Dive bomber accuracy in perspective. (1 Viewer)
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Shortround6
Major General
The dive bomber was flying a straight "course" (or nearly so, aiming corrections not evasive maneuvers) in the dive, after bomb release and from the start of the pullout the plane pretty much continued "on course" with pilot "greying out" if not momentarily blacking out so any evasive maneuvers are going to be minimal at best. At least until the plane is nearly horizontal.
Ju-87s had an "automatic" dive recover system initiated by the bomb release, which helped lower the release height. Less chance of pilot error (not holding quite enough "G"s in the pullout) making contact with the ground/sea.
The rapid (or not so rapid) proliferation of light AA guns, both at sea and on land, raised the losses of dive bombers for the results achieved and lead to the decline in it's importance.
Really light AA guns, rifle caliber mgs, heavy machineguns and 20mm cannon were almost "revenge" weapons. They could shoot down dive bombers but probably not before the release point. They could force the dive bombers to release from higher altitudes and thus have less accuracy.
The slightly larger guns could force the release point a bit higher and as Parsifal said, the 40mm Bofors was in a class of it's own as far as both altitude and destructive effect. At least among the common AA guns used both afloat and ashore.
I would note that it was much faster to refit ships with large suites of AA guns than it was to develop new dive bombers and depending on which army the ground units sometimes saw a large change in AA guns in just a few years so while some countries did develop new dive bombers some of these faced greatly increase AA defenses and some did not. The Japanese Army and Navy facing vast numbers of late war aircraft (or at least 2nd generation) with 1st generation AA weapons and often a 1st generation scale of issue in the Army's case.
Ju-87s had an "automatic" dive recover system initiated by the bomb release, which helped lower the release height. Less chance of pilot error (not holding quite enough "G"s in the pullout) making contact with the ground/sea.
The rapid (or not so rapid) proliferation of light AA guns, both at sea and on land, raised the losses of dive bombers for the results achieved and lead to the decline in it's importance.
Really light AA guns, rifle caliber mgs, heavy machineguns and 20mm cannon were almost "revenge" weapons. They could shoot down dive bombers but probably not before the release point. They could force the dive bombers to release from higher altitudes and thus have less accuracy.
The slightly larger guns could force the release point a bit higher and as Parsifal said, the 40mm Bofors was in a class of it's own as far as both altitude and destructive effect. At least among the common AA guns used both afloat and ashore.
I would note that it was much faster to refit ships with large suites of AA guns than it was to develop new dive bombers and depending on which army the ground units sometimes saw a large change in AA guns in just a few years so while some countries did develop new dive bombers some of these faced greatly increase AA defenses and some did not. The Japanese Army and Navy facing vast numbers of late war aircraft (or at least 2nd generation) with 1st generation AA weapons and often a 1st generation scale of issue in the Army's case.
pinehilljoe
Senior Airman
- 742
- May 1, 2016
I vote for the SBD initial attacks at Midway (but I'm biased) crippling the three carriers.
parsifal
Colonel
they certainly are up there, plus it would have to be said that this attacks were probably the most decisive of the war
Mostly unaware targets, no flak, barely any maneuvering, no fighter opposition...
That same day Lt. Kobayashi led 18 Vals against Yorktown, eight were shot down by the CAP, three more dropped their bombs and engaged the F4Fs to give the other bombers a chance to complete their mission, the remaining seven attacked Yorktown while being chased by fighters and facing a wall of flak, still they did it as planned with the aircraft armed for flak suppression diving first and getting a hit, then the remaining four attacked using armor piercing bombs and got two hits.
A 42% hit rate while under attack, against heavy AA fire and after taking heavy losses... cant beat that for skill, valor and professionalism.
Well, they did sent in the Italians first in order to get the fighters out of the way, so credit for good planning and knowing how to take advantage of enemy weapon and procedure limitations.
I always found that claim a bit suspect, who made the count? The IJN pilots were deadly accurate, but still, 80%? Maybe since they got 42% with opposition I shouldnt be so sceptic...
parsifal
Colonel
The circumstances of the sinking were made in reports to the admiralty, with the numbers of bomb hits and/or near misses studiously recorded in those reports. We also know the numbers of IJN Vals committed to the attack, so combining those two sources of information it is not hard to verify that the hits to bombs dropped works out at an 80% hit rate.
