Lockheed Ventura - Why didn't the RAF rate it? (1 Viewer)

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I can't think of a single reference that claims the Botha was a good aircraft. Virtually every reference I've seen includes the infamous test pilot quote about the cockpit being difficult to enter but should be made impossible. There has also been plenty of criticism of the turret fighter concept going back decades.

As to the comment about "nobody knew that Germans will base their fighter across the Channel", that's absolute nonsense. It was a planning assumption that France would remain as a fighting force. All defence planning is based on assumptions, otherwise the planning problem becomes impossible to manage. The challenge came when France surrendered, bringing the tactically-focused Luftwaffe within range of most of Britain. In the 1930s, nobody could possibly "know" that France would collapse either so quickly or so completely.

Despite not "knowing" that Germany would place aircraft in France, Britain still had the foresight to create the world's first integrated air defence system. Funny how the Brits are so short-sighted and yet so prescient at the same time! Or perhaps...just perhaps...Britain was no better and no worse than any other nation in terms of defence planning. Not a single nation did everything right in their military preparation for WW2.

Is it also possible that British authors are no better or worse than other nation's authors? Consider the Luft-46 crowd who never met a German aircraft that wasn't wonderful, or US authors who criticize the Brits for using .303 "paint scratcher" machine guns when the 50cal was so clearly the right choice (except that it wasn't in 1939).

It's easy to criticize decisions after the fact when we have a much clearer picture of how things evolved. It's much harder to make decisions in the moment trying to predict the future.
I'm totally with you on this. Some aircraft are simply and unreliably 'bad': be they poorly built, underpowered, dangerous handling, lethal quirks etc. But the judgement should always be about THE CONTEXT. Saying something performed poorly in the kind of combat it was required to perform is not at all the same as saying its 'bad', fullstop.
 
Taken from Wikipedia (with salt if required)
Sometimes a very hefty dose ;)
Douglas Boston: Wing area, 464 sq ft. Gross weight: 24,127 lb Power: 3200hp Climb: 2000ft/min Armament: up to 4000lb bombs
Lockheed Ventura: Wing area: 551 sq ft. Gross weight: 31,000lb Power: 4000hp Climb: 2035ft/min Armament: up to 3000lb bombs
Most versions of the Boston required four 500lbs to be hung under the wing to get to 4000lbs.
It was possible. But you really wanted very good escorts and a short penetration distance to do it.
I only have PV-2 manual and while the take-off distances are fairly short for a 30,000lb airplane the landing distances seem a little long?
Remember that the this thing is based off the Lockheed 18 Lodestar airliner. Adding over 50% to the weight and using the R-2800s instead of R-1820s or R-1830s might lead to some "idiosyncrasies".
 
I can't think of a single reference that claims the Botha was a good aircraft. Virtually every reference I've seen includes the infamous test pilot quote about the cockpit being difficult to enter but should be made impossible. There has also been plenty of criticism of the turret fighter concept going back decades.
The (monumental) book 'Blackburn aircraft since 1909' does not mention any of the Botha's shortcoming. Not a single one.
There is no mention of any of Roc's shortcoming there, either.

Kinda suspicious for the aircraft that were designed and produced as combat aircraft, yet saw no war (bar as the targets for the enemy), despite being available in the dark days of 1940-41.
 
Hi
The British had ordered the Ventura in February 1940 (from a September 1939 Lockheed proposal) it received its name in May 1940 with the deliveries supposed to be starting in March 1941, the prototype actually making its maiden flight on 31 July 1941. Deliveries started in the summer of 1942. The introduction into service is mentioned in '2 Group RAF' by Bowyer, pages 254-255, extract below:
Scan_20250427.jpg

Mike
 
The (monumental) book 'Blackburn aircraft since 1909' does not mention any of the Botha's shortcoming. Not a single one.
There is no mention of any of Roc's shortcoming there, either.

Kinda suspicious for the aircraft that were designed and produced as combat aircraft, yet saw no war (bar as the targets for the enemy), despite being available in the dark days of 1940-41.
Errr.

A touch out of context? I've got the 'Gloster Aircraft since 1917' version of that line. They're mostly dry as dust books talking about the specifications, engineering and development of each marque, with the occasional minimal sprinkling of interesting info about overseas sales, test flying programmes and modifications etc. There's very little operational information and next to no operational detail about squadron service either. These books aren't about that aspect.

