Earlier/better/more Sea Hurricane: pros cons

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While replacing the "Roc" with something better (that means most anything) is a popular notion it actually changes very little since the Roc was only built to the tune 136 aircraft and it was decided to use it for target towing and other 2nd line (or 3rd line) duties before the shooting even started. Due to a shortage of aircraft it was issued to a few squadrons for combat use. Please note that there were few, if any, all Roc squadrons. They were usually used by mixed squadrons, one or more flights using another type of aircraft (many times the Skua). It only went to sea (issued to squadrons on an AIrcraft carrier) for a few weeks during the Norwegian campaign on the Ark Royal. It may have failed to engage any German aircraft at this time. Either lack of opportunity or lack of performance being the cause/s. It did engage and succeed in shooting down one German aircraft at the time of Dunkirk but these aircraft were from a shore based squadron.

In 1937-39 (and later) the British were short of nearly everything, engines, propellers, .303 Browning guns, decent incendiary ammunition and so on.
If you want 120-130 additional Hurricanes you need 120-130 more Merlins from somewhere. They won't come from Roc production.
120-130 fewer Defiant's? 120-130 fewer Fairey Battles? (nice idea the last, but it means if you build 120 Sea Hurricanes in 1939 you have 8 to 10 fewer squadrons in Bomber Command To send to France or use for other things until more bombers can be built or bought. Bomber (and fighter) squadrons can transition from one aircraft to another much, much faster than creating them out of thin air (even if you have men sitting in replacement pools). It takes time for men to work together as a team and getting the ground crew functioning as a team is just as important as training the aircrew.

If you are short of .303 Brownings then while it is easy to say that an 8 gun fighter is superior to a 4 gun fighter but gets a bit more complicated when you are comparing 60 eight gun fighters to 120 4 gun fighters. Or you build the eight gun fighters and only put 4 guns in each one and hope the shooting doesn't start until the supply situation improves.

The Airframe factories built pretty much just the airframes, not only the engines/props but the landing gear and brakes came from outside suppliers. Even hydraulic pistons for flaps may come from outside suppliers. Very often too many such parts were already in the supply line when the test flights (or first operational flights) revealed a particular design was less than promised ( and a lot less than what was wanted) but stopping production left piles of unused, very expensive specially made parts/component assembles that cannot be used on the alternative design/s.

They Roc, in all probability should never have built in the numbers it was, But the alternative to the Roc was more Skua's, not Hurricanes. Same or similar engine/prop, much of the fuselage and wings were the same, Similar or identical landing gear.

As far as the Sea Gladiator goes, only 60 were built for the RN, another 22-38 (accounts differ) were transferred and modified from RAF stocks (or contracts). The First Sea Gladiator II (RN contract) was delivered in Dec of 1938. Sea Gladiator IIs used a metal fixed pitch 3 blade propeller. No help there for a 'super' Sea Hurricane. During the war several Gladiators were fitted with Mercury engines from Blenheims and their associated 2 pitch props.

The RN only had 7 carriers in operation when the war broke out and that includes the Argus (converted pre WW I Ocean Liner, 20 knots, 18 air craft), the Eagle ( converted Pre WW I battleship hull, 24 kts 21-30 aircraft) and the Hermes (ordered in 1917 as the first ship designed as an aircraft carrier, 25 knots, 20 aircraft)
Only the Ark Royal was less than 15 years old.
 
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The FAA procured 136 of 4-gun Rocs and then decided to barely deploy them, perhaps it is better to have ~100 Sea Hurricanes not just produced, but actually deployed. If you have a small number of decks, each housing a small number of aircraft, a good bet would be to have excellent types aboard?
The <200 of Rocs and Sea Gladiators produced are a big number when talking about FAA procurements before ww2 started.

3200+ of Battles and Defiants were produced, Hawker also produced 200 Henleys, all 3400+ before 1941. Toss in the Hurricanes and Spitfires produced, plus Fulmars and Merlin-powered Whitleys - looks to me that Merlin production was excellent even in the darkest days of 1940.

Again - for all the changes to take effect in 1940, the decision must be laid down in ~1937.
 
The concept of a turret fighter was very popular in British RAF and Air Ministry circles in the 1930s. At a meeting of 1938, for which I have seen an extract of the minutes somewhere, but can't find them, it was being proposed to replace fixed gun fighters at home and abroad, with turret fighters, in the next three years. The fixed gun fighter was deemed only to have an advantage over the turret fighter in home defence because no defensive armament was required. Note the year 1938! This makes it rather unlikely that any turret fighter programme would have be cancelled a year before this.

