Defensive armament for night bombers: was it worth it?

[Vincenzo]

Hi Vincenzo

In terms of absolute numbers, your right, ther is no comparison. However in terms of the percentages of overall numbers, my sources say a different story.

In 1944 for example, I believe the RAF was credited with the destruction of over 800 Luftwaffe Night Fighters. Estimated strength of the Night Fighter forces was approximately 600 aircraft in that time (give or take). That means that the Luftwaffe replaced its overall Force structure at least once in that period.

In the same period, Bomber Command and its associated subordinate elements stood at about 5000 aircraft at any given time. Bomber Commands losses for 1944 were about 3000 aircraft give or take. That means that in that year Bomber Command replaced about 50% of its Force Structure in that period. That means, that as a member of the German Night Fighter Forces you were more about twice as likely to be shot down compared to the target bombers

Need remember it's common that fighter lost more plane compared with own force the fighter common flying more mission.
Some data in '44 Nachtjagd lost ~1200 fighters enemy related (my calculation on ww2.dk pages) the strenght the julliet, first was ~ 970 (this is only indicative need to do media of all months)

 

[fibus]

google "schrage musik".

 

[Glider]

The B-17s flown by RAF 100 Group had the ball turret deleted. And the waist guns I think.
WINGS PALETTE - Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress - Great Britain

I have a photo of a 100 group B17 from 214 squadron and they did keep the ball turret where possible.

 

[Vincenzo]

Hi Vincenzo

In terms of absolute numbers, your right, ther is no comparison. However in terms of the percentages of overall numbers, my sources say a different story.

In 1944 for example, I believe the RAF was credited with the destruction of over 800 Luftwaffe Night Fighters. Estimated strength of the Night Fighter forces was approximately 600 aircraft in that time (give or take). That means that the Luftwaffe replaced its overall Force structure at least once in that period.

In the same period, Bomber Command and its associated subordinate elements stood at about 5000 aircraft at any given time. Bomber Commands losses for 1944 were about 3000 aircraft give or take. That means that in that year Bomber Command replaced about 50% of its Force Structure in that period. That means, that as a member of the German Night Fighter Forces you were more about twice as likely to be shot down compared to the target bombers

again logical error, you compared a point force (luftwaffe nachjagd) with a sum of flow. this comparison is wrong the point force of BC is well under 2000 planes (maybe ~1700)

 

[parsifal]

I dont think I can agree with that position Vincenzo. I think the total force structure needs to be considered, for both sides, as the best approximation of numbers involved.

I concede that the the numbers of Heavy Bombers (Lancasters, Halifax, Stirling, for the most part), generally did not exceed 2000 aircraft, in 1943, for example, the average readines rate for the heavies during the battle for berlin were 1179 Heavies, but a total of 1740 aircraft in total. By the logic you are applying, we need to ignore the risks, and losses suffered by the mediums and Lights supporting the Heavies (Wellingtons, Mosquitoes etc). We should also ignore the efforts of the the supporting arms, the recon elements, the intruder groups, the spoofers, the Night Fighter forces and the like. I dont get that, since the Night Fighter forces also possessed numbers of support elements. I think the most valid comparison is to compare force to force and make a simple comparison

