Yep, and those aboard KM Königsberg would tell that Blackburn Skua was also a precision weapon.
Dive Bombing improves accuracy how much?
- Thread starter davebender
- Start date
I'm not sure attacking a damaged cruiser at a mooring,effectively unopposed is quite the same as taking on an IJN taskforce. I believe she only got two 2cm light flak guns into action. Those FAA pilots did manage to hit her two or three times and I don't doubt their skill and determination.
Steve
Steve
- Thread starter
- #23
davebender
1st Lieutenant
I think this is what more or less ended dive bombing as a method of attack. It was practically suicide vs an alert enemy with plenty of light flak. And radar can see dive bombers coming for 100+ miles even during WWII.
Contrast that with skip bombing from an altitude of 45 meters (i.e. Swedish Turnip method). With WWII era radar, warning time amounts to less then a minute. Not enough time to get the light flack manned and pointed in the right direction. As the attack on Bari shows, low level skip bombing can be just as accurate as dive bombing.
Of course it takes a lot of guts and good training to fly at an altitude of 45 meters in a fixed wing aircraft.
Contrast that with skip bombing from an altitude of 45 meters (i.e. Swedish Turnip method). With WWII era radar, warning time amounts to less then a minute. Not enough time to get the light flack manned and pointed in the right direction. As the attack on Bari shows, low level skip bombing can be just as accurate as dive bombing.
Of course it takes a lot of guts and good training to fly at an altitude of 45 meters in a fixed wing aircraft.
I'd be reluctant to compare strategic bombing statistics with tactical bombing statistics even as a reference... its apples and oranges. Besides, doctrine could compensate for weaknesses for example, incendiary devices, low altitude strategic bombing, sheer numbers. Anyway,IMO, 70% of the value of 4 engine bomber raids was forcing the enemy to use their resources to react and defend. Strategic bombers cannot be mentioned in the same breath as dive bombers... It's like comparing an A-10 to a B-52 with iron bombs.
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- Thread starter
- #25
davebender
1st Lieutenant
You are attempting to make a distinction that did not exist in the real world.
When Ju-88As bombed English aircraft factories and port facilities they were conducting strategic bombing.
When British and American level bombers attempted to provide CAS for combat troops (something that happened supprisingly often in Italy) they were conducting tactical bombing.
parsifal
Colonel
There are a number of factors that are likely to affect bombing accuracy.The altitude that the bombs are being dropped is an obvious constraint. The Germans generally bombed at altitudes of 14-18K whilst the US Heavy bombers were generally operating 24-28K. If you do a little scale drawing, and assume a certain angle for the error, you will see that the higher an aircraft is flying, the greater the error or distance from the aiming point for an assumed error factor.
The second big variableis the amount of flak. Flak more than anything affects bombing accuracy. If the flak is bursting around your ears, you are going to do a couple of things....the first is that you will tend to fly higher, the second is that you will tend to be thrown off your aim as a bombadier, and will tend to drop the bombload sooner rather than checking the aiming point is right. In the Battle Of Britain the British AA efforts were pretty poor, because of poor training, a scarcity of guns, a gun park that was old and innefficient, a shortage of range and height finding equipment. The Germans were basically untroubled by British flak. The same cant be said about German flak firing at Allied bombers, although later in the war it is generally acknowlewdged that German flak did fall away in quality.
Thirdly, is the crew proficiency. A better trainied crew will generally hit targets more accurately than an untrained crew. During the war, Japanese Val D/Bs went from an unbelievable accuracy of 85% when attacking the Cornwall, Dorsetshire and Hermes, by 1943 the US Navy estimated the Val jockeys were achieving hit rates of below 10%, without any external impact affecting them. They just couldnt hold the crate on the target...same thing happened to the germans as their pilot training programs fell to pices, so too did the quality of their bombers to hit things.
Fourthly, the airframe and the system carrying it will affect the outcome. Probably the least important of all the factors, the airframe and its aiming and delivery systems can affect the accuracy of the bombing effort. Skuas were not as good as Ju87s in terms of accuracy, because of a number of factors, including the fact that the airframe simply was not as stable the Ju-87 when enterring the bombing run....the same criticism is applicable to the French Divebomber, the LN 40.
