Dive Bomber Comparison

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There were 85 British destroyers built after 1925 that did not have quad pom-pom guns. 'A' to 'I' classes. 45 of them were sunk or out of action by the end of 1942. Including the Tribals going on to the 'N' class adds another 56 destroyers. Just under 40% had the quad 2pd and the percentage is only that high if you don't count any of the WW I veterans. of the 40 destroyers of the Tribal and 'J', 'K' and L classes 27 of them were sunk or permanently out of action by the end of 1942.
This is from all causes, gunfire, torpedo, mine and air attack. There is no doubt that they ALL were hard worked and did more than their share in gaining victory. There is also little doubt that more of their crews might have returned home if they had had better AA armament.
True but slightly off centre. Few of the A to I class and none of the VW WW1 vessels were with the Battleships and aircraft carriers by the end of 1942. Most but not all of those left were concentrated in the Atlantic and a number were converted for escort duty with guns and torpedo's removed, additional depth charges, huff duff fitted and so on. The Fleet destroyers generally were the newer destroyers fitted as mentioned in my previous posting. It should also be remembered that 15 of the O, P and Q classes were launched in 1941 and would have started to come on stream over this period. I don't have completion or commisioning dates for these vessels

The 1.1 is an interesting story in the best being the enemy of good, complications that sound good but don't work out and good intentions.
It was specifically designed to be an anti-dive bomber gun (how about that, we are somewhat back on track :lol: and was the smallest caliber that could be made to use a 1lb high explosive projectile and so meet the requirements of the St. Petersburg treaty that banned exploding bullets. Work was started in 1930 when such things were still considered to be important. Rate of fire was slowly improved to the point where they got 140 rpm from one barrel so a quad mount was decided upon to "equal" the rate of fire of a single .50 cal MG. Granted each hit would be much more devastating. In order to deal with dive bombers (of which the US Navy was experimenting with in 1930) the mount was given 110 degrees of elevation to compensate for roll and such when the target is coming STRAIGHT down. Because normal traverse was of little use in such situations it was also arranged so that the barrels could pivot or swing 30 degrees to either side of the dead center position without the entire mount traversing. Naturally such refinements added size and weight to the mount. This being the best being the enemy... In practice the extra traverse was either locked out or eliminated but too late to save weight. The 10 degree elevation might not have been needed in practice either. The 1.1 was a fairly powerful round for it's caliber with more recoil than the mount could stand up to initially and it had to be beefed up. While it did have tracer unlike early British 2pdr ammunition it did not have a self destruct and so didn't make those little puff balls of smoke several thousand yds out to deter attacking aircraft.
In the end it would up being overweight for the firepower it offered, like many other early weapons/mounts in the 20mm to 40mm range.
It had other problems as well including the large gun crew needed to operate it and reliability. Either way it was removed just as quickly as they could get rid of it.
 
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There were 85 British destroyers built after 1925 that did not have quad pom-pom guns. 'A' to 'I' classes. 45 of them were sunk or out of action by the end of 1942. Including the Tribals going on to the 'N' class adds another 56 destroyers. Just under 40% had the quad 2pd and the percentage is only that high if you don't count any of the WW I veterans. of the 40 destroyers of the Tribal and 'J', 'K' and L classes 27 of them were sunk or permanently out of action by the end of 1942.
This is from all causes, gunfire, torpedo, mine and air attack. There is no doubt that they ALL were hard worked and did more than their share in gaining victory. There is also little doubt that more of their crews might have returned home if they had had better AA armament.

The RN also had 45 or so Hunt class destroyers in service by Dec 1941, which had quad pom-poms and about a dozen or so AA sloops.

OTOH, in Sept 1939 the USN had about 45 modern destroyers with DP guns but also about 100 old "four stackers":

As 1940 began, with World War II already under way in Europe, the US Navy had 170 flush-deckers in and out of commission. After fifty were transferred to the Royal Navy later that year, 120 hulls remained; these included 101 in commission, 18 of which were conversions.

Additionally about 16of the older RN V and W class destroyers were converted to AA escorts, under the WAIR program by mid 1940, and they were typically rearmed with HA FC, 2 x twin 4in HA and 2 x 1 pom-poms or 2 x quad .5". One of the larger destroyer leaders also received a quad pom-pom:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V_and_W_class_destroyer#WAIR
 
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RCAFson;704452 Regarding the quad .5" said:
Your simple logic is quite wrong. Unless of course the He-111 managed to overfly the target at almost point blank range.
The gun layer had a geared elevation drive hand wheel and the gun trainer had a gear drive also which could be de-clutched to allow the mounting to be "pushed around" Since the mounting was well over one ton even the rotating part must have weighed a considerable amount. The "push bars" were also at waist or hip height which probably didn't help anyone trying to 'aim" with them. The hand wheels stayed at a fixed hight/position while the sights traveled in an arc. Aiming at high angles required a lot of neck stretching.

