Did the RAF have designs for a long range escort fighter?

[Milosh]

If you were to put up 24 unescorted B17 against 40 late war German fighters I doubt the result would be very different.

Yes Glider, the Bloody 100th didn't its nick name for no reason.

 

[stubbsy]

This picture shows the internal, rear fuselage, fuel tank fitted at Wright Field for the Spitfire IX. It had an approximate 42 gallon capacity, as opposed to the Vickers modification which provided 72 gallons. The extra weight affected the fuel/weight balance characteristics, which required adjustment to the elevator, to make it easier to fly. Whereas the RAF saw this as a problem, the Americans thought it was operationally acceptable if the rear fuel tank was used in the first part of the transit to France.

 

[buffnut453]

The first bombing missions by BC were in fact, daylight raids. And they suffered terribly for a couple reasons:
First, this was early in the war and BC was using older types (Battles, Wellingtons, and so on).
Secondly, they were unescorted in airspace that was, at this stage of the war, dominated by the Luftwaffe.

Virtually all of the daylight missions BC conducted ended with a serious mauling of the bombers.

Even later, when the USAAF initially started thier daylight mission3, they suffered such losses that the missions were stopped while the brass evaluated the situation.

The RAF's decision to move their bombing missions to night-time was a sound move, but it wasn't the original plan.

I'm aware of that GrauGeist, indeed the Fortress MkI first undertook daylight bombing missions with the RAF in 1941...and it was a dismal failure.

The context of my post was PBehn's original claim that "all RAF bombers had inline engines" which is clearly incorrect, and then his assertion that BC aircraft like the Lancaster would have failed in daylight missions but, by the time the Lanc came into service, BC had switched almost entirely to night missions so PBehn's comment is moot at best. As noted by Tony, BC did carry out a number of daylight raids late in the war once air superiority was pretty well established.

 

[Shortround6]

This picture shows the internal, rear fuselage, fuel tank fitted at Wright Field for the Spitfire IX. It had an approximate 42 gallon capacity, as opposed to the Vickers modification which provided 72 gallons. The extra weight affected the fuel/weight balance characteristics, which required adjustment to the elevator, to make it easier to fly. Whereas the RAF saw this as a problem, the Americans thought it was operationally acceptable if the rear fuel tank was used in the first part of the transit to France.

This is part of the problem with an escort fighter. The Problem is NOT getting into France or Germany BUT getting OUT.

going back to the Merlin 45 for a moment, it could burn 2 1/2 gallons a minute at 16lbs boost. Lets assume you get to your "target" with 90 imp gals of fuel. You used drop tanks/extra internal tanks/pixie dust to get there.
5 minutes combat is 12.5 gallons. The Melrin 45 could burn 88imp gallons an hour at 3000rpm and 9lbs of boost. It used 70 imp gallons an hour at 2650rpm and 6lbs boost. So 15 minutes of Max continuous is what? 80 Gals an hour? 15 minutes needs 20 gallons. You need about 1/2 hour's worth of fuel as reserve to find home base and land after reaching the English coast (at a minimum) and that is at about 200mph IND using about 30gal an hor or 15 gallons. SO 47.5 gallons are already accounted for. That leaves 42.5 gallons to get home with and if you are over German held territory you can't putz along at 200mph ind. At 20,000ft and 300mph the fuel consumption is around 46-48gph.

Practical 'radius' of Spitfire would be 300 miles or less. Now this certainly much better than a Spitfire without extra tanks and/or drop tanks but is it what was wanted or needed? It is 247 miles from Ipswich to Dusseldorf.
Distance Ipswich ? Dusseldorf - Distance between Ipswich and Dusseldorf

