Dive bomber for 1940: how would you do it

[rank amateur]

The concept of an unarmed high speed bomber was almost too much for the RAF in 1938/39. The Mosquito started of as a private venture. I also remember having read that the RAF 'did not need' a divebomber in this time frame. Hence the untimely departure of the Henly. So even if we could go back to 1940 and present the ideal unarmed 350 mph single engined divebomber to the RAF, we would probably have been send away politely. "Thank you very much, Jolly good. But we think our Hampden, Blenheims and Battles are more than enough to tackle any thing Jerry can throw at them. Have a safe journey home and we will keep you in mind if we need another target tug!"

Furthermore DB's are more than often used in support of groundtroops. The boys in the mud will surely appreciate it that the flying artillery is still able to achieve something after all the bombs are dropped. A couple of forward fireing guns are to valuable an asset to be missed.

 

[parsifal]

I dont think in 1940 there was even the slightest chance the RAF would have had any sort of dedicated ground attack divebomber. The RAF was far too wedded to the concept of a separate air force with an independant air camapign the focus of its existence. The RAF was even opposed to allocation of resources to ASW and Recon functions. These were major doctrinal flaws in the RAFs thinking.

The purpose of this exercise was to look past that, to examine the technical possibilities rather than taking a realistic pragmatic view on the doctrinal limits of each air force

 

[Shortround6]

The purpose of this exercise was to look past that, to examine the technical possibilities rather than taking a realistic pragmatic view on the doctrinal limits of each air force

There are different aspects of doctrine, although I may be stretching the word here. We have not only the tactical or strategic jobs the planes were designed to do. Like the fact that the Fairey Battle was actually a light 'strategic bomber' that was pressed into ground support/tactical bombing. We have design requirement doctrine that changed from country to country. Like the US insistence that all fighters be stressed for +8-4 "G"s with a 50% safety margin that lead to heavier airframes than some other countries. Or the British emphasis on short field performance and operating from grass airfields. At times, until the shooting started, the air ministry required a tire pressure of no more than 35psi to ensure that the tires had a large enough footprint to avoid rutting the the landing fields. As weights grew this meant larger (read heavier) tires and sometimes landing gear than an equivalent foreign design might use.

For a "what if" we can easily brush aside some of the tactical doctrine and ask easy questions like "what if the British had used some of their medium/heavy bombers for ASW earlier", it requires a change in tactical/strategic thinking but no real change in the aircraft. We can easily ask what if we replace engine "A" with engine "B" in airframe "X" to do almost the same job or for a specific purpose.
Asking why didn't XXXX didn't make a plane in 1940 that acted like a plane in 1944 becomes harder if we don't know some of the constraints/restrictions placed on the designers in 1938-1940 that didn't even have to do with available materials or fuels or "?"

 

[parsifal]

REGARDING STRIP LENGTHD, i DONT HAVE A LOT. i DO KNOW THAT AT MILNE BAY THERE WERE TWO STRIPS, ONE A LITTLE OVER 2000 FEET, AND THE OTHER 1530 FEET. P-40S CARRYING BOMBS OPERATED FROM BOTH. MOST OF THE FIGHTER AIRFIELDS IN THE nT WHERE SPIT VIIIS AND BEAUFIGHTERS AS WELL AS P-40S WERE THE STANDARD 2000 FEET

SORRY ABOUT THE CAPITALS....AM NOT SHOUTING