Effectiveness of the P-38

[tomo pauk]

I would also note that the early FW 190 did not necessarily surpass P-40F/L in climb, depending on the configuration of the latter. A P-40L or lightened F had an initial climb rate of around 3300 FPM. A P-40K at WEP could also outrun tropical configured Bf 109F or early Gs at low altitude, as could the F and L. The early FW 190 was also basically a medium altitude fighter, although it a higher effective ceiling and kept up a significantly higher combat speed.

The early Fw 190 was maybe not as good high-altitude fighter as the Bf 109F-4, but it was among the best high-altitude fighters like the Spitfire IX or the Bf 109G-2. Note that when British compared it with the Spitfire IX, the recommended tactic was to still use the Spitfire's horizontal maneuverability, and do not try to follow the 190 in vertical. Similar was the conclusion of the USN comparison test with the F4U and F6F.
The arrival of the P-47, once debugged, changed the things, not helped with the 190s getting heavier and draggier than the early versions were.

added: since the Spitfire V, with all the overboost that it was allowed, was still struggling with the best LW stuff above ~15000 ft, and vs. the Fw 190 at almost all altitudes, expecting from a 1500 lb heavier P-40F to do better will require a truckload of salt to accept

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The try to say something meaningful waffle

That sounds like a churlish fool unwilling to admit they were wrong to me. I don't know why you persist in trying to be so cranky, but it's not a good look. You are literally insulting me for correctly pointing out that you said something in error.

You wrote and I quote directly here: Meantime the RAF only had two overseas single seat/single engine fighters, Hurricane and Spitfire

I didn't make any negative assumptions as to why you left them out, I just pointed out that the RAF in fact used several foreign types as well: Buffalo (early days), Mohawk (two squadrons), and large numbers of Thunderbolt (late war) being prominent in the CBI, as well as having the Beaufighter and Mosquito which could be considered in a different category, while P-40 was particularly prominent in Africa, the Middle East and Italy. I didn't try to rake you over the coals, or make assumptions as to why you left these out, in fact I assumed it was just an omission or maybe you meant they only had two native fighter types. I just pointed out the others to show the complete picture.

Shores entry for 5 Sqn RAF:
"Following long service in India, 5 Squadron had re-equipped with Mohawks at the start of the war with Japan, operating these aircraft over the front untill June 1943. Following conversion to Hurricane IIcs, the unit returned to action in December 1943, remaining operational until September 1944. It then withdrew to Yelahanka to convert to Thunderbolts. Operations recommenced with these aircraft in December, continuing until June 1945."

Shores entry for 155 Sqn RAF:

"The unit formed in India in April 1942, receiving Mohawks during August. These were employed in action from October, moving to Imphal on the central fron in March 1943. The squadron continued to operate these elderly fighters until January 1944, when re-equipment with Spitfire VIII at last occurred. These were then employed over the front until the end of the war."

This was all done with fighters that had been manufactured in 1940 or earlier, with as far as I know, little to any supply chain except what they could adapt from other types and scavenge from existing airframes. And they proved viable in combat right until the end. I think that is kind of a noteworthy story, it was one I was not aware of until I read Shores third volume of Bloody Shambles, which I learned about in this forum. One can actually learn things here that you didn't already know

The British sent 85 Mohawks from the UK September 1941 to June 1942, another 1 in June 1943, then come the 9 or 10 taken in Iran and the various claims about Chinese production. The two squadrons mimic the 2 squadrons of P-38 present, with P-38 reported on strength from July 1943.

As of February 1943 India reported it had 63 Mohawks, down to 54 in July when the USAAF reports its first 23 P-38, in October 1943 it is 52 Mohawk to 58 P-38.

Mohawks gather lots of mentions in a book and are liked better than the lesser mentioned P-38. This gives a solid opinion, safe from facts, adjectives as history.

Again, pointless, empty derision, based on an uncharitable interpretation of someone else's post which lacks all subtlety or nuance. I didn't say the Mohawk was a better fighter than the P-38, it certainly was not. I noted that the Mohawk IV, used for quite a long time by the British in the CBI Theater, performed a bit better than most would have expected, (certainly better than I expected) basically achieving parity with the Ki-43 in terms of combat outcomes while proving capable of shooting down JAAF bombers, while the early P-38 performed a bit worse (basically also achieving parity in terms of combat outcomes, though at the same time the P-38 also had superior range and altitude capability. And could carry more ordinance.

I would however point out that the Mohawk IV clearly outperformed all marks of the Hurricane in the CBI. Otherwise 5 and 155 squadron would have been converted over to Hurri IIs because plenty of those were available while the Mohawk IVs were in short supply.

Hardly excitement to note someone unwilling to learn and still peddling their opinion as fact, more a judgement on how to proceed.

Pot. kettle. black.

The unwillingness to learn being instantly proven. 80 squadron flying Hurricane I fitted with locally improvised bomb racks for 40 pound bombs was used to test fighter bomber operations, first practice 1 November operations starting 20 November 1941, lasted about a month, being re-equipped with Hurricane IIC in January.