Most countries did not start up, warm up or take-off on drop tanks. The internal tanks had a more reliable fuel feed and take-offs were done on the internal tanks to prevent accidents. Switch over to drop tanks was done at a "safe" altitude so the plane could abort the mission and return to field if the drop tanks failed to feed. 10-20 gallons of internal fuel could be used up getting to the switch over point (big honkers like the P-47 could use 25-35 gallons of fuel). Some planes, like the P-51, stayed on the internal tank/s longer in order to solve CG problems. So figure need internal tankage on that. You want the Spit to have 90 gallons to fight and get home? it needs 100-110 gallons of internal tanks to take-off, very few countries fitted fuel pumps or systems to transfer fuel from external tanks to internal although an internal tank was the "overflow" tank for the return line from the fuel feed system. Another reason for using 10-20 gallons before switching to drop tanks. With full internal tanks any fuel returned from carb/injectors would go out overflow vents and not only be lost but create a fire hazard.

Also please note that The Spitfires going into combat during the BoB and in 1941 had burned off around 20 gallons or more just warming up, taking off and climbing to altitude. They were NOT entering combat with 84-87 gallons of fuel on board. They were around 300lbs lighter than 'nominal' take-off weight.

This is a test of a Spit V with a 90 gal external tank, just look at the climb numbers (and split the difference) to see what kind of effect even 45 imp gallons extra fuel might have.
Spitfire Mk.VB (Tropical) AB.320 Report

Add around 1 minute to 20,000ft? cut climb rate at 20,000ft by 12%?
Granted it is a tropical version but the Spit V was having enough trouble in the 2nd half of 1941 with 109Fs and Fw 190s without sticking another 250-500lbs of fuel in it.

MK VIII and MK IX may be better but the British had to wait for the 2 stage Merlin and the 100/130 fuel (Merlin 45 was designed/built to use 100/115-120).

 

[pbehn]

I'm aware of that GrauGeist, indeed the Fortress MkI first undertook daylight bombing missions with the RAF in 1941...and it was a dismal failure.

The context of my post was PBehn's original claim that "all RAF bombers had inline engines" which is clearly incorrect, and then his assertion that BC aircraft like the Lancaster would have failed in daylight missions but, by the time the Lanc came into service, BC had switched almost entirely to night missions so PBehn's comment is moot at best. As noted by Tony, BC did carry out a number of daylight raids late in the war once air superiority was pretty well established.

The point was not the engine configuration but that the majority were water cooled. The discussion was daylight raids, the Stirling was mincemeat on night raids purely due to its low altitude and lack of speed. Protecting a water cooled engine is difficult and adds a lot of weight, which must be subtracted from the payload the chief advantage of the lancaster especially.

The Lancaster was used on a raid in 1942 on Augsberg, despite diversionary raids and returning mostly in darkness out of 12 AC 7 failed to return. That was a surprise low level raid which to my knowledge wasn't repeated.
RAF - Augsburg, 17th April 1942

 

[stona]

The Augsburg raid was one of Harris' experimental raids, using the new Lancaster bomber. The MAN factory was selected by Harris for tactical reasons. The Ministry of Economic Warfare would have preferred a different target and the correspondence and recriminations, which included the Air Ministry and Prime Minister, went on until May 2nd.
Despite the heroism of the men of Nos. 44 and 97 Squadrons the raid was far too costly and, as you say, the experiment was not repeated.

On the same night 214 sorties were flown by Wellingtons, Stirlings, Halifaxes and Manchesters which bombed Hamburg in what was a more familiar role for Bomber Command. 10 aircraft or 4.7% of the attacking force was lost.

Cheers

Steve

 

[buffnut453]

The point was not the engine configuration but that the majority were water cooled. The discussion was daylight raids, the Stirling was mincemeat on night raids purely due to its low altitude and lack of speed. Protecting a water cooled engine is difficult and adds a lot of weight, which must be subtracted from the payload the chief advantage of the lancaster especially.

The Lancaster was used on a raid in 1942 on Augsberg, despite diversionary raids and returning mostly in darkness out of 12 AC 7 failed to return. That was a surprise low level raid which to my knowledge wasn't repeated.
RAF - Augsburg, 17th April 1942

I don't want this to get into another of these constantly evolving arguments. You said that all RAF heavy bombers had inline engines. That's just plain wrong. Period.