The argument to support your position really falls away when you look later in the war. By July 1944, the average readyh Heavy Bomber Strength of the Command had risen to 1609 aircraft. As far as I know the numbers of big raids had not changed greatly since the Battle Of Berlin, however the sortie rate had soared from around 5000 per month to well over 20000 per month. So, with a heavy bomber force of only 1.36 times bigger than 1943, the RAF was mounting 4.4 times as many sorties. I do know from my reading that the RAF did roughly double sortie rates for individual aircraft (better maintenance, less flak damage I suspect, given that the estimated flak expenditure per kill rose from 3000 rounds per kill in '43 to 16000 rounds per kill in 1944 ) and also improved operational readiness rates in 1944, but it would be very hard to argue that the heavy bomber aircraft alone, even with their increased sortie and readiness rates, and increased numbers, could account completely, or even predominantly for that increase in overall sortie rate. to me ther is only one other possible explanation....the RAF was sending other aircraft over Germany, in addition to the Heavies. I know that the operations of the Mosquito Groups increased dramatically, and I am not aware of any great reduction in Wellington operations (they did decrease as a percentage of the total effort, but not as a raw number). (However Blenheim frontline operations all but disappeared) My guesstimate is that sortie rates across the board roughly doubled in 1944. That, coupled with the 136% expansion of the heavy bomber force means that the Heavies were responsible 55% of the total 20000 monthly sortie rate (speaking very roughly). The remainder must be attributed to the other elements of the command.

I also checked some additional sources concerning the Night Fighter strengths. It seems that most sources quote an average operational strength in 1944 of 800 aircraft, with an average additional strength of 350 for the wild sau formations. In 1943, the average NJG strength was about 650 aircraft.

So even though we can argue semantics all day, about the details of numbers, exactly what you want to include in the force structure to determine casualty rates and the like, the basic numbers underpinning this whole combat relationship has not changed. relatively, it was more dangerous for the Night Fighters than it was for the bombers, and relatively, the NJG groups were suffering a higher attrition rate than Bomber Command. You cant avoid that conclusion, if you look at the numbers subjectively

 

[stona]

google "schrage musik".

An attacker using "Shrage musik" upward firing canon depended absolutely on not being seen in order to position himself for an attack. It was a succesful tactic but if you haven't seen your attacker it doesn't really matter what defensive armament you carry. An evasive manouevre like the British corkscrew also defeated this mode of attack, again you had to see your attacker.
Steve

 

[Vincenzo]

I dont think I can agree with that position Vincenzo. I think the total force structure needs to be considered, for both sides, as the best approximation of numbers involved.

I concede that the the numbers of Heavy Bombers (Lancasters, Halifax, Stirling, for the most part), generally did not exceed 2000 aircraft, in 1943, for example, the average readines rate for the heavies during the battle for berlin were 1179 Heavies, but a total of 1740 aircraft in total. By the logic you are applying, we need to ignore the risks, and losses suffered by the mediums and Lights supporting the Heavies (Wellingtons, Mosquitoes etc). We should also ignore the efforts of the the supporting arms, the recon elements, the intruder groups, the spoofers, the Night Fighter forces and the like. I dont get that, since the Night Fighter forces also possessed numbers of support elements. I think the most valid comparison is to compare force to force and make a simple comparison

The argument to support your position really falls away when you look later in the war. By July 1944, the average readyh Heavy Bomber Strength of the Command had risen to 1609 aircraft. As far as I know the numbers of big raids had not changed greatly since the Battle Of Berlin, however the sortie rate had soared from around 5000 per month to well over 20000 per month. So, with a heavy bomber force of only 1.36 times bigger than 1943, the RAF was mounting 4.4 times as many sorties. I do know from my reading that the RAF did roughly double sortie rates for individual aircraft (better maintenance, less flak damage I suspect, given that the estimated flak expenditure per kill rose from 3000 rounds per kill in '43 to 16000 rounds per kill in 1944 ) and also improved operational readiness rates in 1944, but it would be very hard to argue that the heavy bomber aircraft alone, even with their increased sortie and readiness rates, and increased numbers, could account completely, or even predominantly for that increase in overall sortie rate. to me ther is only one other possible explanation....the RAF was sending other aircraft over Germany, in addition to the Heavies. I know that the operations of the Mosquito Groups increased dramatically, and I am not aware of any great reduction in Wellington operations (they did decrease as a percentage of the total effort, but not as a raw number). (However Blenheim frontline operations all but disappeared) My guesstimate is that sortie rates across the board roughly doubled in 1944. That, coupled with the 136% expansion of the heavy bomber force means that the Heavies were responsible 55% of the total 20000 monthly sortie rate (speaking very roughly). The remainder must be attributed to the other elements of the command.