Now we go back to Britain for a while. The Hurricane mark IIE is reported in many published references as being the designation of early production mark IV. A memo in AIR 20/4572 dated 30 August 1942 notes the mark IIE is the Hurribomber with sixty built to end June 1942, but a signal to the Middle East dated 31 October 1942 states the IIE was not an official designation that had been used at times for IIB and IIC fighter bombers. There are 98 Form 78 aircraft cards marked IIE between September and December 1941, and another 7 in March and April 1942, but nothing in the Contract Cards and Serial Registers. There are one hundred and sixty eight mark IIE in the monthly production reports from March to October 1942, with mark IV production starting in December. As the RAF stops marking aircraft cards IIE the MAP figures start recording IIE production. In October 1943 the cumulative total production of mark IIE is adjusted from one hundred and sixty eight to two hundred and seventy. The designation mark IIE does not appear in the RAF aircraft census, instead the February 1943 census reports two hundred and sixty eight mark IIBB (the second B is for bomber) had been ordered with two hundred and twenty nine delivered, plus others that had been converted. Then in June 1943 the census is amended to one hundred and sixty eight IIBB ordered and delivered, agreeing with monthly reports. In November 1943 the census adjusts the figures to two hundred and thirty IBB and forty IICB ordered and delivered, agreeing with the new mark IIE total. The conclusion the IIE in the monthly reports are 128 IIB and 40 IIC, and the IIE was an unofficial designation for mark II factory fitted with under wing racks, they were not early mark IV. The aircraft census as of June 1944 reports only a nett (that is conversions to less conversions from) sixty six to IIBB but three thousand one hundred and thirty two conversions to IICB.

30-Oct-41 Fighter Command first fighter bomber sortie 30 October 1941, number 607 squadron, attacking Tingray transformer station.

The page Hurricane marks gives a link listing the 296 IIBB serials, the only ones available until mid 1942, which you can then use to figure out when they actually arrived in the Middle East with their ability to carry 250 pound bombs. For example Takoradi reports flying out 11 IIBB in July 1942, first mention of the type in unit records.

Ok so you are saying that no Hurricanes were flying as fighter bombers in the Western desert until mid 1942? If that's the case it's news to me.

The steamed banana opinion, such a low cruising speed, and gets shot down anyway. In fact we are back at square minus 1. Blenheim IV, rated top speed 266 mph, fast cruise 230 mph which gave a range of 678 miles. Steam a banana, watch it wilt.

I'm repeating the words of RAAF pilot and squadron leader Clive Caldwell said in a postwar interview. Caldwell, rightly or wrongly, is credited with playing a role in the decision to use Kittyhawks as fighter bombers, partly on the basis of his frustration .

The Baltimore and Boston were about 40 mph faster than the Blenheim. Short time in target reducing casualties usually means lots of flak, so who was doing the shooting? Or were the German fighters tied to the target area?

The German fighters were apparently more likely to intercept bombers over or near the target area.

To give an idea of losses, NOT loss rates, which requires sorties, which apparently are known, Sortie breakdown by month by type is now required and will no doubt be provided to justify "quite a low loss rate" etc. opinions.

RAF losses to enemy action, Egypt
November 1941 were 47 Hurricane, 29 Tomahawk, 19 Blenheim, 13 Maryland, 4 Boston
December 1941 were 65 Hurricane, 49 Tomahawk, 14 Blenheim, 9 Maryland, 7 Boston
January 1942 were 34 Hurricane, 13 Tomahawk, 13 Kittyhawk, 3 Blenheim, 1 Maryland
February 1942 were 21 Hurricane, 2 Tomahawk, 23 Kittyhawk, 4 Blenheim, 1 Boston
March 1942 were 14 Hurricane, 4 Tomahawk, 14 Kittyhawk, 3 Blenheim, 4 Boston
April 1942 were 16 Hurricane, 12 Tomahawk, 17 Kittyhawk, 3 Blenheim, 1 Boston
May 1942 were around 90 of the above types, page out of focus, June similar numbers
July 1942 was 10 Spitfire, 61 Hurricane, 37 Kittyhawk, 9 Tomahawk, 2 Boston, 4 Blenheim
August 1942 was 4 Spitfire, 28 Hurricane, 20 Kittyhawk, 4 Tomahawk, 2 Boston, 2 Blenheim, 1 Baltimore.
September 1942 was 12 Spitfire, 24 Hurricane, 24 Kittyhawk, 9 Tomahawk, 2 Boston, 3 Baltimore.
October 1942 was 10 Spitfire, 27 Hurricane, 47 Kittyhawk, 6 Tomahawk, 9 Boston, 8 Baltimore, 6 Blenheim

I think here you can see the pattern that the Blenheims were still being used a lot in 1941, but this fell off markedly in 1942. The bomber losses in general dropped off quite a bit, while the fighter-bomber losses spiked after May 1942 with both Hurricane and Kittyhawk losses increasing.

All aircraft, all cause losses, Egypt, November 1941 to October 1942 was 131, 169, 73, 69, 54, 70, 103, 187, 186, 106, 106, 139, there were around 5,000 day sorties in September 1942.

Around 40 A-20C were diverted from USSR shipments to the RAF in the Middle East.

Until mid 1942 the only way for the RAF in the Middle East to deliver bombs was by dedicated bombers, which in turn required dedicated escorts, which in turn meant mission planning took a long time and had problems getting all the aircraft together and over the target. Since most targets during the ground fighting were non fixed this in turn often meant the target was often long gone before the bombers flew by. If the fighting was mobile only fighter bombers had a good chance to hit an enemy ground unit. The dedicated bombers should do pre planned missions against fixed targets, unfortunately in the desert there were few such targets, even the terrain kept moving in sand storms.

A fundamental problem for fighters is they are designed to go fast when level, which meant really fast in a dive, leading to either shallow dives or high pull out altitudes. As ever the lower the ground defences, the more accurate the bombing.

Fighter bombers were generally deemed more accurate for bombing than level bombers, in most cases, and in particular for close air support or strikes near the battlefield. This isn't my idea and I didn't make it up.

Lockheed built 3,810 P-38L June 1944 to August 1945, plus another 113 from Vultee January to June 1945, by the time it turned up the axis air forces were hard to find in the air.

