Thumpalumpacus
Major
Adding a turret to a Mosquito is like adding a pickup-truck bed to a Ferrari; it negates the design advantages in order to provide a utility not asked-for.
Effectiveness of Bomber Defensive Armament by Type and Location
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Adding a turret to a Mosquito is like adding a pickup-truck bed to a Ferrari; it negates the design advantages in order to provide a utility not asked-for.
Once it was realised that radar could guide to within visual range the need for a turret disappeared IMO. A turret version of the Beaufighter was slower and more lightly armed same for a turret armed Mosquito. How does the radar operator use the turret? Or does it have a three man crew that makes it even slower and more cramped for electronics space?
Pretty much. Problem was that the Air Ministry didn't believe de Havilland's figures in 1939 when he first proposed the aircraft. Although the C-in-C Bomber Command Ludlow-Hewitt was enthusiastic about the aircraft, William Sholto Douglas wanted it to be fitted with a tail turret and moves were put in place for the production of a tail-turret armed prototype (not the same as the night fighters we've been talking about) as well as the unarmed prototype, which was to serve as a technology demonstrator, but Wilfred Freeman gambled on the performance of the unarmed prototype being so good that a turret armed one wasn't necessary, and so it was. He and de Havilland thought the duplication of effort was wasteful, so once the unarmed prototype demonstrated its excellent performance in late 1940/early 1941 the tail turret-armed prototype was quietly shelved. I'd love to see a drawing, can't imagine how hideous a Mosquito would have been with a Nash & Thomson tail turret.
Yup, the latter, extra crewmember. In the radar-equipped Defiant the pilot operated the radar, not the gunner. The argument of the need for the turret disappearing, as I mentioned, the turret-armed night fighters were to be equipped with radar. That wasn't the issue. Performance comparisons (on paper) between turret-equipped and fixed gun interceptors revealed that the latter was more effective, this is why the turret was dropped.
It would have been as odd as the rear turret version of the Lysander, immediately after the bomb bay a Mosquito is extremely small, going to a point like a javelin, putting a turret at the rear is designing a completely new plane, that is not a Mosquito in any way.
Oh, I forgot to mention, the turret-armed Mosquito bomber (not the night fighter, which was a standard Mosquito) was to be powered by Griffons. C.C. Walker, de Havilland's Chief Engineer advised that fitted with a Nash and Thomson FN.4A four-gun rear turret, a 1,000lb bomb load and a crew of three, the Griffon engined aeroplane could reach speeds of 390 to 400 mph at 20,000 ft.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I've gotten the impression over the years that the Air Ministry really didn't know what to do with this DeHavilland gift for a year or so. You or someone else, please correct me if I'm wrong. It just seems like they read the plane wrong, through the lens of their own doctrine, rather than asking what the plane could do for them, until 1942 or so.
Of course they eventually ironed out the discrepancy between doctrine and the plane's performance, and put it to great use.
That is because it is only a gift in hind sight, it went against all known and accepted doctrines and schools of thought at the time, as did the P-51 which needed some wise and powerful friends to keep it in production when the doctrine and schools of thought said a long range escort fighter was not possible and actually not needed.
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Yeah, pretty much, as pbehn says, it was a gift in hindsight. The problem was doctrine, tactics and getting over previously held perspectives. The night fighter issue was an example, night fighting and especially as pbehn mentioned, the introduction of radar, was evolved on a nightly basis and radar gave a huge advantage, but since kills were few and far between, but increased as the months wore on in 1941, the guys in charge were learning as they went along. Sure they made missteps, like turrets, but interim Defiants with two sets of eyes and a trainable turret against steadily trundling bombers flying straight and level semed like a good idea, but as pbehn said, radar changed tactics because it meant that aircraft didn't have to spend hours searching for bombers, although they still needed to visually acquire the bomber once they had detected it on radar to fire on it.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Exactly my point: the plane did not, itself, fill a doctrinal need, but rather, brought capabilities of its own that actually impelled doctrine --and experience! -- to accommodate it.
They learnt soon enough it was valuable, they just had to change their own thinking a little. The Mossie changed what we, and they, thought about twin-engined designs., I think.
Acceptance of the bomber Mosquito was a hard-won battle, but as a favourite youtube channel starts, "it's not what you think." The idea of a fast unarmed bomber had been proposed by George Volkert of Handley Page in a paper that was designed as much to shock the pre-war bomber barons as it was to contribute to advances in ideas. So the idea of a high-speed unarmed bomber came before the Mosquito and it found support in many places, which led to two different high-speed bomber projects in early war, the DH.98 and the Blackburn B.28, which was going to be powered by Griffons. That quietly went away once the Mosquito proved its superiority since it flew first - the Blackburn aircraft, as far as I know, was never begun (unless anyone can prove otherwise), although a mock-up was built. The big bomber barons were right in one thing, big four-engined bombers, and lots of them were what was needed for a sustained strategic bombing campaign of the type with the objectives that they had in destroying German industry - said with hindsight of course, and the Mosquito was an aberration, but it found its niche because of its excellent performance, not really because of ay real change in doctrine. In trials in early 1941 it achieved the astonishing speed of 388 mph, which could not be ignored, whichever way you look at it.
