Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
Not strictly true; I forgot to mention that the fuselage tank could only be used in conjunction with the 170 gallon ferry tank (it's in the A.P.)
Did the RAF have designs for a long range escort fighter?
- Thread starter MikeGazdik
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Shortround6
Lieutenant General
And here we get into part of this argument. Timing.
The MK V Spitfire had the good propeller and it had The Merlin 45 engine. The Merlin 45 could hold 9lbs boost to 20,000ft with ram compared to the Merlin III holding 6lb boost to 18,000ft with ram, The Merlin 45 could hold 6lbs of boost to 23,000ft. It also had about 300 more HP for take-off (34%) All for very little increase in weight in the power plant. You now have the power to lug around a bit more weight without taking a big hit to performance. I would note that tests of a "normal" Vb and a MK V with 4 20mm guns show the 4 cannon fighter losing about 340fps (about 10%) in climb and about 1000-1100ft in ceiling. At 28,000ft the loss in climb was about 13-14%. Part may be drag but weight has more influence on climb.
the 4 cannon MK V climbs about like MK II Spitfire. If that is good enough so be it.
30 Imp gallons was good for about 1 hour at a very economical cruise speed. A speed that would be near suicidal to use over enemy territory or in enemy coastal waters. Where over the Channel you cut from the higher cruise to speed to the economical cruise speed may be a matter of argument but 20imp gallons may not get you a radius that includes the Ruhr or much of it.
Steve,
I think most comments in history fora are tinged with a little bit of hindsight, after all we are not facing the difficult decisions faced by the commanders on the spot. Analysing the past is what History is about, and pointing out errors is part of the process. The question on this topic is to compare and contrast what the Americans did when they faced the same problem faced by Bomber Command. You are quite right that the penny didn't drop for the USAAF in 1939/40, but of course they weren't at war then, so it wasn't such a pressing problem for them. The question is how well and how quickly did they respond when they realised the vulnerability of their unescorted daylight bombers. What the USAAF did was learn quicker than the RAF from experience.
The USAAF started their daylight bombing in August 1942, under the protection of short-range Spitfires and fared quite well, but soon after they engaged in operations further afield they recognised the need for long-range fighters and made plans to get the range of their P-38's and P-47's extended. In 1943 General Arnold demanded the change in focus and acknowledged that he should have been quicker to make the decision. The RAF leaders,such as Portal, Douglas and Leigh-Mallory, in contrast, had decided that long-range fighters could not compete on equal terms with the Luftwaffe short range fighters, and in making this (wrong) decision they were delinquent. The success of POINTBLANK, a predominantly American only event, was so successful that it reduced bomber losses considerably showed how good their judgement was on the topic of long-range fighters.
Regards
I think most comments in history fora are tinged with a little bit of hindsight, after all we are not facing the difficult decisions faced by the commanders on the spot. Analysing the past is what History is about, and pointing out errors is part of the process. The question on this topic is to compare and contrast what the Americans did when they faced the same problem faced by Bomber Command. You are quite right that the penny didn't drop for the USAAF in 1939/40, but of course they weren't at war then, so it wasn't such a pressing problem for them. The question is how well and how quickly did they respond when they realised the vulnerability of their unescorted daylight bombers. What the USAAF did was learn quicker than the RAF from experience.
The USAAF started their daylight bombing in August 1942, under the protection of short-range Spitfires and fared quite well, but soon after they engaged in operations further afield they recognised the need for long-range fighters and made plans to get the range of their P-38's and P-47's extended. In 1943 General Arnold demanded the change in focus and acknowledged that he should have been quicker to make the decision. The RAF leaders,such as Portal, Douglas and Leigh-Mallory, in contrast, had decided that long-range fighters could not compete on equal terms with the Luftwaffe short range fighters, and in making this (wrong) decision they were delinquent. The success of POINTBLANK, a predominantly American only event, was so successful that it reduced bomber losses considerably showed how good their judgement was on the topic of long-range fighters.
Regards
Good question. I think the answer lies in the the uncombined nature of the Combined Bomber Offensive.
