Dronescapes
Senior Airman
Here are a couple of nice (also overhaul) manuals that you might not have found before.
If you find these helpful, considering you could never find anything about that engine, consider them a gift from me to you.
Dogfight: Me 262 vs. Meteor (1 Viewer)
- Thread starter Friendly Fire
- Start date
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If you find these helpful, considering you could never find anything about that engine, consider them a gift from me to you.
cherry blossom
Senior Airman
- 555
- Apr 23, 2007
I agree with the main thrust of Dronescapes' posts that Whittle was very badly treated by the British officials. The RLM also made serious errors with the Jumo 004, which was designed as a cheap and dirty axial design but was redesigned as the 004B rather than being used. However, the French work came from the BMW team and the very long time before it was used was because that was needed before it became competitive with British jets (ie. a moving target). The Wikipedia article Snecma Atar - Wikipedia gives a summary.
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
One should run metallurgy history alongside the jet history. The temperatures etc. involved mean that you cannot make viable jet turbines without the metals and alloys that can stand up to the challenges. Early jets used alloys developed originally for other uses so one has to wait until those other uses can produce them, which themselves rely upon the history of their development for those other uses. One can see this in the history of piston engines where sleeve valves were introduced to solve heat surviveability and hotspots which, in the meantime, were solved with fuel additives and developments in poppet valve construction and materials. Air cooled mild steel turbine blades were a sign of desperation in the absence of the right alloys not by choice. With Rolls Royce level backing Whittle was not going to get a viable production service jet engine in 1930. Proof of concept and test engines in flight maybe by 1936. Metallurgy historians can easily correct me in detail but the issue is real.
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Incidentally. As the Rolls Royce/Soviet Union meme has come up. My understanding is that the Soviet Union approached Rolls Royce to buy some Nenes but not to buy a production licence. They offered to pay in hard currency. Allegedly in US dollars. Rolls Royce needed the money, especially if in dollars, to buy tool machinery from the USA. They accordingly asked the UK government if they objected to such a sale. The reply was that the Nene was not on the secret list so there was no legal objection to the commercial sale. This was at a time when the UK was struggling to feed itself and hard currency was very welcome. Remember rationing was still in place for food until into 1954 and had only just returned to wartime levels after being reduced below wartime levels at the time of the request. It was not a UK government gift to the Soviet Union but a commercial contract between Rolls Royce and the Soviet Union as a commercial buyer.
To give you a period picture. Norton Motorcycles, a significant world manufacturer at the time, was still using a second hand lathe for major work which had been bought surplus from the Admiralty in 1910 and the operator had to work with one foot on a plank resting on it to keep the shaft aligned as the bearings were worn oval*. Cooper Racing Cars were making their cars from surplus steel Morrison air raid shelters for the chassis and cutting slices of surplus ships engine liners for brake drums. AC Cars used surplus 'Z' anti aircraft rocket tube bodies for the chassis of their Ace cars which became later the classic V8 Shelby Cobras. Rover Cars were building their new Land Rovers with thick aluminium panels because sheet steel was in short supply and only available in quantity for export production but aluminium sheet was available from all the surplus WW2 aeroplanes being melted down. In my workshop I still have a block wood plane made from such cast aluminium at the time. It was not until quite recently, well into the 21st century, that the UK finally finished paying off the WW1 and WW2 war loans from the USA and also the huge loans taken on in the early 19th century to end slavery.
*just to say that Norton were not unique. One of the presses for the Citroën 2CV body panels became so worn that eventually the operator had to have a steel boot made to kick the machine at the critical time to make it work. When they finally sold the whole factory off to Portugal it came complete with the boot. I have seen it in use.
-
Incidentally. As the Rolls Royce/Soviet Union meme has come up. My understanding is that the Soviet Union approached Rolls Royce to buy some Nenes but not to buy a production licence. They offered to pay in hard currency. Allegedly in US dollars. Rolls Royce needed the money, especially if in dollars, to buy tool machinery from the USA. They accordingly asked the UK government if they objected to such a sale. The reply was that the Nene was not on the secret list so there was no legal objection to the commercial sale. This was at a time when the UK was struggling to feed itself and hard currency was very welcome. Remember rationing was still in place for food until into 1954 and had only just returned to wartime levels after being reduced below wartime levels at the time of the request. It was not a UK government gift to the Soviet Union but a commercial contract between Rolls Royce and the Soviet Union as a commercial buyer.
To give you a period picture. Norton Motorcycles, a significant world manufacturer at the time, was still using a second hand lathe for major work which had been bought surplus from the Admiralty in 1910 and the operator had to work with one foot on a plank resting on it to keep the shaft aligned as the bearings were worn oval*. Cooper Racing Cars were making their cars from surplus steel Morrison air raid shelters for the chassis and cutting slices of surplus ships engine liners for brake drums. AC Cars used surplus 'Z' anti aircraft rocket tube bodies for the chassis of their Ace cars which became later the classic V8 Shelby Cobras. Rover Cars were building their new Land Rovers with thick aluminium panels because sheet steel was in short supply and only available in quantity for export production but aluminium sheet was available from all the surplus WW2 aeroplanes being melted down. In my workshop I still have a block wood plane made from such cast aluminium at the time. It was not until quite recently, well into the 21st century, that the UK finally finished paying off the WW1 and WW2 war loans from the USA and also the huge loans taken on in the early 19th century to end slavery.
*just to say that Norton were not unique. One of the presses for the Citroën 2CV body panels became so worn that eventually the operator had to have a steel boot made to kick the machine at the critical time to make it work. When they finally sold the whole factory off to Portugal it came complete with the boot. I have seen it in use.
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Since you mentioned Eric Brown, in his book Wings of the Luftwaffe , names the Me262 as the most formidable combat aircraft of WW2. he also says that its shaking was better than meteors of the time. He also says that it could fly rings around a meteor of 1944
While its true the limited life of the jumos it was a result of lack of alloys and production s quality and bad fuel.. It s true that the jumos required very careful pilot handling. By early 1945 automatic fuel valve controls would resolve the problem but it was impossible to enter production. They could not even produce aerodynamic futures that the original design included . The gyroscopic sight EZ42 was ready, the MK213 cannons almost ready. Unable to be produced. Jumos 004C&D also.
