Did the RAF have designs for a long range escort fighter?

[buffnut453]

The Americans were actually far worse. They had the examples from over 2 years of war showing quite clearly that bombers were sitting ducks. Even after their own experiences they were still delisional.


You beat me to the punch. Actually the US was far worse. They had observed over 2 years of war which clearly showed that the bombers needed escort and yet they convinced themselves that their aircraft and tactics were superior and they that would succeed where everyone else had failed. Even after several spectacular failures they continued to delude themselves that success was just around the corner. "The cornered wolf fights hardest." Of course believing your own BS was a big help in that regard. 6 Me 109s shot down for very B17 lost. The magic number of 300 bombers per would solve the problems, etc.
And of course we should never forget the YB-40 escort "fighter" which was an idea that never should have seen the light of day.

I would agree with many of your sentiments. The visceral animosity within the USAAF between the "bomber boys" and anyone taking an interest in pursuit caused no end of problems, including the loss of some quality senior leaders (everyone knows about Chennault but there were others). It could be argued that the internal squabbles had a significant impact on fighter aircraft development, hence in 1941 the USAAF's most modern fighter was the P-40C which couldn't even get close to the altitudes that B-17s could fly at...hence self-reinforcing the pre-war view that "the bomber will always get through".

 

[tomo pauk]

I would agree with many of your sentiments. The visceral animosity within the USAAF between the "bomber boys" and anyone taking an interest in pursuit caused no end of problems, including the loss of some quality senior leaders (everyone knows about Chennault but there were others). It could be argued that the internal squabbles had a significant impact on fighter aircraft development, hence in 1941 the USAAF's most modern fighter was the P-40C which couldn't even get close to the altitudes that B-17s could fly at...hence self-reinforcing the pre-war view that "the bomber will always get through".

The most-modern US fighter in 1941 was P-38, followed by P-43. Both capable flying & fighting at B-17 altitudes.

 

[buffnut453]

The most-modern US fighter in 1941 was P-38, followed by P-43. Both capable flying & fighting at B-17 altitudes.

Both those types only entered service in 1941...that doesn't make them operationally ready. Let's jump back to 1939 so we're comparing apples to apples as regards the RAF entry into combat. What was the front-line USAAF fighter then? Bottom line is that the USAAF woefully neglected fighter development, the refusal to require installation of engines with 2-speed superchargers being but one glaring example.

My basic premise here is that there are plenty of criticisms to throw around when it comes to pre-war strategic thinking.

 

[tomo pauk]

Both those types only entered service in 1941...that doesn't make them operationally ready. Let's jump back to 1939 so we're comparing apples to apples as regards the RAF entry into combat. What was the front-line USAAF fighter then? Bottom line is that the USAAF woefully neglected fighter development, the refusal to require installation of engines with 2-speed superchargers being but one glaring example..

I was not the one drawing out the B-17
Is there actually such a thing as 'refusal to require'? The 2-speed superchargers were not present on Hurricanes and Spitfires until the BoB (on Spitfires until 2nd half of 1942).
1-speed S/C on Merlin III, let alone on Merlin 45 was vastly better than 2-speed S/C on VK-105 or the S/C with infinite number of speeds on DB 601A or 601N. 1-speed S/C on V-1710-33 was no worse than S/C with infinite number of speeds on DB 601A.
Having XP-37, XP-38, XP-39, XP-40, XP-42, XP-46, XP-43, XP-47 in development phase within 3 years does refute the claim that USAAF woefully (or in any way) neglected fighter development.

My basic premise here is that there are plenty of criticisms to throw around when it comes to pre-war strategic thinking.

I've agreed with that a page before.
Faults of USAAF or any other air service/force do not mean that other air services/forces are exempt from analysis.

 

[pbehn]

Between 1939 and 1940 there was an awful realisation that bombing a civilian population to sue for peace required an lot more bombing than had previously been thought. The British held a strange view on this, while they were certain they would never surrender to bombing of cities they still maintained Germany would. A count of the tonnage of bombs dropped on Coventry and London produced a calculation of the number of bombers and payloads required, it was clear in 1940 the RAF couldn't do what they wanted to. To this day it still hasn't been established that a population can be bombed into surrender.