I also checked some additional sources concerning the Night Fighter strengths. It seems that most sources quote an average operational strength in 1944 of 800 aircraft, with an average additional strength of 350 for the wild sau formations. In 1943, the average NJG strength was about 650 aircraft.

So even though we can argue semantics all day, about the details of numbers, exactly what you want to include in the force structure to determine casualty rates and the like, the basic numbers underpinning this whole combat relationship has not changed. relatively, it was more dangerous for the Night Fighters than it was for the bombers, and relatively, the NJG groups were suffering a higher attrition rate than Bomber Command. You cant avoid that conclusion, if you look at the numbers subjectively

The bomber command with a force around 1700 planes lost around 2700 planes in '44
The nachjagd with a force around 900 planes lost around 1200 planes in '44

 

[parsifal]

The bomber command with a force around 1700 planes lost around 2700 planes in '44
The nachjagd with a force around 900 planes lost around 1200 planes in '44

No, thats not correct. Bomber Command possessed 1700 Heavy Bombers ready for operations (on average) in 1944, with a further number of supporting aircraft, including Mosquito Bombers, and Fighter Bombers, Mosquito Intruder aircraft and fighters. Then there were the medium bombers (Welingtons mostly), the ECM and spoof aircraft. In total, I believe the total force amounted to well over 3000, some sources say in excess of 5000.

Trying to attribute the losses for the entire command to just the operational numbers of Heavy Bombers skews the statistics very badly, and innaccurately. If you wanted to do that, you would need to at least try to compare apples to apples. You would need to restrict the Night Fighters to operational and ready, which shrank massively throughout 1944 as the fuel shortages, lack of spares, and shortages of pilots began to bite deeper and deeper into Luftwaffe operatrional readiness rates.

But even this is so open to misinterpretation that I believe the only safe way to approach a generalised statisitical analysis like this is to look at the overall force structures of the two organizations, that is the total force availability of each. Non operational Luftwaffe groups could transfer pilots to operational groups, and a proportion of those 2700 aircraft that you attribute to Bomber Command were absorbed by aircraft other than the ready and operational heavies....the mediums and the Light Bombers, for example

 

[Vincenzo]

No, thats not correct. Bomber Command possessed 1700 Heavy Bombers ready for operations (on average) in 1944, with a further number of supporting aircraft, including Mosquito Bombers, and Fighter Bombers, Mosquito Intruder aircraft and fighters. Then there were the medium bombers (Welingtons mostly), the ECM and spoof aircraft. In total, I believe the total force amounted to well over 3000, some sources say in excess of 5000.

Trying to attribute the losses for the entire command to just the operational numbers of Heavy Bombers skews the statistics very badly, and innaccurately. If you wanted to do that, you would need to at least try to compare apples to apples. You would need to restrict the Night Fighters to operational and ready, which shrank massively throughout 1944 as the fuel shortages, lack of spares, and shortages of pilots began to bite deeper and deeper into Luftwaffe operatrional readiness rates.

But even this is so open to misinterpretation that I believe the only safe way to approach a generalised statisitical analysis like this is to look at the overall force structures of the two organizations, that is the total force availability of each. Non operational Luftwaffe groups could transfer pilots to operational groups, and a proportion of those 2700 aircraft that you attribute to Bomber Command were absorbed by aircraft other than the ready and operational heavies....the mediums and the Light Bombers, for example

not look also your source 1700 it's with mosquitoes and until radiation others twin engined bomber, fighterbomb in bomber command ? fighter in bomber command? idk for ECM but i think incluse. imho like here RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary the numbers are for strenght. 3000, 5000 you tell, where? if you counted also the training maybe but they don't go in battle.

No the loss are the loss of bomber command not the generic bombers losses, no light bombers they are not in bomber command. 2770 are official loss for '44 not my attribued