What a dive bomber can achieve depends on the target, a trawler/destroyer is much more difficult to hit than a carrier and not just because of its size it can also change direction much more quickly.
This is correct, but it was not obvious at the beginning of the war. The Royal Navy's
"Air Defence Instructions, 1939" forbade fast avoiding action against dive bombers. Many ships' commanding officers took a different view and the matter was referred to the director of the Naval Air Division in 1940. He conceded that avoiding action might cause a reduction in bombing accuracy because it would cause the pilot to adjust his aim, which was not regarded as easy, but in conclusion reinforced the official view that avoiding action should not be taken at the expense of throwing off the ship's AA fire.
Maneuverable ships, like destroyers, might be better able to 'dodge' bombs than others. It has been suggested that the destroyer
Gurkha was lost to air attack in the Norwegian campaign because her Captain was a 'gunnery officer' who believed in the efficacy of AA fire and chose to keep a steady gun platform without weaving, thereby also presenting a steady target.
Later 'dodging' became the norm.
Alec Dennis was on board the destroyer
Griffin as part of Force B off Crete when attacked (along with
Greyhound, Gloucester and Fiji) by JU 87s. Twenty Ju 87s made the first attack comingdown in,
"groups of three, one after the other, dividing their attention among all four ships. It was a classic attack, technically interesting, physically terrifying and, actually, ineffectual."
Dennis described how all the bombs missed as they weaved about at full speed with the cruisers (
Gloucester and Fiji) throwing up large amounts of flak.
Clearly evasive action did work.
Fiji would later endure nearly 13 hours of air attack before finally being hit. She had run out of ammunition and was defiantly firing practice ammunition, solid shot, at the attacking aircraft!
The destroyer
Kipling was attacked 83 times in one three hour period, but was not hit.
The light cruiser
Naiad managed to dodge 36 near misses in one ten minute period before eventually being hit.
It was these stories, and many like them, that led Cunningham to write (in 'A Sailor's Odyssey'):
"The hasty conclusion that ships are impotent in the face of air attack should not be drawn from the Battle of Crete."
His colleagues in the USN would soon find reason to agree.
Cheers
Steve