Did the RAF have designs for a long range escort fighter?

[stona]

I think the problem for the Americans related to the weather conditions of Western Europe.

Self evidently the bomb sights they would use, principally the Norden Mod5/M-7, M-9 and M-9B, were optical sights. If you couldn't see the ground and target you didn't have a sighting system at all.

US bombing using radar (H2X) was woeful, the results were often worse than those admitted by the British in the Butt Report. There are several reasons for this, beyond the scope of a concise reply.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

I always thought that the obvious flaw to a daytime precision bombing raid was that if you use 600 bombers targeting the same point they will all release at the same point.

 

[stona]

I always thought that the obvious flaw to a daytime precision bombing raid was that if you use 600 bombers targeting the same point they will all release at the same point.

Yep. The USAAF obviously tried to work out better ways of bombing. One of the factors leading all but the first Group(s) bombing to be less accurate was the obscuring of the aiming point by smoke and dust raised by the first bombs to fall.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Lets face it, AS PRACTICED precision bombing in the WW II by large formations meant hitting the right city. In 1939-42 even that could not be guaranteed, especially at night.

Test results under optimum conditions were never going to be duplicated in service.

 

[stona]

To their credit the Americans still tried to target 'military targets' within cities. You will see marshalling yards as a typical aiming point. The reality was, even in good visual conditions, that a lot of bombs missed even such a large target.

In the last three months of 1944 just 14% of the 8th AF's bombing effort was carried out under conditions described as 'Good to Fair Visibility'. Under such conditions, an average of 33.4% of bombs fell within 1000' of the aiming point. This is pretty good, but of course two out of three bombs missed by a wider margin.

In non-visual conditions the results were awful. Bombing through 10/10 cloud, a worst case scenario but representing 35% of the effort for this period, the average circular error in pattern centres (not individual bombs) was 2.48 MILES. 42% of pattern centres were measured as more than 5 MILES from the aiming point.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Clayton Magnet]

Not that that makes them unique, look at European reaction to the Russo-Japanese war and what it suggested about the direction of warfare at the start of the twentieth century.

And the resulting Battle of the Frontiers. Truly a grotesque spectacle

 

[Hop]

To their credit the Americans still tried to target 'military targets' within cities. You will see marshalling yards as a typical aiming point. The reality was, even in good visual conditions, that a lot of bombs missed even such a large target.

Richard G Davis, who was (may still be) the official historian of the USAF, says that the USAAF deliberately changed the "city area" category to "marshalling yard" as a means of claiming they weren't area bombing, but continued to carry out area attacks anyway. From his biography of Spaatz:

A further look at Eighth Air Force operations has revealed two egregious
examples of the gap between bombing practice and stated bombing policy: the
target categories "city areas" and "marshaling yards." The two most cited Eighth
Air Force statistical summaries that cover the entire war do not list a target cate-
gory "city areas" or "towns and cities." Both summaries were prepared from
the same set of data within a month of the end of the war in Europe.
Monthly statistical summaries of the Eighth's operations prepared during the
war, almost contemporaneously with the events they recorded, tell a different
story. The Eighth Air Force Monthly Statistical Summary of Operations, gener-
ated at the end of each month from May 1944 to April 1945, listed a "city areas"
target category. For calendar year 1944, the summary reported that the Eighth
dropped 43,611 tons on "city areas." Nor did these reports make any bones
about their targets. The report for the May 8, 1944, Berlin raid baldly states,
"Berlin city area attacked. Bombing raid done through 10/10 undercast on PFF
markers. Believed that the center of Berlin was well hit." After reaching a
high of 9,886 tons (41 percent incendiaries) in July 1944, when the Eighth con-
ducted a series of H2X raids on Munich, the monthly "city area" totals steadily
declined to 383 tons in December.
A summary in a working paper from a USSTAF file, "Review of Bombing
Results," shows a similar dichotomy according to time period. From January
1944 through January 1945, the Eighth dropped 45,036 tons on "towns and
cities." From February 1945 through the end of the war, this summary
showed not a single ton of bombs falling on a city area. Unless the Eighth had
developed a perfect technique for bombing through overcast, such a result was
simply impossible. Obviously, the word had come down to deemphasize reports
on civilian damage. For instance, when Anderson cabled Arnold about USSTAF's
press policy on the Dresden controversy in February 1945, he noted, "Public rela-
tions officers have been advised to take exceptional care that the military nature
of targets attacked in the future be specified and emphasized in all cases. As in
the past the statement that an attack was made on such and such a city will be
avoided; specific targets will be described."