WWII cruisers has a good summary of the damage suffered by the two cruisers:
"The Dorsetshire (Captain Agar) and Cornwall (Captain Mainwaring) had sailed from Colombo at 2200 4th April. During the night orders were received from the commander in chief to join him at 1600 5th April and at about 0700 course was altered for this rendezvous. About an hour later the report of strong enemy forces to the east of the cruisers was received in the Dorsetshire, and speed was increased to 27.5 knots, the maximum Cornwall was able to proceed, in order to join the commander-in-chief as soon as possible.
It was a calm day, with little or no cloud, and a slight haze over of the sun; visibility was extreme. At about 1100 a single aircraft was sighted by the Cornwall and reported to the Dorsetshire. It was a long way astern estimated at about 20 miles, and was lost sight of before it could be identified. Two other aircraft were sighted about 1300, one some 14 miles ahead, and judged to be friendly, and one astern, which closed to within 14 miles and was considered hostile. In view of the proximity of the rendezvous and the risk of the enemy aircraft detecting the commander-in-chief, it was decided to break wireless silence and make a shadowing report.
At about 1340, 5th April, three aircraft was sighted by the Dorsetshire overhead at high altitude: assuming them to be hostile, she opened fire immediately, but within a few seconds they dived on the Cornwall which was about a mile on the port quarter, and released their bombs at a low altitude, the first striking the after hangar and the second scoring a near-miss port side forward. Simultaneously, a separate formation of three aircraft attacked the Dorsetshire; avoiding action was taken to starboard, but all three bombs hit, one through the quarter deck disabling the steering gear, the second through the catapult, disabling both wireless offices, and the third port side amidships, putting out of action all the port anti-aircraft armament, except the pom-pom. Attacks by a succession of formations of three followed at intervals of a few seconds. Hits were received through the base of the foremost funnel, putting A boiler room out of action; on the quarterdeck, disabling X turret, and at the base of the after funnel bringing it down and at the same time blowing up the H.A. magazine. This bomb also put both pom-poms out of action.
Four minutes after the initial attack the ship took a definite list to port; all communication between the bridge and other parts of the ship had gone, and looking down from the bridge aft, all that could be seen was flames and smoke extending to the stern. At least four more hits were received making a total of 10, in addition to several near-misses, and two minutes later the captain realising the ship was sinking, ordered all hands on deck. This was followed in half a minute by the order to abandon ship, by which time she was slowly turning on to her beam-ends. Enemy aircraft were still flying low over the ship and using their machine guns, and it was possible to get a clear picture of them and their occupants. Almost immediately afterwards she capsized and sank stern first. It was incredible how quickly the ship sank - she just took one plunge by the stern, and as we were thrown into the water, the bows towered up almost vertically alongside us. All around was wreckage of sorts and oil fuel, though not very thick.
Meanwhile Cornwall, though still afloat, had not fared much better. For the next two minutes after the initial attack, bombs fell almost continuously, some scoring direct hits, but the majority were very near misses. Explosions followed each other so quickly that no exact idea could be formed of their sequence, or of the separate effect of each bomb. Altogether 8 hits and six near misses were sustained; only 2 complete misses were observed.
A near miss port side, abreast the Bridge, flooded large sections of the port bilges and dislocated electric power suppliers all over the ship. All personnel in the after engine room were killed (it is believed) by a near-miss on the starboard side, abreast the hangar, and both boiler rooms were flooded by near-misses and had to be evacuated. A bomb on the water line abreast the hangar, burst in the foreward engine room, which rapidly filled with steam and smoke and had to be evacuated, most of the personnel being saved; hits were also received between X and Y turrets, near the Dynamo room, in the sick bay flat and in the recreation space. Many of the Bridge personnel were killed or wounded by splinters of a bomb which exploded on the Starboard paravane; in one case at least the Bridge was also machine gunned. An oil bomb produced a flame which enveloped the starboard pom-pom and fore starboard superstructure, swept right over the air defence position and 8in director. Battledress and anti-flash gear saved all except the gun crew whose clothing caught fire. In less than five minutes after the attacks started all power had failed, and both boiler rooms and both engine rooms were flooding rapidly. The port gunwhale of the ship was awash, and the starboard outer propeller was breaking surface, the ship being slightly down by the bows. Thick black smoke was issuing from the foremost funnel uptake casings on both sides of the upper deck.