The first concerns about the performance of a turret fighter, in this case the Defiant, that I can find were raised in January 1940. That's why I raised 1940. It's the earliest date that anyone started to doubt the concept and therefore the earliest date that even a chance of a change of priority regarding the types might arise.

The cancellation of any turret fighter programme in 1937 (the first Defiant flew for the first time on 11th August that year) is pure 'what iffery' and bears no relation to historic events. You can't expect an entire concept, popular and backed by senior figures at the Air Ministry and RAF, to be cancelled before the principal prototype has even been assessed. Again that would require the vision of hindsight, to understand just how badly the concept was to fail. In an alternate history it might have done quite well, attacking unescorted Luftwaffe bombers, but that too is 'what iffery'.

With hindsight it would make sense to never develop any turret fighters at all, I think we agree on that. The problem is that given the prevalent views of the time there was never the will or opportunity to do this.
Whether the production capacity released had the turret fighters been cancelled might have been used to produce more aircraft, Sea Hurricanes or others, for the Navy is another difficult issue. I suspect that given priorities in 1939/40 that it is the RAF which would have benefited.

I'd be very interested to know whether the Navy expressed an earlier interest in the Sea Hurricane. Naval aviation seems to have been largely neglected and misunderstood by most senior officers at the Admiralty. Had they been offered such an aircraft would they have been interested? Ultimately they might have been cajoled into taking it, but that's a different scenario.
Did any naval commander ever write to his bosses saying that he needed Sea Hurricanes? Was it ever even mooted at the Admiralty? If you don't ask, particularly when there are competing demands from other Services, you don't get.

Cheers

Steve
 
Admiralty policy at the beginning of WW2 was that AA gunnery would protect its ships and therefore the Fleet Air Arm did not require interceptor fighters for Fleet Defence against air attack.
The first time this policy was questioned, by Churchill, was when Ark Royal, accompanied by the Home Fleet, sailed into the North Sea and was 'near missed' (according to Crosley) by the Luftwaffe. We are already past 1937 by several years. It was too late for Churchill to alter the composition of the Fleet Air Arm immediately, to provide interceptor fighters. All he could do was suggest that the Fleet's AA gunners be provided with more realistic, faster, practice targets.
By 1942/3 it was agreed that AA gunnery was really a last resort against a skilful air attack and that fighters operated from carriers with radar direction combined with strikes against adjacent enemy air fields or carriers was the only sure defence. The Pacific war provides absolute proof of this.
For the decision to provide the RN with interceptor fighters and radar control in 1937, at least five years earlier, to have been made would have required more than hindsight. It would have required a TARDIS. It would also have needed a fundamental change in RN doctrine and procurement plans, which is probably less likely than finding Dr Who and borrowing that TARDIS.
Cheers
Steve
 

The point I was trying to make is that in 1938-39 Merlin production was pretty well spoken for and that the RAF was trying to add many more squadrons as fast as they could. As always timing is everything or darn close.

From Wiki.

RR Derby:
The existing Rolls-Royce facilities at Osmaston, Derby were not suitable for large-scale engine production although the floor space had been increased by some 25% between 1935 and 1939;

RR Crewe:
To meet the increasing demand for Merlin engines, Rolls-Royce started building work on a new factory at Crewe in May 1938, with engines leaving the factory in 1939..... Production at Crewe was originally planned to use unskilled labour and sub-contractors with which Hives felt there would be no particular difficulty, but the number of required sub-contracted parts such as crankshafts, camshafts and cylinder liners eventually fell short and the factory was expanded to manufacture these parts "in house"
..Initially the local authority promised to build 1,000 new houses to accommodate the workforce by the end of 1938, but by February 1939 it had only awarded a contract for 100. Hives was incensed by this complacency and threatened to move the whole operation.........

RR Glasgow:
This government-funded and -operated factory was built at Hillington starting in June 1939 with workers moving into the premises in October, one month after the outbreak of war, the factory becoming fully occupied by September 1940.....Unlike the Derby and Crewe plants which relied significantly on external subcontractors, it produced almost all the Merlin's components itself.[70] Engines began to leave the production line in November 1940, and by June 1941 monthly output had reached 200, increasing to more than 400 per month by March 1942.