If the Bomber forces had become combined under a single Coalition Command organisation, headed by the Americans (as they requested), the six months from Jan to Jun 1943 would have focused the attention of the Commander on how best to achieve POINTBLANK and beyond. Portal and Harris demurred as they didn't want to lose the prestige of independent, British led Command. With RAF long-range fighters on board the Luftwaffe would have little or no respite. Even assuming only the same level of success the actual POINTBLANK campaign achieved, which reduced USAAF bomber losses from between 4 to 5% in 1943 to between 1 and 2 % in 1944 to 1945 it would be reasonable to suggest that the more vulnerable Lancaster and Halifax bombers could fly by day with, potentially, even more accuracy.
The American focus on attacking oil was acknowledged, grudgingly, by Bomber Harris after the war as betting on an outsider that happened to win the race but for the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the USAAF oil was never an outsider; it was always a favourite. With the Americans in charge the campaign against oil may the war may have been shortened considerably. Now this view is certainly counterfactual and laced with hindsight, but hopefully some will find it worthy of the forum.
Regards
If the Bomber forces had become combined under a single Coalition Command organisation, headed by the Americans (as they requested), the six months from Jan to Jun 1943 would have focused the attention of the Commander on how best to achieve POINTBLANK and beyond. Portal and Harris demurred as they didn't want to lose the prestige of independent, British led Command. With RAF long-range fighters on board the Luftwaffe would have little or no respite. Even assuming only the same level of success the actual POINTBLANK campaign achieved, which reduced USAAF bomber losses from between 4 to 5% in 1943 to between 1 and 2 % in 1944 to 1945 it would be reasonable to suggest that the more vulnerable Lancaster and Halifax bombers could fly by day with, potentially, even more accuracy.
The American focus on attacking oil was acknowledged, grudgingly, by Bomber Harris after the war as betting on an outsider that happened to win the race but for the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the USAAF oil was never an outsider; it was always a favourite. With the Americans in charge the campaign against oil may the war may have been shortened considerably. Now this view is certainly counterfactual and laced with hindsight, but hopefully some will find it worthy of the forum.
Regards
Where's the advantage of putting a 27 gallon tank behind the pilot, which remains full of volatile fumes when "empty," and interferes with the pilot's rear/downward view, against hanging a 30 gallon tank under the fuselage, from where it can be dumped when empty?[/QUOTE]
Edgar, your question reflects British thinking at the time. There were a number of issues with rear fuel tanks, not least the impact on weight and balance of the aircraft. The Vickers trial modification found a full 72 gallon tank behind the pilot prohibitive in terms of aircraft manoeuvrability, but the American modification to the Spitfire at Wright Field only had 42 gallons. Nevertheless it took modifications to mitigate these weaknesses.
What is perhaps more interesting is that the some of the RAF Mustang III's and some of the USAAF P-51's had rear fuel tanks and little was made of the fumes and volatility problems because the Americans chose to accept the operational risks. When Ops 1A flew with the USAAF in a P-51 in April 1944 his report noted that "The Americans are much more go ahead than we are, and much, as I have observed before, greater realists." (Ref AIR 20/860, TNA)
Edgar, your question reflects British thinking at the time. There were a number of issues with rear fuel tanks, not least the impact on weight and balance of the aircraft. The Vickers trial modification found a full 72 gallon tank behind the pilot prohibitive in terms of aircraft manoeuvrability, but the American modification to the Spitfire at Wright Field only had 42 gallons. Nevertheless it took modifications to mitigate these weaknesses.
What is perhaps more interesting is that the some of the RAF Mustang III's and some of the USAAF P-51's had rear fuel tanks and little was made of the fumes and volatility problems because the Americans chose to accept the operational risks. When Ops 1A flew with the USAAF in a P-51 in April 1944 his report noted that "The Americans are much more go ahead than we are, and much, as I have observed before, greater realists." (Ref AIR 20/860, TNA)
There was considerable inertia in the US system too. The 8th AF's own official history boldly states that:
"The formation of a long range fighter organisation began in early 1942 with the activation of VIII interceptor command...."