The problem was few believed de Havilland's figures when he proposed the type, hence the idea of turrets and extra prototypes, but it was the fighter and reconnaissance potential of the type that gave it traction and eventual production orders, plus the backing of Freeman, who saw the value of what de Havilland was trying. Britain had the benefit of operational experience from 1939 until the USA entered the war and even at that time the Brits were still figuring out what was needed, Mosquito or no Mosquito - bombing Germany was not proving to be what they expected.
The problem was few believed de Havilland's figures when he proposed the type, hence the idea of turrets and extra prototypes, but it was the fighter and reconnaissance potential of the type that gave it traction and eventual production orders, plus the backing of Freeman, who saw the value of what de Havilland was trying. Britain had the benefit of operational experience from 1939 until the USA entered the war and even at that time the Brits were still figuring out what was needed, Mosquito or no Mosquito - bombing Germany was not proving to be what they expected.
Nightfighting was a technical challenge and Dowding had the seeds of the answer. Already he knew that some raids between levels of cloud in the BoB were intercepted which is pretty much what you have to do with night fighting. That is to guide the interceptors close enough to the target such that their eyes or the very short range radar they carry can take over. The developments of "nightfighters" as planes went hand in hand with the "Ground Controlled Intercept" RADAR which was fully operational by June 1941 Ground Controlled Interception The range and abilities of airborne RADAR improved but the principle is the same. All of these RADAR developments straddle the development of the Beaufighter and Mosquito as airplanes and changed what they became.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
The addition of fast, precise planes added pathfinding to the doctrine of BC, did it not? How much pathfinding did BC practice before the Mosquito became available? That was exactly why I thought it changed doctrine a bit.
If I'm missing something here I'm all ears. But I think the Mossies did sterling work (if you'll pardon the pun) putting the heavies in on target, a capability BC didn't really have in 40-41. Am I missing something?
Again, this is hindsight, not only did the British not have pathfinders in 1940-41 or consider them needed, they also didnt have heavies, no one did. Mosquitos were only a part of pathfinding, behind them were elite bombing squadrons that bombed the TIs to make a large target for the bomb taxis behind to hit.
The Germans were the first to introduce the pathfinder concept, when KG 100 were using aircraft equipped with Knickebein and X-Gerat in 1939/1940. Not every bomber was equipped with this equipment, so aircraft would direct the bomber streams when to drop their bombs.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
That is exactly my point: perhaps the plane's capabilities helped RAF leadership think differently. Sometimes new technology and new capabilities can drive doctrine.
By the way, Stirlings were in service in 1941, just so you know. B-17s were entering service too, so that's pretty much a clod you're throwing against the wall there. Heavies in 1941 were a fact.
Shortround6
Major General
While the first squadron to get Stirlings (No 7) got it's first ones in August 1940 they only flew their first operational mission in Feb 1941. By the end of 1941 only two more squadrons had been equipped with Stirlings (in part because both factories had been bombed.)
heavies in 1941 were a fact but in practical terms that means you can win a bar bet. 3 squadrons of Stirlings, while useful, didn't change BC thinking much. Same with the early B-17s and B-24s.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I wasn't saying they were doing all the lifting. I was pointing out that, your claim aside, heavy bombers were indeed operational in 1941. Thanks for acknowledging as much.
Shortround6
Major General
The heavy bomber was being brought into action as much on faith and extrapolation of medium bomber results as on it's own proven merits.
British experience with the B-17 from Joe Baughers website.
By September of 1941, RAF Fortresses had flown 22 attacks against targets such as Bremen, Brest, Emden, Kiel, Oslo, and Rotterdam. A total of 39 planes had been dispatched, out of which eighteen planes had aborted and two had been forced to bomb secondary targets because of mechanical problems. Eight Fortresses had been destroyed in combat or lost in accidents. Discouraged by these losses, the RAF decided to abandon daylight bombing raids over Europe.
The British had a total of 20 B-17C s to start with, but the first plane ran off the runway upon landing at West Raynham on it's ferry flight ripping off the under carriage.
British experience with the first four-engined heavies proved that no one really had a complete idea of how to progress with a heavy bomber strategy. The Stirling, for all its well-meaning intentions, fell short as a bomber, as did the Halifax, neither type living up to either the RAF's nor their manufacturer's expectations. As for the Boeing, yup, high altitude (which contributed to poor accuracy), high speed, but poor defensive armament, guns and crew freezing at altitude and routine mechanical failures signified that the USAAC/F's premier heavy bomber was just not ready for combat in 1941/42. It was all a massive learning curve and while it's easy to sit back and criticise in hindsight, these guys were feeling their way blindly into this. One thing the RAF use of the Fortress I proved was that the pre-war US doctrine of unescorted daylight bombing was foolhardy.
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