Ford at Tafford Park:
....building work on a new factory was started in May 1940 on a 118-acre (48 ha) site. Built with two distinct sections to minimise potential bomb damage, it was completed in May 1941 and bombed in the same month.

Excellent production in Sept of 1940 was by no means a sure thing in 1938 or early 1939. Engine production per month may have been 1/4-1/3 per month in summer/fall of 1939 what it was in the fall of 1940.
If you want Squadrons at sea (trained squadrons) in the spring of 1940 the planes (at least the first few dozen) would have to leave the factory/s by the end of 1939 in order to give the squadrons time to train/work up.

In Sept 1939 total British aircraft carrier capacity was under 260 planes between the 7 carriers. The Illustrious class, 4 laid down in 1937, would have been replacements for 3-4 of the earlier carriers if the war had not broken out until several years later, not additions to bring the carrier total to 11. The British were looking for multi-role aircraft for their carriers, not specialist aircraft.

You also have to consider what would have happened if war had broken out sooner. The Roc was late but Several squadrons still Had Hawker Nimrods on Strength in early part of 1939. And by the way, the Nimrod could carry four 20lb bombs which, while pathetic by 1940 standards, was pretty impressive in 1932 and rather useful for attacking wooden pirate ships in the China sea.
Bomb load of a 1939 Sea Hurricane with a fixed pitch prop would have been ?????



 
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stona said:
Admiralty policy at the beginning of WW2 was that AA gunnery would protect its ships and therefore the Fleet Air Arm did not require interceptor fighters for Fleet Defence against air attack.
Click to expand...

Admirality went for FAA got Skuas to serve also as fighters, they/Air Ministry/RN/whoever purchased Roc and Fulmar, Sea Gladiator, so I'd say that Admirality's policy envolved fighters very much for Fleet defense.


Again, no need to wait for 1940 and Churchill, let alone 1943 and outcomes of Pacific battles - instead of non-performers with half a weapon battery, negotiate the purchase a performer with full battery, before the war.


I'm not sure why involving TARDIS here? To tell the Admirality that 320+ mph is better than 220-250 mph, or that 8 guns is better than 4 guns? To tell them that one crew member is easier to train and replace than two crew members, for doing the same job?
'Hurricane + no radar' is far a better proposal than 'Gladiator + no radar', that got involved here also for no reason.
 

Thanks for the Merlin production overwiev. I agree that it would need to have them in service by late 1939 in order to have them in combat by Spring of 1940.
Since Sea Gadiator and Roc were capable to carry zero bombs, the bomb-less Sea Hurricane is no worse than either. If the war broke sooner, that also means that those two 'performers' are non factors.
 
The Roc was still really a bomber, or would you fit racks and brakes to your fleet defence fighter? It could still carry bombs, you could say it was a proto-fighter bomber . The Roc had more in common with it's dive bomber brother the Skua than a modern fighter, indeed it was cleared for 70 degree dive bombing. It's typical under wing load was to be 250lb SAP bombs(for use against shipping) or 100lb anti submarine bombs. It didn't have any wing armament. To understand the enthusiasm for the Roc and other turret fighters an appreciation of the WW1 concept of 'no allowance shooting', what we would call zero deflection, on expected fighter tactics is required. The thinking behind the Roc's design was heavily influenced by the Royal Navy's belief that the fleet at sea would be able to defend itself from air attack by anti-aircraft fire. The Navy invested considerable amounts in this policy; building and converting a whole range of "anti-aircraft cruisers" that were designed to put up an impenetrable barrage of AA, as I alluded to above.
Thinking in the 1930s was confused. The chance of air-to-air interception was nigh on impossible given the increasingly short times between hostile formations being visually spotted and when they mounted their attacks. Until seaborne radar gave early warning (and in 1937 you would need that TARDIS again) this is a valid point
At one point the Air Ministry became convinced that there was no point for fighters being aboard aircraft aboard carriers at all. This was compounded by the newly independent RAF assuring anyone who would listen that it could provide ground-based fighter cover, wherever the fleet was deployed, this was optimistic to put it mildly.
There was serious consideration given to equipping the carriers only with strike types. The need for some form of defensive fighters was eventually conceded, resulting in the Roc but the bombing capability of the Roc was retained, reflecting the general attitude and confused thinking which would remain in to the late 1930s.

