Earlier/better/more Sea Hurricane: pros cons

The RN had Sea Hurricanes in 1941, it just didn't have them where they were needed. I'm not sure some of the timings for the attack on Illustrious quite add up. Though Cunningham had an hours warning of the attack by intercepted radio traffic he could hardly have sent Hurricanes, with such limited endurance, up to perform standing patrols.

10.06. 5 Fulmars take of from Illustrious and climb to 14,000ft. About an hour later they drive of a group of Italian aircraft that approach in a half hearted way.

12.00 1 Fulmar returns to Illustrious with combat damage, 2 have expended all their ammunition and will shortly allight, 2 have expended half their ammunition.

12.20 a pair of SM 79s fly in low causing Illustrious to swing out of line to comb torpedo tracks. The remaining 2 Fulmars pursue them towards Sicily.

12.28 Sub flight of Fulmars is ranged, ready on deck, scheduled to take off at 12.35

12.30 Radar reports of an enemy formation reach Boyd, Lyster and Cunningham.

12.34 Cunningham orders Illustrious to alter course and fly off her aircraft. The first is off by 12.35

12.36 A large group of aircraft is sighted of Illustrious' port quarter and both her and the fleet's AA batteries commence firing. At this point the Fulmars (or your Sea Hurricanes) are just taking off or have just taken off.

12.38 First bomb strikes Illustrious,

The rest, as they say, is history.
Many accounts say that the attack lasted for one hour, but from the time the first bomb struck Illustrious at 12.28 and the fourth, from the second wave of attacks (the one that hit the Fulmar on the after lift which then collapsed onto the hangar deck below) at 12.40 only 12 minutes had elapsed.
It was only the third wave of attackers that were finally engaged by the Fulmars which had been on deck 16 minutes earlier and they certainly weren't at 20,000ft! They were described as being 'still below the last wave of Stukas' but their pilots ' drove their machines against [the Ju 87s] disrupting the precision of the final part of the German assault.'.

Had Sea Hurricanes rather than Fulmars taken off at around 12.35 I can't see how they could have done much against the first attack, nor the second, either. From first radar report of the enemy formation to first bomb striking Illustrious was just 8 minutes.

Cheers

Steve

I've just read that Captain Boyd considered launching those Fulmars at 12.28, a full seven minutes early. He didn't because he had standing orders from Cunningham expressly forbidding him from turning into the wind on his own initiative. He needed the express permission of the C-in-C and this would be forthcoming at 12.35 automatically. Seven minutes is not a lot, but significant. On such small things do the outcome of battles depend.

Times wise I don't really have any disagreement, though there are differences of detail. We are both reading the same report, so the broad facts seem similar enough to me. I should point out that there are actually three contemporary reports relating to the attacks that day, none of them fully correlate and Boyds timing does seem a little off when compared to the more contemporary reports of the time. Boyds report was not finalised until 11 days after the attacks, so he was working from quite old memories by then.

Its the interpretation of that data that makes it interesting.

The important question in the context of this discussion is whether Sea Hurricanes instead of Fulmars might have done better. it depends if they could get into action or not. The first hits were indeed at 12:38 (according to Boyd, about 2 mins later according to the other contemporary reports), and the fact they achieved so many hits in such a short space of time is revealing in itself, and the very point of it. They achieved that many because the fleet at that moment was defenceless. Exactly where each of the elements of the CAP were is revealing and telling of this situation. There were already 4 in the standing patrol at 12:34, and another 5 were scrambled once Cunningham gave the order to do so. Of these 4, 2 had chased the SM-79s too far, expended their ammunition and were returning to the carrier. These were the only guys to get into action against the Ju87s at the heights above 7000 ft, and then only to make threatening passes because they were out of ammo.

the others, as you say had only 4 mins to gain the height they needed, and at 1200 ft per min, that puts them at a maximum height of 3600 ft before the first bombs were dropping and a maximum theoretical altitude of 7200 feet at the end of that critical 12 mins,

Exchange the Fulmar for hurricane MkIs using the climb data I got from this site.....Hurricane Mk I Performance

and in theory at least those hurricanes could be at 5000 feet in 1.89 mins and 10000 feet in 3.63 mins... That means that in theory at least the hurricanes could have reached the form up height of the Ju87s, and be engaging from some distance from the carrier (because of the greater speed of the mount) than the fulmar equipped unit could ever hope for.