I dont think any conclusions can be drawn about the relative merits of any aircraft unless and untill these and many other variable are considered for their effect on the outcome
The second big variableis the amount of flak. Flak more than anything affects bombing accuracy. If the flak is bursting around your ears, you are going to do a couple of things....the first is that you will tend to fly higher, the second is that you will tend to be thrown off your aim as a bombadier, and will tend to drop the bombload sooner rather than checking the aiming point is right. In the Battle Of Britain the British AA efforts were pretty poor, because of poor training, a scarcity of guns, a gun park that was old and innefficient, a shortage of range and height finding equipment. The Germans were basically untroubled by British flak. The same cant be said about German flak firing at Allied bombers, although later in the war it is generally acknowlewdged that German flak did fall away in quality.
Thirdly, is the crew proficiency. A better trainied crew will generally hit targets more accurately than an untrained crew. During the war, Japanese Val D/Bs went from an unbelievable accuracy of 85% when attacking the Cornwall, Dorsetshire and Hermes, by 1943 the US Navy estimated the Val jockeys were achieving hit rates of below 10%, without any external impact affecting them. They just couldnt hold the crate on the target...same thing happened to the germans as their pilot training programs fell to pices, so too did the quality of their bombers to hit things.
Fourthly, the airframe and the system carrying it will affect the outcome. Probably the least important of all the factors, the airframe and its aiming and delivery systems can affect the accuracy of the bombing effort. Skuas were not as good as Ju87s in terms of accuracy, because of a number of factors, including the fact that the airframe simply was not as stable the Ju-87 when enterring the bombing run....the same criticism is applicable to the French Divebomber, the LN 40.
I dont think any conclusions can be drawn about the relative merits of any aircraft unless and untill these and many other variable are considered for their effect on the outcome
drgondog
Major
Dive bombing was inherently more accurate than high altitude level flight precision bombing. It reduced the variables of drift and circular error by virtue of pointing at the target and closing the distance of the free fall to thousands of feet rather than 10's of thousands.
High altitude release accuracy not only depended on a very effective gyro linking of the sight to the flight controls but also the lack of wind shear at various altitudes.
Having said this it required significant pilot skill and aircraft designed for the tactical purpose (dive brakes, etc) to reduce the speed sufficiently to reduce the altitude of release before dropping the load.
Aircraft like P-47's were less accurate than Ju 87 or SBD.
High altitude release accuracy not only depended on a very effective gyro linking of the sight to the flight controls but also the lack of wind shear at various altitudes.
Having said this it required significant pilot skill and aircraft designed for the tactical purpose (dive brakes, etc) to reduce the speed sufficiently to reduce the altitude of release before dropping the load.
Aircraft like P-47's were less accurate than Ju 87 or SBD.
Just because there was occasional overlap, doesn't mean there is no distinction..
The distinction exists without my "attempt"
Comparing the accuracy of a stuka with a b-17 is ridiculous..
- Thread starter
- #29
davebender
1st Lieutenant
But not necessarily more accurate then low level precision bombing like that employed at Bari.
What I am trying to determine is whether large dive bombers like the Ju-88 and Me-210/Me-410 were worthwhile. The structural strengthening required by dive bombing results in some loss of performance. Did the Luftwaffe get their moneys worth turning the Ju-88 into a dive bomber? Or would they be further ahead making the Ju-88 as fast as possible at low level and practising precision bombing at a height of 45 meters?
drgondog
Major
Well, if you want to do a long range strike on a Murmansk convoy, or penetrate Malta defenses or attack Great Britain you better not bring your Stuka if you want them back.
The tactical doctrine of close air support dominated german high command thinking but you could not turn a Stuka (or SBD) into an A-20 or a Mossie.
And yes, it (dive momber) is still more accurate across a wide range of pin point targets than a low level high speed light bomber.