By 1351 the last bombs had been dropped, the Dorsetshire had sunk, and endeavours were being made in the Cornwall to correct the list to port and to get away a report by wireless. It soon became evident the ship was sinking, and the Captain, who continued to direct operations though wounded in the right shoulder, gave orders to prepare to abandon ship. He then with the remaining Bridge personnel, left the Bridge and making his way aft saw to the launching of all available floats. At 1355 the final order to abandon ship was given.
While this was being done, the Japanese aircraft, which had ceased attacking, either because it was obvious the ship was doomed, or more probably because they had expended all their bombs, formed up and flew over the survivors. 27 dive bombers and one floatplane were counted; there was no machine gunning of the men in the water.
The end was not long in coming. Some four minutes later the Cornwall heeled over to about 70 degrees and went down by the bows, taking her final plunge at an angle of about 30 degrees to the vertical and making singularly little disturbance. Once again the Japanese airmen had attacked and their dive bombing had been as successful as the torpedo and high-level bombing used against the Prince of Wales and Repulse. The attacks were carried out by single-engine 2 seater planes diving steeply at an angle of from 60 degrees to 80 degrees from ahead or fine on the bow. Their tactics were facilitated by the ships being on a southerly course, thus enabling them to combine the advantages of attacking down sun and from ahead - the cruisers blind spot for AA defences. The attacks were well pressed home, the height of release estimated at from 500 ft to 1000 ft and the bombing was remarkably accurate. The bombs were dropped in such a manner as to have one falling at the moment the previous one was exploding. The size of the bombs dropped was thought in the Cornwall to be between 250 and 500 pound. Some burst on impact and in some the explosion was delayed. The great effect of the near-misses which burst underwater was remarked on. So sudden and severe was the attack that the main HA armament of both cruisers was put out of action before more than a few rounds could be fired. The short range weapons continued to be fought right up to the last; the Cornwall is credited with having damaged one aircraft and probably destroyed another which was seen to hit the water.
A surprisingly large number from each cruiser survived these devastating attacks. They found themselves adrift in a shark-infested ocean, 300 miles from land, and with the scantiest of boat accommodation. Of the Dorsetshire there remained only 2 whalers - leaking badly - a skiff, a floatanet, 2 Carley floats, some rafts and odd bits of wreckage. The wounded were placed in the boats or rafts, and the remainder swam round collecting wreckage and joining it up as rafts around the boats. In a short time all survivors from the ship numbering over 500, formed one single body in the water, and were under perfect discipline and control. A couple of miles away Cornwall's survivors were doing much the same. In their case a whaler, a motor boat, 2 large oiling fenders and six floats formed the rallying point. Help could not be expected to reach them for 24 hours, but they were cheered in the late afternoon by the appearance of an Albacore, followed shortly by a Fulmar, which passed them a message to hold on.
About sunset an aircraft believed to have been hostile was sighted flying very high overhead. Then the night closed down. All that night and the following day they drifted in an oily calm, the wounded and exhausted in the boats, which were loaded almost gunwhale under, and the remainder in the water, holding on to what they could. The spirit, fortitude and discipline of the officers and men of both ships throughout this ordeal, as well as during the action, is described as beyond all praise. Soon after sunrise, 6 April, the heat became intense, and head coverings were fashioned from pieces cut from battle dress. Sharks were numerous; but these seemed content to wait for the corpses which were from time to time committed to the sea, and made no attempt to molest anyone living. Both parties were short of food and drink; what they had was sparingly doled out at intervals. In the late afternoon, 6th April, the appearance of an Albacore put good heart into everyone, and shortly afterwards the masts of a cruiser and two destroyers were sighted over the horizon to the south-west. These proved to be the Enterprise, Paladin and Panther, and their 30 hours ordeal was nearly at an end. 1122 men in the water, for the most part exhausted and with a large number of wounded, were brought on board within the space of an hour without the loss of a single life.
19 officers and 215 ratings were lost from Dorsetshire and 10 officers and 180 ratings from Cornwall".