In April 1942 General Spaatz sent a memorandum from Bolling Field to General Arnold, then commanding general of all US Army Air Forces.
Yet nearly eighteen months later we can see a communique like this which clearly shows that the USAAF did not have fighters with sufficient range in Europe, and the drop tank conundrum was still not solved.
The problems with the various drop tanks are well documented. Here's a 3rd September 1943 report on the 108 gallon tank as an example:
Testing was carried out in July 1943 on the 200 gallon unpressurised paper tanks. The 75 gallon (actually 84) and 108 gallon tanks were tested in August and September 1943. It was a shortage of sway braces which initially held up their use. It was late in 1943 before they could be made to work satisfactorily.
The problem was such that at an 8th AF commanders meeting of August 1944 there was a serious discussion of deploying the P-38 as the major escort fighter in the ETO at the expense of the P-47 and even P-51 if a 'droppable 150-gallon tanks, pressurized to an altitude of 30,000ft' could not be made available. At another meeting, when Kepner succeeded Hunter on 29th August, the decision to assemble P-38s became a first priority. It didn't happen because within a month the much wished for drop tanks finally did become available.
In summary, having failed to learn the lessons taught by the unmitigated disaster the RAF had suffered bombing in daylight, it took the USAAF over eighteen months to finally develop the technology to enable its fighters to escort its bombers to and from the target. It knew far earlier that this was required and earlier that this sort of escort was the only way to preserve its bombers, and the men who flew them.
Cheers
Steve
"The formation of a long range fighter organisation began in early 1942 with the activation of VIII interceptor command...."
In April 1942 General Spaatz sent a memorandum from Bolling Field to General Arnold, then commanding general of all US Army Air Forces.
Yet nearly eighteen months later we can see a communique like this which clearly shows that the USAAF did not have fighters with sufficient range in Europe, and the drop tank conundrum was still not solved.
The problems with the various drop tanks are well documented. Here's a 3rd September 1943 report on the 108 gallon tank as an example:
Testing was carried out in July 1943 on the 200 gallon unpressurised paper tanks. The 75 gallon (actually 84) and 108 gallon tanks were tested in August and September 1943. It was a shortage of sway braces which initially held up their use. It was late in 1943 before they could be made to work satisfactorily.
The problem was such that at an 8th AF commanders meeting of August 1944 there was a serious discussion of deploying the P-38 as the major escort fighter in the ETO at the expense of the P-47 and even P-51 if a 'droppable 150-gallon tanks, pressurized to an altitude of 30,000ft' could not be made available. At another meeting, when Kepner succeeded Hunter on 29th August, the decision to assemble P-38s became a first priority. It didn't happen because within a month the much wished for drop tanks finally did become available.
In summary, having failed to learn the lessons taught by the unmitigated disaster the RAF had suffered bombing in daylight, it took the USAAF over eighteen months to finally develop the technology to enable its fighters to escort its bombers to and from the target. It knew far earlier that this was required and earlier that this sort of escort was the only way to preserve its bombers, and the men who flew them.
Cheers
Steve
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Thanks.
The 170 gal tank was also drop-able. For the Spitfire there was also a possibility of having an under-seat fuel tank installed (closer to the CoG than the rear fuel tank), used on some early PR machines? There was also possibility of 10 extra gals in the front tank(s), that was used to that cause in Mk VIII and modified Mk IXs, among other.
Think that we could also compare the Merlin III and XII with what was available in 1938-40 in other countries, especially in Germany as a likely adversary. The DB 601A is available from Spring of 1939, prior that Germans cannot compete, the gap in power between Merlin III and Jumo 210 is too great. Germany has problem of timing?
The Merlin III has 1030 HP at 16300 ft, the the early DB 601A has some 900 HP there - Merlin has almost 15% more. Same difference between Merlin XII vs. late DB-601A? There was enough engine power to cancel out the extra 250-300 lbs worth of extra fuel. Merlin XII is also rated at greater take off power than the Mk.III, 1175 HP.