From "Destroyer Weapons of WW II"
" Its barrels were deliberately misaligned from each other to give a 'scatter' effect. and later mathematical calculations showed that when firing an approximate ten-second burst at 1000yds range, and assuming the total target was within the pattern of the spread for the duration of the burst, 40 rounds of the 500 fired might hit the target. This sounded hopeful, but took no account of the fact that keeping the target within the pattern depended on the both the Layer and Trainer, independently yet concurrently, exactly judging the speed of the aircraft as well as constantly tracking it by hand-follow on a rolling and pitching deck for ten seconds."

It rather depends on range as to wither 1, 2, 3, or all four barrels are actually pointed at one aircraft at the same time. While both US and British 1/2in MGs are pop guns compared to some larger AA weapons the British round had about 60% of the muzzle energy of the American round and the difference only got worse with range. The higher velocity of the US .50 also means a slightly shorter time of flight to a given range, I don't know if the difference is of more than academic interest at the ranges these guns would be effective.

As for the 5.25in dispute I would note a couple of things.
1. The "Gunnery Pocket book" seems to a hand book for recruits to give them the basics of their jobs. Not a Critique of British weaponry. Don't want to discourage the men too soon.
2. Having said that please look at the diagram of the 5.25 turret in the book. Please notice the separate shell hoists for for L.A. (anti-ship) shells and H.A. (anti aircraft) shells. Notice that the L.A. shell hoists are much nearer to the breech than the H.A. shell hoists and would need less man handling of the shells to load the guns. The L.A. shells also don't to pause at the fuse setter before being loaded. It might be possible to get 10-12 rounds per minute from the 5.25 in a surface action.
3. considering that the 4.7in AA guns in the Nelson and Rodney were found to have ammo that was too heavy for sustained fire at 74lb per complete round it is a little difficult to believ that the 80 lb shells for the 5.25 were no problem,. Maybe the WW II sailors were in better shape and better fed than the 1920s and 1930s sailors?
 
True but slightly off centre. Few of the A to I class and none of the VW WW1 vessels were with the Battleships and aircraft carriers by the end of 1942. Most but not all of those left were concentrated in the Atlantic and a number were converted for escort duty with guns and torpedo's removed, additional depth charges, huff duff fitted and so on. The Fleet destroyers generally were the newer destroyers fitted as mentioned in my previous posting. It should also be remembered that 15 of the O, P and Q classes were launched in 1941 and would have started to come on stream over this period. I don't have completion or commisioning dates for these vessels

Excuse me, I hadn't realized that we were picking and choosing which month of which year we were comparing. I thought we started talking about difference in AA capability at the beginning of the war. RCAFson then tried to do a comparison for the Battle of Santa Cruz.

Claiming that the RN had good AA defense near the end of 1942 doesn't do much for all those ships off Norway, Dunkirk, Greece and Crete does it?
 
From "Destroyer Weapons of WW II"
" Its barrels were deliberately misaligned from each other to give a 'scatter' effect. and later mathematical calculations showed that when firing an approximate ten-second burst at 1000yds range, and assuming the total target was within the pattern of the spread for the duration of the burst, 40 rounds of the 500 fired might hit the target. This sounded hopeful, but took no account of the fact that keeping the target within the pattern depended on the both the Layer and Trainer, independently yet concurrently, exactly judging the speed of the aircraft as well as constantly tracking it by hand-follow on a rolling and pitching deck for ten seconds."

It rather depends on range as to wither 1, 2, 3, or all four barrels are actually pointed at one aircraft at the same time. While both US and British 1/2in MGs are pop guns compared to some larger AA weapons the British round had about 60% of the muzzle energy of the American round and the difference only got worse with range. The higher velocity of the US .50 also means a slightly shorter time of flight to a given range, I don't know if the difference is of more than academic interest at the ranges these guns would be effective.