From this source;
http://www.armouredcarriers.com/battle-for-ceylon-hms-indomitable-formidable/
"In total, the strike included 18 Vals from Soryu, 18 from Hiryu and 17 from Akagi.
By 1348, Dorsetshire's bow lifted as her stern began to slip beneath the waves. In all, she'd been hit by 17 500lb bombs
Japanese reports are cited as saying 13 bombs were dropped on Cornwall, with 11 direct hits. The heavy cruiser went under, bow first, at 1400
Egusa's dive-bomber crews had set a record for bombing accuracy: Every bomb either struck the heavy cruisers, or burst right alongside.
Spotted some two hours later by a Swordfish sent to investigate the scene, a rescue destroyer would be recalled by Somerville under the mistaken belief the Japanese main force was nearby".
The Japanese reports are more or less confirmed by the after action reports to the RN admiralty.
It should be noted that Akagi's Air Group did not actually participate in the sinkings. By the time this air group had arrived, the two cruisers were sinking already. Akagi's air group was several minutes behind the attck formation led by Lt Obusa and Tomonaga.
You can play games with these reports all that you like, but it appears that from the available source information that the IJN achieved 30 hits out of 36 attacks. That's a hit rate of 83%.
WWII cruisers has a good summary of the damage suffered by the two cruisers:
"The Dorsetshire (Captain Agar) and Cornwall (Captain Mainwaring) had sailed from Colombo at 2200 4th April. During the night orders were received from the commander in chief to join him at 1600 5th April and at about 0700 course was altered for this rendezvous. About an hour later the report of strong enemy forces to the east of the cruisers was received in the Dorsetshire, and speed was increased to 27.5 knots, the maximum Cornwall was able to proceed, in order to join the commander-in-chief as soon as possible.
It was a calm day, with little or no cloud, and a slight haze over of the sun; visibility was extreme. At about 1100 a single aircraft was sighted by the Cornwall and reported to the Dorsetshire. It was a long way astern estimated at about 20 miles, and was lost sight of before it could be identified. Two other aircraft were sighted about 1300, one some 14 miles ahead, and judged to be friendly, and one astern, which closed to within 14 miles and was considered hostile. In view of the proximity of the rendezvous and the risk of the enemy aircraft detecting the commander-in-chief, it was decided to break wireless silence and make a shadowing report.
At about 1340, 5th April, three aircraft was sighted by the Dorsetshire overhead at high altitude: assuming them to be hostile, she opened fire immediately, but within a few seconds they dived on the Cornwall which was about a mile on the port quarter, and released their bombs at a low altitude, the first striking the after hangar and the second scoring a near-miss port side forward. Simultaneously, a separate formation of three aircraft attacked the Dorsetshire; avoiding action was taken to starboard, but all three bombs hit, one through the quarter deck disabling the steering gear, the second through the catapult, disabling both wireless offices, and the third port side amidships, putting out of action all the port anti-aircraft armament, except the pom-pom. Attacks by a succession of formations of three followed at intervals of a few seconds. Hits were received through the base of the foremost funnel, putting A boiler room out of action; on the quarterdeck, disabling X turret, and at the base of the after funnel bringing it down and at the same time blowing up the H.A. magazine. This bomb also put both pom-poms out of action.
Four minutes after the initial attack the ship took a definite list to port; all communication between the bridge and other parts of the ship had gone, and looking down from the bridge aft, all that could be seen was flames and smoke extending to the stern. At least four more hits were received making a total of 10, in addition to several near-misses, and two minutes later the captain realising the ship was sinking, ordered all hands on deck. This was followed in half a minute by the order to abandon ship, by which time she was slowly turning on to her beam-ends. Enemy aircraft were still flying low over the ship and using their machine guns, and it was possible to get a clear picture of them and their occupants. Almost immediately afterwards she capsized and sank stern first. It was incredible how quickly the ship sank - she just took one plunge by the stern, and as we were thrown into the water, the bows towered up almost vertically alongside us. All around was wreckage of sorts and oil fuel, though not very thick.
Meanwhile Cornwall, though still afloat, had not fared much better. For the next two minutes after the initial attack, bombs fell almost continuously, some scoring direct hits, but the majority were very near misses. Explosions followed each other so quickly that no exact idea could be formed of their sequence, or of the separate effect of each bomb. Altogether 8 hits and six near misses were sustained; only 2 complete misses were observed.