Davis also points out that incendiary bombs were not normally used against marshalling yards because they were completely ineffective. The RAF didn't use them, the 15th AF didn't use them, even the 8th AF didn't use them against marshalling yards in occupied countries, or even against marshalling yards in Germany when the target was a marshalling yard as part of the transport plan. But in attacks on "marshalling yards" when the 8th AF used radar bombing against German cities, they used close to 40% incendiaries:

Of the 9,042 tons of bombs dropped on
French rail yards, mostly during the pre-OVERLORD transportation bombing
phase, when the Americans took scrupulous care to avoid French civilian casual-
ties, 90 percent were visually sighted and only 33 tons were incendiaries.
Even over Germany itself, during Operation CLARION, when the Eighth bombed
dozens of small yards and junctions in lesser German towns, it dropped, over a
two-day period of visual conditions, 7,164 tons of bombs in all, but less than 3
tons of fire bombs.
In contrast, using H2X, the Eighth pummeled marshaling yards and rail sta-
tions in large German cities with high percentages of incendiary bombs. For
example, rail targets in at least four major cities garnered the following percent-
ages of fire bombs out of all bombs dropped on them: Cologne, 27 percent;
Nuremberg, 30 percent; Berlin, 37 percent; and Munich, 41 percent.
"Marshaling yards" undoubtedly served as a euphemism for city areas. Because
the yards themselves were not good targets for incendiaries, the prime purpose
in employing such weapons was to take advantage of the known inaccuracy of
H2X bombing in order to maximize the destruction of warehouses, commercial
buildings, and residences in the general vicinity of the target. Large numbers of
planes scattering their bombs around their mostly unseen and unverifiable aim-
ing points surely would cause great collateral damage to any soft structures
located nearby.
The AAF never officially acknowledged that it had bombed German city
areas as a matter of policy. Analysis of the Eighth's bombardment policy, of its
employment of incendiary bombs, and of its targeting of "city areas" and "mar-
shaling yards" clearly reveals that, despite denials, it did engage in the deliberate
bombing of German population centers.

Davis goes on to point out that there were a couple of differences with the RAF, whereas BC considered area attacks to be the prime method of attacking Germany, for the 8th AF they were a second choice, and the 8th AF didn't put as much effort in to maximising the effects of area bombing as BC did. But the 8th AF carried out deliberate area bombing attacks and used the category "marshalling yards" to disguise the fact for political reasons.

 

[stona]

"The AAF never officially acknowledged that it had bombed German city
areas as a matter of policy. Analysis of the Eighth's bombardment policy, of its
employment of incendiary bombs, and of its targeting of "city areas" and "mar-
shaling yards" clearly reveals that, despite denials, it did engage in the deliberate
bombing of German population centers."

The Americans wanted to dissociate themselves from the British effort, and in Europe were prepared to be very economical with the truth. This went all the way to the top.

When Eisenhower told Spaatz to prepare plans for 'Thunderclap' the latter protested that it would compromise American claims regarding "precision" targeting of military objectives. Eisenhower replied that while he too had always insisted that "US Strategic Air Forces be directed against precision targets" (he had not), he was prepared to try anything that "gives real promise of ending the war quickly." This was to be an attack on the morale of the people of Berlin. Spaatz instructed Doolittle to be ready to bomb Berlin "indiscriminately". Maybe because 'Thunderclap' had originated with Portal and the British Spaatz also protested to Arnold, "There is no doubt in my mind that the RAF want very much to have the US tarred with the morale bombing aftermath which we feel will be terrific." He either wrote that with an eye to posterity, or in an act of self delusion.

Le May finally dropped all pretence with the low level, night time, incendiary raids on Japanese cities, but that was bombing Asian people. In Europe the pretence was maintained, and many still believe it today.

On 9th March 1945 Le May said with reference to the incendiary raids, "If the war is shortened by a single day, the attack will have served its purpose." One cannot help but be reminded of Harris' plagiarising of Bismarck when he said, "personally I do not regard the whole of the remaining cities of Germany as worth the bones of one British Grenadier."

Cheers

Steve

 

[Zipper730]

There was an assumption that ADGB's zone fighters would intercept bombers at night, it is why they were specified with a day/night capability. The reality was that they could not, yet another abyss between the reality and rhetoric.

How did they plan to do this? Use radar to get them to within visual range? The angular accuracy probably wasn't good enough -- if I recall they were sometimes off by as much as 2000 feet in altitude alone...