Mine doesn't mention that the Gladiator was too slow to combat 109s and had a pilot rumoured propensity to burst into flames. It merely dryly lists its development in chronological order and lists their deployment. These aren't critiques, reviews or story books. They're just a historical record of the production of a manufacturer first and foremost.

So I'm not sure what hair you're trying to split, or point you're trying to prove with that single example, tbh

Every single Brit who's *any* knowledge of the Botha or Roc *what-so-ever*, knows full-well that they were awful aircraft.

You're not going to find anyone anywhere to say otherwise. And If got dozens of books on my shelf who's authors are in no doubt either!

The fact that there's possibly no overt criticism of the Botha in your Blackburn book is a little moot - I bet you cold hard cash there's no glowing praise for either in it either!
 
Hi
The British had ordered the Ventura in February 1940 (from a September 1939 Lockheed proposal) it received its name in May 1940 with the deliveries supposed to be starting in March 1941, the prototype actually making its maiden flight on 31 July 1941. Deliveries started in the summer of 1942. The introduction into service is mentioned in '2 Group RAF' by Bowyer, pages 254-255, extract below:
View attachment 828836
Mike
Interesting stuff Mike! Thankyou :)

I'm increasingly concluding that there wasn't really anything inherently or noteworthily wrong with it as an aircraft, just that it didn't offer anything not already provided by the established Boston, renowned for its surprising agility and pleasantness to fly, and new more exciting, higher performance and/or more warlike aircraft arriving on airfields like the Mitchell or Mosquito .

If you were transferring from the death-traps in the Blenheim squadrons, a bloated looking converted airliner that had already copped a hammering and heavy loss rate (through no inherent fault of the airframe) is likely going to be an object of suspicion and derision. All the more so if you're missing out crewing a Boston, Mitchell or Mosquito.
 
A touch out of context? I've got the 'Gloster Aircraft since 1917' version of that line. They're mostly dry as dust books talking about the specifications, engineering and development of each marque, with the occasional minimal sprinkling of interesting info about overseas sales, test flying programmes and modifications etc. There's very little operational information and next to no operational detail about squadron service either. These books aren't about that aspect.
The 'Blackburn' book has two pages about the service use of the Roc, and 3 pages about the service use of the Botha.
 
Looking at British wartime figures ...

Max speed: Mitchell had about 17 - 20 mph on the Ventura at all heights
Max weak mix: Mitchell had 25 - 40 mph on the Ventura (depending on Mitchell version)
Most economical: Mitchell had 35 - 50 mph on the Ventura
Mitchell could carry 6 x 500 lb vs. only 3 x in the Ventura
The Ventura could reach 15,000 ft 4 min faster than the Mitchell

Boston's max speed was 45-50 mph faster and carried 4 x 500 lb, one more than the Ventura.
 
I recall reading an assessment by a RAF crewman who moved from Venturas to Mitchells and said that it was an improvement in every category. Also note that the B-25 was considered to be so easy and safe to fly that the USAAF began phasing out twin-engined trainers and replacing them with B-25's even before WW2 was over.

And I am convinced that one of the B-25's advantages over other aircraft was it gave you a great view. The cockpit was clear glass all over and the nose transparency gave everyone up there terrific visibility. Compare it to the Ventura and B-26 Marauder.

Admittedly the PV-2 Harpoon reportedly was a much better aircraft than the Ventura.
 
Bomber Command 1945 War Room report Day bomb raids, % loss is of despatched, the Blenheim flew a large number of anti shipping sorties that failed to find a target plus cloud cover raids abandoned due to weather.

Blenheim, September 1949 to February 1942, 7,302 sorties despatched, 3,471 attacking, 1,492.8 tons HE, 45.1 tons incendiary, 349 aircraft missing, 39 category E (14 not enemy action), 5.1% missing + Cat E, average bomb load dropped 992 pounds. HE bombs dropped, 708x500 pound, 18,933x250 pound, 34,022x40 pound, 1,896x20 pound, 936x9 pound. All causes, all times, all units, loss figures, 443 missing, 91 Category E (59 not enemy action), 161 Category B or AC (55 not enemy action)

Boston, February 1942 to May 1943, 1,533 sorties despatched, 1,097 attacking, 908.7 tons HE, 17.8 tons incendiary, 36 aircraft missing, 6 category E (1 not enemy action), 2.7% missing + Cat E, average bomb load dropped 1,892 pounds. HE bombs dropped, 3,957x500 pound, 199x250 pound, 2,290x40 pound, 150x9 pound. The use of 250 pound bombs in 1943 would be problematical. All causes, all times, all units, loss figures, 40 missing, 6 Category E (1 not enemy action), 40 Category B or AC (7 not enemy action)