Which alleid fighter could turn with the Me262 at 750km/h ? The A6M could outurn the F4U at low speeds but it was not very useful, was it?
Comparing the Me262A1a to the meteor Mk4 is totaly unreasonable.
The Me262 had two fundamendal problems a) it was relatively small , which limited its potential development b) The 2 engines far out in the wings reduced rate roll and made single engine handling dificult. With various improvements would be very competitive until middle 1946 but i am sure that , if it was production possible, would be replaced as soon as possible by some version of the Ta183 which was much superior
bada
Airman 1st Class
Well, the speed record is a one-off. it's the same as saying that P-51 Voodoo represent an operational P-51.
It was a modified, prepared and lightened airframe. a show case, nothing else, as proved by the CFE report where EE-428 and EE-446, build well after the speed record couldn't even get to the manufacturer specs, let alone get to the same speed as the record. See my previous post that you consider out-of-context, but being actually fully on topic, unlike your Quora-post, with all the history part repeated ad nauseum (totaly OT) and how the poor Whittle was bashed by his governement (totaly OT), then switching to after war's end (totaly ot), making some what-ifs (totaly ot), gaslighting just to put in the middle what you really wanted to say: the meteor was faster and better than the 262.
Again, the CFE tells the contrary.
Like we say in french: "with what-ifs, we could put Paris in a bottle".
You seems to not know the adage "the winner take the spoils". Germany couldn't even sell matches without an autorisation from the occupiers, but strangely enough a lot of engeneers were invited to the USA where they could "sell" their V2, 2 High-speed Wind tunnels and all their aeronautical/engeneering knowledge, or to the CCCP where they were forcibly invited to do exactly the same things. We know how it ended somewhere at the end of the 50's : "our germans are better than yours".
At the same moment some island-country was bankrupt and needed to sell whatever crap they could to other countries to get some cash flow.
They needed to solve all the issues with their dead-end airframe and sell it to whoever was willing to pay for it, by making some marketing stunt.
But more than a year before that, the so called crappy german engine, made several hundreds (if not thousends) sorties possible in which the pilots claimed more than 500 victories on allied airplanes, within a period of 7months.
Not bad for such disaster-engine, much better than the 30 sorties made above allied-controlled territories in 5 months period.
It took 5 years for the meteor to get to the 262's tactical Mach. Great airplane, great engeneering, really splendid.
On the other side of the pond, some guys working on a centrifugal engine, came to the conclusion that it was a dead-end for airplane propulsion and started to build their own axial engine, what did not requiring being blown up in size each time you needed more power, and so came the great J-35, but meanwhile, the derwent5, the Nene saved the world off course with their thousend hours Tbo's. I'm like St Thomas, i believe what i see, until now, no trace of overhaul manuals for the Welland and the Derwent 1/3 that could confirm the advanced tbo numbers. But off course, when flying above controlled territory making some marketing stunts, without any risk of being shot-down by german airplanes, you need a long time working engine, because you do not have spares anyway, that certainly make the plane better... what was the original Topic actually.
And as what Brown said, here are his words:
(ISBN-9781902109152-Wings of the Luftwaffe-Flying the captured German Aircraft of World War II)
If asked to nominate the most formidable combat aircraft to evolve in World War II, I would unhesitatingly propose Messerschmitt's Me 262. I say 'unhesitatingly' advisedly, despite having flown the Spitfire in virtually all of its variants, the Mosquito, the Lancaster, the Mustang, and even Mitsubishi's Zero-Sen; all warplanes that might be considered as contenders for this accolade. Dubbed unofficially and not entirely appropriately as the Schwalbe, or Swallow, a bird popularly regarded as a harbinger of summer, the Me 262 was also to receive the appellation of Sturmvogel, or Stormy Petrel. This was perhaps more suitable in view of the storms that it was to weather before finally succumbing to the pressure of events that it could no longer influence.
If the Me 262 was a harbinger of anything it was the future in so far as fighter design technology was concerned. It was a fantastic aeroplane from several aspects, and its eleventh hour debut in the finale to the Gotterdammerung of Germany's Third Reich provided as dramatic a movement as any the great Wagner himself could have composed. In this case, however, the 'composer' was one Professor Willy Messerschmitt, whose Bf 109 fighter, after blooding over Spain, had provided most of the vertebrae of the Luftwaffe's spinal column throughout the entire war. ...(omitted)
While obviously proud of the Me 262, the German pilots were equally obviously somewhat apprehensive of it and especially of the two-seat night fighting version! As far as we could ascertain their worries were twofold. Firstly, the turbojets were unreliable and had, we were told, an overhaul life of a mere 10 hours and a total life of no more than 25 hours. This was bad enough, but all the records had been hurriedly destroyed before our arrival, and thus we had no means of knowing how many hours any engine had already run. ...(omitted)
The take-off run was long, and the aircraft gave one the feeling that it was underpowered, as indeed was the contemporary Meteor I. If one throttle was cut at 260km/h (160mph) the Me 262 went into a violent diving turn. Full rudder was required to counteract the swing pnd roll, and backward stick pressure had to be applied to keep the nose up. This action had to be taken within two seconds or else the situation was disastrous. The rudder force involved was high. Initial climbing speed was 460km/h (286mph), and from 300km/h (185mph) upward the Me 262 really took the bit between its teeth and became a thoroughly exciting aeroplane to fly. ...(omitted)
Our interest in the Me 262 at RAE Farnborough was threefold. Firstly, we were intrigued to discover if the performance really did match the capabilities claimed by the Germans; secondly we were anxious to discover the behaviour of the swept-wing configuration at high Mach numbers, and thirdly we wanted to know if this aircraft provided a good gun platform. We soon ascertained that the German performance figures were by no means extravagant, but the high Mach performance must, of course, be related to the contemporary state of the art, to use an Americanism. To place matters in perspective, it should be remembered that, in the same time scale, there were only two military jet aircraft in the UK, the Meteor I and the prototype Vampire. The former had a maximum safe Mach number of 0.8, and then the nose pitched up so strongly that speed fell away automatically, while the latter started trim change effects at speeds as low as Mach 0.74 with vigorous purposing building up by Mach 0.78. ...