A near miss port side, abreast the Bridge, flooded large sections of the port bilges and dislocated electric power suppliers all over the ship. All personnel in the after engine room were killed (it is believed) by a near-miss on the starboard side, abreast the hangar, and both boiler rooms were flooded by near-misses and had to be evacuated. A bomb on the water line abreast the hangar, burst in the foreward engine room, which rapidly filled with steam and smoke and had to be evacuated, most of the personnel being saved; hits were also received between X and Y turrets, near the Dynamo room, in the sick bay flat and in the recreation space. Many of the Bridge personnel were killed or wounded by splinters of a bomb which exploded on the Starboard paravane; in one case at least the Bridge was also machine gunned. An oil bomb produced a flame which enveloped the starboard pom-pom and fore starboard superstructure, swept right over the air defence position and 8in director. Battledress and anti-flash gear saved all except the gun crew whose clothing caught fire. In less than five minutes after the attacks started all power had failed, and both boiler rooms and both engine rooms were flooding rapidly. The port gunwhale of the ship was awash, and the starboard outer propeller was breaking surface, the ship being slightly down by the bows. Thick black smoke was issuing from the foremost funnel uptake casings on both sides of the upper deck.
By 1351 the last bombs had been dropped, the Dorsetshire had sunk, and endeavours were being made in the Cornwall to correct the list to port and to get away a report by wireless. It soon became evident the ship was sinking, and the Captain, who continued to direct operations though wounded in the right shoulder, gave orders to prepare to abandon ship. He then with the remaining Bridge personnel, left the Bridge and making his way aft saw to the launching of all available floats. At 1355 the final order to abandon ship was given.
While this was being done, the Japanese aircraft, which had ceased attacking, either because it was obvious the ship was doomed, or more probably because they had expended all their bombs, formed up and flew over the survivors. 27 dive bombers and one floatplane were counted; there was no machine gunning of the men in the water.
The end was not long in coming. Some four minutes later the Cornwall heeled over to about 70 degrees and went down by the bows, taking her final plunge at an angle of about 30 degrees to the vertical and making singularly little disturbance. Once again the Japanese airmen had attacked and their dive bombing had been as successful as the torpedo and high-level bombing used against the Prince of Wales and Repulse. The attacks were carried out by single-engine 2 seater planes diving steeply at an angle of from 60 degrees to 80 degrees from ahead or fine on the bow. Their tactics were facilitated by the ships being on a southerly course, thus enabling them to combine the advantages of attacking down sun and from ahead - the cruisers blind spot for AA defences. The attacks were well pressed home, the height of release estimated at from 500 ft to 1000 ft and the bombing was remarkably accurate. The bombs were dropped in such a manner as to have one falling at the moment the previous one was exploding. The size of the bombs dropped was thought in the Cornwall to be between 250 and 500 pound. Some burst on impact and in some the explosion was delayed. The great effect of the near-misses which burst underwater was remarked on. So sudden and severe was the attack that the main HA armament of both cruisers was put out of action before more than a few rounds could be fired. The short range weapons continued to be fought right up to the last; the Cornwall is credited with having damaged one aircraft and probably destroyed another which was seen to hit the water.
A surprisingly large number from each cruiser survived these devastating attacks. They found themselves adrift in a shark-infested ocean, 300 miles from land, and with the scantiest of boat accommodation. Of the Dorsetshire there remained only 2 whalers - leaking badly - a skiff, a floatanet, 2 Carley floats, some rafts and odd bits of wreckage. The wounded were placed in the boats or rafts, and the remainder swam round collecting wreckage and joining it up as rafts around the boats. In a short time all survivors from the ship numbering over 500, formed one single body in the water, and were under perfect discipline and control. A couple of miles away Cornwall's survivors were doing much the same. In their case a whaler, a motor boat, 2 large oiling fenders and six floats formed the rallying point. Help could not be expected to reach them for 24 hours, but they were cheered in the late afternoon by the appearance of an Albacore, followed shortly by a Fulmar, which passed them a message to hold on.