A more realistic what if outcome is that the Hurricanes reach the 7000 ft final aiming altitude an start to engage the Stukas from that point. A big part of the stukas success that day is that the main body could circle from a safe height without interference whilst one stuka at a time descended to the 7000 foot height, took time to line up, and then delivered each attack with absolute precision. Put even a few hurricanes at either of those altitudes, and the attack is going to be completely disrupted. Unquestionably.

This very outcome was achieved 9 days later whilst ILLUSTRIOUS lay helpless in Malta harbour. 43 stukas attacked her, coming in at a height that was above the effective height of the flak curtain that was by that time in place around the carrier. The Ju-87s again attacked the ILLUSTRIOUS, the only difference being that this time the carrier was stationary (a plus for the attackers), had better flak defence (a big plus for the defenders, but it should be noted the flak was ineffective at the heights that the attacks were carried out), weather was better for the attackers...... and just 6 Hurricanes (and 3 Fulmars) that were in position and ready to defend the carrier. At least 10 ju87s were shot out of the sky, and the attackers were limited to a single hit, reflecting the greatly diminished accuracy of the bombers. Maybe these results were affected by sheer dumb luck, but at least the possibility that the hurricanes made a difference on that second occasion needs to be considered. For me, it is proof enough, just a few well placed fighters can be critical in the defence of the fleet, not because of the number of enemy destroyed, but because of the effect on bombing accuracy. Of course the density of the flak also has an effect in this equation.

It is Sea Hurricane's thread, that's why

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Ah, and here's me thinking we were discussing alternative scenarios to what actually happened. Despite the thread being about Sea Hurricanes, I still think that BP building Sea Defiants instead of Rocs would have been a more satisfactory outcome, for the reasons stated that the Hurricane was less suitable as a carrier aeroplane and the Sea Defiant, in whatever form it took would have been purpose built, would have been able to be deployed more quickly etc, etc, but since this is a Sea Hurricane thread, Tomo...

Don't get angry at me, I thought that title gave a rough bearing that Sea Hurricane is the main topic
Could you please post why the Sea Defiant would be a better choice than the Sea Hurricane?

I'm not getting angry, Tomo; chill, brother.

To answer your question, I already have answered your question. let's say BP built the Sea Defiant instead of the Roc, it would have been in production and service before the Sea Hurricane, that is, if the decision to build Sea Hurricanes was made at the same time, so two alternate timelines running simultaneously here, because it was based on an existing design already in production in the same building using (some of) the same jigs, which also means getting it into production and service quicker since drawings were already made. The Sea Hurricane was not a proposition at all before the outbreak of war and therefore much would have had to be done to modify the basic design to be a workable naval fighter; it wouldn't simply be a stopgap as the real Sea Hurricane was.

And, as I pointed out, the argument has been already stated that if the Sea Defiant had gone into service, there would have been no need for either the Fulmar or the Sea Hurricane, as the FAA would have already had a single seat fighter/interceptor that had performance that could match its land based contemporaries.

Smile Tomo.

Great website on FAA aircraft development and RN armoured carriers:

Fairey Fulmar: Development

Very interesting page, RCAFson; a goodie.

Thank you.

This article also seems relevant to this debate,

Hawker Sea Hurricane: Development

and doesn't paint the hurricane as a ship borne fighter in great terms I might add. It had severe limits, relating mostly to the limits on its endurance and poor deck handling and visibility characteristics

A problem with the article on the Sea Hurricane is that it compares the HSH IB with the early Martlet which was lighter and had better endurance than the service version Martlet II or IV. In fact the HSH endurance was not that much worse than a Martlet II/IV and it considerably outperformed it. The HSH 1A (catapult fighter) lost only 1 pilot in 8 launches. From what I can determine the HSH IB had a better serviceability rate than the Martlet and was probably safer to land on than the Martlet. HMS Avenger, an escort carrier operated the HSH IB with an excellent safety record, even in Arctic conditions, so the HSH had to have very good deck landing performance.

