Earlier/better/more Sea Hurricane: pros cons

stona said:

........ I am even more confident of the reaction of the RAF/Fighter Command to the proposal that it give up any of its allotted production to the RN. It would have kicked up a stink. The RAF suffered from a serious 'little brother' complex which poisoned its relations with the Army in the prewar and early war years, it could have been much worse with the Senior Service.

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Pretty much in agreement here. The RAF wanted to be seen as an equal service to the other two and not an auxiliary to either or both. To do that it needed to present itself as a war winning force in it's own right and not simply as a defensive force ( although that became it's most important mission in 1940/41) or "eyes" for another service or as substitute coastal artillery or army field artillery. EVERY aircraft built to perform one of those missions was plane (or parts) NOT being used for the primary goal of establishing the RAF as a service equal in footing to the Army and Navy.

All of the 136 Rocs got the variable-pitch prop?

edi: so did 60 Sea Gladiators?

The propeller is important but we are in the world of 'what iffery'.
The first two pitch, three blade de Havilland (Hamilton) propeller was fitted to a Hurricane in August 1938. The Rotol variable pitch propeller with its CSU couldn't be fitted to a Merlin II powered aircraft and anyway the Air Ministry insisted that the original order for 600 aircraft be completed as specified with the Watts fixed pitch propellers.
Any costs associated with developing the Rotol driven aircraft would have to be borne by the manufacturer(s). Hawker managed to acquire a damaged ex No. 56 Sqn aircraft for a nominal fee and in cooperation with Rolls Royce and Rotol a Merlin III, CSU and variable pitch propeller were fitted. This aircraft was commercially registered as G-AFKX and was flying in January 1939.
Once again, if decisions had been taken earlier, then Hurricanes, or Sea Hurricanes, with CSUs and variable pitch propellers COULD have been available much sooner than they were historically.
Cheers
Steve

The Merlin I and II onboard the Battle were fitted with either 2-pitch or CS prop, so no what-iffery here.

The 'what iffery' would be the Air Ministry financing the early adoption of variable pitch propellers rather than leaving it, as was historically the case, to the manufacturers. Had Hawker not developed the system in G-AFKX, an aircraft which they were obliged to buy back from the Air Ministry (with all AM equipment removed) then one wonders if the conversions would have been quite so easy when rushed through in 1940. Hawker had tried and tested the system at their own expense. It was still August 1940 before all Hurricanes in Fighter Command had been converted.
If the Hurricanes fighting in the BoB just about got their CSUs and propellers in the summer of 1940 what chance would the imaginary Sea Hurricanes have in 1939?

The Merlin II did not have the "universal airscrew shaft" and couldn't drive the hydraulically operated pitch control of the variable pitch propellers. It obviously didn't have a CSU bolted on the from either. The conversion could be made but it was rather more complicated and took longer. A hydraulic pump had to be fitted and driven from the engine and various other pipes and controls fitted. The Merlin III was a simpler conversion and was designed to be fitted with propellers from de Havilland, Hamilton Standard, Watts, Rotol and Fairey Reed that I know of, probably others too.

Cheers

Steve

tomo pauk said:

All of the 136 Rocs got the variable-pitch prop?

edi: so did 60 Sea Gladiators?

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Rocs were lucky they got 2 pitch props.

I believe the Sea Galdiators had fixed pitch props, they were metal and 3 bladed but fixed pitched. At least one of the ones on Malta (and possibly more) was/were were fitted with engine/s and
prop/s from/or intended for Blenheims. Obviously this well after they were built. One or more Gladiators in other theaters (including Finland) may have gotten the Blenheim engine/propeller. The Blenheim engine having the correct prop shaft and pump to operate the 2 pitch prop.

I would note that what the British should have been fitting to multi engine aircraft were not only constant speed props but ones that were capable of being fully feathered. With the two pitch prop should one engine fail or be damaged the pilot was supposed to set the prop to course pitch (if the plane was more than a few thousand feet high and flying at more than 150-160mph it already was in course pitch) and apply and engine/prop brake to keep the spinning prop from further wrecking the engine. Obviously a prop in course pitch has a lot more drag than one that is fully feathered. Also note that not all constant speed props had the range of motion to be fully feathering.