1000 yards would be very long range for a 20mm, much less a .5" MG and at 100 yards, the same gun might expect 400 rounds to hit the target, and that would hurt! If all aircraft stayed at 1000 yds, the quad .5" could be considered a success on that point alone. However, such was not always the case:

http://www.royal-naval-reserve.co.uk/images/admiralty/rep3.JPG
http://www.royal-naval-reserve.co.uk/images/admiralty/rep4.JPG
http://www.royal-naval-reserve.co.uk/images/admiralty/rep5.JPG
TM Convoy Report 29 March 1940 (confirmed kill, aircrew identified)
as the above report shows, a .5" MG and a Lewis gun downed a JU88.

As for the 5.25in dispute I would note a couple of things.
1. The "Gunnery Pocket book" seems to a hand book for recruits to give them the basics of their jobs. Not a Critique of British weaponry. Don't want to discourage the men too soon.
2. Having said that please look at the diagram of the 5.25 turret in the book. Please notice the separate shell hoists for for L.A. (anti-ship) shells and H.A. (anti aircraft) shells. Notice that the L.A. shell hoists are much nearer to the breech than the H.A. shell hoists and would need less man handling of the shells to load the guns. The L.A. shells also don't to pause at the fuse setter before being loaded. It might be possible to get 10-12 rounds per minute from the 5.25 in a surface action.
3. considering that the 4.7in AA guns in the Nelson and Rodney were found to have ammo that was too heavy for sustained fire at 74lb per complete round it is a little difficult to believ that the 80 lb shells for the 5.25 were no problem,. Maybe the WW II sailors were in better shape and better fed than the 1920s and 1930s sailors?

The HA hoist, according to Campbell, actually positions the AA shells directly into the fuze setter, unlike most RN DP guns where the shell has to be placed into the fuse setter manually, such as the 93lb fixed rounds on the 4.5" twin BD mount. In Jan 1941 HMS Illustrious reported that her 4.5" guns fired 3000 93lb rounds at an average 12 r/m. and these were definitely fired at aircraft. The 5.25 loader than has about 5 seconds to transfer the fuzed shell into the loading tray, to maintain 10 r/m. In the mid 1930s the RN actually achieved 15 r/m with the 74lb 4.7" rounds while firing at aircraft:
http://www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/adm186/adm186-339.pdf (page 142)
 
Excuse me, I hadn't realized that we were picking and choosing which month of which year we were comparing. I thought we started talking about difference in AA capability at the beginning of the war. RCAFson then tried to do a comparison for the Battle of Santa Cruz.

Claiming that the RN had good AA defense near the end of 1942 doesn't do much for all those ships off Norway, Dunkirk, Greece and Crete does it?

My point is that RN AA was still in 1939, 1940, 1941 and up to and including Oct 1942, better than the USN and every other navy to that point in the war. The USN found out the hard way that 5" DP guns are no substitute for a good LAA outfit, and the paucity of USN AA kills prior to Santa Cruz bears this out. The RN took it on the chin early in the war, but the USN would have been even harder hit had it faced the same attacks.
 
Excuse me, I hadn't realized that we were picking and choosing which month of which year we were comparing. I thought we started talking about difference in AA capability at the beginning of the war. RCAFson then tried to do a comparison for the Battle of Santa Cruz.

Claiming that the RN had good AA defense near the end of 1942 doesn't do much for all those ships off Norway, Dunkirk, Greece and Crete does it?

My mistake. Before I reply can I ask what you mean by start of the war i.e UK start or US start?
 
Hello RCAFson
Quote:" My point is that RN AA was still in 1939, 1940, 1941 and up to and including Oct 1942, better than the USN"

Based on what? PQ-18 or Pedestal IMHO didn't show any clear advance. If Axis lost 42 a/c out of 330 attacking Pedestal, remember that not only RN and FAA made claims but also RAF made at least 14 claims during Pedestal. Was that after all better than USN AA alone shooting down 25 (14 x D3A and 11 x B5N) and USN CAPs 29, ie altogether 54 out of smaller number of attackers. Conditions were different for sure but not all was easier to USN, especially during the Junyo's main dive-bomber attack conditions were very difficult for AA, Vals popping out of clouds which had base at 300-450m, some even at 150m and warnings, up from Admiral coming in "Don't shoot own planes, bogies coming in but there are also own planes around". And in the end of the day IJN lost almost half of its planes participating the battle.

Have you some hard facts, especially against dive bombers to back up your claim? Nobody have argued that the 40deg max elevation of 4.7" guns on DDs was hindrance against Axis torpedo-bombers but that it was a handicap against

June 42 AA of Yorktown and its screen shot down 2-3 dive-bombers out of 7-8 attacking.