If the target is one with high vertical contrast like a fortress/prison wall or a dam or a building a hit at the base is pretty much as good as a high hit - but contrast that same vertical dispersion attempting to hit a tank or a pill box. The base hit is still good, the mast or high hit is a very bad miss on a low profile target.
Glider
Major
Personally I don't think that Germany did get their monies worth out of turning Ju88 and similar aircraft into dive bombers. That said, I can understand why they tried. We know that the dive bomber was basically replaced by fighter bombers such as FW190, P47, Typhoon which fulfilled the same role effectively. However the dive bombers were designed in the late 30's when the idea of a fighter carrying a bomb load of 1,000 lb + was laughable.
Germany and to be fair Russia tried to extend the range of the dive bomber by extending it to the Ju88 and Pe2 must have seemed like a good idea but it didn't really work.
- Thread starter
- #32
davebender
1st Lieutenant
That is also the conclusion I am coming around to.
Dive bombers like the Ju-87 were very accurate. This was proven in operational exercises as well as during combat with the Kondor Legion.
Norden bombsight claims notwithstanding, it was obvious that high altitude bombing was not going to work with WWII era technology. Only wishful thinking (which the RAF and U.S.Army Air Corps had in abundance) could make one think otherwise.
So late 1930s Germany institutes a multitrack approach to improve bombardment accuracy.
- Guided weapons, untimately resulting in the Fritz X and Hs-293.
- Take dive bombing to the next level by turning the Ju-88 medium bomber into a large dive bomber.
- Skip bombing from extremely low level, resulting in the Swedish Turnip technique.
- Go slow with heavy bomber development until the Luftwaffe has a better idea what will work.
Without WWII the Luftwaffe would probably have sorted all this out during the early 1940s. But time ran out and you go to war with the aircraft you already have. All said and done, the historical Ju-88A was a pretty good compromise. And the next generation Do-217 was a wonderful level bomber that failed to reach it's potential only due to a wartime shortage of BMW801 engines.
parsifal
Colonel
Norden bombsight claims notwithstanding, it was obvious that high altitude bombing was not going to work with WWII era technology. Only wishful thinking (which the RAF and U.S.Army Air Corps had in abundance) could make one think otherwise.
How did you come to the conclusion that High altitude bombing doesnt work? I think for the roles it was used in it was far superior to anything attempted by the Germans. Imagine if it was the Germans attempting to bring a country to its knees with low level (ie below 10000 feet) level bombing strikes, or worse, using divebombing techniques. The result would have been a slaughter of the bombing force, as the losses from flak went through the roof, five, ten and then twenty times the loss rates by High altitude bombers. Instead of an attrition rate of 2.5%, you would have been looking at loss rates of 25%+ per raid. There would have been catastrophic and irreversible effects on the experience pool of the Luftwaffe.
High leverl bombing has its place, and as several other members have repeatedly pointed out, comparing the two is just an invalid approach.