I believe something like 22 air lines around the world were using fully feathering props by the end of 1938 so this was hardly secret of rare technology.

The DH/Hamilton two pitch propeller wasn't hydraulically operated. It was a relatively simple conversion from a fixed pitch propeller, assuming that the propeller shaft was compatible.
Cheers
Steve

stona said:

Well we agree 100% on that. It certainly could have been done. The issues of the Royal Navy's attitude to it's aerial arm have already been discussed. Had some far sighted (for the time) senior and influential officer seen the need for a pure fleet defence fighter and been able to get away from the multi role specifications that the Admiralty kept issuing early enough, then a carrier operated Sea Hurricane would have been a possibility in 1940 but only IF his view had prevailed and IF the Air Ministry could have been convinced to divert some of its premier fighter production away from the RAF and to the RN.
Since historically the Navy didn't see a need for such a fighter, or any fighter until it was very nearly too late, the Fulmar actually did a pretty good job for what it was, it is unlikely that anyone in the Air Ministry would have seen such a need. I am even more confident of the reaction of the RAF/Fighter Command to the proposal that it give up any of its allotted production to the RN. It would have kicked up a stink. The RAF suffered from a serious 'little brother' complex which poisoned its relations with the Army in the prewar and early war years, it could have been much worse with the Senior Service.
Cheers
Steve

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What is the Sea Gladiator if not a pure fleet defence fighter?.

The Sea Gladiator was ordered as a stop gap until the Fulmar could be rushed through. It was a compromise that didn't meet the requirements (for long range escort of strike aircraft, reconnaissance etc) that the Fulmar would. The contract for 60 new built Sea Gladiators, as opposed to the earlier conversions,of which I think 38 were completed, wasn't signed until early 1939
It was ordered when the penny finally dropped at the Admiralty that a fighter capable of defending the fleet was going to be needed and that the Roc wasn't capable, hence the idea of transferring the lot of them to the RAF as trainers. The Munich crisis of late 1938 seems to have concentrated minds in all three Services.

The RN had 54 Sea Gladiators (12 were the 'interim', there's a clue, partially navalised, converted version) in service at the outbreak of the war.

Cheers

Steve

I have spent some time over the weekend investigating the exploits of the 'Hurricats'. A total of eight operational missions were flown by Hurricanes from CAM ships between 1/11/41 and 27/7/43. Three other operational missions were flown by Hurricanes from the Fighter Catapult Ship (FCS) Maplin. These ships more normally operated Fulmars.

By the end of October 1941 Maplin was the only surviving FCS, now equipped with 3 Hurricanes. No operational launch had yet been made from a CAM ship. The first operational launch was made by George Varley from Empire Foam on 1st November.

I have now read accounts from surviving pilots or other officers of all the Hurricane missions, length and duration of mission etc and am 100% certain that they were all undertaken with the normal interior fuel load.
Accounts often refer to endurance and available fuel and it seems to have been a common or standard procedure to burn off fuel, if it wasn't already exhausted, before abandoning the aircraft or,rarely, attempting to ditch. Once airborne, even when an initial interception failed, the pilots and FCOs were always keen to keep the fighter up for as long as possible and chase down other contacts. This is understandable given the 'one shot' nature of the mission.
The absence of evidence for external tanks on all the photographs is, in this case, evidence of absence.

Many other launches were made at the end of voyages (118 by May '42 without mishap) which dispels another myth, that the aircraft were craned onto quays or barges for service and re-use.

I've sifted this from the only two references I have (both were elusive, stored in the attic).'The Catafighters and Merchant Aircraft Carriers' by Kenneth Poolman and 'The Hurricats' by Ralph Barker.
Cheers
Steve

I wonder if the FAA could have asked for the 200 spare Henleys. They seem to have been better performing than a Fulmar though not sure if fitting 8 guns and a folding wing would have been an easy job