 

[buffnut453]

Faults of USAAF or any other air service/force do not mean that other air services/forces are exempt from analysis.

I'm not saying that. I just don't see the point of knocking the RAF for lacking a viable strategic bombing capability when there wasn't a single air force on the planet that DID have such a capability. It's fair game to ding individual air forces on their specific weaknesses (eg the Luftwaffe on its lack of a strategic capability, the RAF's lack of tactical support to the Army, the USAAF's predilection for precision bombing that was impractical in the real world etc). I just don't see the point of singling out one service for its lack of strategic capability when every late 1930s air force was weak in that area.

 

[tomo pauk]

I'm not saying that. I just don't see the point of knocking the RAF for lacking a viable strategic bombing capability when there wasn't a single air force on the planet that DID have such a capability. It's fair game to ding individual air forces on their specific weaknesses (eg the Luftwaffe on its lack of a strategic capability, the RAF's lack of tactical support to the Army, the USAAF's predilection for precision bombing that was impractical in the real world etc). I just don't see the point of singling out one service for its lack of strategic capability when every late 1930s air force was weak in that area.

People, at least in this thread, were mostly questioning whys and whynots with regard of UK-designed LR escort fighters. The RAF movers and shakers, some more (Trenchard) and some less, were claiming that bombers on their own will be decisive in a future war.
Both RAF and LW have had substantial strategic bomber force in 1939/40, but without proper and numerous LR escorts neither force was able to prosecute a bombing war envisioned pre-war.

 

[BiffF15]

. To this day it still hasn't been established that a population can be bombed into surrender.

I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...

Cheers,
Biff

 

[Shortround6]

Bottom line is that the USAAF woefully neglected fighter development, not least by refusing to require 2-speed supercharger being but one glaring example.

There are two speed superchargers and there are two speed superchargers (and the engines they are attached to).

For the US there were only two viable fighter engines ready to go and in production in 1939. The Wright R-1820 9 cylinder and the P & W R-1830 14 cylinder radial.
Allison delivered 46 engines in 1939 and 29 of them were for the twin engine YFM-1. Allison also had to take back and rework 277 P-40 engines in 1940 in order for them to make rated power and still meet the original overhaul life. Mucking about with a two speed supercharger was only going to delay something else.

for most companies using a two speed supercharger was a way to increase take-off power without hurting altitude performance.
Most 1939 engines had full throttle heights around 13,000ft (4,000 meters) give or take a bit (1500ft?) . The Merlin III was far and away the exception.
The superchargers were maxed out at around that altitude and spinning them faster with a higher gear wasn't going to get you much. The impeller tips were already getting close to exceeding the speed of sound inside the supercharger.

Even with RR the big advantage of the Merlin X over the Merlin III was the extra 200 or so hp for take-off using 87 octane fuel rather than the extra 1500ft or so of full throttle height.

The US had gone to 100 octane before the British (and had gone through the intermediate 91/92 octane) and that allowed the Allison ( and the two radials) a bit of breathing room on the take-off ratings without using a 2 speed supercharger.
Please note that the P & W R-1830 was good for about 950-1000hp at 14,500ft in high gear if it had two speeds and the same if it had one speed and used the high ratio.
I would also note that in the P-36 the low altitude engine was the -17 and the experimental single speed high altitude engine (14,500ft) was the -23 version. The US allocated the -19 model number to an experimental two stage engine that gave 1050hp at 17,500ft. The two speed production engine with the lowest type number is the -33 used in the P-66 Vanguard and some early non turbo B-24s.

I would note that the US had built more turbo charged aircraft than the rest of the world put together by 1939/40 (something like about 100) although that includes the 50 P-30 two seat fighters. The US was hardly ignoring high altitude engines or fighters. ( see the YP-37s, The YFM-1 was supposed to use turbos and the P-38)

 

[Shortround6]

I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...

Cheers,
Biff

The Toyko raid of March 9/10 was the first that might have forced a surrender. It destroyed more square miles and killed more people than either atomic raid.
It just took 279 bombers over the target to do it (325 total took off).

Even without the Atomic bomb the handwriting was on the wall. But 300 plus B-29s would have been a delirious dream to the war planers of 1936-38.