The de Havilland 2-pitch prop was installed in a number of Spitfires prior ww2 broke out, there is a picture of such Spitfire Is at the Morgan Shacklady book, pg. 54, dated 8th June 1939. Constant speed props were installed in 1940?
Thanks.
I'd try to have the Spit V LR having LMGs only.
Not 1 hour, but closer to 30 minutes; the V-1650-1 in high gear would use 46-58 imp gal per hour in cruise setting (77 imp gph in max continuous setting). 30 min on 300 mph gives 150 miles, quite a boost for the combat radius.
I don't believe invasion of northern Europe would have happened significantly sooner than the summer of '44 for a variety of reasons. I do agree that the war might have been shortened by two or three months, to early '45. You might make a case for 'winter' '44.
There are many, many reasons why this was never going to happen, which you touched on above, but as a 'what if' I think it is entirely plausible.
Cheers
Steve
buffnut453
Captain
It's more complex than just a straight numbers count. For example, only one gun of the 3 in the noses of the B-17F and B-24D could be fired at one time because there was only one guy in there to do the shooting. That takes 2 guns out of commission from your count and puts the B-17F at 10 effective guns and the B-24D at 8 effective guns. Also, of those available guns, 3 in each aircraft were swivel-mounts with relatively limited arcs of fire. The tunnel and radio skylight positions were particularly poor in this regard, while the waist guns probably did more damage to friendly aircraft in their own formation than they did to the opposition. I'd contend that those guns were more for morale than actual combat effectiveness.
I entirely accept that the 50cal had a longer range and more hitting power than the .303, as I made clear in my previous post.
It didn't have a longer effective range and that was due to the sights.
Cheers
Steve
buffnut453
Captain
Thanks Steve. The problem is compounded by the challenges of accurately sighting the swivel-mounted guns. I stand by my statement that there wasn't much effective difference between the gun defences fitted to RAF and USAAF heavy bombers through most of the war. The tide turned with the B-17G while the B-29 was a generation ahead, but prior to that point probably not much in it.
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It's odd that Harris was still complaining in 1944 about the 'pop guns', meaning the .303 machine guns, on Bomber Command aircraft.
Almost every account I've read from the men of Bomber Command reinforces the idea that firing their defensive argument was a last resort, only when they saw a night fighter lining up an attack. It would be combined with evasive manoeuvres. They all seem to have thought that firing their guns otherwise simply gave away their position.
I have read and heard several accounts of instances when a night fighter was seen, but as it clearly was unaware of the bomber it was not engaged. It's only fair to say I know of one instance when a Lancaster actively pursued a Ju 88, but this was very much the exception.
From the other side, most night fighter pilots took the fire from the bomber as a sure indication that they had been seen and would break off to find a less alert target.
Cheers
Steve
Almost every account I've read from the men of Bomber Command reinforces the idea that firing their defensive argument was a last resort, only when they saw a night fighter lining up an attack. It would be combined with evasive manoeuvres. They all seem to have thought that firing their guns otherwise simply gave away their position.
I have read and heard several accounts of instances when a night fighter was seen, but as it clearly was unaware of the bomber it was not engaged. It's only fair to say I know of one instance when a Lancaster actively pursued a Ju 88, but this was very much the exception.
From the other side, most night fighter pilots took the fire from the bomber as a sure indication that they had been seen and would break off to find a less alert target.
Cheers
Steve
buffnut453
Captain
Of course Bomber Command night ops were an entirely different threat environment compared to the USAAF's daylight raids. It probably wouldn't have been too difficult to design new turrets with 50cal machine guns for fitment to RAF heavy bombers but, as we've noted, the change probably wouldn't have qualitatively improved an aircraft's defences.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Early on, the B-17 had a reputation with the Luftwaffe as the "fliegendes Stachelschwein" - "Flying Porcupine". The Luftwaffe went to great lengths to defeat the B-17's (and to a certain degree: the B-24) defensive armament. You may have seen photos of the wire-frame "defensive cones" on scale models of B-17s and B-24s in use by the Luftwaffe flight school.