F2G-1, 3 accepted June to September 1945, then 2 in October, F2G-2 5 accepted post war, F4U-4 first acceptances December 1944, 1,969 built in 1945.

P-51K, the P-51D with a different propeller, 1,337 built September 1944 to March 1945, P-51D production continued until August.

Tempest V, 800 built to end August 1945, very useful catching V-1.

In the sudden scramble for modern military aircraft in the late 1930's the USAAF was going with turbo superchargers, in fighter terms two designs with what should be reliable 1,000 HP class engines, then the big stretch, one with a 2,000 HP class engine. Curtiss was a major producer, an update of the P-36 should provide a good enough fighter in numbers in 1940/41, even though it would probably be not as good as new designs and not have much design stretch, the USAAF went with it. Similarly the USN had the choice of building Hornet to the years old Yorktown design or waiting many more months for something else, they went Yorktown.

Once the P-40 had wing racks capable of more than 40 pound bombs it could carry fuel tanks there, as Francis Dean notes up to 450 gallons external, but while the total fuel decides how far you can go out, internal decided how far you can come home after combat, not much point going beyond 150 gallons external, the P-51 could use almost twice that.

I can't remember seeing a P-40 with wing tanks but I'd be glad to be corrected if you know of a photo.

Over in P-39 land the British passed as many of their order as they could to other people, the Australians had a few orphans, ignoring the P-400 the US took delivery of 3,869 out of 8,900 P-39C to Q, deliveries in the US for the USSR were 4,754 including over 2,000 "Britain for Russia". The French ended up with a number.

As of 1 May 1943 the USAAF tactical air force in North Africa had 1 P-39 fighter squadron plus P-39 and P-51 in an observation squadron while the Coastal Air force held two P-39 groups, 81st and 350th, which is where they stayed, the 81st made it to Sicily in October 1943, Italy in February 1944 but not flying missions with the 12th Air Force, then sent to India. The 350th made it to Sardinia in November 1943, Corsica in February 1944, Italy in September 1944 by which time it was a P-47 unit.

The 350th FG appears to be the unit which was using it's P-39s as fighter-bombers and CAS duties in Italy, before converting to P-47s.

The only 8th/9th Air Force fighter group shuffling was done in early 1944, existing P-51, but remembering the 354th FG remained a 9th Air Force unit, after that it was converting 8th Air Force FG from P-38 and P-47 to P-51

Ok with me!

 

[Shortround6]

As for production, I think they were expecting production of the P-40 to taper off in 1942 as they shifted to using them as advanced trainers in the US etc., but demand kept up, partly due to the failure of the P-39 and the limitations of the early P-38 / P-47 / Corsair (and for the British, the Spit V) and because improved tactics, better training, various minor fixed and improvements of later models like the K and M as well as the Merlin engined F and L, and things like upping the boost rate all made them more viable.

The US Army and the Navy had different production programs. Problems with the Corsair would not be met by increased P-40 production.
They (Army) may very well have planned for decreased P-40 in late 1942/early 1943. The Curtiss XP-53/XP-60 program had two prototypes ordered Oct 1st 1940 using the Army's fair haired engine, the Continental I-1430, Allisons were just temporary substitutes. The I-1430 was a more than optimistic choice and one of the protypes fell back to using a Merlin 28 and flew Sept 18th 1941. Performance was good, all things considered but not good enough. The new, bigger wing and desired eight .50 cal guns were too heavy for a single stage Merlin engine and the search for a new engine was on. This resulted in a turbo Allison installation as shown in the above photo was ordered in Jan 1942 and it flew Nov 1st 1942. Too late and performance not up to snuff and with most of the problems of a late 1942 turbo installation. Curtiss kept making P-40s.
Upping the boost only worked at lower altitudes and that worked pretty well in North Africa. The Germans and the Italians were not interested in high altitudes used the BoB or in some of the fights over France/Belgium. Japanese were fitting 2 speed superchargers that worked fairly well that easily beat the single speed Allisons and the Army was in trouble. If the Japanese came in low or descended during the fight the higher boost could be used. If the Japanese came in high and stayed there the higher boost limit was of no use.

The US only got about 260 P-51As. They were useful but were rather odd balls. The contract for 1200 planes had been cut to 310 in Dec 1942 with the other planes to be completed as P-51Bs. 50 of them were given to the British as repayment for the 57 P-51s the US swiped from the British. The first P-51As reach a combat unit in July 1943 so they make no difference to procurement plans of the P-40 in any year.

P-47 development was not a smooth as hoped and none of the 171 P-47Bs are judged suitable for combat. The P-47Bs were supposed to go operational in May 1942 but the 56th FG is declared operational with P-47Cs in the US in Nov 1942. Things in England go slower and it is not until April 8th that the 3 fighter groups in England are declared operational. P-38s look reliable in comparison. Basically the P-47 was 8 to 11 months late from 1940 planning.
P-47s are being built in 3 factories several months before they go operational, If they don't work the US is in serious trouble. Curtiss drags their feet. They want to be building either P-40s of some type or P-60s, not a Republic design.

 

[Shortround6]

I can't remember seeing a P-40 with wing tanks but I'd be glad to be corrected if you know of a photo.

In 1943 they figured out how to put large ferry tanks on P-40s and there are several pages in the 1943 manual that show photos (blurry) and take off distances and speed.
However this does nothing for operational radius due the small amount of internal fuel. Max fuel was a pair of 225 US gallon ferry tanks. You basically need a large B-24 runway for it to work.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

P-38 had two capabilities in the Pacific in 1942. Range and altitude. P-36 was out of production at the end of 1940 and was not coming back. Numbers in US service are under 100 after Dec 7th 1941. P-43s had some of the same problems the early P-38s had except there was no 2nd engine to get home with. Very few made to combat service with the US. They had problems with the fuel tanks leaking even without getting shot.