Ventura November 1942 to May 1943, 007 sorties despatched, 709 attacking, 677.4 tons HE, 47.9 tons incendiary, 38 aircraft missing, 4 category E (2 not enemy action), 4.0% missing + Cat E, average bomb load dropped 2,291 pounds. HE bombs dropped, 1,658x500 pound, 2,520x250 pound, 1,684x40 pound, 150x9 pound. All causes, all times, all units, loss figures, 38 missing, 4 Category E (2 not enemy action), 26 Category B or AC (6 not enemy action)

Mitchell, January and May 1943, 96 sorties despatched, 51 attacking, 89.2 tons HE, 7 aircraft missing, 1 category E, 8.3% missing + Cat E, average bomb load dropped 3,918 pounds. Which technically makes the Mitchell the type with the highest day bomber loss rate in Bomber Command, 3 were lost on the 22 January 1943 raid to Ghent. HE bombs dropped, 94x1,000 pound, 212x500 pound. All causes, all times, all units, loss figures, 7 missing, 1 Category E, 1 Category B or AC

For something not comparable to the above

Mosquito 3,633 sorties despatched, 2,472 attacking, 1,022.6 tons HE, 607.7 tons incendiary, 56 aircraft missing, 14 category E (10 not enemy action), 1.7% missing + Cat E, average bomb load dropped 1,478 pounds.

Also as of end June 1942 there had been 52 Albemarle I built, an aircraft that became non strategic by the design condition of not using strategic materials.

Take off distances etc., USN figures. BD-2 at 21,500 pounds is carrying a torpedo.
ModelGross WeightCalm15 knots25 knotsTime toTime toService
ModelPoundsFeetWind FeetWind Feet10,000 feet20,000 feetCeiling feet
PBO-1
18,837​
550​
300​
170​
7.5​
17.8​
26,200​
PBO-1
19,230​
590​
320​
190​
8.1​
19.1​
25,500​
PBO-1
20,203​
670​
380​
220​
8.5​
20.7​
24,900​
BD-2
20,150​
1,168​
816​
616​
5.4​
12.9​
26,900​
BD-2
20,500​
1,217​
853​
649​
5.5​
13.3​
26,700​
BD-2
21,500​
1,397​
989​
757​
6​
14.8​
25,600​
PBJ-1C/D
29,735​
1,704​
1,204​
912​
9​
23.6​
24,900​
PBJ-1C/D
32,893​
2,243​
1,616​
1,244​
11.5​
32.3​
22,800​
PBJ-1C/D
33,493​
2,356​
1,700​
1,318​
12.1​
34.5​
22,400​
PBJ-1C/D
32,098​
2,148​
1,537​
1,180​
11​
30.8​
23,000​
PBJ-1C/D
33,798​
2,490​
1,797​
1,390​
12.7​
37.6​
21,800​
PBJ-1C/D
35,844​
3,105​
2,312​
1,773​
16.5​
n/a
19,700​
PBJ-1C/D
31,255​
1,916​
1,372​
1,044​
10​
26.8​
24,000​
PV-1
26,500​
1,252​
850​
620​
6.8​
17​
25,600​
PV-1
31,077​
1,884​
1,319​
995​
9.3​
25.6​
22,800​
PV-1
30,836​
1,844​
1,290​
970​
9.2​
25.2​
22,900​
PV-1
30,758​
1,831​
1,280​
963​
9.1​
24.9​
23,000​
PV-1
29,971​
1,764​
1,230​
918​
8.8​
23.8​
23,200​
PV-1
30,000​
1,750​
1,218​
910​
8.7​
23.6​
23,200​
PV-1
30,893​
1,902​
1,327​
1,001​
9.4​
26.1​
22,600​
PV-2
33,688​
1,795​
1,267​
957​
9.5​
25.8​
23,400​
PV-2
35,718​
2,070​
1,471​
1,126​
10.8​
30.6​
22,200​
PV-2
35,800​
2,130​
1,517​
1,161​
10.9​
30.6​
22,000​
PV-2
33,845​
1,815​
1,284​
969​
9.6​
26.2​
23,300​
PV-2
36,000​
2,160​
1,540​
1,180​
11​
32.1​
21,900​
PV-2
35,072​
2,010​
1,426​
1,090​
10.5​
29.5​
22,400​
 