12 Aug 42 RN and FAA shot down 1-2 (Smith in his Stuka book says one by AA and Shores in his Malta: The Spitfire Year says two by fighters but add that fighters claimed 3, of which one was confirmed by the witnesses on both Victorious and Indomitable and HMS Kenya and HMS Charybdis jointly claimed one) out of 12 Stukas from I./StG 3 which knocked out Indomitable with 2 hits and 3 near misses. Now Stukas succeeded to surprise British and first of them had already initiated their dives when British saw them. And the AA cruiser behind the carrier, Phoebe was just engaging Italian torpedobombers with its 5.25". So at most 1 for AA. Of course Ju 87D-1 was better protected than Val.

26 Oct 42 Enterprise and her screen shot down 3 out of 8 Vals from Junyo attacking her. Vals suddenly popped out of low clouds but on the other hand those clouds forced them to attack at 45 deg dives, which made them easier targets to AA.

RN AA was clearly better than that of IJN, on KM more difficult to say, there was a clear political reason for Bismarck's record but Tirpitz and its screen didn't do so badly on 9 March 1942.And IMHO in Oct 42 USN AA might well be better than that of RN.

Juha
 
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Hello
checked the Official Histories; RN Official History, Roskill's The War at Sea, Vol. II [first publ. 1956] p. 305 says that "it appear that they [FAA fighters] and the ships' guns between them destroyed about thirty of all types during the entire operation [Pedestal]."
Interservice official history, Playfair et al The Mediterranean and Middle East Vol. III [first publ. 1960] p.321 says that the enemy lost 35, including those shot down over Malta. IMHO the Med history is probably most reliable, writers, high ranking Army, Naval and AF officers had access to Ultra messages, but lets say that FAA and ships' AA got 30 a/c during the Pedestal, FAA claims were 39 IIRC.
 
per Bergstrom, Luftwaffe losses during PQ-18 were:

KG-26 - 19 bombers (HE-111/Ju-88 )
Kustenfliegergruppen 406/506/906 - 5 x HE-115

4 possible 109 losses (JG-5)
 
Hello Nikademus
on bombers, I counted also 3 Ju 88A-4s from KG 30, one written off after undercarriage failure during landing, maybe mechanical failure or after effect of battle damage, one missing at Spitsberger and one missing at a square, exact place of which I have not bothered to check. On KG 26 losses there are also few cases in which I have given the benefit of doubt to RN.
I can find only 3 Bf 109 losses between 13 and 18 Sept, none had anything to do with PQ-18 and one on 19 Sept, shot down in air combat over Murmansk, so most probably by Soviets.

Juha
 
Hello RCAFson

RN AA was clearly better than that of IJN, on KM more difficult to say, there was a clear political reason for Bismarck's record but Tirpitz and its screen didn't do so badly on 9 March 1942.And IMHO in Oct 42 USN AA might well be better than that of RN.

Juha

hi Juha

Glad you raised this. Someone earlier claimed the Italians and the Germans lacked directors for their AA. Not true. According to Campbell both nations had fire control for their HAA.



In the case of italian FRC, Campbell simply says"Aa FC progressed gradually from barrage to Director control, but the electromechanical computer was too slowfor accurate AA. Gyroscopic and similar directors for close range gunfire was lacking.

Data transmission from the rangefinders to the gunlaying computers was not entriely satisfactory. Campbell does not say why.

In the case of the Germans had possessed fire control since 1931, beginning with the biaxial Type 1931 and was fitted to the Pocket battleships and the Light Cruisers. The Type 1933 was fitted to the heavy cruisers and the battlecruisers. The type 1937, the best of the prewar directors was fitted to the bismarcks and the Eugen These were all biaxial gyroscopically based directors, and gave good levels of accuracy for non radar directed fire. There were later, radar directed Fc systems for the capital ships, but as a generalization they were not used at sea to any great extent

Some Destroyers began to receive Type 1943 combined HA'LA directors from 1943, and were designed specifically to control the new 128 cm DP guns being developed by Germany at that time.

I have another book on the German Capital ships, which says that the Bismarck was unsuccessful in AA due to faulty settings in the Directors. The germans had not anticipated the very slow speed of the Swordfish, and this meant that most rounds exploded in front of the attacking Swordfish. This was rectified by 1942, along with the fact that the RN was beginning to use faster, more modern attack aircraft. The tirpitz did quite well in the attacks launched against her, both in 1942 and '44.
 
