Effectiveness of Heavy Bomber defensive fires vs LW Fighters

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A-26 had remote control turrets on top and bottom. Somewhat similiar to defensive weapons on Do-217 and Fw-191 bombers.

How did the A-26 fare in combat vs enemy fighter aircraft?
 
i always liked that plane... must have been pretty good because they used them up to and during some of Nam. i know a guy who was a crew chief on one.
 
The turrets and aiming systems may also be share technology with the B-29 turrets and aiming systems, which means they actually work. doesn't answer the question as to wither the plane would have been better off without them ( smaller fuselage, smaller wing and higher performance)?
 
how much faster are you going to make it so that it does not need defensive guns? the ar-234 started out not having any armament and it was only 25-30 mph faster than a 51D...and could carry 3300 lbs of bombs. where as the bomber version of the 262 couild carry ~1100lbs of bombs...go ~100mph faster than a D and still carried 2 cannons.
 
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I guestimate that most every fighter attacking from the rear took a few hits from return fire, 90%????
But of these 50% no real effect immediate effect, maybe 25% did damage that would put the plane in the shop for hours/days/weeks with 15% crippling, and 10% fatal/destructive? Figure 25% took some hits attacking from the front? Real hard to figure this AND to make simple fast-reading tables for miniatures gaming
 
I guestimate that most every fighter attacking from the rear took a few hits from return fire, 90%????

Not if they killed or disabled the gunner(s) first. There are several well known Luftwaffe gun camera clips in which the attacking fighter closes to less than 100m receiving no return fire from the obvously disabled guns or gunners.

Likewise,head on attacks seem often to have resulted in no damage to many fighters as they fired on the bombers. Pilots attacking in this way seem generally to consider their evasion after the attack to have been the most vulnerable phase for them. Some elected to roll and dive down through the bomber formation deeming the risk of collision less than the risk of the bombers' guns if they zoomed away.



Steve
 
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and what would the state of german industry have been with out any bombing at all? are you suggesting there was not change and that it was a complete waste of time, energy, and tens of thousands of airmen? or are you suggesting this was primarily only for the purpose as a pinning action to keep LW units over germany and way from the front?

No way am I suggesting that the daylight bombing campaign had zero effect on the war, but it's also true that there is still a lot of debate about how effective it was and in what ways. Some historians point out that German industrial output peaked post-D-day in spite of the daylight bombing campaign, then fell off after production sites were overrun by ground forces. Others point out that Germany only went on to a war-time production footing during the bombing campaign and therefore would have been producing much more had the bombing not occurred. Studies after the war also suggested that attacks on infrastructure and oil facilities had much greater effects on production than attacks on factories. All open to debate, of course, but I'd posit a few conclusions:
1. The concept of unescorted formations of bombers protecting themselves through mutual firepower was disproven – to keep losses at a realistic level the bombers needed escort to and from the target.
2. The idea of precision daylight bombing taking out industrial targets with minimal collateral damage was way beyond the technical capabilities of the time – by the end of the war the USAAF was bombing civilians with the same enthusiasm displayed by all other combatants.
3. Damage to German production notwithstanding, one of the major accomplishments of the USAAF bombing campaign was to severely degrade the fighting capabilities of the Luftwaffe in the period before D-Day, ensuring air-superiority for the Allies.
 
i can pretty much agree with 1,2, 3. my thoughts on the effects of bombing are pretty much exeplified by our recent hurricane. government agencies, local law enforcement volunteers, utility companies, corporate business, and other various enitities had to rush people into the area by the thousands to try to keep things going while those who lost everything could get their lives back on track. a guy shovelling rubble in the streets isnt making rifles, airplanes..or driving a truck delivering food. if the streets of his town are impassable he isnt going anywhere...and not really wanting to. he will try his best to look after his family. you now have a wealth of hungry homeless people. take that scenario nationwide and you can have a serious problem! in a war time people are pressed to still keep up the war effort and family matters are pushed back. but bombing is still tying up manpower resources and reserves that could better be used for that war effort. if you can impede any part of the countries industry that is just another area of friction in their war machine. the fact that they were able to maneuver and keep production going and in some cases beat previous years output is amazing. but i still have to think had there been no bombing that output would have been extremely more. enough to turn the tide....i doubt it. but enough to prolong the agony...probably.
 
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A bombers purpose is to put bombs on target. Not shoot down fighter aircraft. If defensive weapons, ECM, chaff etc. keep the bomber alive they are successful even if enemy fighter aircraft are only scared off.
 
Oh, not making the defensive fire as simple as I commented on, no sir! Just rambled out loud!!!
Attack angle, direction, formation concentration, is the tail gunner dead/guns inop, etc
yes, distract the attacker, cause him to not concentrate, evade etc all play a part

simple solution will be tough
 
The USSBS would tend to contradict has led many historians to ask,retrospectively,the wrong question.

We can quantify the effects on German production and the ways in which the bombing eventually forced the Germans to take up the considerable slack in their production sector. We can count the millions of men and tens of thousands of guns commited to protect against the bombers. One motorised "Gemischte Flak Abteilung"with its eighteen 88mm guns and thirty three 20mm guns,280 trucks,searchlights etc was manned by 1,300 officers and men. A lot of men and resources.
We can estimate the cost of dispersing various industries or forcing them underground. All this,and more,the USSBS did. It's objective after all was to ascertain the effects of bombing Germany in order to sharpen the tool for the ongoing bombing of Japan.