Hi
Reference the Botha, 'British Flight Testing, Martlesham Heath 1920-1939' by Tim Mason, Putnam 1993, has this comment on page 40:
"Access to the [de Havilland] Don was awkward, and could have been the subject of the comment, possibly apocryphal, 'Entry to this aeroplane is difficult; it should be made impossible'! It could equally have been said of the Blackburn Botha and some other types."
Does that mean the famous quote was not originally even about the Botha and may only have been added in retrospect?
Also by Tim Mason is 'The Secret Years, Flight Testing at Boscombe Down 1939-1945', Hikoki 1998, and this has the following on the Botha:
Scan_20250428.jpg
Scan_20250428 (2).jpg

Also reference the 'Blackburn' book, it also includes the serials of Bothas allocated to various units and more importantly those lost in accidents, it is that kind of book, extract pages below:
Scan_20250428 (3).jpg


Mike
 
The 'Blackburn' book has two pages about the service use of the Roc, and 3 pages about the service use of the Botha.
License production contracts aside, it's amazing to me that Blackburn survived as a design house for as long as it did. Had Blackburn gone bust in 1937 after Fairey took over the FAA's TSR biz with the Swordfish replacing the Shark, would the British had been any worse off? No Skua, Roc, Botha, Firebrand or Firecrest, so what? The very best Blackburn, the postwar Buccaneer was well into its ownership under Hawker-Siddeley so might have been labeled something else.
 
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Taking this back to the Ventura, the following comments appear in "Vega Ventura. The Operational History of Lockheed's Lucky Star" by John C Stanaway that help to explain the RAF dislike of the Ventura and that all was not plain sailing with the PV-1 in USN service.

Introduction
....The RAF despised the Ventura because it was slow,
unmaneuverable and inadequately armed. The USN began
to use the Ventura just about the time that the RAF was giving
it up, and found the patrol bomber speedy, agile and adaptable
to heavy armament. Some of the Navy pilots jokingly
suggested that the RAF and U.S. Army crews proved the
superiority of USN training when the Navy took up the Ventura,
designated it the PV-1 and demonstrated its true potential.
The quality of all Ventura crews was unusually high, so
the blame for the disparity in performance does not lie there.
There are several factors such as mission designation and
various equipment uses that much more determined the
record of the Ventura in combat.

Chapter 2 Air combat over Europe
.....Reaction to the Ventura was less than enthusiastic from
the first. Apparently, a good deal of equipment was added for
wartime missions and the performance that had so impressed
the purchasing commission was compromised in the operational
version of the aircraft.....

.....Sometime between September and the full-scale operational
debut of the Ventura in November the decision was
made to again change the role of the Lockheed bomber from
night intruder to daylight bomber. The original purpose of the
Ventura had been to upgrade the antisubmarine role of the
Hudson and now it was expected to perform in the highly
specialized work of the offensive bomber. That the Ventura's
record showed any commendable points at all is a tribute to
the basic soundness of the design - and there were com-
mendable points to the relatively brief service life of the
Ventura in raids on the European continent......


The first RAF unit to receive the Ventura was 21 squadron which was trading up from the comparitively sedate Blenheim IV. The next two squadrons formed in Aug / Sept 1942 were new formations most of whose crews would have been fresh from OTUs, with just a leavening of more experienced personnel.


Chapter 4 Training in the US
.......
In May of 1943 Whitehead
[a pilot with two and a half years flight expeience, including one on Venturas]
first experienced the extremely
speedy and sensitive PV-1 Ventura. The high wing loading
and critical weight and balance factor demanded dedicated
attention from new pilots. The unstable PV-1 would roll and
pitch, and Whitehead remembers that some crews were lost
when their Venturas dropped a wing into the ground. In time,
the pilots became used to the touchy controls and tamed the
high-strung mount.

One officer earned Whitehead's ill will when he insisted
on loading nineteen men for a flight aboard Whitehead's PV1.
Normally, the Ventura is moving along at about 100 miles
per hour when it leaves the runway, but with the weight of
nineteen men in the rear fuselage versus the two in the cockpit
the Ventura was leaving the ground at seventy-five mph.
Whitehead quickly ordered all passengers forward and saved
twenty-one lives when the center of gravity moved up where
it belonged.


The Ventura training unit VPB-200 was formed in April 1944 at which point the training syllabus consisted of 27 flights and 80 flying hours on type. I doubt British pilots enjoyed the luxury of so many hours on the type in 1942 when the first Venturas had just arrived in Britain.