Hello Parsifal
what more in Bismarcks case, its two rear AA directors were older types, without hemispherical armoured cover because German-Soviet Treaty gave to Soviet experts right to examine the rear AA directors of Bismarck, the two AA directors on the sides of Bismarck's bridge structure were newer ones, out-of-limits to Soviets. And as we know the fatal torpedohit on her was made by a Swordfish which aproached from behind

Juha
 
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Hello Nikademus
on bombers, I counted also 3 Ju 88A-4s from KG 30, one written off after undercarriage failure during landing, maybe mechanical failure or after effect of battle damage, one missing at Spitsberger and one missing at a square, exact place of which I have not bothered to check. On KG 26 losses there are also few cases in which I have given the benefit of doubt to RN.
I can find only 3 Bf 109 losses between 13 and 18 Sept, none had anything to do with PQ-18 and one on 19 Sept, shot down in air combat over Murmansk, so most probably by Soviets.

Juha

Thanks to the power of Google, I found the following website:

Nordic Aviation During WW2

and from the loss registers on the above site, it seems likely that these aircraft were lost while attacking PQ-18 from 12-09-42 - 14-09-42
floatplane:5 x He-115
Recon: 1x ju:88
Bombers: possible 1 to 4
KG26: 25-26 JU88/He111
KG:30 2 to 4 possible

The website cautions that the records on it are still incomplete, but 40 kills by PQ-18, mostly ( 35+) from AA seem likely.
 
hi Juha

Glad you raised this. Someone earlier claimed the Italians and the Germans lacked directors for their AA. Not true. According to Campbell both nations had fire control for their HAA.



In the case of italian FRC, Campbell simply says"Aa FC progressed gradually from barrage to Director control, but the electromechanical computer was too slowfor accurate AA. Gyroscopic and similar directors for close range gunfire was lacking.

Data transmission from the rangefinders to the gunlaying computers was not entriely satisfactory. Campbell does not say why.

In the case of the Germans had possessed fire control since 1931, beginning with the biaxial Type 1931 and was fitted to the Pocket battleships and the Light Cruisers. The Type 1933 was fitted to the heavy cruisers and the battlecruisers. The type 1937, the best of the prewar directors was fitted to the bismarcks and the Eugen These were all biaxial gyroscopically based directors, and gave good levels of accuracy for non radar directed fire. There were later, radar directed Fc systems for the capital ships, but as a generalization they were not used at sea to any great extent

Some Destroyers began to receive Type 1943 combined HA'LA directors from 1943, and were designed specifically to control the new 128 cm DP guns being developed by Germany at that time.

I have another book on the German Capital ships, which says that the Bismarck was unsuccessful in AA due to faulty settings in the Directors. The germans had not anticipated the very slow speed of the Swordfish, and this meant that most rounds exploded in front of the attacking Swordfish. This was rectified by 1942, along with the fact that the RN was beginning to use faster, more modern attack aircraft. The tirpitz did quite well in the attacks launched against her, both in 1942 and '44.

I stated that no KM or Italian destroyer had AA FC for their main guns, which is true, AFAIK. The KM. IJN and Italians also did not introduce tachymetric gyro directors for their LAA. I doubt that any Type 1943 directors actually went to sea. Campbell also states that the KM HA directors were flawed and their stabilization gyros were very prone to damage, and took 20min to start up.
 
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Hello
checked the Official Histories; RN Official History, Roskill's The War at Sea, Vol. II [first publ. 1956] p. 305 says that "it appear that they [FAA fighters] and the ships' guns between them destroyed about thirty of all types during the entire operation [Pedestal]."
Interservice official history, Playfair et al The Mediterranean and Middle East Vol. III [first publ. 1960] p.321 says that the enemy lost 35, including those shot down over Malta. IMHO the Med history is probably most reliable, writers, high ranking Army, Naval and AF officers had access to Ultra messages, but lets say that FAA and ships' AA got 30 a/c during the Pedestal, FAA claims were 39 IIRC.

Operation Pedestal - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia :
Royal Navy gunners and Fleet Air Arm fighters shot down 42 of the approximately 330 attacking Axis aircraft.[26]
(26) Naval Staff History, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys, p89.
 
Hello RCAFson
If you read the table more carefully you will notice that Ju 88 from Wettererkundungsstaffel 5 wasn't lost, only damaged unknown amount. And the only other recon Ju 88 lost during PQ-18 oper was lost in accident.