Yes all this is true though they were still around, being used somewhat in Alaska and CBI. P-36 were legacy of course, P-43 didn't really work out but it was still liked due to it's great altitude capability and I think found a niche role as a recon plane.

A lot of this is true but they were complicated machines with green crews, both pilots and ground crew. The P-40 and P-39 crews in Torch were also green.

Green as in hadn't seen combat but the P-40 units were very well trained by Allied standards at the time, as noted in interviews by some of the Commonwealth DAF pilots, the Americans had about a 4 month intensive workup which included significant gunnery training. Some of the US squadrons (notably from 57th FG) were also embedded with RAF units prior to Torch so they could learn the lessons of combat in the Theater. I suspect this is part of why the US P-40 FG did so well in the MTO.

Fighting at altitude needs a careful look. It means different things in different theaters and flying at 25,000ft in NA is different than flying in Northern Europe in the winter.
A P-38F if running right, had 1150hp per engine at 25,000ft.
A P-38G if running right, had 1150hp per engine at 25,000ft. It had more power at lower altitudes. Up to 1325hp at 15,000ft.
P-40F had 1120hp at 18,500ft.
P-39K & L had 1150hp at 12,000ft.
Now who had trouble at high altitudes?

I would agree that the P-38 had much more capability at altitude, the problem was overheating, freezing cockpit, electrical issues, overheating / breaking intercoolers, and it wasn't safe to dive them which limits the advantages of being at altitude. And pilot training vis a vis pilots not really trained for twin engines plus the complexity of the system especially before the second generator was put in. But it could certainly cruise at 20-25,000 ft and could fight at those altitudes, and had better power and speed and climb than any P-40 let alone P-39.

Earlier Allison P-40s were also maxing out with a critical altitude of around 12,000 feet as well, meaning they were not much good above 15 or 16,000 ft.

German fighters were varied at the time. Italians were flying pretty much Macci 202 for fighters at the time of Torch in NA with just a few other types in just a few squadrons. Macci 202s were not hi altitude (over 20,000ft) fighters. P-38 pilots may have used bad tactics.

German fighters were mostly Bf 109F-4 then G-2 and G4, and then G-6, with tropical filters down in North Africa that I guess were gradually phased out in Italy. Italians had the Macchi 202s which were then augmented by some 205s by the time you get into Sicily etc., and a few oddballs like the Re 2000 series fighters. A very small number of excellent G.55s as well.

The P-38s had range and had altitude capabilities many other planes did not have even in Jan 1943. P-38F could climb at around 2000fpm from 20,000ft to 26,000ft and do it at 2600rpm.

No argument there.

Part of the bomber busting was the six .50s and the fact that most Axis bombers were not all that tough. A P-40 had around 3 times the fire power of Ki-43 or most Macci 202s.
However the six .50s meant the P-40 couldn't turn or climb as well as most of it's opponents.

P-40 could out turn the MC 202. No Allied monoplane fighter could out turn the Ki-43, though the Mohawks could apparently 'turn with' them, as Shores points out paraphrasing 5 Sqn RAF pilots. For that matter I wonder how Gladiators would have done in the CBI?

Sounds like Curtiss press release

It seems to be the truth if you read the operational histories.

P-40 didn't have the range to escort the B-17/B-24 at any altitude. It didn't have the range to escort either the B-25 or the B-26 on longer missions.
Ability to escort A-20s is marginal, The P-40s better have washed and waxed their aircraft

Again, here we seem to have a clash between theory and reality. P-40s actually did escort all of the above types on countless occasions, but it couldn't effectively escort the B-24s or B-17s at altitude. The 325th FG was attached to a B-26 bomb group over the Med in 1943 (I think it was 319 BG?). In New Guinea and the Solomons P-40 units were routinely escorting A-20s and B-25s, and sometimes B-24s. They were also doing so with B-25s later in China and India.

For escort it is not the external fuel. The problem is the internal fuel once the escorts have to drop tanks in combat. How far can they fly home? P-40s sometimes carried 75 gallon tanks. Using two external tanks sometimes means the fighters can go deeper into enemy territory than they get back out of.
Standard procedure for escort fighters was to start, warm up and take off on one of the main tanks, 12-18 gallons for the smaller fighters, R-2800 powered fighters could use up a lot more just getting off the runway. Getting home you have to figure two more things. One is about 20-30 minutes of flight at max endurance, 160-190mph at near sea level hunting for an airfield because of bad weather. P-40 needs 10-15 gallons of fuel. 2nd is the combat allowance. How many minutes at what power levels? 5 minutes WEP and 15 minutes military or 20 minutes military or only 15 minutes? At these power levels the P-40 could burn 2 to 2.5 gallons a minute. You want to use WEP at 5,000ft? you might need 3 gallons a minute.
Take those the 3 things out of the under 150 gallons in the early (non P-40M & N) and that is the fuel you have to get home with. under 100 gallons at best and possibly closer to 75 gallons. Lugging in two tanks and just dropping the fuel doesn't extend the range any.

I honestly don't know how this works in enough detail to have a strong opinion, but one would assume that the two external fuel tanks were better than one. The rule of thumb was that the fighters fly out on the external tank fuel and don't go farther than a maximum operational range (much less than the 'ideal' maximum range). Whether they actually have to drop the tanks depends a lot on where they are flying before reaching the target area but it doesn't seem to be all that common in the Pacific, CBI, or MTO.