The real question we should be asking is "what could German industry have achieved if there had been no bombing?"

The answer may well be salutary.

Steve
 
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Cobber - I do have a problem with the semantics of "USAAF joining in the bombing of civilians with enthusiasm". Dresden comes as a theoretical poster child for the comment but falls short when the debate about the attack Before the 8th joined the RAF is an example in point. Both Spaatz and Doolittle objected strenuously but when ordered to comply they did so. What examples come to mind for you that support 'enthusiasm' for bombing civilians?
 
Not if they killed or disabled the gunner(s) first. There are several well known Luftwaffe gun camera clips in which the attacking fighter closes to less than 100m receiving no return fire from the obvously disabled guns or gunners.

Don't trust all those films. Some were propaganda clips of LW fighters approaching captured 17s/24s - with no gunners.
 
Don't trust all those films. Some were propaganda clips of LW fighters approaching captured 17s/24s - with no gunners.

The films I am referring to are Luftwaffe training films with impeccable provenance. Some must surely have escaped to the internet by now.

I am not aware of the sort of propaganda film you refer to. Was someone flying the captured bomber as it was literally shredded by cannon fire? He'd be someone with a death wish. Who was flying the other bombers in the formation visible in the films?

Steve
 
Cobber - I do have a problem with the semantics of "USAAF joining in the bombing of civilians with enthusiasm". Dresden comes as a theoretical poster child for the comment but falls short when the debate about the attack Before the 8th joined the RAF is an example in point. Both Spaatz and Doolittle objected strenuously but when ordered to comply they did so. What examples come to mind for you that support 'enthusiasm' for bombing civilians?

I didn't mean to create an image of senior USAAF staff gleefully dancing around the table at the prospect of killing tens of thousands of civilians but, objections of some officers notwithstanding,the fact is that American doctrine moved from a pre-war ideal of presision bombing that would take out industrial targets while minimising civilian casualties, to the deliberate and systematic tageting of civilian centres whith the aim of killing and unhousing as many of the population as possible. Remember - I didn't confine myself to the ETO here!
History is recorded by the victors. Naizi-ism was an evil that had to be confronted, but at the end of the day all sides deliberately bombed cities and all sides had individuals who strafed civilians, machine-gunned parachuting air-men and the like. Whether that made you a hero or a villian depends largely on which side you were on; George Beurling being a case in point. Without meaning to pontificate, perhaps we should all be wary that our shared interest in the dry, historical aspect of WWII never blinds us to the fact that war is the great human tradgedy. Like Clausewitz said: "War is a game which, were men wise, kings would not play at."
 
Cobber - there is no question that Lemay took the concept of precision bombing, a doctrine he implemented as well as any could given the tools in the ETO, from high level attacks on Japanese Industry - to low level attacks on the entire city surrounding the strategic targets. Then he extended the footpring to obliterate entire cities like Toyama (Sp?). There is zero controversy that there was no consideration for civilians during the March 1945 through August 9, 1945.

The ETO for US doctrine was a different story. Dresden was the exception.
 
Cobber - there is no question that Lemay took the concept of precision bombing, a doctrine he implemented as well as any could given the tools in the ETO, from high level attacks on Japanese Industry - to low level attacks on the entire city surrounding the strategic targets. Then he extended the footpring to obliterate entire cities like Toyama (Sp?). There is zero controversy that there was no consideration for civilians during the March 1945 through August 9, 1945.

The ETO for US doctrine was a different story. Dresden was the exception.

I'm sorry - the US doctrine of precision bombing in Europe might have served to soothe consciences back home but it didn't make much difference to German civilians. I believe the USAAF routinely bombed through cloud using radar in the last two years of the war – how could that be anything but bombing of a civilian centre? According to Wiki (yes, I know) only 7% of bobs dropped by the USAAF fell within 1000 feet of the target. That is what I meant by the difference between area and precision bombing being a matter of semantics.
Don't get me wrong, I'm not suggesting the US was any worse than any other European combatant, just that they weren't any better. Who could expect they would be? It was total war. I certainly don't presume to judge and I am wary of those who do. But I'm also wary of the human impulse to believe the other side played dirty while we played clean (not accusing you there). There is, after all, a much stated consequence to forgetting the past.
 
That is what I meant by the difference between area and precision bombing being a matter of semantics..

I sort of agree with you here. It was the difference between intent and what was actually possible with the technology of the day.

It was the British who discovered that to hit anything useful they would have to employ a lot of bombers,dropping a lot of bombs,and hit a lot of other stuff too. We were prepared to do that,quite rightly in my opinion.

Some will beat their chests and wring the hands over the morals of the bombings. Some will debate the effect and efficiency of the effort. This they will do from their nice safe houses and comfy armchairs and in complete freedom. They are perfectly entitled to do that,it's what our forbears were fighting for.
They should however never lose sight of the fact that this freedom was partly paid for by the 55,000 men who paid the ultimate price carrying out the RAF's bombing campaign and the tens of thousands of their American allies who made the same sacrifice thousands of miles from home in the cold,cloudy and unfamiliar skies of Europe.

It is them that I choose to remember.

Steve
 
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I'm sorry - the US doctrine of precision bombing in Europe might have served to soothe consciences back home but it didn't make much difference to German civilians.
I'm comforted we have really smart bombs, now. :rolleyes:
 

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