I don't understand your point about protecting inline engines. Are you suggesting that Lancasters operating in daylight would have needed additional protection for their engines? If so, that's ok but bear in mind that the Lancaster would still have had a decisive lifting advantage over USAAF heavy bombers, particularly the B-17. Was there any wartime discussion of the need to enhance armour protection for Merlin engines on heavy bombers?

Unescorted daylight raids by heavy bombers did not succeed until the advent of long-range escorts, which is the whole thrust of this thread. Whether they were British Lancasters or American B-17s, unescorted deep-penetration raids were simply bound to fail. The RAF adapted to the issue by moving to night bombing while the USAAF persevered in daylight but the early USAAF missions were typically much shorter-range thru all of 1942 and much of 1943. By the time a suitable long-range escort came along, in the form of the P-51C and D, the die was set and Bomber Command was fully occupied on night bombing. Trying to move from night to day would have resulted in stopping operations which would have given Germany needed breathing space...and that's a foolish thing to do in wartime.

You reference the Augsberg raid from April 1942 but that was only undertaken in daylight because of the point-nature of the target and the desire to increase the chances of hitting the target. Note that the USAAF didn't fly a mission into Germany until January 1943 and even then it was a port not a deep-penetration raid.

The combination of day and night bombing provided no let-up for German defences and undoubtedly contributed to shortening the war but I still see nothing in your statements that shows any marked difference in overall capability between the heavy bombers of the RAF or the USAAF in the 1942-1944 timeframe. Tactics and employment were different, and that led to different technical solutions to problems. However, the USAAF's daylight efforts were not a success until long-range escorts arrived on the scene. The RAF never tried long-range escorted daylight missions for its heavy bombers because, by the time a suitable escort fighter was available, it would simply be too difficult to change the tactical employment...plus "round the clock bombing" was seen as a positive thing from an enemy attrition perspective.

 

[stona]

Very early in the Lancaster's career, July 1941, the Air Staff called for an investigation into the possibility of developing removable armour to be fitted to the Lancaster for daylight operations. It was to protect the tail turret, flying controls, fuel tanks and engines and was expected to weigh about 2,000lbs. That's a lot of armour.

Sorley and Freeman at the Air Ministry were very keen on the idea and hoped to use armoured Lancasters in daylight missions in 1942. Trials were completed in April 1942 and the conclusion was that the armour offered "a fair degree" of protection.

Subsequently 12 of these special Lancasters were sent to 5 Group. Freeman told Harris to allocate them to a squadron that would be freed from night bombing and told to "devote its whole attention to a technical and tactical study of daylight raiding."

So keen was Freeman that he ordered a further 100 of these special Lancasters, although he was aware that Harris wasn't keen. He wrote to Harris:

"I know you do not like the specially armoured Lancasters but I want you to give them a very thorough trial. The lessons we hope to learn from them about daylight attack may be of enormous value and affect the whole range of tactical doctrine."

He underestimated Harris who despised the whole idea. Not only did it take one of his squadrons away from night operations, it reduced the bomb load carried and it seemed to Harris that Freeman was using his men as guinea pigs in a dangerous experiment. There followed a bad tempered exchange of letters in which Harris openly accused Freeman of gambling with his men's lives, a accusation which Freeman rejected, finishing by writing:

"It is possible, for example, that our casualties on the Augsburg raid might have been 50% less if the armour had been carried by our aircraft. Instructions have been given to for the armour to be made as far as possible detachable and I should now be glad if you would carry out the orders given to you."

Again, he underestimated Harris who simply refused. He wrote back saying:

"If this armoured Lancaster proposal is to stand I must ask for an official directive to which I can register my official protest."

Harris had his way and in October the detachable armour was placed in permanent storage. Freeman wrote wistfully that "it may be possible to introduce them [armour plates] at some time into future production."

So, yes, there was a plan to armour the Lancaster for daylight operations. It never happened because Harris simply refused to countenance the idea and was anyway committed to the night time campaign.