 

[pbehn]

I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...

Cheers,
Biff

You can make an argument for that, but there were many in the Japanese military who wanted to fight on, I don't believe the civilian population were demanding surrender. The fire bombings of Tokyo actually killed more people and that didn't provoke surrender. As I understand it the Emperor intervened on behalf of his people, but that requires a man with some sense, Adolf wouldn't have done the same, he didn't.

 

[BiffF15]

I would argue that once the word gets out that a single bomb from a single plane did the damage associated with an atomic bomb, and he general population would get involved or start raising their collective voices.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[pbehn]

I would argue that once the word gets out that a single bomb from a single plane did the damage associated with an atomic bomb, and he general population would get involved or start raising their collective voices.

Cheers,
Biff

On many of the islands taken by US forces men women and children would commit suicide rather than surrender, crouching around the last grenade or just jumping off cliffs. The notion of bombing a nation into surrender is a throwback to European siege warfare, but in many sieges almost all the residents of a city died without opening the gates.

 

[stona]

I'm not saying that. I just don't see the point of knocking the RAF for lacking a viable strategic bombing capability when there wasn't a single air force on the planet that DID have such a capability. It's fair game to ding individual air forces on their specific weaknesses (eg the Luftwaffe on its lack of a strategic capability, the RAF's lack of tactical support to the Army, the USAAF's predilection for precision bombing that was impractical in the real world etc). I just don't see the point of singling out one service for its lack of strategic capability when every late 1930s air force was weak in that area.

The issue is that the RAF was claiming a strategic bombing capability that it did not have. Many senior officers and members of the Air Council KNEW that it couldn't do it, but kept claiming it and arguing for funds to do it because it was the raison d'etre of the RAF as an independent service. It was an exercise in self delusion (if we are being kind) or dishonesty (if we are not).
Though there was a doctrinal hangover from WWI regarding attacks on that most ephemeral and unmeasurable quality of the enemy, its morale, there was not an express intent for the RAF to attack it in official inter-war policy. Many senior airmen saw it [enemy morale] as a legitimate target, but it did not feature in any public pronouncements, nor in any pre-war target planning.

Whilst it is true that the first bombing of London was a mistake, the subsequent 'Blitz' was an entirely intentional campaign, forced on the Germans by the failure of the Luftwaffe to attain any of the objectives set out for it in Fuhrer Directive 17, though the Luftwaffe deluded itself in believing some had in fact been achieved. It was an attack carried out in a last ditch attempt to force Britain out of the war in 1940, by negotiation. Nazi Germany had more pressing and ideologically driven business to undertake in the East. The Luftwaffe campaign against London (and other British cities) was precisely the scenario in which the pre-war air planners had envisaged the RAF mounting a counter-offensive of at least equal ferocity. What happened? The RAF despatched about 50 aircraft to bomb Berlin on the night of 25/26 August. The only bombs falling within the Berlin city limits destroyed a summer house, two people were injured. Most bombs fell into country areas south of the city, many in 'Stadtguter', large farms owned by the City of Berlin. Berliners joked, 'Now they are trying to starve us out'. 3 Hampdens were lost and 3 more ditched in the sea on the return flight, a strong head wind on the outward journey had caused them to run out of fuel. That was the RAF's counter-offensive, while large tracts of London would soon burn. It is not possible to argue that no air force had the capability to successfully attack cities when Warsaw, Rotterdam and now London burned, soon to be joined by other major British cities. Coventry, where I happen to be going later today, had its city centre destroyed in November 1940.

Cheers

Steve

 

[swampyankee]

I think the events of 6 & 9 August, 1945 might have proven otherwise...

Cheers,
Biff

Except this was after four years of war, including a submarine campaign, augmented by minelaying, that radically impaired Japanese imports of food, fuel, and raw materials. Japan was also being defeated at sea and heavily pressured on land. The bombing campaign, including the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, certainly contributed to Japan's defeat, but could not have done so alone, which was the pre-war position of many advocates of strategic bombing.

 

[stona]

My basic premise here is that there are plenty of criticisms to throw around when it comes to pre-war strategic thinking.