Of course, the maximum safe flight Mach number is by no means that at which the aircraft can be employed tactically, or, in other words, at which combat manoeuvres can be carried out. Gerd Lindner had told me that he had dived the Me 262 up to Mach 0.86, although above Mach 0.83 the research dives had been performed under strict control. Before takeoff the elevator trim had been set by the aerodynamicists and not touched in flight other than in cases of dire emergency. Apparently the aircraft was dived from about 8,000m (26,250ft) at an angle between 20 and 25 degrees until 1,000km/h (620mph) TAS was achieved at about 6,000m (19,685ft). At Mach 0.83 the nose started to drop and it was necessary to apply some 14kg (30Ib) of pull on the stick with both hands. As the Mach number increased a violent buffeting set in, apparently coming from the aft portion of the cockpit canopy and producing an extremely alarming high-frequency banging. The aircraft meanwhile became progressively heavier in the nose, the stick pull necessary at Mach 0.86 increasing to about 45kg (100Ib). Recovery was effected by holding the dive angle steady until the Mach number automatically reduced with the decreasing altitude.
On the strength of these tests, the Luftwaffe pilots had been instructed not to exceed an airspeed of 960km/h (596mph) below 8,000m (26,250ft), more than 900km/h (560mph) being considered inadvisable above that altitude. They were also advised to set the elevator trimmer so that a slight initial push was required to enter a dive, and that the trimmer should not be used as an aid to recovery. Nevertheless, these instructions were sometimes forgotten in the heat of combat, and accidents happened.
I carried out high Mach dives on the Me 262 up to a maximum of Mach 0.86 true, and these fully confirmed all Gerd Lindner's observations. The important thing, however, was that I had ascertained the tactical usability of the Me 262 up to Mach 0.82, and this capability had undoubtedly endowed Messerschmitt's fighter with a marked advantage over every other operational aircraft of WW II.
One of the flight characteristics plaguing early jet aircraft was the phenomenon known as directional snaking. Its probable cause was recognized as being airflow separation just forward of the tail section, this giving rise to a small-amplitude, short period yawing oscillation. This compressibility effect did, of course, seriously impair the aircraft's tactical use as a stable gun platform, and we at Farnborough had experienced severe snaking trouble with the Meteor I above Mach 0. 7.
The attempts that were made to sort out this problem on the Meteor I make quite a saga, the problem of high Mach snaking being compounded by another undesirable form of sinuosity, rough air snaking, which seriously limited the Meteor's tactical use in the ground attack role.
Interrogation of Lindner had revealed an almost identical story of a lengthy trial-and-error process in attempting to eliminate the Me 262's tendency to snake. It had been ascertained that rough air snaking was due to a lack of effective fin area which was inherent in the design. Since the destabilizing effect of the airscrew was missing, it had evidently seemed apparent that fin area could be reduced for a given stability, but in fact the loss of resultant damping had proved excessive. The Me 262's snaking characteristics had improved when the top third of the fin-and-rudder assembly had been removed, but the loss in rudder power had increased the single-engine safety speed to 320km/h (200mph), so this modification had been found unacceptable. We had had similar results with an identical modification to the Meteor I, although these had not been quite so successful. The nose of the Gloster fighter was much shorter than that of the Me 262 which acted as a counteracting fin, and made up for some of the loss of damping resulting from reduction of the tail fin area.
The high Mach snaking had been found to be due to induced rudder oscillation, caused by variation in rudder hinge movement, which tended to move the rudder to overbalance direction. The best way of combating this effect was by use of rudder auto stabilisation, as we discovered with the Meteor after the war had ended, but German experimentation had not progressed that far. The German development programme had gone no further than the thickening of the trailing edge of the fin-and-rudder assembly and the provision of strips of sheet metal which were bent outwards along this edge. The overall effect was better than that obtained with the Meteor I, but inferior to that of the little Heinkel He 162.
The normal range of flight characteristics from aerobatic manoeuvres to the stall revealed the Me 262 as a very responsive and docile aeroplane, leaving one with a confident impression of a first-class combat aircraft for both fighter and ground attack roles. Harmony of control was pleasant, with a stick force per 'g' of 2.72kg (6Ib) at mid-CG position and a roll rate of 360 degrees in 3.8 seconds at 645km/h (400mph) at 1,525m (5,000ft). Maximum speed attainable in level flight on one engine was about 500km/h (310mph), and this called for application of one-third full rudder. That, then, was the Me 262, variously known as the Schwalbe and the Sturmvogel. But whatever the appellation, it was in my view unquestionably the foremost warplane of its day; a hard hitter which outperformed anything that we had immediately available but which, fortunately for the Allies, was not available to the Luftwaffe in sufficient numbers to affect drastically the course of events in the air over Europe. It was a pilot's aeroplane which had to be flown and not just heaved into the air.
Dronescapes
Senior Airman
Perhaps you, like others, missed parts of my comments.
Brown praised the airframe, as I mentioned, not the engine.
We own countless hours of Eric Brown's interviews (with him commenting directly), including never-before-published ones.
Perhaps you misread his interpretation, as he was quite vocal about the engine's flaws, rating it at 25 hours before needing to be scrapped.
He also mentioned his conversations with Whittle about the choice of centrifugal (at the time), confirming that Whittle knew all along (since the 30s). That at the time his engine was so simple that it was easy to develop and really reliable (despite having lost years and years of development, and not for his fault, as also explained).
It was a strategic choice, and quite frankly, months before Nazi defeat, the Allies had better things to do than think about a novel, largely unproven technology.
Had they listened to Whittle in 1929, and his engine had been developed with Government funding, this would not even be a discussion because, as envisioned by Whittle, they would have had the perfect turbojet at the time before the beginning of WWII, and by the end it would have been developed into a much better engine.
As a further reminder, and as mentioned before, on November 7, 1945, a Meteor F.3/F.4 flew at 606 mph (975 km/h).