Cheers

Steve

 

[buffnut453]

Thanks Steve. That's interesting stuff. Agree 2000lb is a lot of armour but I presume not all was used solely for the engines. That said, it's still one seventh of a reasonably standard load which still leaves the Lanc carrying more than its USAAF counterparts.

 

[stona]

Thanks Steve. That's interesting stuff. Agree 2000lb is a lot of armour but I presume not all was used solely for the engines. That said, it's still one seventh of a reasonably standard load which still leaves the Lanc carrying more than its USAAF counterparts.

Not all for the engines, though they were to be well protected. I have a drawing somewhere which shows all the major components of the armour. It was intended primarily as protection from fighter attack and I think the US experience probably showed that Harris had been right to reject the idea, hence the plate languishing in storage for the rest of the war.

It was barely more than a proposal in any case, but that is due entirely to Harris' opposition, some might say intransigence!

Cheers

Steve

 

[buffnut453]

Harris certainly could be...I think the polite phrase is "single-minded".

 

[stona]

One of the paradoxes of Arthur Harris is that he demanded and expected complete loyalty and obedience from his subordinates whilst adopting a more 'flexible' attitude towards the orders of his own superiors.

The copy of the letter asking Harris to follow the orders he had been given that Freeman sent to Sorley bears the hand written note, "The only way to deal with Bert [Harris] is to treat him rough." He was wrong. He should have fired him, but never did.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

If I may cut in:

This is part of the problem with an escort fighter. The Problem is NOT getting into France or Germany BUT getting OUT.

Very true.

going back to the Merlin 45 for a moment, it could burn 2 1/2 gallons a minute at 16lbs boost. Lets assume you get to your "target" with 90 imp gals of fuel. You used drop tanks/extra internal tanks/pixie dust to get there.
5 minutes combat is 12.5 gallons. The Melrin 45 could burn 88imp gallons an hour at 3000rpm and 9lbs of boost. It used 70 imp gallons an hour at 2650rpm and 6lbs boost. So 15 minutes of Max continuous is what? 80 Gals an hour? 15 minutes needs 20 gallons. You need about 1/2 hour's worth of fuel as reserve to find home base and land after reaching the English coast (at a minimum) and that is at about 200mph IND using about 30gal an hor or 15 gallons. SO 47.5 gallons are already accounted for. That leaves 42.5 gallons to get home with and if you are over German held territory you can't putz along at 200mph ind. At 20,000ft and 300mph the fuel consumption is around 46-48gph.

Re. the bolded part - having extra 25 imp gals (give or take) of internal fuel really means something for the frugal Spitfire IMO.

Practical 'radius' of Spitfire would be 300 miles or less. Now this certainly much better than a Spitfire without extra tanks and/or drop tanks but is it what was wanted or needed? It is 247 miles from Ipswich to Dusseldorf.
Distance Ipswich ? Dusseldorf - Distance between Ipswich and Dusseldorf

Negates the threat of the LW fighters based in Abeville and Gilze Rijen, ie. in France and Netherlands/Low countries?

Most countries did not start up, warm up or take-off on drop tanks. The internal tanks had a more reliable fuel feed and take-offs were done on the internal tanks to prevent accidents. Switch over to drop tanks was done at a "safe" altitude so the plane could abort the mission and return to field if the drop tanks failed to feed. 10-20 gallons of internal fuel could be used up getting to the switch over point (big honkers like the P-47 could use 25-35 gallons of fuel). Some planes, like the P-51, stayed on the internal tank/s longer in order to solve CG problems. So figure need internal tankage on that. You want the Spit to have 90 gallons to fight and get home? it needs 100-110 gallons of internal tanks to take-off, very few countries fitted fuel pumps or systems to transfer fuel from external tanks to internal although an internal tank was the "overflow" tank for the return line from the fuel feed system. Another reason for using 10-20 gallons before switching to drop tanks. With full internal tanks any fuel returned from carb/injectors would go out overflow vents and not only be lost but create a fire hazard.