It depends how far back you want to go. After WW1 the Americans, separated by two oceans from potential enemies and after that war more determined than ever to stay that way, took a far more complacent view of developments in aviation. They could afford to. Their perspective on bomber aircraft and the future of air war was more distanced and far less visceral than that of their British colleagues. Unlike the British they were not going to be bombed themselves in a future war.

The Americans did see the bomber as an offensive weapon, but the official American national security posture was distinctly defensive in orientation and bomber aircraft were given a defensive role; to find and attack naval threats to the US Coastline. This did not stop American airmen from posing and discussing hypothetical scenarios for strategic bombing, but it was a very, very, long road from the early inter-war position to attempted implementation and failure of a precision bombing doctrine in N W Europe, the fire bombing of Japanese cities and, ultimately, the dropping of the ultimate 'area' weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (using, with supreme irony, the 'precision' sight developed by the USN).

Cheers

Steve

 

[BiffF15]

Except this was after four years of war, including a submarine campaign, augmented by minelaying, that radically impaired Japanese imports of food, fuel, and raw materials. Japan was also being defeated at sea and heavily pressured on land. The bombing campaign, including the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, certainly contributed to Japan's defeat, but could not have done so alone, which was the pre-war position of many advocates of strategic bombing.

Swampyankee,

You have a valid point, and totally agree that those two bombs were but the icing on the cake.

However, under different circumstances, say zero or almost zero bombs had been dropped on Japan (or any country), and your opponents roll in and hit your major cities, one after another, with an Atomic weapon. Combine this with mass leafleting and radio (yesterday's version of the internet). Probably not much reaction until the conclusion is drawn that you are facing extermination. It is then that, in my opine, there would be a push for survival that would encompass at a minimum, a change in direction from leadership if not out right removal and replacement.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[Ascent]

It depends how far back you want to go. After WW1 the Americans, separated by two oceans from potential enemies and after that war more determined than ever to stay that way, took a far more complacent view of developments in aviation. They could afford to. Their perspective on bomber aircraft and the future of air war was more distanced and far less visceral than that of their British colleagues. Unlike the British they were not going to be bombed themselves in a future war.

The Americans did see the bomber as an offensive weapon, but the official American national security posture was distinctly defensive in orientation and bomber aircraft were given a defensive role; to find and attack naval threats to the US Coastline. This did not stop American airmen from posing and discussing hypothetical scenarios for strategic bombing, but it was a very, very, long road from the early inter-war position to attempted implementation and failure of a precision bombing doctrine in N W Europe, the fire bombing of Japanese cities and, ultimately, the dropping of the ultimate 'area' weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (using, with supreme irony, the 'precision' sight developed by the USN).

Cheers

Steve

And yet with more than two years of war they still thought that it would be different when they did it and they'd succeed where others failed using the same tactics.

Not that that makes them unique, look at European reaction to the Russo-Japanese war and what it suggested about the direction of warfare at the start of the twentieth century.

 

[stona]

Noble Frankland argued (to an American audience, after the war) that there were three reasons why the US clung so tenaciously to the daylight bombing of selected targets.

1. They believed that the B-17 was better suited to daytime operations than to night time.

2. They were unimpressed with the British effort.

3. They were determined to operate their own forces independently.

He was right on all three counts. Also, the Americans had developed a precision daytime doctrine in the inter-war years, which they were hardly likely to abandon because the British told them that it wouldn't work.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Kevin J]

Noble Frankland argued (to an American audience, after the war) that there were three reasons why the US clung so tenaciously to the daylight bombing of selected targets.

1. They believed that the B-17 was better suited to daytime operations than to night time.

2. They were unimpressed with the British effort.

3. They were determined to operate their own forces independently.

He was right on all three counts. Also, the Americans had developed a precision daytime doctrine in the inter-war years, which they were hardly likely to abandon because the British told them that it wouldn't work.

Cheers

Steve

I think the problem for the Americans related to the weather conditions of Western Europe. While precision high altitude bombing may have worked fine in practice in the continental US, over here we have something called clouds, which you can't see through at any altitude. You will always get a few clear days but not many. The RAF tried a few high altitude bombing runs with Flying Fortresses before the USAAF arrived but they still got intercepted, and by high altitude, I mean 30000 feet plus or 10000 feet higher than the 8th Air Force was flying.