If you do simple math and start counting the years between 1929, when Griffith rejected Whittle's proposal, and when a proper company took over his work (Rolls-Royce) in 1943, there are 14 years of mostly lost time.
Unlike the Nazi war machine, with the pampered Von Ohain, BMW, Junkers, Daimler, and, of course, Heinkel devoting resources to develop a turbojet, Whittle's real chance to prove his 1929 idea was the ideal solution at the time came in mid-1935, when a private investor gave him a very limited amount of money to prove it could work.
It took him less than 2 years to build the first turbojet in history, and from then on, it was anything but smooth sailing, as it had been before that date, as his brilliant interim solution first ended up in the incompetent hands of Rover (1940), which was another disastrous choice, and yet again, more time was wasted.
The British government took over Whittle's engine in 1939.
Depending on how you interpret the time lost (without the private investor's intervention), it ranges from 10 to a staggering 14 years of lost opportunities.
During those times, weeks and months were of the essence; imagine what a decade or more of lost government-backed R&D made at the time!
Whittle was almost alone, bankrupt, ridiculed, ostracized, and ignored for most of the journey, yet he had the most intelligent solution at the time all along, and could have given, as he so badly wanted, a massive strategic advantage to his country well before the beginning of the conflict.
I will ask once more, as I did in other comments: what happened to the Jumo at the end of WWII?
In the mid-50s, most of the world was still using Whittle's engine, and as mentioned before, it kickstarted the turbojet business for companies in the US, Russia, and, of course, Britain, which also had, during WWII, its own flawed axial variant as well.
Comparing a flawed (mostly useless) Jumo to Whittle's engine and the undeniable lost decade or more of development, not at all his fault, is utterly unfair.
Give the genius full credit, as he was way ahead, also in strategic terms, of anyone else, both in Britain and in Germany.
He was simply not allowed to execute his vision, probably, at least in 1929, because of petty jealousy or a conflict of interest, as I tend to exclude the idea that Griffith's blunder was simple idiocy, him being one of the fathers of the axial variant, when he struck down his proposal in 1929.
By the way, below is the May 1935 letter where his friend tells him about some interested party in his "aeroplane san propeller".
Without his friend, we would probably not even know Whittle ever existed.
I believe the actual investment was received in 1936, so in reality it took him less than 18 months, despite the financial limitations, to create his engine.
To compare the timeline, or even the sheer scale of the efforts made by Whittle, almost alone, and the Germans, is also completely unfair, yet he crossed the finish line first (and then had to suffer many more years after that until RR finally showed up).
Brown praised the airframe, as I mentioned, not the engine.
We own countless hours of Eric Brown's interviews (with him commenting directly), including never-before-published ones.
Perhaps you misread his interpretation, as he was quite vocal about the engine's flaws, rating it at 25 hours before needing to be scrapped.
He also mentioned his conversations with Whittle about the choice of centrifugal (at the time), confirming that Whittle knew all along (since the 30s). That at the time his engine was so simple that it was easy to develop and really reliable (despite having lost years and years of development, and not for his fault, as also explained).
It was a strategic choice, and quite frankly, months before Nazi defeat, the Allies had better things to do than think about a novel, largely unproven technology.
Had they listened to Whittle in 1929, and his engine had been developed with Government funding, this would not even be a discussion because, as envisioned by Whittle, they would have had the perfect turbojet at the time before the beginning of WWII, and by the end it would have been developed into a much better engine.
As a further reminder, and as mentioned before, on November 7, 1945, a Meteor F.3/F.4 flew at 606 mph (975 km/h).
If you do simple math and start counting the years between 1929, when Griffith rejected Whittle's proposal, and when a proper company took over his work (Rolls-Royce) in 1943, there are 14 years of mostly lost time.
Unlike the Nazi war machine, with the pampered Von Ohain, BMW, Junkers, Daimler, and, of course, Heinkel devoting resources to develop a turbojet, Whittle's real chance to prove his 1929 idea was the ideal solution at the time came in mid-1935, when a private investor gave him a very limited amount of money to prove it could work.
It took him less than 2 years to build the first turbojet in history, and from then on, it was anything but smooth sailing, as it had been before that date, as his brilliant interim solution first ended up in the incompetent hands of Rover (1940), which was another disastrous choice, and yet again, more time was wasted.
The British government took over Whittle's engine in 1939.
Depending on how you interpret the time lost (without the private investor's intervention), it ranges from 10 to a staggering 14 years of lost opportunities.
During those times, weeks and months were of the essence; imagine what a decade or more of lost government-backed R&D made at the time!
Whittle was almost alone, bankrupt, ridiculed, ostracized, and ignored for most of the journey, yet he had the most intelligent solution at the time all along, and could have given, as he so badly wanted, a massive strategic advantage to his country well before the beginning of the conflict.
I will ask once more, as I did in other comments: what happened to the Jumo at the end of WWII?
In the mid-50s, most of the world was still using Whittle's engine, and as mentioned before, it kickstarted the turbojet business for companies in the US, Russia, and, of course, Britain, which also had, during WWII, its own flawed axial variant as well.
Comparing a flawed (mostly useless) Jumo to Whittle's engine and the undeniable lost decade or more of development, not at all his fault, is utterly unfair.
Give the genius full credit, as he was way ahead, also in strategic terms, of anyone else, both in Britain and in Germany.
He was simply not allowed to execute his vision, probably, at least in 1929, because of petty jealousy or a conflict of interest, as I tend to exclude the idea that Griffith's blunder was simple idiocy, him being one of the fathers of the axial variant, when he struck down his proposal in 1929.
By the way, below is the May 1935 letter where his friend tells him about some interested party in his "aeroplane san propeller".
Without his friend, we would probably not even know Whittle ever existed.
I believe the actual investment was received in 1936, so in reality it took him less than 18 months, despite the financial limitations, to create his engine.
To compare the timeline, or even the sheer scale of the efforts made by Whittle, almost alone, and the Germans, is also completely unfair, yet he crossed the finish line first (and then had to suffer many more years after that until RR finally showed up).
Dronescapes
Senior Airman
Piles of numbers (and omissions).
Let's try again:
- What happened to the Jumo after the end of WWII?