The RAF was doctrinally committed to the aerial offensive, but never stopped thinking about fighters and other methods of home defence. Dowding did not invent the concept of integrated air defence. General E B Ashmore, who had directed Britain's air defence in WWI, argued after the war for the development of an information network to aid the interception of bombers.

I thought it was General Smuts, though he did push for the creation of the RAF among others

There is a clear contradiction in RAF policy and doctrine. On the one hand it argued that its bombers would get through and deliver a devastating counteroffensive in the case that Britain was attacked. This was nothing less than wishful thinking, events from 1939-1942 would prove it so. On the other hand it imagined that it might prevent the enemy bombers from getting through. In daylight at least this proved almost accidentally correct.

It's weird how people can have such gaps in thinking -- it seems we all have blind-spots like this. On one hand they argue the bomber will always get through... then they argue they can shoot them down.

It is Overy (with whom I seldom entirely agree) who wrote "To admit that there was a defence against the bomber was to question the whole basis on which an independent air force had been built." In this case he is absolutely right. The RAF had a tendency, as do many organisations, military or otherwise, to preserve its fundamental assumptions whenever possible.

When doctrine goes against facts -- stick with doctrine unless absolutely forced to agree with facts -- then after the war's over -- go back to doctrine.

At least that's what the USAF did back in the states.

 

[stona]

They didn't really have a plan for night interception. I would say that there was wishful thinking going on.

It was Ashmore who laid the basis for an integrated system. It was several relatively small steps from connecting observers with fighter stations and artillery to the sophisticated system developed in the 1930s. Ashmore obviously didn't have radar, nor had he developed the data processing system, via a filter room to the Groups and Sector stations etc. for which Dowding takes credit. If you can't process the information received from observers, radar etc. and get it to the right people, in the right place, at the right time, then it is useless. Doing just this was Dowding's greatest contribution, and then allowing his Group Commanders to fight the Battle.

Cheers

Steve

 

[fliger747]

Yes, in the event the "Bomber always got through". However at the time this theory was espoused, it was thought that the destruction that would be wrought would justify the losses in many of the bombers getting through. However the resistance of populations and industry to the bombing efforts of the time were greatly underestimated. Perhaps an effort was needed one or two orders of magnitude greater than envisioned by the pre war theorists.

 

[Greyman]

As much as everyone chortles at Stanley Baldwin's (and Douhet's) expense, they were -- and are -- 100% correct. With regard to the one line anyway.

As I've said before, it's gotta be one of the most misunderstood quotations in aviation. He didn't mean that every bomber that takes off will make it through the enemy's air defences unscathed -- he meant that no matter what a government does with regard to defence, it wont be able to prevent its citizens from being bombed.

That said ... he, like most others at the time, might have overestimated the effects of that bombing.

Though as I've also mentioned, we luckily never got the full test. Things might have gone differently if everyone's cities were also contaminated with phosgene, mustard, etc. for weeks/months on end in addition to being blown apart and burned (as pre-war theorists had every reason to suspect was a possibility).

 

[Zipper730]

Richard G Davis, who was (may still be) the official historian of the USAF, says that the USAAF deliberately changed the "city area" category to "marshalling yard" as a means of claiming they weren't area bombing, but continued to carry out area attacks anyway.

That's a common strategy when the policy becomes unpalatable -- sanitize.

The other strategies I've heard to gloss over such things would be censorship (after all if you can legally make it illegal to publish, it usually cancels out the truth long enough that anybody who was involved would be dead or dying), and officially end a practice/program while creating a new one that does the exact same thing (an example would be the Phoenix program, it was ended in 1971, and a new program was called F-6 in its place).

"The AAF never officially acknowledged that it had bombed German city areas as a matter of policy. Analysis of the Eighth's bombardment policy, of its employment of incendiary bombs, and of its targeting of "city areas" and "marshaling yards" clearly reveals that, despite denials, it did engage in the deliberate bombing of German population centers."

Well, saying "We'll be carrying out a systematic policy of killing civilians by bombing and setting fire to the towns and cities they live in under the presumption that, if we create enough pain, suffering, and death, they'll do anything to make it stop" tends to be viewed kind of negatively...

The Americans wanted to dissociate themselves from the British effort

I think it's more than that -- generally, the idea is to paint the enemy as completely and totally evil, and to paint your side as totally good, or at least reasonable and fair.

When your side does something that would be viewed as objectionable, the goal usually is to cover it up, as many fear that it would cause a damaging debate that could either be harmful to the nation, or at least reduce the popularity of the war (this is more likely in this case).