Now we need to clarify the timeline.
The Fulmar was developed as a fighter from another light bomber, the P4/34, not yet the Battle. It was a response to the failure of the Roc. It was developed under an emergency programme. It first flew on 4 January 1940 and was delivered to its first squadron in May. Within two months it had replaced the Roc and the Rocs hardly saw any action during the war, unlike the Fulmars.
According to the FAA website, "Only one Roc was reported to have been involved in combat between 1939-1945, this was when on 21 June 1940 a Roc flown by Sub Lt AVM Day and NA 1 F Berry from 801 squadron took part in an attack on a gunnery battery at Cap Blanc Nez, near Calais. The aircraft was shot down smoking by HA fire and both of the crew killed."
The RN specification was for a fighter carrying eight .303 machine guns but with a six-hour endurance at 138 mph for patrol duties or three hours at 175 mph for escort duties. The need for a single 250lb bomb was also stipulated. The Fulmar I could reach 265mph at 7500ft (on a good day!). The four-hours and 45 minute endurance was adequate and the .303 guns were fed by trays containing 750 rounds per gun. Hurricanes only carried 334. A Sea Hurricane could not have matched most of these requirements. It is often forgotten that though the Fulmar was heavy it was also strong and capable of a 400+mph dive. Careful positioning of patrols by fighter direction officers often enabled Fulmars to use an altitude advantage to make diving attacks on enemy formations. In pre-radar days the Sea Hurricane would not have had the endurance to mount CAPs over the fleet, and could never have made any interceptions.The conversion of the P4/34 was expected to procede quickly, but it was delays in this that led to the order for the Sea Gladiators, they remain a red herring in this discussion and were only ever intended as a stop gap between the Roc and Fulmar..
The Fulmar was never expected to meet enemy fighters, shades of the Defiant here. It actually did okay against the opposition it was planned to meet, like the Italian torpedo bombers in the Mediterranean. By the time it was finally withdrawn in 1943 the Fulmar had been credited with 122 victories. It had also produced nine FAA aces for the loss in air to air combat of just 16 of its own.

The Navy never anticipated the need for a high performance fighter to act as fleet defence until it was too late. Unfortunately the war did not pan out as the planners had intended. What it got, in double quick time, was the Fulmar which exceeded or met its own requirements.

Cheers

Steve
 
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The RN had more than its share of misconceptions that held back its aircraft development, plus there were underlying and bitter rivalries that would prevent access to the high performance RAF designs for several years.

Oe of the biggest misconceptions was that for navigation reasons single seat fighters could not be used in over water situations. the second, related to this was that the RN had to accept multi roles for their aircraft, and for its fighters their primary role was recon. It was not until after April 1940 that the idea that a fighter could provide air defence over the fleet was accepted. another big misconception was that high performance fighters could not operate from the heaving deck of a carrier.

This last misconception came crashing down after Norway. During the evacuation in June, despite the RAF pilots flying hurricanes around Narvik having no carrier quals, poor weather, and flying hurricanes with no arrester gear or other navalised equipment, these guys bravely and successfully landed all the still operational hurricanes onto the deck of HMS Glorious. it was a massive eye opener for the RN, immediately blowing away some of the more ridiculous prejudices that until then had stood in the way of the Sea hurricanes. thereafter the RN moved as fast as it could, but around this time it was the old foe, the RAF that dug in and for a while refused to provide the necessary resources for the conversions....
 

True, Steve. The Defiant's and any other turret fighters' real weakness was in its forward speed, but then again, as a bomber destroyer it didn't need to be able to catch up with single seaters. Interestingly enough despite reservations with the concept and 264 Sqn's redesignation as a night fighter unit at the end of August 1940, the Air Ministry wasn't finished with the turret fighter and F.18/40, dated 31st October 1940 for a fixed gun, two-seat night fighter was amended on 9 December to include a power operated turret. The only hardware to come from this, apart from a de Havilland Mosquito gun turret mock up on the prototype, was a couple of Beaufighters, which were fitted with a Boulton Paul turret. Beaufighter V R2274 actually saw active service with 406 Sqn and was taken on patrol on 4 September 1941. Trials were unsuccessful as it was found that the turret armed Beaufighter was slower than the Defiants it was meant to replace.

The FAA procured 136 of 4-gun Rocs and then decided to barely deploy them, perhaps it is better to have ~100 Sea Hurricanes not just produced, but actually deployed.
Click to expand...