Divebombing and low level strikes can work in a tactical or ground support situation where the flak is not concentrated, and/or, the fighter opposition is thinned or dispersed, or where you have an exceptional aircraft like the Mosquito, that can use its speed to minimise the effects of LAA. If Divebombing was attempted against strategic targets where the flak and the fighter defences are concentrated, the Divebombers would be massacred, as the Ju87s were in the BoB. The Ju88 was never used in a vertical divebombing role, but it was used in gentle divebombing roles, both in 1940, and again in 1944. The glide bomb effort in 1944, was used to give the German bombers some additional speed....they basically did a Hi-Lo flight plan as they nervously attacked targets in England in 1944. The loss of altitude gave the by then thick and effective flak defences in England easy targets to attack, and gave the defending fighters plenty of time to gain altitude and pouince on the unfortunate bomber crews using this ill thought out strategy. The German Bomber losses in the 1944 offensive, using only slightly modified tactics to the ones you are suggesting were hacked out of the sky with ease, and because the bomb runs were so fast (with poor crews I will concede), the bombiong accuracy significantly worse that those Allied High Level Bombers that you are so disdainful of
Looking further at the only real strategic bombing effort by the germans using these updated methods you are longing after, we see German bombing efforts in Operation Steinbock were a near total failure. The first air raid occurred on the night of 21 st January 1944 when 227 bombers were involved. They used "Dueppel", which was the German equivalent of "Window". These were strips of metal foil designed to confuse radar defences. Then a repeat raid was made during the latter part of the same night. Some of the returning Luftwaffe bombers had been refuelled and these were joined by other bombers. In this second raid a total of 220 bombers took part. London had been the target of both raids but only 44 incidents in the London area were logged. The bombs fell mostly in Sussex, Kent and Essex. At least 43 Luftwaffe aircraft were lost in these two raids including at least 18 to the lethal De Havilland Mosquito night fighters. Flak brought down at 15 bombers. . A further 18 bombers were destroyed in noncombat accidents, including mishandling, navigation errors or crashes at dimly lit bases. More raids occurred in February and caused little damage, apart from a raid on 18/19 th of that month. About 200 German bombers dropped 140 tons of bombs in the London area on that night. Further attacks continued in March and Hull and Bristol were also targeted. In May Weymouth, Torquay and Falmouth received attention from Operation Steinbock before the offensive was abandoned. Air raid casualties in Britain totalled 1556 killed and 2916 seriously injured. During that five month period the Luftwaffe lost 330 bombers. For every 5 citizens killed, the Germans lost 1 bomber and four trained aircrew either killed or captured. It had been a costly failure. How it can be argued that German bombing was superior to Allied technologies and techniques either as level bombers, glide bombers, or even divebombers, when operating in a strategic role is just wishful thinking....
So late 1930s Germany institutes a multitrack approach to improve bombardment accuracy.
- Guided weapons, untimately resulting in the Fritz X and Hs-293.
- Take dive bombing to the next level by turning the Ju-88 medium bomber into a large dive bomber.
- Skip bombing from extremely low level, resulting in the Swedish Turnip technique.
- Go slow with heavy bomber development until the Luftwaffe has a better idea what will work.
And all the while the allies, including France and the USSR are working on their own programs that would largely cancel these benefits out completely and more
Without WWII the Luftwaffe would probably have sorted all this out during the early 1940s. But time ran out and you go to war with the aircraft you already have. All said and done, the historical Ju-88A was a pretty good compromise. And the next generation Do-217 was a wonderful level bomber that failed to reach it's potential only due to a wartime shortage of BMW801 engines.
In the case of the Germans, it was an economic and political necessity that they go to war when they did. The German economy was in such a terrible state by 1939, that it really had no option other than to use the wepons it had invested the meagre national wealth in up to that time....whereas more peaceful nations were addressing the economic after shock of the depression by re-investing in their industrial and social infrastructures, the Germans (whoi had suffered more than most from the depression) under the Nazis, were investing their meagre resources in preparing for war. If they had wited as you suggested for their armaments programs to mature, they would have lost the war before it even started
How did you come to the conclusion that High altitude bombing doesnt work? I think for the roles it was used in it was far superior to anything attempted by the Germans. Imagine if it was the Germans attempting to bring a country to its knees with low level (ie below 10000 feet) level bombing strikes, or worse, using divebombing techniques. The result would have been a slaughter of the bombing force, as the losses from flak went through the roof, five, ten and then twenty times the loss rates by High altitude bombers. Instead of an attrition rate of 2.5%, you would have been looking at loss rates of 25%+ per raid. There would have been catastrophic and irreversible effects on the experience pool of the Luftwaffe.
High leverl bombing has its place, and as several other members have repeatedly pointed out, comparing the two is just an invalid approach.