That's a good couple of articles. Unfortunately for the original proposition for the early adoption of Sea Hurricanes they reinforce the view that they were not even considered for carrier operations until 1940.

As far as interception of incoming attacks on the fleet, this depends very largely on detection ranges of the radar available at the time. I think we all agree that unlike a Fulmar a Hurricane lacked the endurance to perform standing patrols over the fleet and would have to be launched to meet an attack as an interceptor. Detection ranges, in practical use, were really not very good. They depended on many factors but the 30-50 miles theoretically possible seems practically to have been closer to 20-30 miles, giving 10 minutes warning on a good day. I seem to remember Valiant reporting radar contacts at 43 miles on one occassion, but can't find the reference.

The real problem is getting fighters, any fighters, into the correct position in good time. This can be done by flying standing patrols over the fleet, requiring endurance, or by early detection, requiring good radar, command and control and a high performance interceptor. The RN had understandably gone for the former option in 1939/40. A couple of years later the latter became more viable.

Fighters could also be at the right place at the right time, largely by luck.
The undoubted ability of a few well positioned fighter to disrupt an attack was demonstrated on the day of the initial attack. Illustrious was making 18 knots towards Malta when, at about 16.00hrs Fliegerkorps X had another go. She was attacked by fifteen Ju 87s escorted by five Bf 110s.The attackers were intercepted by Illustrious' own Fulmars who were fortuitously returning, refuelled and rearmed from Malta. Five Ju 87s were shot down but the one bomb that did hit the ship, close to an earlier hit on the after lift, very nearly did for her. At 17.30 Boyd seriously considered flooding the ships magazines following reports that the newly started fires were out of control and the pumps burnt out. He didn't and the ship did make Malta 4-5 hours later.

Cheers

Steve
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Thank you very much for the link.

The problem of small amount of fuel can be easily adressed by addinng 2 x 45 gal tanks, like historically used by Hurricanes. Relocating the radiator system from belly to under the reduction gear means it won't be sticking out that much down (thus making ditching characteristics acceptable); Hawker already has experience with Henley how to do it.
Since the Hurricane II received another 4 Brownings (obviously with ammo), increase of ammo for 8 Brownings to 500 rpg does not look like a long shot.

The Martlet isnt the panacea some think it was the FAA had problems with early Martlets. The landing gear was too bouncy and needed work on it I presume better dampers or re-shimmed dampers to slow the rebound also I am sure I have read somewhere that the tail weaved from side to side when taking off or landing and the tailwheel needed modifying. This plus no folding wings, outdated gunsights and jam prone guns means the Martlet isnt ready for sea service till mid 41 at the very earliest. Its only in 42 the FAA gets properly sorted Martlets.

I find it baffling that so many people think you just get a crowbar open the crate, wheel out a factory fresh plane that none of the pilots or crew have ever seen before fill it with fuel and ammo and get straight into action. You might as well save time, shoot the pilot and set fire to the plane for all the good it will do in action.

Normal loaded weight for a Hurricane I with a Merlin II was 6,218 lb (Merlin II went up to 6,447 with a Rotol propeller). The aircraft overload weight, tropicalised (Rotol again) with the extra 44 gallon tanks etc was 7,490 lb, over 1,000lb extra.
For the Sea Hurricanes Is the normal loaded weights were, IA 6,589lb, IB 7,410 lb, IC 7,605 lb. They are heavier to start with. I don't have figures handy for these aircraft overload weights, but a tropicalised IC weighed in at a hefty 8,210 pounds, an extra 600lb or so, which may give a clue.
The Fulmar weighed in at around 10,000lb IIRC.
It would be ill advised to compare the performance of the regular RAF operated Hurricanes with the Sea Hurricanes operated by the Navy. Rate of climb is critical in fleet defence and the laws of physics dictate that a similar aircraft with the same engine will climb slower when it is heavier.
Having the 44 gallon tanks under wing must have impacted top speed (already reduced in the Sea Hurricane) and manoeuvrability, but I haven't looked up the figures.
Cheers
Steve

The Sea Hurricane I featured Merlin III engines in all iterations. A great engine prior 1941, but not the best what was available from mid-1940 on. The Merlin XII is in production, from early 1941 the Merlin 45 and Merlin 30, that is before we consider the 2-speed supercharged Merlin XX that was installed in (Sea) Hurricane II.

