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still, the city smashing raids after June were probably more successful , and certainly less costly than the earlier efforts September '43 to April'44. These were very coslty and of limited value really , but the raids after June were really quite accurate and really were flattening the cities.....
Imagine if that ability to flatten such areas was directed at the large oil pants?
Both.
No one would claim the 8th AF devoted as much effort to area bombing as Bomber Command did, but it's wrong to claim they didn't do it at all. Until 1944 they were pretty open about their area bombing against Germany, after that they removed all reference to area bombing from their records, although they still carried out area attacks.
This is an old post but I agree Hop. It is worthwhile to note that Northern Europe weather and visibility precluded
visual acquisition of the Aiming Point in many instances from October through February and mid March.
I question LeMay's judgement regarding Stateside shortcomings. Having personally gone through the Bombardier Training Program I can attest to it's quality.Usually lost in the Precision Bombing Debate is the definition of "precision." We should start with the AAF criterion of the 1000-foot circle around the aim point. The 1000-ft CEP (circular error probable) BEGAN with the notion that half the bombs would strike outside that circle. A 1000-pounder hitting at 1050 feet still would inflict some damage but presumably would not be cited as a success. The fact was: the 1000-ft CEP was seldom achieved, though things did improve (they had to.) In researching the Curt LeMay biography, IIRC when took the 305th BG to England he found that the 8AF could not tell where half its ordnance landed--a hellacious big CEP. (In the highly controversial Monte Cassino bombing, Gen. Mark Clark's trailer was rocked by explosions miles behind the lines. And that was in broad daylight.) There were of course multiple reasons: equipment, weather, and especially training. In each of his commands LeMay established remedial training programs to compensate for Stateside shortcomings.
I question LeMay's judgement regarding Stateside shortcomings. Having personally gone through the Bombardier Training Program I can attest to it's quality.
I wonder if those remedial schools were before your time in training.
I believe that the training quality issues were for the initial intakes of the 8th AF, and the later trainees benefited from improved training informed by combat experience/
Bill - LeMay's experiences and reflections pointed to the very earliest days of 8th AF operations in fall and Winter of 1942 - based on observed results.I question LeMay's judgement regarding Stateside shortcomings. Having personally gone through the Bombardier Training Program I can attest to it's quality.
Thanks for the info. I graduated from Bombardier School September 30, 1944 so the training I received would have included the changes he made.Bill - LeMay's experiences and reflections pointed to the very earliest days of 8th AF operations in fall and Winter of 1942 - based on observed results.
The trained officer corps was at a very low level in 1938-1939-1940 due to budget constraints. The crews and Navigator/bombardiers were trained and deployed without the integration of combat experienced trainers or combat experience relative to weather and least of all, the combined systems/doctrines and flight disciplines that led him to institute Lead Crew training.
I suspect that your training program in the states was circa mid-late 1943 after more Lessons Learned filtered back to the States? Additionally, the B-17E and early Fs went to England without the Automatic Flight Control systems that permitted the Bombardier to take over control from pilot during the bomb run from the IP (IIRC).