When Eisenhower told Spaatz to prepare plans for 'Thunderclap' the latter protested that it would compromise American claims regarding "precision" targeting of military objectives. Eisenhower replied that while he too had always insisted that "US Strategic Air Forces be directed against precision targets" (he had not), he was prepared to try anything that "gives real promise of ending the war quickly." This was to be an attack on the morale of the people of Berlin. Spaatz instructed Doolittle to be ready to bomb Berlin "indiscriminately". Maybe because 'Thunderclap' had originated with Portal and the British Spaatz also protested to Arnold, "There is no doubt in my mind that the RAF want very much to have the US tarred with the morale bombing aftermath which we feel will be terrific." He either wrote that with an eye to posterity, or in an act of self delusion.

Eye to posterity: The original plan for Thunderclap called for using the USAAF to wreck around 2-3 square miles of city with 5,000 tons of ordinance with a day-raid, followed by a night-raid by bomber-command (I would not be surprised if sector bombing would be used for this, as it had been employed in Darmstadt a month earlier).

As a rule of thumb the USAAF had little compunction with bombing civilians, they just were deathly afraid of looking bad doing it, and the effect that this would have on their "legacy" -- maybe they thought it'd prevent their wet dream of gaining an independent service. There was only one General, Charles Cabell, who seemed to express any real issue about the morality of such bombings, though there was an image based concern that it would leave a blot on the USAAF, he also seemed to feel that the raids were "baby-killing schemes" that were aimed more at "retaliation and intimidation for the future", than simply ending wars rapidly, and that he had doubts that world peace could come about by killing more women and children (all in caps are basically his exact words, the source of these quotes were from "Wings of Judgement").

I'm not sure about "retaliation", as it seemed that all independent and wannabe independent air-arms wanted to not just bomb cities, but launch first strikes (first attack the airfields, then bomb, burn, and gas the population). Intimidation for the future does sound about right -- General Frederick L. Anderson even basically said that he didn't think Operation Clarion would end the war any faster, but that having thousands of bombers and fighters striking Germany all over would be passed down from father to son, and prove a firm deterrent from waging war again.

Le May finally dropped all pretence with the low level, night time, incendiary raids on Japanese cities, but that was bombing Asian people. In Europe the pretence was maintained, and many still believe it today.

We viewed the Germans as humans that went bad; many viewed the Japanese as subhuman (General Hansell actually said more or less that he thought there was some sort of unwritten rule that the Japanese were viewed as subhuman -- I admire his candor actually, though I don't think it's right to view people as subhuman).

As much as everyone chortles at Stanley Baldwin's (and Douhet's) expense, they were -- and are -- 100% correct. With regard to the one line anyway.

As I've said before, it's gotta be one of the most misunderstood quotations in aviation. He didn't mean that every bomber that takes off will make it through the enemy's air defences unscathed -- he meant that no matter what a government does with regard to defence, it wont be able to prevent its citizens from being bombed.

If that's correct, then you're right. More bombers actually were blipped-out on their way out of enemy territory than on their way in.

That said ... he, like most others at the time, might have overestimated the effects of that bombing.

Though as I've also mentioned, we luckily never got the full test. Things might have gone differently if everyone's cities were also contaminated with phosgene, mustard, etc. for weeks/months on end in addition to being blown apart and burned (as pre-war theorists had every reason to suspect was a possibility).

The death tolls would probably have been greatly higher (I have no idea by how much, but phosgene is remarkably deadly and, from what I remember, the amount needed to kill is below the amount one can smell) and damage to the cities would likely have also been worse because the fires would have spread more (you can't put out fires if you're dead).

I'm frankly amazed that nobody did employ poison gas during the war, though I'm kind of relieved about the matter.

 

[Zipper730]

Disclaimer, since you need one or everything these days: The bulk-post that I created above was not intended in anyway to ignite political discussions -- some of what I wrote was more insights on the behavior or some people.

 

[pbehn]

Well, saying "We'll be carrying out a systematic policy of killing civilians by bombing and setting fire to the towns and cities they live in under the presumption that, if we create enough pain, suffering, and death, they'll do anything to make it stop" tends to be viewed kind of negatively...
I think it's more than that -- generally, the idea is to paint the enemy as completely and totally evil, and to paint your side as totally good, or at least reasonable and fair.
.

