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Maybe all of them should have been de-navalized and sent to Malaya or Burma in advance of the Vengeance arrival.Turning to the RN and the FAA, everyone here seems absolutely fascinated with the Skua. It equipped only 4 front line squadrons. Having entered front line service in late 1938, the last squadron gave them up in May 1941.
Maybe all of them should have been de-navalized and sent to Malaya or Burma in advance of the Vengeance arrival.
These guys clearly knew their craft.
...The technique that we were taught was to approach target at
about 8,000 ft (2 440 m) at right angles, keeping it in sight
until it disappeared under the leading edge of the wingtip,
pulling up until it reappeared at the trailing edge and then
winging over into a 70 deg dive, extending the Zap flaps fully
and keeping the target at the top of the engine cowling.
Release height was 3,000 ft (915 m) and pull-out was com-
menced, simultaneously retracting the flaps, being completed
at around 1,500 ft (460 m) to avoid the bomb blast and any
light flak. The elevator force required to pull out was heavy,
Subsequently, I was to fly quite a number of US and
German dive bombers and the Skua matched up well with the
best of these as regards its diving characteristics, but it had
only a two-position propeller and this tended to overspeed in
the dive before terminal velocity was reached. However, a
nicely screaming propeller was always to be considered a
psychologically aggressive asset in any dive bomber...
Another Enterprise pilot, Dusty Kleiss of Scouting Six, also went 2 for 2 on 4 June.I have on my list of research topics to look at dive bombing accuracy over the course of the War.
For the USN, it seems in 1942 with Lundstrom's "First Team", one squadron of SBDs could disable and or sink one CV. In round numbers, in 1942, one carrier air group had the ability to sink one carrier. Then in 1944 during the Marianas, the ratio of USN CVs to IJN CVs was staggering in the US favor, the USN did not seem to have the same ratio for bombing. Whether it due to less trained pilots or better defense by the IJN, the ratio swung to the defender. At Midway, pilot training was everything. The Marine aviators flying SBDs from Midway didn't have the dive bombing experience of the Naval aviators and their score reflects this. Hornet's air group performance at Midway is an example of training and experience mattered more than aircraft type.
The Germans had very high hit rates with the Stuka in the Mediterranean, there was previous thread where a poster listed Stuka hits and kills in the Med, and argued the Luftwaffe was the highest scoring plane for plane of any air force against shipping.
This paper is an interesting Monte Carlo simulation of Midway. https://www.researchgate.net/public...he_Battle_of_Midway_A_Counterfactual_Analysis
The authors simulate a "good" Hornet air group and if Zuikaku had sailed with Kido Butai.
As for the best dive bomber crews, Richard Best is to my knowledge the only pilot during the war to score hits on two different carriers in one day. He has my vote for the Best.
I had to look up Dusty Kleiss, from Wikipedia: "Kleiss was the only pilot to score three direct hits with a dive bomber plane during the Battle of Midway. For his participation in the battle, Kleiss received the Navy Cross in November 1942."Another Enterprise pilot, Dusty Kleiss of Scouting Six, also went 2 for 2 on 4 June.
I was fortunate to know Dick for about 25 years. He was a New Deal Democrat and one of very few war lovers I've known, versus combat lovers. He said "I thought it was a great war and I wanted to stay out there until the end." He intended to be the finest dive bomber pilot in the Pacific Fleet, and likely was!
In regards to pilots and training, a clear example would be the USN's SBD versus the USAAF's A-24.
Same aircraft, two different approaches to a target: As we know, the USN would have the SBD slightly overfly the target and heel over into a 70° dive to target.
With the Army, they would have the A-24 descend into a shallow dive to target, which produced poor results.
Had the Army put their pride aside for a moment and had the Navy teach their pilots to use the Dauntless as it was designed, the Banshee would have been a huge asset when it was really needed, instead of being labeled a failure.
Look at the USAAF record in the Pacific, particularly with the 91st BS.A difficulty you didn't mention is that of identifying targets. While it's true that land targets do not move, they're also much smaller than ships in most cases and don't stand out against ground features like ships do against water. Given the terrain where the A-24 was mostly used, USAAF dive-bomber pilots would have had difficulties even compared to LW Stuka pilots in identifying the right target and nailing it.
Not saying you're wrong, just thinking that there's some nuance here.
Look at the USAAF record in the Pacific, particularly with the 91st BS.
They did score kills against the IJN, but their execution of attack differed from USN doctrine to the point that they were not fully utilizing the Dauntless' strengths.
As for aim points, a late friend of mine was a pilot of an SBD, attached to VS-6 (USS Enterprise) and saw action in the PTO, including Midway, and he said that they selected features that were easy to focus on.
For example, he and other Dauntless drivers would aim at the Hinomaru (flag) or elevators on IJN carriers, or superstructure of battleships or cruisers.
The idea with the battlewagons or cruisers, was to decapitate the command and control, not sink it. Once.it was dead in the water, it could be picked off piecemeal.
Sadly, my books are still in storage, however, Pacific Wrecks online has an overview of the FEAF's 27th BG/91st BS complete with references.I'll have to read up more on the 91st. Do you have any links convenient to read?