P-39 was a screw up of the 1st order. But it was all the US army had aside from the P-40s.
Production
plane....................1941............................1942..........................1943
P-38.......................207.............................1479..........................2497
P-39.......................926.............................1932..........................4947
P-40.....................2248*...........................3854*........................4258
P-47..........................1................................532...........................4428
* a lot of British and Lend lease.
British got smart real quick on the P-39 and sent many of their initial order to Russia.
The US sending a lot of P-40s to the British and to Russia and needed something/anything to fill in the squadrons and that was the P-39. Bell lied about the speed and climb. It needed a longer runway than the P-40. and it held about 80% of the fuel of the 1941/42 P-40s so it was useless for any type of escort except short range tactical. It was avialable and it was faster than P-36

True though the P-36s were being used by the British to escort bombers in the CBI!

US also got somewhat stuck when a few of the planned replacements did not work out. Summer of 1942 saw the cancelation of the Curtiss P-60 (P-40 with laminar flow wing and trick engine/s) and ordering 1000-2000 more P-40s as substitutes.
View attachment 863480
View attachment 863481
With turbo.
They wound up sticking R-2800s in them for a sort of P-47 Junior except they weren't as fast, carried 1/2 the guns and had a few other problems.
This P-60 thing pretty much ended Curtiss as an airplane manufacturer.

P-39s were available and were better than nothing but only just.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The early Fw 190 was maybe not as good high-altitude fighter as the Bf 109F-4, but it was among the best high-altitude fighters like the Spitfire IX or the Bf 109G-2. Note that when British compared it with the Spitfire IX, the recommended tactic was to still use the Spitfire's horizontal maneuverability, and do not try to follow the 190 in vertical. Similar was the conclusion of the USN comparison test with the F4U and F6F.

I don't want to overstate it, I don't know of a lot of cases of P-40Fs or Ls dueling with FW 190s at 20,000 feet, I'm sure trying to do vertical maneuvers would be a problem, except maybe a high speed turn since the P-40 could certainly out-turn it. But one advantage the P-40 had over the Spitfire in these engagements was it's good roll rate. Not as good as the FW 190 but probably closer than any other major Allied fighter except the P-47?

There are two 'episodes' where the P-40 were engaging with Fw 190s a fair bit in the Med. One was shortly after Torch, in Jan or Feb 1943, JG 2 was sent to Tunisia and caused a nasty surprise for the 33rd FG on two occasions. Somewhat tellingly, they thought they were engaged with Bf 109s but their normal tactics clearly didn't work, they lost 6 or 7 fighters in two engagements IIRC. I can look it up though if you want.

Then a bit later from mid 1943 in Sicily and Italy, and up to Anzio in early 1944, P-40 units like 79th and 325th FG were periodically engaging FW 190s I think mainly flown as fighter-bombers, and seemed to be coming out Ok in those presumably low altitude engagements. Again I can look up some examples if you don't have Shores MAW series to check for yourself.

The arrival of the P-47, once debugged, changed the things, not helped with the 190s getting heavier and draggier than the early versions were.

added: since the Spitfire V, with all the overboost that it was allowed, was still struggling with the best LW stuff above ~15000 ft, and vs. the Fw 190 at almost all altitudes, expecting from a 1500 lb heavier P-40F to do better will require a truckload of salt to accept

Very true but the Spit V seemed to have different outcomes as well depending on the configuration, clipped wings or no, which engine it had, boost setting allowed (which changed over time, and improved after the early clashes over the channel) and of course what altitude the engagement was.

Fw 190 also improved a lot vis a vis climb rate from the early A2 or A3 to say the A8, but some of the fighter bomber versions F etc. were heavier IIRC. Spit VIII and IX, P-47s and P-51s had an advantage over 20,000 ft seems to be the general assumption, or do I have that wrong? FW 190 could of course convert momentum into zoom climb better than a lot of other fighters, and notably vs. the Spit V.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The US Army and the Navy had different production programs. Problems with the Corsair would not be met by increased P-40 production.

yes but Corsairs and P-40s were flying out of (and defending and escorting bombers from) the same airfields, like Henderson field at Guadalcanal. P-38s, P-39s, P-40s, F4Fs, and F4Us were all part of the mix in the Solomons in 1943, all trying to solve the same problems with the little red disks on the wings.

When the St. Vlentine's Day massacre occured in February 14 1943, it was a sign that both the P-38 (at that time G models were being used) and the early F4U may have needed some more fine tuning before they could reach their full potential. So it looks like P-40s are still going to be needed.

(I would also like to note the role played by the A6M2-N 'Rufe' in this engagement, as I think this is another type that doesn't get the respect it deserves based on operational histories)

It does seem that this is also when Curtiss was having some trouble with production because there are numerous reports from the US and the RAAF and RNZAF too, of early P-40Ns arriving with significant production problems starting around this time. Maybe those guys in Buffalo were too pre-occupied with their new experiments

They (Army) may very well have planned for decreased P-40 in late 1942/early 1943. The Curtiss XP-53/XP-60 program had two prototypes ordered Oct 1st 1940 using the Army's fair haired engine, the Continental I-1430, Allisons were just temporary substitutes. The I-1430 was a more than optimistic choice and one of the protypes fell back to using a Merlin 28 and flew Sept 18th 1941. Performance was good, all things considered but not good enough. The new, bigger wing and desired eight .50 cal guns were too heavy for a single stage Merlin engine and the search for a new engine was on. This resulted in a turbo Allison installation as shown in the above photo was ordered in Jan 1942 and it flew Nov 1st 1942. Too late and performance not up to snuff and with most of the problems of a late 1942 turbo installation. Curtiss kept making P-40s.

You keep bringing this up, and you do have a good point here, I tend to gloss over it too much but the various experments for P-40 successors were truly a debacle for Curtiss, and maybe you are right this is what broke the company, along with the SO3C and a few other catastrophes.