Divebombing and low level strikes can work in a tactical or ground support situation where the flak is not concentrated, and/or, the fighter opposition is thinned or dispersed, or where you have an exceptional aircraft like the Mosquito, that can use its speed to minimise the effects of LAA. If Divebombing was attempted against strategic targets where the flak and the fighter defences are concentrated, the Divebombers would be massacred, as the Ju87s were in the BoB. The Ju88 was never used in a vertical divebombing role, but it was used in gentle divebombing roles, both in 1940, and again in 1944. The glide bomb effort in 1944, was used to give the German bombers some additional speed....they basically did a Hi-Lo flight plan as they nervously attacked targets in England in 1944. The loss of altitude gave the by then thick and effective flak defences in England easy targets to attack, and gave the defending fighters plenty of time to gain altitude and pouince on the unfortunate bomber crews using this ill thought out strategy. The German Bomber losses in the 1944 offensive, using only slightly modified tactics to the ones you are suggesting were hacked out of the sky with ease, and because the bomb runs were so fast (with poor crews I will concede), the bombiong accuracy significantly worse that those Allied High Level Bombers that you are so disdainful of
Looking further at the only real strategic bombing effort by the germans using these updated methods you are longing after, we see German bombing efforts in Operation Steinbock were a near total failure. The first air raid occurred on the night of 21 st January 1944 when 227 bombers were involved. They used "Dueppel", which was the German equivalent of "Window". These were strips of metal foil designed to confuse radar defences. Then a repeat raid was made during the latter part of the same night. Some of the returning Luftwaffe bombers had been refuelled and these were joined by other bombers. In this second raid a total of 220 bombers took part. London had been the target of both raids but only 44 incidents in the London area were logged. The bombs fell mostly in Sussex, Kent and Essex. At least 43 Luftwaffe aircraft were lost in these two raids including at least 18 to the lethal De Havilland Mosquito night fighters. Flak brought down at 15 bombers. . A further 18 bombers were destroyed in noncombat accidents, including mishandling, navigation errors or crashes at dimly lit bases. More raids occurred in February and caused little damage, apart from a raid on 18/19 th of that month. About 200 German bombers dropped 140 tons of bombs in the London area on that night. Further attacks continued in March and Hull and Bristol were also targeted. In May Weymouth, Torquay and Falmouth received attention from Operation Steinbock before the offensive was abandoned. Air raid casualties in Britain totalled 1556 killed and 2916 seriously injured. During that five month period the Luftwaffe lost 330 bombers. For every 5 citizens killed, the Germans lost 1 bomber and four trained aircrew either killed or captured. It had been a costly failure. How it can be argued that German bombing was superior to Allied technologies and techniques either as level bombers, glide bombers, or even divebombers, when operating in a strategic role is just wishful thinking....
So late 1930s Germany institutes a multitrack approach to improve bombardment accuracy.
- Guided weapons, untimately resulting in the Fritz X and Hs-293.
- Take dive bombing to the next level by turning the Ju-88 medium bomber into a large dive bomber.
- Skip bombing from extremely low level, resulting in the Swedish Turnip technique.
- Go slow with heavy bomber development until the Luftwaffe has a better idea what will work.
And all the while the allies, including France and the USSR are working on their own programs that would largely cancel these benefits out completely and more
Without WWII the Luftwaffe would probably have sorted all this out during the early 1940s. But time ran out and you go to war with the aircraft you already have. All said and done, the historical Ju-88A was a pretty good compromise. And the next generation Do-217 was a wonderful level bomber that failed to reach it's potential only due to a wartime shortage of BMW801 engines.
In the case of the Germans, it was an economic and political necessity that they go to war when they did. The German economy was in such a terrible state by 1939, that it really had no option other than to use the wepons it had invested the meagre national wealth in up to that time....whereas more peaceful nations were addressing the economic after shock of the depression by re-investing in their industrial and social infrastructures, the Germans (whoi had suffered more than most from the depression) under the Nazis, were investing their meagre resources in preparing for war. If they had wited as you suggested for their armaments programs to mature, they would have lost the war before it even started
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drgondog
Major
Hard to say that high altitude bombing didn't work - but share your metric for 'success' and maybe I will understand.
Secondly, explain how any 'low altitude bombing' approach works in the Strategic campaign context in ETO?