About sunset an aircraft believed to have been hostile was sighted flying very high overhead. Then the night closed down. All that night and the following day they drifted in an oily calm, the wounded and exhausted in the boats, which were loaded almost gunwhale under, and the remainder in the water, holding on to what they could. The spirit, fortitude and discipline of the officers and men of both ships throughout this ordeal, as well as during the action, is described as beyond all praise. Soon after sunrise, 6 April, the heat became intense, and head coverings were fashioned from pieces cut from battle dress. Sharks were numerous; but these seemed content to wait for the corpses which were from time to time committed to the sea, and made no attempt to molest anyone living. Both parties were short of food and drink; what they had was sparingly doled out at intervals. In the late afternoon, 6th April, the appearance of an Albacore put good heart into everyone, and shortly afterwards the masts of a cruiser and two destroyers were sighted over the horizon to the south-west. These proved to be the Enterprise, Paladin and Panther, and their 30 hours ordeal was nearly at an end. 1122 men in the water, for the most part exhausted and with a large number of wounded, were brought on board within the space of an hour without the loss of a single life.
19 officers and 215 ratings were lost from Dorsetshire and 10 officers and 180 ratings from Cornwall".
From this source;
http://www.armouredcarriers.com/battle-for-ceylon-hms-indomitable-formidable/
"In total, the strike included 18 Vals from Soryu, 18 from Hiryu and 17 from Akagi.
By 1348, Dorsetshire's bow lifted as her stern began to slip beneath the waves. In all, she'd been hit by 17 500lb bombs
Japanese reports are cited as saying 13 bombs were dropped on Cornwall, with 11 direct hits. The heavy cruiser went under, bow first, at 1400
Egusa's dive-bomber crews had set a record for bombing accuracy: Every bomb either struck the heavy cruisers, or burst right alongside.
Spotted some two hours later by a Swordfish sent to investigate the scene, a rescue destroyer would be recalled by Somerville under the mistaken belief the Japanese main force was nearby".
The Japanese reports are more or less confirmed by the after action reports to the RN admiralty.
It should be noted that Akagi's Air Group did not actually participate in the sinkings. By the time this air group had arrived, the two cruisers were sinking already. Akagi's air group was several minutes behind the attck formation led by Lt Obusa and Tomonaga.
You can play games with these reports all that you like, but it appears that from the available source information that the IJN achieved 30 hits out of 36 attacks. That's a hit rate of 83%.
parsifal
Colonel
There were a lot of missed opportunities for the Japanese. The quality of their aircrews were outstanding, and yet strangely they tended to think of them as being expendable. the IJN never developed an advanced system for SAR of its downed aircrews, never developed a system of unit or crew rotations, so that green new formations being raised had that vital sprinkling of seasoned veterans to lead the way and work the unit up to steam. They never developed their training schools to churn out reasonably proficient aircrew, so that the quality of aircrew remained. IJN pilot training before the war, it took 5 years minimum for a new recruit to gain his carrier qualifications. the average service time for aircrew aboard Cardivs 1 and 2 was 9 years!. These were irreplaceable assets.
Cardiv 5 (shokaku and Zuikaku) were the strike force at Coral Sea. They were less well trained than the 4 carrier goups that made up most of the forces in the indian ocean. The RN forces in the indian ocean were hastily thrown together, with equipment unsuited to massed strikes, ships unused to working together, and caught badly out of position. in terms of planes on the decks, the RN was badly outnumbered. Worse, they committed the cardinal sin of underestimating the Japanese in every way imaginable
The US CAGs committed to coral sea were still short on training, but the C&C of their forces was far better. even though the training proficiency of the USN groups was still less than the IJN, they were probably the best trained formations in the USN at the time, with the most experience. The raids at tulagi just before the battle honed the skills of the USN CAGs. At Coral sea, the IJN CAGs did pretty well, but not well enough to make a strategic difference to the outcome. moreover it was the Japanese now making the strategic blunders. They were fatally overconfident, committed far too few forces to the attack, and their logistics were not up to the task anymore
Cardiv 5 (shokaku and Zuikaku) were the strike force at Coral Sea. They were less well trained than the 4 carrier goups that made up most of the forces in the indian ocean. The RN forces in the indian ocean were hastily thrown together, with equipment unsuited to massed strikes, ships unused to working together, and caught badly out of position. in terms of planes on the decks, the RN was badly outnumbered. Worse, they committed the cardinal sin of underestimating the Japanese in every way imaginable
The US CAGs committed to coral sea were still short on training, but the C&C of their forces was far better. even though the training proficiency of the USN groups was still less than the IJN, they were probably the best trained formations in the USN at the time, with the most experience. The raids at tulagi just before the battle honed the skills of the USN CAGs. At Coral sea, the IJN CAGs did pretty well, but not well enough to make a strategic difference to the outcome. moreover it was the Japanese now making the strategic blunders. They were fatally overconfident, committed far too few forces to the attack, and their logistics were not up to the task anymore
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
^^^ Not much to add to what parsifal said except to echo what Parshall and Tully said in "Shattered Sword" in that the IJN should have either committed all six fleet carriers to Coral Sea or none at all. They (IJN) were a finite asset, not so the USN opposing them.