Upping the boost only worked at lower altitudes and that worked pretty well in North Africa. The Germans and the Italians were not interested in high altitudes used the BoB or in some of the fights over France/Belgium.

It was a problem in North Africa too, to be clear. The Germans and the all-too-frequently forgotten Italians had the luxury of attacking from above probably at least half the time, a huge advantage for fighter pilots. They did seem to fly at about 20-25,000 feet fairly often especially on the 'frei jagd' missions where just a few would go out like a rotte of 4, looking for easy victims. The DAF adapted to this problem somewhat successfully but it was never ideal. The problem was less acute with the Merlin P-40 and the Spit Vs but it was still an issue. The P-38s and then the Spit IXs and P-47s could get above them though.

Japanese were fitting 2 speed superchargers that worked fairly well that easily beat the single speed Allisons and the Army was in trouble.

Keep in mind the 2 speed superchargers came out slowly, the Ki-43-I and A6M2 were still quite common in 1943, the A6M3 had some limitations of it's own, notably range, which meant that it wasn't used in a lot of the long range attacks in the Solomons, and both it and the Ki-43-II came into the Theater rather slowly.

If the Japanese came in low or descended during the fight the higher boost could be used. If the Japanese came in high and stayed there the higher boost limit was of no use.

This is a fair point, but...

The fighters have to go where the bombers are, most of the time. Sometimes for certain targets (like Darwin, notably) the Japanese would come by at altitudes of 25-28,000 feet, and that was indeed a problem for the USAAF and for the USN / USMC as well when they were relying on the F4F-4s especially (due to slow climb rate, not atltidue capability which the F4F did have).

But that depended a lot on the bombers and the mission type. G4M and Ki-21 could drop bombs at that altitude, but the often relied upon (because much more accurate) D3A certainly didn't bomb from that high up, and the G4Ms or G3Ms had to come down low as well to drop torpedoes, while all of the IJN and JAAF bombers generally needed to come in lower if they wanted to have a good chance of damaging the target (or depending on the weather, to even see the target, since South Pacific rarely had clear skies up to 25,000 ft, to put it mildly). So it depended in part if it was basically a harassment mission or if they really needed to really do some damage, like destroy planes or ships.

Even over Darwin, with good tactics using very "altitude anemic" P-40Es the 49th FG managed to cause enough havoc to Japanese bombers coming in at 25,000+ ft to force a pause in their bombing campaign. This case has famously been given a pretty close look such as you can read in this article.

The US only got about 260 P-51As. They were useful but were rather odd balls. The contract for 1200 planes had been cut to 310 in Dec 1942 with the other planes to be completed as P-51Bs. 50 of them were given to the British as repayment for the 57 P-51s the US swiped from the British. The first P-51As reach a combat unit in July 1943 so they make no difference to procurement plans of the P-40 in any year.

In the CBI I think it was the 311 Fighter-bomber group with two squadrons of P-51A and one of A-36. The 23rd FG had a few P-51A as well for a while.

P-47 development was not a smooth as hoped and none of the 171 P-47Bs are judged suitable for combat. The P-47Bs were supposed to go operational in May 1942 but the 56th FG is declared operational with P-47Cs in the US in Nov 1942. Things in England go slower and it is not until April 8th that the 3 fighter groups in England are declared operational. P-38s look reliable in comparison. Basically the P-47 was 8 to 11 months late from 1940 planning.
P-47s are being built in 3 factories several months before they go operational, If they don't work the US is in serious trouble.

Someone, I think it was Ewan, pointed out upthread that the P-47 was selected as the new main fighter type for India by the British, they seem to suddenly ramp up production. Much faster than the P-38, and coinciding with improved variants coming out.

Curtiss drags their feet. They want to be building either P-40s of some type or P-60s, not a Republic design.

That situation with the P-47s was definitely another nail in the coffin for Curtiss

 

[tomo pauk]

Very true but the Spit V seemed to have different outcomes as well depending on the configuration, clipped wings or no, which engine it had, boost setting allowed (which changed over time, and improved after the early clashes over the channel) and of course what altitude the engagement was.

Note that Spitfire V needed to be of the particular 'flavor' (preferably the engine with small impeller and with the clipped wing) and that Fw 190 needed to f(l)ight in that Spitfire's sweet spot (= low altitude) in order for Spitfire to prevail. A normal Spitfire, with the normal Merlin 45 and the normal wings was in a disadvantage, especially if the 190's pilot was playing to his strengths and not to his opponents.

Fw 190 also improved a lot vis a vis climb rate from the early A2 or A3 to say the A8, but some of the fighter bomber versions F etc. were heavier IIRC.

The early 190s were much lighter than the later versions, and especially the A8 was overweight. The power increase that was supposed to follow the weight and rag increase was barely keeping up, and it was not there above ~15000 ft.
In the same time, the Allied engines installed on their best fighters were getting far better in power vs. altitude department. Thus, come mid 1943, the Fw 190 mimicked the problems the P-40 had from the P-40E onwards.

Spit VIII and IX, P-47s and P-51s had an advantage over 20,000 ft seems to be the general assumption, or do I have that wrong? FW 190 could of course convert momentum into zoom climb better than a lot of other fighters, and notably vs. the Spit V.

The aircraft you've listed, apart the Spit IX, were not pitted against the early Fw 190 versions, but against the mid- and late marques.
As noted above, there was no appreciable rise of engine power on the 190s as much as it was the case with these Allied fighters. Zoom climb requires that the aircraft in question has the altitude advantage, not easy when the enemy is better at higher altitudes.