The question to be asked here is, why get Boulton Paul to build Sea Hurricanes instead of Rocs (the Rocs' tail sections were built by General Aircraft) when BP could build the Sea Defiant, which was to use jigs and components from a type that was already in production in its own factory, thus speeding up the production process and getting the aircraft into service earlier. Actual Defiant production was held up because of the turret delays, so air frames were rolling off the production line with no turrets. Because the Sea Defiant had fixed forward firing guns, this wouldn't be an issue.
 
When the Rocs were ordered, they were not intended as an out and out fleet defence fighter. They were a horrible compromise and it seems to have been acknowledged by 1938 when a secondary role, in which they would be handed over en masse to the RAF for use as trainers was suggested. Only 133, excluding prototypes, were ordered (compared with 600 Fulmars).
It was this realisation that the Roc was unlikely to prove useful as a combat aircraft that led to the emergency programme to develop the Fulmar, and the stop gap conversion of the Gladiator. Once the penny dropped there was simply no time to develop a completely new carrier aircraft. The Hurricane was completely unsuited to naval operations in any of the required naval roles, reconnaissance, strike/escort of strike aircraft or, later, fleet defence. This would explain why the Navy had no interest in it in the 1930s. It's lack of endurance meant that until radar control systems had matured it couldn't be used in the role in which it would eventually prove useful, fleet defence.
Finally, the Sea Hurricane in the wildest 'what ifs' could only ever have been a substitute for the Fulmar, not the Roc, and any attempt to take Hurricanes out of the hands of the RAF at the time of the Battle of France, as the Fulmars were being delivered, was doomed to fail.
Cheers
Steve
 

It is Sea Hurricane's thread, that's why
But I agree that a Sea Defiant, presumably a single seater with 8-12 guns would be a very useful fighter.
 
Was there any action/battle the RN Carriers took part in or fought in 1939 or 1940 where swapping the existing fighters for an early Sea Hurricane would have made any difference to the outcome?

RN Carriers tended to be deployed singly in the early part of the war. Not in groups although pairs were sometimes used on certain operations. Given the size of the air groups having 12 serviceable fighters might be a luxury.

Ark Royal had by far the largest air group; From Wiki:


Balance that against the Eagle's air group in Feb 1941 in the Med when she provided the air defense for the RN units operating in the western Med after the Illustrious was damaged. ----
the ship carried nine Fairey Fulmars of 805 Squadron, five Sea Gladiators and six Swordfish. By Feb 1942 and after many travels, operations and a refit she got four Sea Hurricanes in her air group, however the size of the elevators on the Eagle meant the Hurricanes had to stay on deck as with their non folding wings they were too big to be taken below.
 
Shortround6 said:
Was there any action/battle the RN Carriers took part in or fought in 1939 or 1940 where swapping the existing fighters for an early Sea Hurricane would have made any difference to the outcome?
Click to expand...

Certaily not in 1939, perhaps in 1940, certainly in 1941-42.


With Sea Hurricanes in the design pipeline from, say, 1938, it is not a great stretch to have folding wing Sea Hurricane by 1942, if not 1941.
 
The first Sea Hurricanes were delivered to the RN in early 1941 and were operational with No. 880 Sqn by March so your time line is now bearing some resemblance to reality.
Of the 440 Sea Hurricanes delivered to the RN, 380 were conversions from RAF Hurricanes which were no longer needed by that Service.
The first Hurricanes to go to sea were in all senses disposable. A Hurricane with a wing fold is more pie in the sky. The vast majority were rather simple conversions which a wing folding mechanism is not. It was the Spitfire that eventually got that in the form of a Seafire III. I'm no fan of the Seafire, but in the air it was a much more capable aircraft than any version of the Hurricane, which is why it started to replace them as soon as it became available.
Oddly the last Sea Hurricanes in the RN inventory were returned to the RAF shortly after the war! They hadn't been operational for about 18 months by then.
Cheers
Steve
 
How about licence built F2A-1 from 1940 with:
- Reinforced landing gear
- Seat armor
- R-1820-40 (F2A-2) engine

IMO much better than early Sea Hurricanes
 
For the RN, had it been looking for a fleet defence fighter early enough, this would make theoretical sense. It certainly comes closer to the requirements than a Hurricane.
Whether it would ever have been possible to build them under license in the UK is another question. I'm not sure it would have been possible, they would have been purchased to British specifications, and soon all those surplus Hurricanes were available. Some Sea Hurricane conversions were originally built in 1938.
Later the British were none too happy with the version of the 'Buffalo' they purchased although your guys seem to have done okay with theirs
I'd have to read up on the different versions, but from memory the export versions for Britain were heavier, to meet British specifications, and less powerful.
Cheers
Steve
 
A bigger help to the RN carriers would have been better policy and tactics.