Illusttrate a Definition - bomb Berlin/Posnan/Brux/Merseberg from UK with 'low altitude bombers'..versus 'high altitude bombers'
or, conversely Luftwaffe bomb UK (or Moscow) from east/central Germany with any aircraft in their inventory
Jabberwocky
Tech Sergeant
Ju-88s regularly dive bombed over Malta, with impressive accuracy.
- Thread starter
- #36
davebender
1st Lieutenant
The attack by 105 Ju-88 bombers that closed the Port of Bari for about two months. That put a major crimp in U.S.Army Air Corps efforts to get a heavy bomber campaign going from the Foggia airfield complex.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
It might be more accurate to say that the Do-217 was a wonderful level bomber that failed to reach it's potential only due to a lack of an engine of significantly higher power than either the BMW 801 or DB 603.
With less power than a B-25 or Wellington in the BMW801 versions the Do 217 was not going to be able to mount any short of strategic bombing campaign no matter how many were built.
drgondog
Major
dave- is this your perception of an ETO strategic bombing campaign?
- Thread starter
- #39
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Closing a vital enemy seaport for a significant period of time is about as strategic as it gets. Just as when the USN mined the Port of Haiphong shut during 1972.
parsifal
Colonel
The closure of Bari as a port for over two months owed virtually nothing to the accuracy of the Axis bombers. It was almost exclusively the result of sheer bad luck and utter stupidity on the part of the Port Commander.
The urgent need for supplies for the forces fighting on the Italian peninsula led the port commander to oirder that ships be unloaded with the harbour fully illuminated. This was th4e first blunder. The second was the utter complacency in setting up adequate flak, radwar and night fighter defences over such a vital tartget. The attacking bombers therefore were providede with a fully illuminated target, and no night fighter defences. Their effective deployment of Duppel meant that the radar guided AA guns were totally inneffective agaiunst the attacking bombers.
But bad as this all is, the real killer came in the targets that were bombed. These included an entire ammunition convoy docked and in the process of unloading at the port. Two of these ships were detonated by the attacking bombers, which started a massive chain reaction that destroyed over half the port facilities, inflicted over 1000 deaths of allied service personnell and many thoiusands of civilian casualties.
However, this was not the end of it. The two ammunition ships when they exploded, caused another ship, the John Harvey, carrying a load of Mustard Gas and other nerve agaents. The ship sank, but the gas containeres onboard ruptured allowing a slow and rapid release of the deadly toxins. The presence of these toxins was kept secret for obvious reasons, but it also delayed the reconstruction of the port for at least 30 days.
No denying that this was the most catastrophic damage suffered by the allies since Pearl Harbour, but to try and say the results were the product of the Ju88s destructive capabilities is pure fantasy. It was the result of allied incompetence more than anything
The urgent need for supplies for the forces fighting on the Italian peninsula led the port commander to oirder that ships be unloaded with the harbour fully illuminated. This was th4e first blunder. The second was the utter complacency in setting up adequate flak, radwar and night fighter defences over such a vital tartget. The attacking bombers therefore were providede with a fully illuminated target, and no night fighter defences. Their effective deployment of Duppel meant that the radar guided AA guns were totally inneffective agaiunst the attacking bombers.
But bad as this all is, the real killer came in the targets that were bombed. These included an entire ammunition convoy docked and in the process of unloading at the port. Two of these ships were detonated by the attacking bombers, which started a massive chain reaction that destroyed over half the port facilities, inflicted over 1000 deaths of allied service personnell and many thoiusands of civilian casualties.
However, this was not the end of it. The two ammunition ships when they exploded, caused another ship, the John Harvey, carrying a load of Mustard Gas and other nerve agaents. The ship sank, but the gas containeres onboard ruptured allowing a slow and rapid release of the deadly toxins. The presence of these toxins was kept secret for obvious reasons, but it also delayed the reconstruction of the port for at least 30 days.
No denying that this was the most catastrophic damage suffered by the allies since Pearl Harbour, but to try and say the results were the product of the Ju88s destructive capabilities is pure fantasy. It was the result of allied incompetence more than anything