On Pedestal sources, staff study is from 1957, so older than official Med history

Juha
 
Hello RCAFson

Have you some hard facts, especially against dive bombers to back up your claim? Nobody have argued that the 40deg max elevation of 4.7" guns on DDs was hindrance against Axis torpedo-bombers but that it was a handicap against





Juha

Everyone keeps saying how the 5"/38 is such a great gun, but where are the kills to prove it? The experience of the USN was that DP weapons could not protect the fleet, and that the real threat to aircraft was automatic AA, and the RN had heavier batteries of AAA controlled by better methods of FC, in Oct 1942 than the USN - this is what it all comes down to. Here's what Enterprise's gunnery report states, after Santa Cruz:

It is believed that the 5-inch guns of screening vessels might best be employed in shooting at enemy planes that have not yet pushed over into their dives. Their problem in this respect is identical to our own. The fire of 5-inch at diving planes other than a barrage fired by the ship being attacked is ineffective, but it should be possible to hit them before they start their dives. All supporting ships should direct their 5-inch fire accordingly.

The 5-inch guns should be equipped with a single man control, either a Mark 51 director or a joy stick similar to that of the 40mm for use against dive bombers. The 5-inch gun can hit, but it is most difficult to get the pointer and the trainer on the same plane. This is important and must be done if we are to stop dive bombers before they release their bombs.
Action Report: 26 October 1942

The USN would have been better off by staying with LA 5" guns and devoting the weight saved to more AAA and the gunnery report from Yorktown at Midway states exactly that:

B. Gunnery

1. The following listed alterations should be installed.

(a) A workable hand-powered ammunition supply for 5"38 caliber guns.
(b) A hand-operated cooling system, as an auxiliary, for the water-cooled automatic guns.
(c) Automatic fuse setters for 5"38 caliber guns not already so equipped.
(d) Automatic parallax control for 5"38 caliber fire control installations not already so equipped.
(e) Replacement of 5"38 caliber guns, 1.1" guns and 50 caliber machine guns, by a large number of 40mm automatic guns. While smaller caliber automatic guns have proven effective at short ranges, their range is too short to offer effective opposition to attacking planes prior to delivery of their attack. 5"38 caliber guns are very effective at long ranges and should be retained in ships which are used as anti-aircraft screening vessels.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv5-Midway.html
So, HA DP guns are only effective at ranges where they really don't need to be "High Angle", as on screening destroyers, just like the RN thought pre-war! Of course, once VT ammo came into use this changed dramatically.
 
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Hello RCAFson
If you read the table more carefully you will notice that Ju 88 from Wettererkundungsstaffel 5 wasn't lost, only damaged unknown amount. And the only other recon Ju 88 lost during PQ-18 oper was lost in accident.

On Pedestal sources, staff study is from 1957, so older than official Med history

Juha

Unknown damage could equal 99%...there is a good chance that the aircraft could be classed as a kill

I believe that the staff study was classified and was based upon classified info, that could not be released in a public history:

This book contains the Naval Staff History originally issued by the Admiralty in 1957 as a confidential book for use within the Royal Navy. It has since been declassified and is published here for the first time, along with an extended preface.
The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys: A Naval Staff History (Hardback) - Routledge
 
Hello RCAFson
we all know, and have knew a while that you think that RN AA was best of the world in early part of the war, but show by some concrete figures when it did clearly better than USN AA.

Again the end of your message #218, do you read the chapter 9 of the action report of Enterprise, USN saw the dive-bombers when they were well in their dives, see my Indomitable case on 12 Aug. 42, RN AA succeeded to shoot down max one out of 12 Dive-bombers in similar circumstances. How that shows that RN automatic AA was better than that of USN?

Weather was rather cloudy during the Japanese attack, which made it difficult especially to heavy AA.

You quoted Yorktowns combat report but the Enterprise action report, even if critical to the performance of 5" guns gives entirely different recommendations.

On those screenings, as I wrote earlier, USN liked to have its DDs in circular formation 2000y out of the escorted ships, and by the way, according to p. 282 in RN official history, when air attack threatened PQ-18, 8 of the screening DDs moved nearer to the merchantmen, nearer than 1000 y from nearest merchantman, others keep their position 3500-5000y out from the nearest merchantman, so much your 6000 minimum distance for RN DDs.

And your last message clearly shows, that you really see what you want. Maybe some basic study on LW loss reporting might help. notice that the %? was in dam column not in loss column.

And maybe you should find out a bit more on staff studies and why they were classified.
 
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