 

[andy1967]

The early Fw 190 was maybe not as good high-altitude fighter as the Bf 109F-4, but it was among the best high-altitude fighters like the Spitfire IX or the Bf 109G-2. Note that when British compared it with the Spitfire IX, the recommended tactic was to still use the Spitfire's horizontal maneuverability, and do not try to follow the 190 in vertical. Similar was the conclusion of the USN comparison test with the F4U and F6F.
The arrival of the P-47, once debugged, changed the things, not helped with the 190s getting heavier and draggier than the early versions were.

added: since the Spitfire V, with all the overboost that it was allowed, was still struggling with the best LW stuff above ~15000 ft, and vs. the Fw 190 at almost all altitudes, expecting from a 1500 lb heavier P-40F to do better will require a truckload of salt to accept

When Biggin Hill started to receive Merlin 66 powered Mkixs in March 43 the Spitfire could then take the 190A on in the vertical.

 

[Shortround6]

Yes all this is true though they were still around, being used somewhat in Alaska and CBI. P-36 were legacy of course, P-43 didn't really work out but it was still liked due to it's great altitude capability and I think found a niche role as a recon plane.

The odd balls are interesting, but they never drove policy or future procurement or very much on deployment. P-43 recon planes tended to get replaced fairly quickly by F-4s. Whatever the failings of the F-4 Lightning recon planes at least they didn't leak fuel on the runway or inflight.

I would agree that the P-38 had much more capability at altitude, the problem was overheating, freezing cockpit, electrical issues, overheating / breaking intercoolers, and it wasn't safe to dive them which limits the advantages of being at altitude.

Some of these problems were less In North Africa. Freezing cockpit was less likely for one. Desired performance was not available in the F & G but actual performance was not bad.

German fighters were mostly Bf 109F-4 then G-2 and G4, and then G-6, with tropical filters down in North Africa that I guess were gradually phased out in Italy. Italians had the Macchi 202s which were then augmented by some 205s by the time you get into Sicily etc., and a few oddballs like the Re 2000 series fighters. A very small number of excellent G.55s as well.

Again the odd balls are interesting but not that important. The Italians only built 254 Re 2001s and some of them were dedicated fighter bombers and some were night fighters (MK I eye ball). The Re 2001s did not operate much south of Malta and by the time of operation Husky there were a number of P-38Hs in service.

Again, here we seem to have a clash between theory and reality. P-40s actually did escort all of the above types on countless occasions, but it couldn't effectively escort the B-24s or B-17s at altitude. The 325th FG was attached to a B-26 bomb group over the Med in 1943 (I think it was 319 BG?). In New Guinea and the Solomons P-40 units were routinely escorting A-20s and B-25s, and sometimes B-24s. They were also doing so with B-25s later in China and India.

I honestly don't know how this works in enough detail to have a strong opinion, but one would assume that the two external fuel tanks were better than one. The rule of thumb was that the fighters fly out on the external tank fuel and don't go farther than a maximum operational range (much less than the 'ideal' maximum range). Whether they actually have to drop the tanks depends a lot on where they are flying before reaching the target area but it doesn't seem to be all that common in the Pacific, CBI, or MTO.

A lot of this depends on what they wanted the bombers to do. Limiting your strike options because you have short range escorts is a problem/
A P-40N has, at best, about 100 US gallons to get home with. Started with 160 gallons, used 15 gallons for take-off and early switch to drop tank. Manual says up 30 gal for take off and climb to 9-10,000ft. Now IF the plane needs to drop the external tank and IF you want even 10 gal of fuel to find the airfield getting home due to weather or even head winds. We have 25 gallons gone out of the 160 gallons but at WEP the engine uses just under 3 gallons a minute (170 gal/hr) so 15 gal gone and even 10 minutes at military power is worth 22.5 gal so
so we have just about 100 US gallons left for the flight home.
P-40N manual says
530 miles at 220 TAS at low altitude.
420 miles at 260 TAS at low altitude.
290 miles at 290 TAS at low altitude.
How fast do you have to fly to get out of the danger area?
How fast do you have to fly to get home once out of the danger area?
How fast are bombers flying?
How much safety margin do you want?
Needing cross mountains can take 8-10 gal to climb 5,000ft.
Not counting formation flying or other problems.

 

[tomo pauk]

When Biggin Hill started to receive Merlin 66 powered Mkixs in March 43 the Spitfire could then take the 190A on in the vertical.

They certainly could.
OTOH, by March 43, the Fw 190s of the early versions are as good as gone by that date.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Note that Spitfire V needed to be of the particular 'flavor' (preferably the engine with small impeller and with the clipped wing) and that Fw 190 needed to f(l)ight in that Spitfire's sweet spot (= low altitude) in order for Spitfire to prevail. A normal Spitfire, with the normal Merlin 45 and the normal wings was in a disadvantage, especially if the 190's pilot was playing to his strengths and not to his opponents.

Sure but two things - clipped wing lets remember was not just for low altitude, though clipped impeller was. A clipped wing Spit could fight at 20 -25,000 ft for sure, it might start making a difference at 30,000 ft maybe.

The other big change which i forgot to mention is metal ailerons, which seemed to be a big changer for higher speed roll rate on the Spitfires.

What altitude the two types might be fighting at would be based on what missions they were flying. In some of those weird provocation / fighter sweep raids the British did over the channel, maybe they would be at 25,000 ft. But in the tactical war like in North Africa or Italy they are probably going to be chasing medium bombers or fighter-bombers, or playing that role themselves, so they will typically be lower.

The early 190s were much lighter than the later versions, and especially the A8 was overweight. The power increase that was supposed to follow the weight and rag increase was barely keeping up, and it was not there above ~15000 ft.