The British have had a system, installed in Fairey Fulmar, where the drop tank fuel was used to fill the internal fuel tank. So pretty early in the war. Had anybody wanted it, same system would be installed in a Spitfire (as would better props earlier on, or two-speed Merlins etc.).
The F6F-6 and F4U-4 were also outfitted with similar systems, but not the earlier variants.

Also please note that The Spitfires going into combat during the BoB and in 1941 had burned off around 20 gallons or more just warming up, taking off and climbing to altitude. They were NOT entering combat with 84-87 gallons of fuel on board. They were around 300lbs lighter than 'nominal' take-off weight.

20 imp gals @ 7.2 lb per gallon makes 144 lbs. Granted, some fuel was also used in shorter or longer horizontal flight in some cases.

 

[Juha]

The company front head on attacks were as much a response to the escorts as bomber defensive fire and from posts I have read here were in retrospect probably a mistake.
Are you saying that using 25 fighters to attack a formation of 1000 bombers is "ungentlemanly conduct" Squadrons of fighters fight together, 25 fighters is half of the Big Wing used by the RAF in 1940.


If the guns were aimed as accurately as you say then they would hit the target frequently and an escort would not be required because any aircraft coming within 600 yards would be hit and between 5 and 8 hits (I read here) would normally destroy the attacker. Despite all the "computerized" gun sights no deep penetration raid was attempted after the disastrous losses suffered. That you could say is my "source"

I didnt mean that bullets were thrown up at random but that the aiming even with so called computerised sights was not good enough to hit enough fighters to repel attacks, again I say that if the aiming was accurate an escort would not be needed, it was introduced because a bombers defensive fire was not as good as everyone from the "bomber doctrine" thought it would be. In this conflict it was hard for a bomber to destroy a LW plane and even harder to kill a LW pilot but relatively easy for a LW fighter to destroy a bomber and crew. Germany was losing the war but without escort fighters they would have won the daylight bombing battle IMO.

As far as night fighter defense goes I think a different game played out. A night fighter was in a different position, it is almost impossible to make a forced landing at night and parachuting out in complete darkness is no picnic either, any bomber showing an alert rear gunner was avoided and an easier target looked for. Schrage music put an end to that.

E.g. 6 March 44 the first LW head-on attack against the Mission 250 was made by 107 109s and 190s, they hit the 3rd Bomber Division. Of course not all 107 attacked in one massive line abreast formation but in several smaller line abreast formations one after another.

I haven't say anything on the accuracy of defensive fire of bomber formations, only that according to gunner training manuals I have seen gunners aimed at individual planes, aiming isn't a synonyme for hitting.

Escort was essential for bomber formations, that was learned by all major air powers by hard way. But US heavy bombers were at first difficult targets for LW fighters because their resilience and heavy fire power, but by giving their fighters heavier firepower and improving their attack tactics they got upper hand and only LR escorts saved USAAF daylight bombing campaign.

Schrage music didn't put an end to that. It just made much easier and safer to attack bomber's underside. It is much easier in nighttime to see an a/c against sky than against dark earth but if the rear gunner saw the attacking fighter in time, most of the experts went to look an easier target, whether their fighter had Schrage music armament installed or not.

Juha

 

[pbehn]

I haven't say anything on the accuracy of defensive fire of bomber formations, only that according to gunner training manuals I have seen gunners aimed at individual planes, aiming isn't a synonyme for hitting.

Of course they aimed at individual targets but at 600 meters 1 degree is about 5 metres, range is estimated and varying by 100s of meters per second and you must estimate the lead on a target which unhelpfully is piloted not to be hit.