Courageous was lost to a U-boat, the very thing she was supposed to hunting. Using fleet carriers with a few destroyers as escort as anti sub patrols given the sensors and weapons of 1939 was, shall we say in understatement, stupid.

Glorious was lost returning from Norway when she ran into the German battlecruisers. Only two destroyers for "escort" and NO planes in the air for recon even though the weather was good. She did have several flyable planes on board. Seems somebody forgot what one of the basic duties of an aircraft carrier was.

Not sure what a modified Defiant brings to the table. Slightly smaller wing and slightly heavier airframe than the Hurricane= higher stall speed. Adding more armament than the Hurricane carried just makes things worse. There is a reason the Fulmar had 342 sq ft of wing. Fulmars acted as long range spotters during the Bismark chase, something the Sea Hurricane or Sea Defiant could not do.
 
Timppa said:
How about licence built F2A-1 from 1940 with:
- Reinforced landing gear
- Seat armor
- R-1820-40 (F2A-2) engine

IMO much better than early Sea Hurricanes
Click to expand...

You might want to add self sealing tanks..........and so starts the Weight spiral

Engine in the F2A-2 added at least 100lbs and required a new propeller. The F2A-1 used an engine without reduction gear to the prop. F2A-2 used a reduction gear and a larger slower turning prop.
 

Actually it might. Including some that they could not fight because they did not have an adequate "high performance" fighter to protect the fleet. This wasnt the pacific, 12 fighters over the fleet was a huge number for the RN, and would be decisive in most of the fights they had to fight. EAGLE, for example, went to war in June 1940, with just 3 ex RAF Gladiators hastily lashed up so that they could be called "Sea Gladiators". ILLUSTRIOUS entered the MTO with no fighters, then before Taranto received either 6 or 8 Fulmars, among the first to be operated from a carrier. These pitifully weak fighter complements were enough until October to provide a credible threat to the high level bombers of the RA, until more credible fighter components to the CAGs started to become available . But as the months rolled by the RN learned that fighters were in fact critical to the fleet defence problem and complements steadily ramped up as new deliveries, and more importantly, pilots, became available. Without adequate fighter components, the carriers after January could not operate safely in enemy dominated waters. Malta at that time was the key. Without control of Malta, North Africa was probably untenable, without North Afrtica, though they didnt realize it at the time the western allies stood to lose some very vital interests

Over ILLUSTRIOUS in the following January, there were just 2 Fulmars in position over the fleet, out of a 4 plane standing patrol. The other two had been allowed to go off on a wild goose chase, pursuing now unimportant pair of SM 79s that had been deployed ahead of FKX for the specific purpose of drawing off the CAP. 5 more were on the deck, and were scrambled 4 mins before the first bombs were dropped. The first hits were registered on the carrier 6 minutes after scramble had been ordered, but the Fukmars from any of these sources never made it to the attacking heights of the stukas. The Stukas were pushing into their dives from a tight clover formation at 10000 feet, basically peeling off one at a time down to 7000 feet to get the speed up levelling off for a few seconds to get the aiming point corrected, before re-entering their divesat virtually point blank height. They were pulling out of their dives after bomb release at heights as low as 1500 ft. Of the 6 Fulmars that got airborne and into the fight (1 didnt make it off the deck and 2 others were just too late), only one could make any attacks at the 7000 ft aiming height, none could attack at the 10000 height, the rest were bottom feeders attacking the stukas either in the dive or just after it.

With a climb rate of just 1200 feet per min, the Fulmars did not have a good day. Exchange the Fulmars for Hurricanes, and I think the situation will be different. Top speed will be about 50 mph greater, and climb rate about 800 ft per min higher. In that same situation , the initial standing patrol, all four of them can be at the 10000 feet approach height, and be engaging for about 2 mins. This might be long enough for the bottom feeders to gain height, to engage at the 7000 feet aiming waypoint, and give the last 2 fighters time to at least do something to the tail of the attack.

This is just one incident, I cangive repeat examples all through 1941 in which the Sea Hurricane, if it had been deployed in numbers, and with wing folding would have made a measurable difference to RN operations. Unquestionably so.
 
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