That was exactly what Churchill said he would do in July 1941 and was applauded by all at the time. (my bold)
"We ask no favours of the enemy. We seek from them no compunction. On the contrary, if to-night the people of London were asked to cast their vote whether a convention should be entered into to stop the bombing of all cities, the overwhelming majority would cry, "No, we will mete out to the Germans the measure, and more than the measure, that they have meted out to us." The people of London with one voice would say to Hitler: "You have committed every crime under the sun. Where you have been the least resisted there you have been the most brutal. It was you who began the indiscriminate bombing. We remember Warsaw in the very first few days of the war. We remember Rotterdam. We have been newly reminded of your habits by the hideous massacre of Belgrade. We know too well the bestial assault yon are making upon the Russian people, to whom our hearts go out in their valiant struggle. We will have no truce or parley with you, or the grisly gang who work your wicked will. You do your worst and we will do our best." Perhaps it may be our turn soon; perhaps it may be our turn now.

 

[Zipper730]

That was exactly what Churchill said he would do in July 1941

He didn't explicitly say what I said -- not as overtly anyway.

The RAF often had a tendency to pussy-foot around the issue interestingly -- when pulled in front of Parliament, they would often say that the bombing policy hadn't changed, and things to that nature. The only person that seemed to come remotely close to telling the truth (in the RAF anyway) was Harris, interestingly.

 

[pbehn]

He didn't explicitly say what I said -- not as overtly anyway.

The RAF often had a tendency to pussy-foot around the issue interestingly -- when pulled in front of Parliament, they would often say that the bombing policy hadn't changed, and things to that nature. The only person that seemed to come remotely close to telling the truth (in the RAF anyway) was Harris, interestingly.

My uncle was in Bomber Command, it was a war, the Germans had been singing "bomben auf Engeland" quite cheerfully, the meaning of Churchills speech is quite clear. as far as he was concerned it was unrestricted warfare. This apart from the fact that you cant choose what you hit from 20,000 ft at night. As far as I am concerned revenge was part of the motive and de housing was part of the strategy, whether that is judged lawful or unlawful in retrospect doesn't concern me at all. V1 and V2 weapons were launched on London until they couldn't launch any more and as far as I know they were all targeted on Tower Bridge.

 

[Zipper730]

As far as I am concerned revenge was part of the motive and de housing was part of the strategy

There was one book either "Among the Dead Cities" or a book by Richard Overy which mentioned that right after Rotterdam, he wanted to know the public view of the event. This leads me to suspect that he wanted to carry out similar raids at that point in time.

It was stated that as the BoB started, plans for what would become Abigail Rachael were drawn up (though would not be implemented until December, 1940). As for dehousing, it seemed that was more a matter of several ideas coming together

1. Fire was realized as the best method of causing massive destruction to cities
2. The idea of houses being destroyed as a morale-killer came from Lord Cherwell who claimed it was in the Hull & Birmingham reports (ironically the reports supposedly said that morale wasn't affected by any raid or sequence of raids -- but it's not who writes the report, it's who reads it).
3. Working-class neighborhoods had lots of houses close together that would ignite easily
4. Saying one's goal is the morale of the civilian population, in particular, the working population sounds better than just saying the goal is the morale of the civilian population.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

At that point in time, the British people literally and/or figuratively had a boot on their neck, with total destruction looming and no help in sight. Perhaps they chose to kick their attacker in the balls in retaliation, and claw at his eyes, but what was the alternative?

 

[stona]

There was one book either "Among the Dead Cities" or a book by Richard Overy which mentioned that right after Rotterdam, he wanted to know the public view of the event.

Full title is 'Among the Dead Cities - Is the Targeting of Civilians in War Ever Justified?" It's written by A C Grayling, who is a philosopher, not a historian.

Anyone interested in the moral question of WW2 bombing should read it. I don't agree with most of Grayling's conclusions, but he makes some good moral arguments. Grayling sums up thus:

Was area bombing necessary? No.
Was it proportionate? No.
Was it against the humanitarian principles that people have been striving to enunciate as a way of controlling and limiting war? Yes.
Was it against general moral standards of the kind recognised and agreed in Western civilisation in the last five centuries, or even 2,000 years? Yes.
Was it against what mature national laws provide in the way of outlawing murder, bodily harm, and destruction of property? Yes.
In short and in sum: was area bombing wrong? Yes.
Very wrong? Yes.

Like I said, you don't have to agree with him, but you should read his book.

If people like Grayling were in charge of fighting our wars, then we would lose them all. I would argue that the most immoral thing we could have done in WW2 would have been to lose it.

Cheers

Steve