Regarding VPB-200
Lovelace [its CO] sent an interesting letter to the Commander of
Air Forces in the Pacific Fleet on July 20, 1944, noting that,
"Fortunately, losses in PB4Y and particularly in PV-1 aircraft
have been very low in forward areas. This has enabled this
command to train crews to a level far above that attained by
a squadron training in the United States."

The main training base for VPB-200 was Kanehoe, Hawaii
with detachments sent to Johnston and Midway Islands
to conduct searches under the Hawaiian Sea Frontier. The
squadron also served to ferry aircraft to forward areas.

Thus, it would seem that the USN had a great advantage
over the RAF in the operational pressures that were light
enough to allow complete training of PV crews. The handicap
of severe losses complicated by the demands of almost
daily combat had made the British situation so much more
severe than that endured by the Navy in the Pacific that the
disparity in crew morale is entirely understandable.


The book has a series of cartoons from "The Ready Room" Newsletter circulated amongst Ventura personnel regarding various issues regarding the flying traits of the Ventura as well as the intricacies of handling the fuel system.
 
The PV-1 was a very different machine to the Venturas that 2 group were lumbered with. The PV-1 was fitted with engines highly optimised for low altitude work and was quite fast at those altitudes. Compared well in speed and manuverability with the Japanese fighters they were matched up against.
The RAF Venturas were heavily loaded, thus poorly performing at the medium altitudes they were operating against very experienced Luftwaffe fighter defences. So why didn't they fly at low level where the PV-1s were operating, just one problem FLAK.
Both the RAF and USAAF when they tried it on a disastrous B-26 mission found that trying to fly around at low level in the ETO in 1943 was absolute suicide. The USN PV-1 units would have performed just as poorly in the ETO theatre as the RAF Venturas.
 
Hornet has nailed it here, the Ventura was a light bomber in the RAF operating in a very different environment compared to USN PV-1s. I'd have to agree with tactics being the problem with the RAF's early Ventura operations, the targets the aircraft were put up against were by and large heavily defended, which resulted in high losses per operational unit. These were of course of no result of the aircraft itself, but high losses definitely affect the reputation of the aircraft.

Look at the reputations of the Fairey Battle and Boulton Paul Defiant (for those who think the British never criticise their own aircraft), both types were roundly criticised at the time and have been since, both regularly appearing in "worst aircraft of WW2" lists. The Defiant was criticised by none other than C-in-C Fighter Command AM Hugh Dowding in early 1940 before it had even engaged in its first combat operations. He also made the decision to remove the only active squadron in August 1940, 264 Sqn, from frontline fighter duties after heavy losses the squadron suffered, including its CO Sqn Ldr Philip Hunter, one of the type's biggest advocates. If ever there was a criticism of a type, its removal from the combat arena is a pretty big one.

From my experience reading books, combat reports, manuals and other things, no country wants to admit that their equipment was sub par, but every country had clangers and the reality was that British writers were actually more honest about these things that most other nations - the British test pilot that quipped about the Botha's cockpit, "access to the cockpit is difficult, it should have been made impossible" - if that isn't a criticism, I don't know what is.

American authors, for example, virtually ignore anything that doesn't put the USA first - the British criticisms of the Fortress I, for example are almost always ignored in US histories of the type, the technological aid the British offered the USA during the war, radar, gun turrets, jet engines, the fitting of self sealing tanks and armour plating based on Battle of Britain experience are never recognised and always assumed that they had this stuff already, even the fact that the Mustang was designed and built for the British is often glossed over and at times never admitted to at all.

Of course the German fans, as mentioned already, tend to elevate the capabilities of German aircraft and deeds to ridiculously high levels, whilst ignoring shortcomings, like not being able to get a reliable 2,000 hp engine off the bench and into service, or being able to put a reliable replacement bomber into service during the war, leaving the He 111 still in frontline service in 1945 - it would be like the British still using the Whitley or Wellington, or the USAAF using the B-18 Bolo, or the fact that those wunderwaffen they go on about were seriously hampered by poor quality because of not only the bombing raids but the reliance on slave labour, which often rendered the weapons next to useless, and so on... Thankfully, German writers are a lot more honest about the country's shortcomings in WW2 than the fans.