We are back to timing, a better Sea Hurricane in the summer of 1940 or in the summer of 1941 or in the summer of 1942?
Making the RN wait until 1942 for both 20mm cannon and Merlin XX engines was borderline criminal, and no, boosting Merlin IIIs to 16lbs wasn't really the answer.
However that does't mean Hurricanes dunning on 87 octane and using fixed pitch props were suitable in 1939 either.
The Merlin III, while allowed higher combat boost, was never cleared for the higher rpm and boost for max cruise and for climb that the later engines were. In combat you may have to do what you have to do, but running CAP patrols day in and day out when you are days (hundreds of miles) from spare aircraft, spare engines, and spare parts is not the time to be abusing engines.
There is no technical reason Hurricane IIs could not have been used in 1941.

Sea Hurricane in 1940 falls under 'earlier' catergory - Merlin III, fixed pitch prop replaced by 2-pitch and/or constant speed prop as availability allows. Once the better prop is there, take advantage of drop tank development from RAF.
By Summer of 1941 there is indedd no reason for not to have the better Sea Hurricane, including a better engine and maybe a relocated radiator (should also add a bit of speed), and by 1942 the folding wing version, with upped ammo count.

Shortround6 said:

Making the RN wait until 1942 for both 20mm cannon and Merlin XX engines was borderline criminal, and no, boosting Merlin IIIs to 16lbs wasn't really the answer....
There is no technical reason Hurricane IIs could not have been used in 1941.

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Agreed all the way.

A minor point, but the 44 gallon tanks were not drop tanks but auxiliary tanks. They were in fact factory fitted, though I would bet they could be removed in service.
Drop tanks were also made, but might not be a terribly practical idea given the limited size and space on most RN carriers.
This is a nice series of films

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBugc28Eqj0

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This screen grab, showing the tanks is from reel 3 (of 4)

Cheers

Steve

You do have to careful with the drop tank thing.

as an illustration because I don't have the Hurricane numbers look at the P-40E.

http://zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Images/P-40/P-40TOCLC.pdf

Adding 600lbs (8%) to the P-40 increased the take-off run by 100ft with a 40mph head wind (fleet carrier) and 150ft at 20mph (escort carrier/converted merchant ship), increasing another 600lbs (7.4%) added another 150ft with 40mph head wind and 200ft with a 20mph head wind. Or a roughly 16% increase in weight added 54% to the take-off run with a 20mph head wind.
Please note that the performance numbers are for 0 degrees Celsius and/or 0 degrees F. which may work for arctic convoys or the north Atlantic in winter. The Med in summer is going to be a whole different story.

Again this is just for illustration sake to show that adding 10% to weight doesn't change the take-off by 10% but a whole lot more. I will note that the chart is in 50ft increments so things might not be as bad as they appear (but then they might be worse?)

The Hurricane may very well be able to do it after it gets the Merlin XX engine, but drop tanks and earlier versions of the Merlin may be a bit doubtful. Using Merlin VIII or Merlin 30 engines (Fulmar engines) may get you off the deck but then saddles your Sea Hurricane with one of the same problem as the Fulmar, crap performance over 16,000ft (or a bit higher in the lighter Hurricane).

stona said:

A minor point, but the 44 gallon tanks were not drop tanks but auxiliary tanks. They were in fact factory fitted, though I would bet they could be removed in service.
Drop tanks were also made, but might not be a terribly practical idea given the limited size and space on most RN carriers.
This is a nice series of films

Click to expand...

Thanks for the films.
The 44 gal tanks, that I've never mentoined as a good idea to extend the range of Sea Hurricanes, were indeed fixed, the 45 gal ones were drop tanks. Saying that there was a limited space to house the drop tanks reminds me of saying that there was not enough of space on American carriers to house the water-glycol mixture
Though the Fulmar also used drop tanks.