 

[Shortround6]

Re. the bolded part - having extra 25 imp gals (give or take) of internal fuel really means something for the frugal Spitfire IMO.

perhaps: lets look at two data sheets (if any one has a better one for the spitfire please post)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit8adsaussie.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/mustang-III-ads-3.jpg

Please note that the Mustang, with it's extra 30 gal of fuel is good for a "nominal" extra 210 miles range at economical speed ( which is 33mph faster than the Spitfire). USAAF rated the Mustang at a 150 mile radius with that much fuel and NO drop tanks and 460 miles (?) with about 120/125 IMP gallons worth of drop tanks. Data sheet says the Mustang is good for 1710 miles of "range" with that fuel load. the MK VIII is good for a 'nominal' 1265 miles with a 90 gallon drop tank. Granted if escorting British bombers the escorts won't have to cruise quite so high and less fuel is burned getting to altitude and perhaps cruise is a bit better (?).
See this page for difference in climb for a MK IX with and without a 30 gallon exterior tank.
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/bf274climb.jpg

If you can afford the performance "hit" so be it. 30 gals of fuel is closer to 300lbs of weight including tankage.

Negates the threat of the LW fighters based in Abeville and Gilze Rijen, ie. in France and Netherlands/Low countries?

Yes and no. It may help negate the threat to the bombers somewhat but it means the Fighters, even if operated in relays and not tied to the bombers from beginning to end have to maintain a high cruising speed ( 50%-100% higher fuel consumption per hour) to help avoid being bounced themselves, both in going and out going. You have to keep the rate of attrition low for BOTH the bombers and fighters.

The British have had a system, installed in Fairey Fulmar, where the drop tank fuel was used to fill the internal fuel tank. So pretty early in the war. Had anybody wanted it, same system would be installed in a Spitfire (as would better props earlier on, or two-speed Merlins etc.).
The F6F-6 and F4U-4 were also outfitted with similar systems, but not the earlier variants.

American system shows up too late to do any real good.

20 imp gals @ 7.2 lb per gallon makes 144 lbs. Granted, some fuel was also used in shorter or longer horizontal flight in some cases.

Plus the weight of the tank/s. and 20 more gallons is only 104 gallons? 20 gallons won't run the engine for more than 30 minutes even at moderate cruise speeds(if that, about 17 minutes at max cruise or about 100 miles at max cruise at 20,000ft). It requires very careful juggling of cruise speeds to gain any real benefit from 20 gals unless the goal is to bomb further into the low countries and leave Germany untouched.

 

[pbehn]

I don't want this to get into another of these constantly evolving arguments. You said that all RAF heavy bombers had inline engines. That's just plain wrong. Period.

I don't understand your point about protecting inline engines. Are you suggesting that Lancasters operating in daylight would have needed additional protection for their engines? If so, that's ok but bear in mind that the Lancaster would still have had a decisive lifting advantage over USAAF heavy bombers, particularly the B-17. Was there any wartime discussion of the need to enhance armour protection for Merlin engines on heavy bombers?

Unescorted daylight raids by heavy bombers did not succeed until the advent of long-range escorts, which is the whole thrust of this thread. Whether they were British Lancasters or American B-17s, unescorted deep-penetration raids were simply bound to fail. The RAF adapted to the issue by moving to night bombing while the USAAF persevered in daylight but the early USAAF missions were typically much shorter-range thru all of 1942 and much of 1943. By the time a suitable long-range escort came along, in the form of the P-51C and D, the die was set and Bomber Command was fully occupied on night bombing. Trying to move from night to day would have resulted in stopping operations which would have given Germany needed breathing space...and that's a foolish thing to do in wartime.

You reference the Augsberg raid from April 1942 but that was only undertaken in daylight because of the point-nature of the target and the desire to increase the chances of hitting the target. Note that the USAAF didn't fly a mission into Germany until January 1943 and even then it was a port not a deep-penetration raid.

The combination of day and night bombing provided no let-up for German defences and undoubtedly contributed to shortening the war but I still see nothing in your statements that shows any marked difference in overall capability between the heavy bombers of the RAF or the USAAF in the 1942-1944 timeframe. Tactics and employment were different, and that led to different technical solutions to problems. However, the USAAF's daylight efforts were not a success until long-range escorts arrived on the scene. The RAF never tried long-range escorted daylight missions for its heavy bombers because, by the time a suitable escort fighter was available, it would simply be too difficult to change the tactical employment...plus "round the clock bombing" was seen as a positive thing from an enemy attrition perspective.