The worst part is that they really didnt give them much importance, very few pilots were officers, simply it was no path for professional advancement for a career savvy officer.
I recall reading somewhere that at Coral Sea the IJN did use a C&C aircraft to coordinate the strike, but I have found nothing further on the matter.
Yeah, risking a partial force at Coral Sea was dumb...
Above is a Stuvi 5B mounted on a Ju 87 upper window frame. In the pictures below of the reflector sight view one can see the cross hairs the moving "wurfabkomen" or "release solution" which showed where the bombs would go. The pilot would preset the release altitude, release velocity (fairly constant in the Ju 87) and dive angle. He might have to make adjustments to the dive angle. At the preset altitude a buzzer would let him know to release the bombs and an automatic pull up could commence. This would allow greater standoff distances and more accurate releases from non vertical angles.
When mounted on the Ju 88, Arado 234, Me 410, Do 217, He 177 the bomb sight was attached to a computer called the BZA "Bomb Ziel Automat" which continuously entered air speed, dive angle and altitude so that the impact point was calculated continuously. Typical dive angle might be 22 degrees which could be done without dive brakes. The attack could commence from as low as 8000ft and be complete by 5000 thus keeping the bomber some distance from AAA. The Stuvi worked from vertical to level so it was similar to the British Mk XV.
All light bombers were vulnerable, nothing unique about dive bombers. On the Ar 234 a periscope sight called the Pilotvisiers (PV 1 B) was used. I suppose it could have been fitted to fighters such as the Me 262 or even Fw 190 that didn't have a good over the nose view. In the Ar 234 it was reversible so that the pilot had tail coverage and could aim fixed rearward firing guns. Both the EZ42 and EZ45 were being modified to deflect the mirror allow toss bombing, dive bombing and radar blind fire attacks.
Computing bombsights gave accuracy that eliminated the need for vertical dive bombing.
As can be seen from the illustration of the Ju 88 Installation there was a complex set of power supplies, sensors, inverters involved.
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Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
See post #31
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Agree, see my post #32, according to "Shattered Sword" seven dive bombers started their runs, three were shot down before they could drop coming in from astern of Yorktown, four managed a beam attack (Starboard) and got three hits. Not sure how anyone wants to count it, but I'd say 75% hits (3 out of 4) unless you want to count the three shot down astern in the mix, then yeah, 42% hit rate.
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Not to mention the hole in the wing bigger than the guy's head standing next to it...
I'm relying on Wikipedia article on the Mk XIV Bomb sight.
Mark XIV bomb sight - Wikipedia
"The Mk. XV was a version designed for the Royal Navy and Coastal Command for attacking submarines. As these operations took place at low altitudes, even small changes of altitude air pressure could lead to large errors in calculations. The Mk. XV allowed the altitude input to be taken directly from a radar altimeter, eliminating these inaccuracies and any instrument lag.[13] The Mk. XVII was a Mk. XV modified for the very high attack speeds of the Naval Mosquito at more than 400 mph (640 km/h). As the Naval Mosquito did not have a bomb aimer's position, the sight head was unstabilized and mounted in front of the pilot.[13]"
Note it says there was a high speed version for the Mosquito known as the Mk XVII.
I just assumed it saw service.
I seem to recall that at least two if not all of the first three got to drop their bombs, getting one hit, so I counted them, AFAIK the other four got only 2 hits.
Let me check.