As for the Ventura, the RNZAF had success with the type as a strike aircraft in the Pacific, the Kiwis liked the type, but it was again, operating in a very different environment toContinental Europe. 487 (New Zealand) Sqn, RAF operated the Ventura and suffered high loss rates, but operations closer to home in the Pacific gave the Kiwis better experiences with their Venturas.
 
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American authors, for example, virtually ignore anything that doesn't put the USA first - the British criticisms of the Fortress I, for example are almost always ignored in US histories of the type, the technological aid the British offered the USA during the war, radar, gun turrets, jet engines, the fitting of self sealing tanks and armour plating based on Battle of Britain experience are never recognised and always assumed that they had this stuff already, even the fact that the Mustang was designed and built for the British is often glossed over and at times never admitted to at all.

Most American histories of the Mustang explicitly mention its British provenance, that Dutch Kindelberger was able to cook up something better than the P-40 in 100 or so days to earn a British order. That knowledge is widespread. We also acknowledge the Brit development of the cavity magnetron, making for better radar, and as well our use of Tube Alloys discoveries is well-known. The abject failure of the P-59 until British engines were license-built for the P-80 is also common knowledge. I'm not sure what you're reading.

On the other hand, American sources, including pilots who themselves fought in the airplanes, are scathing about the inferior performance of our own planes -- Buffalo and P-39 (yikes!) especially -- but even the F4F in Midway came in for criticism. We also took time to shoot the M-4 Sherman full of critical holes, not to mention the M-5s. You could also look at the after-action reports from USS Enterprise to see detailed critique of USN AA, DC, and FDC.

Plenty of American authors and commentators offer plenty of critique on much American gear.
 
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Of course the German fans, as mentioned already, tend to elevate the capabilities of German aircraft and deeds to ridiculously high levels, whilst ignoring shortcomings, like not being able to get a reliable 2,000 hp engine off the bench and into service, or being able to put a reliable replacement bomber into service during the war, leaving the He 111 still in frontline service in 1945
The Vickers Wellington was still in front line use in Italy in 1945. Indeed the last production Wellington went into service in November. 1945. Pedantic trivia I acknowledge.
 
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The Vickers Wellington was still in front line use in Italy in 1945. Indeed the last production Wellington went into service in November. 1945. Pedantic trivia I acknowledge.

Obviously this doesn't hold water against the fact that by that time Lancasters and Halifaxes outnumbered Wellingtons in RAF service as frontline bombers by a large margin, now, does it. Not the same as the Luftwaffe having to rely on the He 111 because its intended replacement was a dog's breakfast.
 
I've read plenty of US-written stuff about our planes that had less then wonderful things to say about US aircraft. Almosy every book I have ever read about early jets mantions the British contribution to the US jet engine effort. The other things you mention above that US authors neglect mention ... I've read about many time in US-authored books. Most of the time, it is buried in the development section of the writing, but it is usually, not always, there.

I have observations about British WWII aircraft myself. One of them is admiration couple with several "Why the heck don't they FIX this crap" thoughts. I can tell you from personal observation that a Spitfire is MUCH more delicate than a US fighter aircraft. That is, it is much easier to damage it around the hangar, by long shot.

But, to be fair, to fix this characteristic, you'd have to build it heaver and it would lose some of the sparkling performance and handling it enjoys. So, nobody who owns one tries to do that. They enjoy the light handling and good climb rate and learn to be Spitifre owners.

Conversely, people who own P-51 Mustangs learn to be Mustang owners instead of trying to lighten it up by 2,000+ pounds so it will be more like a Spitfire.

Just to throw it out there, the main reason we have a lot of P-51 owners in the USA (and other US-built aircraft) and very few Spitfire (and other European WWII warbirds) owners is simple. It's NOT because we're stuck on only US airplanes ... it is becasue they were built here, so we can find more parts for them here. More parts means less expensive parts and better serviceability. If I had the money to own and fly a warbird, I'd choose the engine/prop combo first and then find a plane that uses that engine/prop combo and restore and fly that aircraft type. Here in the USA, I'd choose an R-2800, Allison V-1710, or Merlin (Packard or Rolls-Royce).

Yes, I see some "made in USA" bias over here in the USA. It isn't that common, but it can be seen. But don't tell me there isn't some "made in the Britsh Empire" bias in the UK among warbird owners. I see it when we get visitors over here at times. Not always, but at times. A bit of pride and bias seems pretty normal around the world for locally-built equipment of most sorts.

But, in my experience, it rarely reaches the point of trying to deny the contributions of others.

Cheers and keep 'em flying.
 

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