The Germans didn't go to such lengths with the RAF bombers, nor did they show as much concern with the U.S. medium bombers.
As the Germans refined their methods, Boeing countered that...this is why the B-17 grew to the 13 MGs of the B-17G. The chin turret of the B-17F (late) and B-17G actually coming from the B-40 gunship.
And I'll do a little looking through my archives, as I have a photo of two crewmen manning the cheek MGs, it's a bit grainy/fuzzy, since the photo was taken during combat by a "ghost rider".
The Germans didn't go to such lengths with the RAF bombers, nor did they show as much concern with the U.S. medium bombers.
As the Germans refined their methods, Boeing countered that...this is why the B-17 grew to the 13 MGs of the B-17G. The chin turret of the B-17F (late) and B-17G actually coming from the B-40 gunship.
On the contrary, there was room and the Bombadier and the Navigator manned the foreward (nose - cheek) MG positions. The Engineer manned the dorsal turret and the Radio Operator manned the spine position.
And I'll do a little looking through my archives, as I have a photo of two crewmen manning the cheek MGs, it's a bit grainy/fuzzy, since the photo was taken during combat by a "ghost rider".
drgondog
Major
It wasn't going to fade. Arnold was just looking for a contract vehicle to continue the P-51 production line. He was already receiving very strong recommendations for the Rolls Royce/RAF modification of the Mark I to the Mark X. Funds were available for a dive bomber without having to go through the politicized Procurement Board. The A-36 and P-51A contracts were let just before the RAF proposal to install the Merlin after Harker flew it on April 30. June saw the contract for the P-51A which stipulated the authority to convert the balance of the P-51A contract to the P-51B contract, to be let in August.
The P-51A contract was perhaps the most important because it funded high production tooling. The original 1200 order was reduced to 310 P-51A and the balance was funneled into the P-51B order.
This report is fairly typical.
The Luftwaffe pilots were wary of the defensive fire from the bomber formations, but they would invariably press home attacks on unescorted formations.
This was not the case, particularly late in the war, when escort fighters were present as evidenced by PoW interrogations and wireless intercepts.
Cheers
Steve
The Luftwaffe pilots were wary of the defensive fire from the bomber formations, but they would invariably press home attacks on unescorted formations.
This was not the case, particularly late in the war, when escort fighters were present as evidenced by PoW interrogations and wireless intercepts.
Cheers
Steve
buffnut453
Captain
Then again the RAF's bombers didn't have "defensive cones" in the way that USAAF bombers did. The rear turret on RAF heavy bombers could traverse more than 180 degrees and had greater elevation and depression than the rear guns on either the B-17 or the B-24. Same-same for the RAF front turret compared to the nose guns in the B-17F and B-24D.
For your latter point, fair enough...so 2 guns out of 3 could be fired. That's still one gun flopping around doing nothing. Also, changing from one gun to another with 2 crewmen in the nose would have been sporting given the "cosy" accommodations. Again, this is more than just a gun count...it's about applying effective fire on the attacking aircraft.
Glider
Major
Apologies for being late into the thread but in 1944 the RAF did at least one daylight raid from the UK to the Rhur using Halifax bombers escorted by Tempests. The Tempest didn't have the range of the P51 but it had sufficient range to escort raids capable of inflicting significant damage.
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
Not once you put the radio IFF gear back in, plus armour, which the P.R. aircraft normally didn't carry.
If you mean the tanks in the leading edges, they couldn't be fitted to the V, and were only on the VII, VIII, XIV XVIII, not the IX (or XVI for that matter.)
The props were fitted by de Havilland teams, travelling across the country, just before the start of the Battle.
Not the LE tanks, but increase in front fuel tank (lower?) volume; total fuel carried between pilot and engine was increased to 96 imp gals; tests of the modifications were carried out in second half of 1944. The Mk. VII and it's 'kin' received the same modification in late 1942.
Kindly provided by our member glider:
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