- What turbojet engine dominated the skies until the rushed introduction of the F-86 Sabre on all sides?
As for, to name a company, General Electric during WWII, we all very well know that their first turbojet was Whittle's. They even made a dedicated documentary about it, but most importantly, as mentioned before, Metrovick pioneered axial-flow jet engine designs (the Metrovick F.2). British axial compressor and gas turbine research data—vital to advanced jet propulsion—was passed to the U.S. under technical interchange programs in 1942–1943. Perhaps you missed this part.
How the US all of a sudden had variants of turbojet engines is still a huge mystery to me...
Thank God G.E. reminds us all on their official site; perhaps Pratt & Whitney does not. I need to check into that.
As for the manuals, you also know why you cannot find them. Those engines were mostly prototypes, and if they even existed, they would have been highly classified and would probably be to this day, like so many other British things and programs.
Brown stating so is not good enough for you; Rolls-Royce must have been running a marketing scheme, the RAF Museum is obviously a hoax, and the list goes on.
You aim for the impossible rather than candidly admitting the obvious, but you already know that.
But! If you really want to play Indiana Jones, I am here to help. You may request a never-digitized copy of the AVIA 46/237 report here:
As I was typing this, an anonymous contributor on this board who does not want to end up being hated by you emailed me the link.
Apparently you have a connection with him, and he does not want to publicly contradict you.
I guess not everything is on the internet, nor does it need to be there to be real.
Obviously, I cannot vouch for this, but apparently it should prove the overhaul times.
Good luck on your quest; it might burst one of your bubbles (or not), but don't fear, in case this confirms your "Indiana Jones" T.B.O. I am certain you will also blame the National Archives for producing a "Marketing" document, and your goalpost will be moved once more.
Please post it publicly when you get it, if you even want to get it.
As for Brown, as mentioned in another comment:
Brown praised the airframe mostly, not the engine.
Perhaps you misread his interpretation, as he was quite vocal about the engine's flaws, rating it at 25 hours before needing to be scrapped.
He also talks about his conversations with Whittle, confirming that an interim (I stress interim) centrifugal choice was precisely because of reliability, ease of development, and of course reliability.
You do not seem to grasp the importance of those goals, just like the Nazis did; hence, a disastrous engine.
He is literally stating it on tape, with his face and voice!
I am sure I am going to be bombarded with more useless numbers, or you are going to throw the likes of Von Braun into the mix...Wait, you already did that.
At the same time, ignoring what Whittle went through is a punch in the face of objectivity.
His life, between 1929 and roughly 1943, when Rolls-Royce took over, serves primarily as a validation of how brilliant he was and, most importantly, what a strategic vision he had.
Because of endless events he could not control, and not his own decisions, he started with massive handicaps, yet he came out on top, beating people to the finish line who had immense resources, 1/2 cheated, etc.
To refuse to acknowledge this with catchy phrases is a clear indication that you will go to your grave to keep your position, and you will probably tell yourself that the Jumo was the greatest engine of all time. Despite all the evidence to the contrary, you will keep throwing unrelated data, omitting evidence, or switching subjects.
By the way, you most likely know why some manuals do not exist, so do us a favor and tell us why. The reason is very logical and justified, especially for the
But hey, that's another way to divert from the main topic, so why not?
You also know perfectly well why the Allies never used jet-powered aircraft at the time, so just be honest about it.
Perhaps you can tell me how many Me 262s crossed the Channel; there is a hint for you.
You transform a lack of strategic idiocy on the part of the Allies into proof that the Me 262 was a great aircraft, but again, you already know that.
Thank God the Nazis wasted their time and resources on the Me 262, with its wonderful airframe and a joke of an engine.
Their obsession with propaganda served them well till the end, not so much their country.
Allies had no need, nor any intention, nor any use for deploying jet-powered aircraft. I am also absolutely sure you know that, but you are just ignoring the fact.
Again, you conveniently omit obvious facts for the sake of arguing, but you are not telling the whole story. Why would you, when your sole goal is to defend a shitty engine to the death?
Intellectual honesty is a virtue; you seem to think it is a tumor.
Please keep feeding us partial, handpicked, or disconnected micro-details as long as it makes you feel good and safe, and don't stop questioning anything you don't like, factual or not, you will always find a detail you don't like, just like flat-earthers did when their cult leaders finally confirmed they were wrong, they just moved the goal post, found all sort of details that did not make sense to them, and called for additional conspirancies. The way you drive the conversation is not, unlike Whittle's, a brilliant novel invention.
I need to sadly say goodbye to you now; I still have a life as well.
bada
Airman 1st Class
It's funny how the same arguments comes back for more than 25years now, when talking about the 262: "if it was so good, Why did it not was produced after war?", "What happened to the production of the 004?", "the speed record", "but-but the Derwent5 doh", and don't forget: "the Nene". And none of them actually linked to the subject of 262 vs meteor3 in45. I Just send you back to the adage "the winner takes the spoils" and all the consequences of it.
Just what ruled the skies at the begin of the 50's? it certainly wasn't the Derwent in a concrete airframe, but i suppose you have it over the Soviet Klimov VK-1, that had a great contender in the J-47. but i still do not see any link to the 262 vs meteor3 in this case. As what happened to the 004, it was just analyzed and tested by all allied countries that could get the spoils of war and influenced in a way or another engine designs after war (bypass cooling being an example) and shown what not to do by using bad materials. That's what happened. Strangely, when GE got the blueprints from the GB, they saw rather rapidly the limitations of the barrel-engine and didn't pursue it's development, fixating their work on axial engines even if they build their own centrifugal for testing purposes and their first gen jet, because the axial wasn't ready yet and they needed something to propel their new designed airframe anyway (the viable one, that could change angles rapidly, in production. The one that could actually be called a fighter) . But yes, the americans waited for the english to provide them with so much light about jet engines, that they didn't even draw jet fighters in 1939 (L-133) and didn't started the work on their own jet propulsion known as the J-1000 well before the english provided them the light of knowledge.
Unlike the words you try to put in my mouth, i do not consider the 004B as the alpha-omega, i consider it the right tool for the job, being able to be mass-produced, what was needed for the war effort.
