the limitations on their armament and targetting systems. they were reasonably well equipped with CIWs, but their long range gins were just not up to the task. CIWs dont need much in the way of aiming or fire control....you generally just point and shoot, relying on barrage effects to try and do as much disruption as possible. for that reason RN light ships could both manouvre and fire, without much loss of accuracy, and not much effect om mission priority either. British light ships could only offer very limited area defence, until the introduction of dedicated l/r aa guns. They never really solved the limitations of their fc systems, and this in turn dictated their area defence escorts sail straight and on a predictable course. this was perhaps the most significant weakness in RN pre-war preprations, thei choice of HAA fire control was very unfortunate.
On just about every occasion that RN ships were tasked with defending a high value target, like a carrier a BB or even a convoy, they would adopt controlled manouvre tactics, manouvering as a group to maximise the effectiveness of their LR gunnery. This didnt happen until the general introduction of radar controlled gunnery and the introduction, in numbers of suitably armed escorts. throughout 1940, neither of these pre-requisites existed, but increasingly in 1941 and beyond, it did.
 
parsifal said:
This table needs to be considered with certain caveats, and the summary about RN AA tactics, is correct in a very general way only.
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Agree 100% with your first point and as for the RN AA tactics, the summary had better be correct as it is taken, paraphrased, from the Admiralty report. RN officers generally did what they were told if they knew what was good for them and their career

Cheers

Steve
 
The admiralty orders are one issue, and certainly worth noting and appreciating in this discussion. In the context of 1939-40 i think it a fair assesment to say that light ships would adopt manouvre over massed firepower. And at the very beginning, the RN entered the war in the mistaken belief that its AA protectiuon was adequate and effective. later as systems and weaponary was increased and upgraded, there seems to have been a variable approach. There were times when light ships manouvred, and times when they stayed in a fixed formation and maintained station relative to the TG core assets. These observations are not orders based, they are based simply on the observed facts....how the RN reacted at various times. And there were limits to admiralty control believe it or not. The group i am most familar with is the BPF, 1945, wherein its AA procedures against Kamikaze attacks were worked out by Fraser and his staff, not the Admiralty. He eventually submitted his battle orders to the admiralty, who dutifully approved them, but only after the BPF had been action for nearly a month already. By 1945 the RN was well equipped with 1st class stand off weaponary, and had more modern AA FC systems. The decision was taken for the escort to hold station and provide maximum firepower over the vital carrier assets. The results of these tactics were tangible and immediate. British AA effectiveness went from some way behind the USN in terms of rounds per kill, to being roughly twice as efficient.

The point Im making isnt to disagree blanketly to the idea that RN ships used manouvre as a primary means of defence. Particularly in the early war period i think this is very true. further, neither am i disputing the Admiralty orders. Not aware of the orders, but it makes sense that they would make such a call at the times indicated. the admiralty went into the war with a false sense of security regarding the threat of air attack. that rapidly changed as their weapons systems were exposed as having serious flaws. But just as forcefully, the actual reactions to air defence issues were so varied and changed as the war progressed within the RN as to challenge the notion that there was a standard or particular response applied to every situation....it simply did not work out that way.
 
There was certainly an over confidence in anti aircraft defences prevalent in the RN between the wars and in the early part of the second war. Some relatively junior officers did express doubts. Lieutenant Commander J.A.J Dennis recalled the effects of a fleet barrage on a radio controlled Queen Bee radio controlled target during a 1939 exercise whilst he was serving on the destroyer HMS Griffin. He was appalled to see the target fly straight, level and slowly through the barrage unscathed. He considered the anti aircraft defence to be 'pathetic'. (Dennis' papers are held at the IWM).
Cheers
Steve
 
The Queen Bee wasnt supposed to be shot down they were too expensive for that. The ships fired practice rounds with reduced firing charges and dummy shells that burst short of the target. Gunnery referees then noted where the round burst and calculated a hit, a damage or a miss.

Any gunnery officer who accidently shot down a QB drone was in for a very tense interview with the Fleet Gunnery Officer at Whale Island and might find his next posting was the Falkland Islands.
 

Maybe Dennis didn't know that. He was certainly unimpressed with the barrage. I have a reference somewhere in my files for his papers at the IWM if anyone wants to look them up for themselves.

Edit. It also occurs to me that Dennis wrote 'unscathed'. Whether he meant literally or that no hits were awarded by the umpires I know not. I only have access to notes I made several years ago, not to the original documents.

Cheers

Steve
 
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It shouldn't have taken a rocket scientist to figure out that a pair of WW I 2pdr pom-poms on hand worked mounts or a pair of hand worked quad .5in Vickers guns were NOT adequate AA Armament for a destroyer. Or that single 12pdr or 4in gun in local control (cartwheel sight and gun captains eye and wetted finger held high for fire control) weren't going to be satisfactory either no matter how steady a course the ship steered.

The vast majority of British destroyers at the beginning of the war had pretty much only maneuver to depend on.
 
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