Just because you "discounted the Stirling" doesn't make your statement about all RAF heavy bombers having in-line engines any more correct. Rather like your question on "How do you make a protective formation with so many different aircraft?" Bomber Command didn't fly in formation during night missions because it was impossible. I also fail to understand the point you're trying to make with "there is no way the British could mount a daylight campaign without crippling losses". The RAF had already decided that daylight operations were impractical, hence the switch to night ops. There was never any consideration of flying in dayligh

This already is a circular argument and it is driving me nuts. This is a thread entitled "Did the RAF have any designs for a long range fighter escort"? I asked the simple question "what would an RAF long range escort, escort" To my mind no RAF bomber was ever capable of it in daylight except the mosquito. They didn't have the defense or the altitude performance. However I have been convinced by the technical arguments. 0.303mm brownings mounted in turrets were ample to defend a formation and so there was no reason for the RAF shouldn't mount daylight raids with their Stirlings, Halifaxes and Lancasters as and when available, it must be a mystery why they didn't. Additionally there was no reason for a long range escort for the US daylight bombers. I presume the US was just too full of aluminium merlins and pilots.

In answer to the thread question, long range escorts were never necessary so the RAF didn't bother.
Source: This thread

 

[Mike Williams]

perhaps: lets look at two data sheets (if any one has a better one for the spitfire please post)
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit8adsaussie.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/mustang-III-ads-3.jpg

I don't know if this spitfire data sheet is "better", but it may be of interest as it shows range info: Spitfire H.F. VIII Aircraft data Card.

 

[stubbsy]

So this brings me to the next question, if Leigh-Mallory's team assessed a Spitfire IX with a 45gal external tank had an operational range of 230 miles, how was it that the Mustang with only 30 extra gallons more fuel than the Spitfire and NO drop tanks was, according to Shortround6, rated by the USAAF to fly 460 miles?

The answer, I believe, is in the willingness of the respective RAF and USAAF communities to accept the operational risk. If every worst-case argument defines the figures the commander chooses not to accept the risk. This is what I think Leigh-Mallory did. Whereas the USN fighters in the Pacific (flying up to 600 miles – mostly over the sea ref: Gregory Boyington, Baa Baa Black Sheep, London, Putnam, 1958, p. 147-148) and those of the USAAF, led by Kepner had a totally different perspective; they was much more aggressive and, therefore, willing to take the operational risk.

For instance the Americans learned not to drop their drop tanks at the first sight of other aircraft, as the Germans had realised the P-47 vulnerability in this regard quite early.

Indeed, AIR/556 FC/S.29970/Ops.1 dated 28 Dec 1944 recognised this noting that 'navigation by fighters, once they are airborne is purely D.R. 'and that such dead reckoning 'navigation is very satisfactory and is uniformly better than the bombers''. Indeed, it was 'so good that unless the weather is appalling, little use is made of the homing facilities, which are first class.

'Drop tanks are never dropped unless positive identification of the Hun has been made.'

'Training consists almost entirely of instrument flying and formation, at which they are much better than we are. The weather makes little difference except for landing and they will land in much worse conditions than we will. It should be noted that the fighters will take off, land and operate in worse weather than the bombers without any blind approach facilities. No gunnery training, no night flying and practically no cross-country training are undertaken.' Finally in the Conclusions the report assessed the Americans as 'much more go ahead than we are' and 'much greater realists'.

The Americans asked 'if there is any real need for night flying training for the amount of night flying' they did. 'If they are going to crash at night in operational aircraft why not let them do it operationally, why practice.' and "I know its no fun to fly with the fuselage tank full but if we can lets do it, in any case no war is fun and we gain operationally'

So the difference, in my opinion comes down to leadership and risk management; something the Americans handled better than the British.

 

[stona]

A very limited man power reserve will always lead to a more cautious approach to accepting casualties. Nonetheless, I think you make a valid point.

Cheers

Steve