Again, you do not build long time engines for short life-airframes, it's a waste of ressources. Even if this situation was the consequence of 2 previous decisions in 1943 (redesign for serial mass production and removal of strategic materials) that hadn't this specific goal of such a short life expectancy in mind, the result was fitting the situation germany was in starting autumn44, with short life-span aircraft in front line squadrons. Sometimes things work out by chance.
What i could consider as the greatest turbine of WWII would be the 004A, having passed the 100h+ test without issues (that you would consider disastrous anyway, seeing your hate for this engine and the germans), but i do not work by "what-ifs", the 004A wasn't produced due to 2 previous decisions, one of them, taken by decisions makers (let's call them politicians) being just as stupid as the decisions taken for Whittle's projects, who's contribution to the jet-engine i do not try to minimize by anyway, unlike you tried to put those words on me, again. The flow of history being what it is, we can't change that and nothing will bring it back. Discussing the chain of events that produced those decisions is one thing, going into what-if's if those decisions haven't been taken is another...and here comes the HeS-011 and the Ta-183
If you interested, there is a good post about the 004's materials on this forum, but be careful, you seems to be allergic to numbers, with a lot of good info and a nice chart (with numbers!) by Mr Calum (Deleted User 68059)
As for Mr Brown, he didn't praised the airframe, he praised the airplane, even with it quirks and short life engines explicitly mentioned by him.
When mentioning an airframe, men talk about the structure, materials, wing profiles, general set-up/disposition, rigidity, G-resistance, cog, aerodynamical values (aaarghl, all those irrelevant numbers again!),etc...
An airplane is a combo of the airframe and the engine(s), when not accoupled and matched, both are just ground-sitting, nicely shaped, piles of scrap metal with no use, just like the metrovic axial...naah, just jocking, we all know it served for the development of the avon, even if it took trice the time than the germans and their 004 to make it work, being even run in it's first version a whole year later than the 004V. Well, it was the "later axial pioneer" but english pioneer never the less!
At least this crappy german 25h engine flew right up to UK in Recco missions, with the Ar-234, it's maybe not the 262 but why should a front-line fighter with a 1h combat radius, the 262, fly to England in autumn44 (or later)? For what kind of mission? What do you think , what even a whole SQ of 262, could accomplish above GB at the end of 44 (or begin45)? Marketing stunts like the meteor above controlled territories? it was also too far for their range, just the same as if you invert the situation with the meteor based in GB and need to fly to middle Germany, that's why no continental operations by the 616 were ever made from the UK...or any other missions btw.
As for the Manuals, if according to you, those engines were prototypes, who did the maintenance? the After flight checks? I would say it was a specifically trained crew of grease monkeys, but even with a special training, you still need manuals with specific timings for specifics checks, Torque value for the screws (ah, numbers again), measuring values for different components of the engine (numbers again and again), etc, etc... hell, you can find a full overhaul manual for the J-79 from the F-4 Fantom era here on the forum, so don't tell me about so highly classified totally outdated tech from 80 years ago that is so secret nobody has ever seen those manuals. We have more recent secret papers at disposal than old crap's manuals nobody used for more than 70 years.
And BTW, thanks to the anonymous member (thanks Geoff) for the AiR/Avia Reference, but he could have send it directly to me, as this doc could dissipate my doubts about the mentionned TBO's (and not my inexistent denial that you try to imply, 2 different words with 2 different significations) that are found in each discussion about the meteor/262 without providing the source or in any book talking about those Tbo's where the source is also never referenced. Will request a quote from Kew and if they as expensive as they were few years ago, i'll hire a dedicated kew-digger-guy to take pictures of it...and other Air16's i need for work, at the same time.
So, after having Prototypes-engines, now you claim, the jet weren't needed ? so why field them for a whole year? I could understand for the Mk-1's, just as JG-26 with the Fw-190A1's assigned as operational testing, but the Mk-3? it was the same airframe with small modifications and new engines (except the first batch, that got the old welland's, but let's forget about this little fact as this is totally irrelevant to what you wrote, so you couldn't tell i'm the one trying to change subject). Why even send those airframes to the continent and provide them missions in fully allied-controlled areas empty of any risk of encounters with the LW? Maybe the command knew they sucked as fighters and didn't want to loose them because of lack of airframes and engines? Marketing stunt ? The narrative that the cause was the metallurgy of the engines is so convenient here, just like "they need more democracy". Why did the LW TEST their airplanes in real combat situations and the GB was soooo afraid to do so? aah right, the germans will copy their metallurgy, when the LW was already on it's last leg, almost invisible on the west of Berlin compared to the east front. yeah, i'm sure germans would have had time to do a fullmetal spectroscopy of the metals used in the derwent, start the production of the metals and build their uberfuhrer-jumo004-666series, and all this under daily bombing, their logistics in shambles and an allied supremacy in the air, sure...
So now, because we diverted a lot of the original topic, tell us, which one of the main points you described, you think is the one that makes the meteor a better plane than the schwalbe?
1° the Political and financial bullying of Mr Whittle?
2° The one time speed record?
3° The Nene?
4° The 180h Tbo?
In all your narrative, you didn't even once mentionned one point from the CFE Evaluation and considered the results i posted (yes, all those numbers everywhere) done by CFE as Nitpicking, just as all fanatics trying to pass the meteor Mk-3 for a splendid fighter better than the 262, most who don't even dare to read the report cause it hurt their feelings/believes/implanted thoughts. I'm sure you even didn't read it yourself. And i'm sorry if the discussion was unpleasant, english being my fourth language, there is a tendency to go straight to the point and using more sarcasm than usually in my 3 other languages. But don't worry, this unpleasant feeling, this phenomenon is well know and it's called cognitive dissonance in medical jargon , found in all cultist of any sort or tv brainwashed lifeforms. But don't worry, the fanatism goes down with age (at least in my case), how more you read books/documents that you wouldn't when being younger, how more WTF moment and beer spill on the screen/books. And suddenly so much more open perspectives about the wwII aviation subject. Really advise to buy the following book, it's great. The cure is to stay open and analyzing a ton of numbers, this is the key.
And just to be sure that my comprehension of english isn't that bad, and to be sure that my understanding of the text is right, i put some nitpicked text of the Conclusion made by the CFE (pg19, easier to find when you've decided to read the report) in the gogol translator and it gives me the following in my first 3 daily languages:
-Le Meteor présente une instabilité en lacet (« serpentin »), ce qui le rend impropre à une utilisation comme plateforme de tir à des vitesses opérationnelles.
-De Meteor vertoont instabiliteit in de gierhoek ("slangenbeweging"), waardoor hij ongeschikt is als kanonplatform bij operationele snelheden.
-Meteor ma niestabilność w odchyleniu ("wężowaniu"), co sprawia, że nie nadaje się jako platforma artyleryjska przy prędkościach operacyjnych.
Well that fit my english comprehension.
And now, i leave you , because i have a rather busy life and a ton of Orbs of the SQ92 to check , extract the data from the text, put all this stuff into numbeeeeeeeers and get nice statistics for the Spit-12 and the SQ92 and It's already past 11PM...
Just what ruled the skies at the begin of the 50's? it certainly wasn't the Derwent in a concrete airframe, but i suppose you have it over the Soviet Klimov VK-1, that had a great contender in the J-47. but i still do not see any link to the 262 vs meteor3 in this case. As what happened to the 004, it was just analyzed and tested by all allied countries that could get the spoils of war and influenced in a way or another engine designs after war (bypass cooling being an example) and shown what not to do by using bad materials. That's what happened. Strangely, when GE got the blueprints from the GB, they saw rather rapidly the limitations of the barrel-engine and didn't pursue it's development, fixating their work on axial engines even if they build their own centrifugal for testing purposes and their first gen jet, because the axial wasn't ready yet and they needed something to propel their new designed airframe anyway (the viable one, that could change angles rapidly, in production. The one that could actually be called a fighter) . But yes, the americans waited for the english to provide them with so much light about jet engines, that they didn't even draw jet fighters in 1939 (L-133) and didn't started the work on their own jet propulsion known as the J-1000 well before the english provided them the light of knowledge.
Unlike the words you try to put in my mouth, i do not consider the 004B as the alpha-omega, i consider it the right tool for the job, being able to be mass-produced, what was needed for the war effort.
Again, you do not build long time engines for short life-airframes, it's a waste of ressources. Even if this situation was the consequence of 2 previous decisions in 1943 (redesign for serial mass production and removal of strategic materials) that hadn't this specific goal of such a short life expectancy in mind, the result was fitting the situation germany was in starting autumn44, with short life-span aircraft in front line squadrons. Sometimes things work out by chance.
What i could consider as the greatest turbine of WWII would be the 004A, having passed the 100h+ test without issues (that you would consider disastrous anyway, seeing your hate for this engine and the germans), but i do not work by "what-ifs", the 004A wasn't produced due to 2 previous decisions, one of them, taken by decisions makers (let's call them politicians) being just as stupid as the decisions taken for Whittle's projects, who's contribution to the jet-engine i do not try to minimize by anyway, unlike you tried to put those words on me, again. The flow of history being what it is, we can't change that and nothing will bring it back. Discussing the chain of events that produced those decisions is one thing, going into what-if's if those decisions haven't been taken is another...and here comes the HeS-011 and the Ta-183
If you interested, there is a good post about the 004's materials on this forum, but be careful, you seems to be allergic to numbers, with a lot of good info and a nice chart (with numbers!) by Mr Calum (Deleted User 68059)
As for Mr Brown, he didn't praised the airframe, he praised the airplane, even with it quirks and short life engines explicitly mentioned by him.
When mentioning an airframe, men talk about the structure, materials, wing profiles, general set-up/disposition, rigidity, G-resistance, cog, aerodynamical values (aaarghl, all those irrelevant numbers again!),etc...
An airplane is a combo of the airframe and the engine(s), when not accoupled and matched, both are just ground-sitting, nicely shaped, piles of scrap metal with no use, just like the metrovic axial...naah, just jocking, we all know it served for the development of the avon, even if it took trice the time than the germans and their 004 to make it work, being even run in it's first version a whole year later than the 004V. Well, it was the "later axial pioneer" but english pioneer never the less!
At least this crappy german 25h engine flew right up to UK in Recco missions, with the Ar-234, it's maybe not the 262 but why should a front-line fighter with a 1h combat radius, the 262, fly to England in autumn44 (or later)? For what kind of mission? What do you think , what even a whole SQ of 262, could accomplish above GB at the end of 44 (or begin45)? Marketing stunts like the meteor above controlled territories? it was also too far for their range, just the same as if you invert the situation with the meteor based in GB and need to fly to middle Germany, that's why no continental operations by the 616 were ever made from the UK...or any other missions btw.
As for the Manuals, if according to you, those engines were prototypes, who did the maintenance? the After flight checks? I would say it was a specifically trained crew of grease monkeys, but even with a special training, you still need manuals with specific timings for specifics checks, Torque value for the screws (ah, numbers again), measuring values for different components of the engine (numbers again and again), etc, etc... hell, you can find a full overhaul manual for the J-79 from the F-4 Fantom era here on the forum, so don't tell me about so highly classified totally outdated tech from 80 years ago that is so secret nobody has ever seen those manuals. We have more recent secret papers at disposal than old crap's manuals nobody used for more than 70 years.
And BTW, thanks to the anonymous member (thanks Geoff) for the AiR/Avia Reference, but he could have send it directly to me, as this doc could dissipate my doubts about the mentionned TBO's (and not my inexistent denial that you try to imply, 2 different words with 2 different significations) that are found in each discussion about the meteor/262 without providing the source or in any book talking about those Tbo's where the source is also never referenced. Will request a quote from Kew and if they as expensive as they were few years ago, i'll hire a dedicated kew-digger-guy to take pictures of it...and other Air16's i need for work, at the same time.
So, after having Prototypes-engines, now you claim, the jet weren't needed ? so why field them for a whole year? I could understand for the Mk-1's, just as JG-26 with the Fw-190A1's assigned as operational testing, but the Mk-3? it was the same airframe with small modifications and new engines (except the first batch, that got the old welland's, but let's forget about this little fact as this is totally irrelevant to what you wrote, so you couldn't tell i'm the one trying to change subject). Why even send those airframes to the continent and provide them missions in fully allied-controlled areas empty of any risk of encounters with the LW? Maybe the command knew they sucked as fighters and didn't want to loose them because of lack of airframes and engines? Marketing stunt ? The narrative that the cause was the metallurgy of the engines is so convenient here, just like "they need more democracy". Why did the LW TEST their airplanes in real combat situations and the GB was soooo afraid to do so? aah right, the germans will copy their metallurgy, when the LW was already on it's last leg, almost invisible on the west of Berlin compared to the east front. yeah, i'm sure germans would have had time to do a fullmetal spectroscopy of the metals used in the derwent, start the production of the metals and build their uberfuhrer-jumo004-666series, and all this under daily bombing, their logistics in shambles and an allied supremacy in the air, sure...
So now, because we diverted a lot of the original topic, tell us, which one of the main points you described, you think is the one that makes the meteor a better plane than the schwalbe?
1° the Political and financial bullying of Mr Whittle?
2° The one time speed record?
3° The Nene?
4° The 180h Tbo?
In all your narrative, you didn't even once mentionned one point from the CFE Evaluation and considered the results i posted (yes, all those numbers everywhere) done by CFE as Nitpicking, just as all fanatics trying to pass the meteor Mk-3 for a splendid fighter better than the 262, most who don't even dare to read the report cause it hurt their feelings/believes/implanted thoughts. I'm sure you even didn't read it yourself. And i'm sorry if the discussion was unpleasant, english being my fourth language, there is a tendency to go straight to the point and using more sarcasm than usually in my 3 other languages. But don't worry, this unpleasant feeling, this phenomenon is well know and it's called cognitive dissonance in medical jargon , found in all cultist of any sort or tv brainwashed lifeforms. But don't worry, the fanatism goes down with age (at least in my case), how more you read books/documents that you wouldn't when being younger, how more WTF moment and beer spill on the screen/books. And suddenly so much more open perspectives about the wwII aviation subject. Really advise to buy the following book, it's great. The cure is to stay open and analyzing a ton of numbers, this is the key.
And just to be sure that my comprehension of english isn't that bad, and to be sure that my understanding of the text is right, i put some nitpicked text of the Conclusion made by the CFE (pg19, easier to find when you've decided to read the report) in the gogol translator and it gives me the following in my first 3 daily languages:
-Le Meteor présente une instabilité en lacet (« serpentin »), ce qui le rend impropre à une utilisation comme plateforme de tir à des vitesses opérationnelles.
-De Meteor vertoont instabiliteit in de gierhoek ("slangenbeweging"), waardoor hij ongeschikt is als kanonplatform bij operationele snelheden.
-Meteor ma niestabilność w odchyleniu ("wężowaniu"), co sprawia, że nie nadaje się jako platforma artyleryjska przy prędkościach operacyjnych.
Well that fit my english comprehension.
And now, i leave you , because i have a rather busy life and a ton of Orbs of the SQ92 to check , extract the data from the text, put all this stuff into numbeeeeeeeers and get nice statistics for the Spit-12 and the SQ92 and It's already past 11PM...
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
This topic has certainly engendered a passionate discussion.
Holtzauge
Senior Airman
In 1989, both Whittle and von Ohain participated at a convention in Dayton , Ohio, where they both presented papers about the development of jet powered flight and jet engine devlopment in commemoration of the 50th anniversary since the first jet fight.
Hans von Ohain's contribution was called The first turbojet flights and other German developments, and attached below are some passages from that paper about German axial flow jet engine development that sheds some light on the German's thinking with regards to engine service life and what was possible to achive with the materials they had at hand.
Looks like von Ohain was of the opinion that not only would the engine thrust of the Jumo 004 been higher if they had had access to the right alloying metals, but that it would also have been possible to increase the service life from the oft quoted 25 hours to "far over 100 hours".
Hans von Ohain's contribution was called The first turbojet flights and other German developments, and attached below are some passages from that paper about German axial flow jet engine development that sheds some light on the German's thinking with regards to engine service life and what was possible to achive with the materials they had at hand.
Looks like von Ohain was of the opinion that not only would the engine thrust of the Jumo 004 been higher if they had had access to the right alloying metals, but that it would also have been possible to increase the service life from the oft quoted 25 hours to "far over 100 hours".
A very good post by Anders!
Overall, I do think that reasonable and balanced posters can understand the complicated values and historic realities that often define the historic importance of contemporary developments in warfare, and technology.
Just to put on the record, I suspect that I might be the only person here to have actually run a R-R W2 Welland.
Eng
bada
Airman 1st Class
you have all my attention sir, if you decide to share your experience and knowledge, maybe start a dedicated topic so it wouldn't be drawn in all those here present ramblings.
thank you.
Holtzauge
Senior Airman
Yes, and the more one learn about it, the more one is impressed with how the designers of the time coped with the problems that faced them. The way Calum Douglas covers the Germans problems with steel alloying metals in the SHR was an eyeopener: And while many blame the fuel for much of their problems to crank up their piston engines boost pressures, I've come to understand that it was actually more the problems connected to their low alloyed exhaust valves which held them back there as well, just as for their jet engines performance and longevity.
About the Welland: Pictures or it didn't happen!
Jokes aside, would be nice to see some photos if you have any.Yes, and the more one learn about it, the more one is impressed with how the designers of the time coped with the problems that faced them. The way Calum Douglas covers the Germans problems with steel alloying metals in the SHR was an eyeopener: And while many blame the fuel for much of their problems to crank up their piston engines boost pressures, I've come to understand that it was actually more the problems connected to their low alloyed exhaust valves which held them back there as well, just as for their jet engines performance and longevity.
About the Welland: Pictures or it didn't happen!
Ha, Pictures!
I am not a crazy photo taker, I prefer to experience the moment! No, we took no pictures on that day. I will see about writing a few words about running the Welland.
Cheers
Eng
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Cool!