I'll take your word for it, I am not an expert on the Fw 190 and I keep seeing contradictory numbers when i try to look this up. I know some Fw 190s were loaded and built more heavily for anti- heavy bomber attacks and for the fighter-bomber role, did they also have 'stripped' or lighter versions for fighter vs fighter role?

In the same time, the Allied engines installed on their best fighters were getting far better in power vs. altitude department. Thus, come mid 1943, the Fw 190 mimicked the problems the P-40 had from the P-40E onwards.

Yes I've noticed some parallels between the two types.

The aircraft you've listed, apart the Spit IX, were not pitted against the early Fw 190 versions, but against the mid- and late marques.

Fair point. Did all the A3s and A4s etc. get shot down or worn out already by then?

As noted above, there was no appreciable rise of engine power on the 190s as much as it was the case with these Allied fighters. Zoom climb requires that the aircraft in question has the altitude advantage, not easy when the enemy is better at higher altitudes.

Not necessarily, what they need is some separation in most cases, and / or a faster dive speed. They don't necessarily need to be high just a few thousand feet above sea level at least. Diving and zoom climbing was a common tactic with a lot of Allied fighter types against the Japanese in the Pacific and CBI.

 

[ColFord]

50 of them were given to the British as repayment for the 57 P-51s the US swiped from the British.

58 NA-91 P-51 the US swiped from the UK, all accounted for in US and UK records and cross checking between the two. The 50 NA-99 P-51A supplied by US in substitution, then the balance of the '8' was made up in allocation of airframe and engine spares from the US that could be used to keep the Mustang I and IA the RAF already had in service flying for the critical invasion of Europe period.

Of the remaining P-51A a number were sent to the ETO for use in the low level Tactical Reconnaissance role with 9th AF. A number sent were lost in transit - one particular loss was a tanker carrying partially disassembled and 'cocooned' P-51As involved in a collision with another vessel in the convoy in fog, caught fire and aircraft destroyed in the fire. A number of the other early P-51A destined for 9th AF in the UK also arrived damaged (sea water ingress or damage caused by storms whilst in transit) and were either written off or required significant repair before being able to be used. That had the cumulative effect of delaying the operational readiness of the USAAF unit in the ETO that was to receive them and changes in future aircraft re-equipment plans.

 

[tomo pauk]

Sure but two things - clipped wing lets remember was not just for low altitude, though clipped impeller was. A clipped wing Spit could fight at 20 -25,000 ft for sure, it might start making a difference at 30,000 ft maybe.

It might.
There is still the 30 mph disadvantage vs. the Fw 190, though.

What altitude the two types might be fighting at would be based on what missions they were flying. In some of those weird provocation / fighter sweep raids the British did over the channel, maybe they would be at 25,000 ft. But in the tactical war like in North Africa or Italy they are probably going to be chasing medium bombers or fighter-bombers, or playing that role themselves, so they will typically be lower.

I'd certainly avoid 25000 ft past the Summer of 1941 with the Spit V, and try to fight at between, say, 13000 and 17000 ft. Problem is that the enemy will disagree with my wisehes. Basically, the same problem the Fw 190 had against the P-40 and Merlin Mustang.
If the engine is with the cropped impeller, I'd try to be at under 10000 ft; these altitudes do make me very susceptible to the Flak, though.

I'll take your word for it, I am not an expert on the Fw 190 and I keep seeing contradictory numbers when i try to look this up. I know some Fw 190s were loaded and built more heavily for anti- heavy bomber attacks and for the fighter-bomber role, did they also have 'stripped' or lighter versions for fighter vs fighter role?

This website might've been a good start: link
The 190s I was referring to were the just plain, normal 190s. Anything other, like the armored Rammjaegers, or the ones with cannon gondolas or with rockets will be even worse. The stripped 190s usually were with the outer cannons removed. These were mostly used in the Easter front - the presence of the 4-engined bombers all but precluded such things in the 'West'.

Fair point. Did all the A3s and A4s etc. get shot down or worn out already by then?

The A-1s and A-2s were mostly out. The A-3s were still in, if in small quantities, the A-4 was in full use, with A-5 being the current model by winter of 1942/1943. German-language Wikipedia on the 190s is a good source, too, and can be translated; although, the MW 50 passage inn the A-4 section can be misleading, the 190s saw next to no combat use of the MW 50.

Not necessarily, what they need is some separation in most cases, and / or a faster dive speed. They don't necessarily need to be high just a few thousand feet above sea level at least. Diving and zoom climbing was a common tactic with a lot of Allied fighter types against the Japanese in the Pacific and CBI.

Zoom climb works against the enemy that has either speed or altitude disadvantage, as well as if it can be surprised. The more modern Allied fighters were in that position vs. the Japanese stuff, the best Allied fighters were in that position vs. the LW, and the best LW types were in such position vs. the P-40.
A slower fighter, with a bad power/weight ratio, that also has the positional disadvantage trying to do zoom climb? A recipe for nothing good.

 

[EwenS]

Shores description of 5 squadron and its Mohawks is a less than full description of what actually happened.

The re-equipment of 5 squadron with Mohawk IV began at the end of Dec 1941. The first pair were received on 29th & 31st Dec. Subsequent deliveries to the squadron were:-

Jan - 3
Feb - 8

It had begun handing its Audax over to 146 squadron from the formation of the latter in Oct 1941. It had been planned to equip 146 with Mohawks, and it did receive 4 in March. In April they were ordered to hand them over to 5 squadron instead. 5 squadron lost a number of Mohawks in 1942 and didn't give up the last of its Audax until Aug 1942. So clearly there were not enough Mohawks around in the early part of 1942 to maintain more than the larger part of one squadron

 

[Tiger11]

I am guessing (?) you may be thinking of Thomas McGuire flying a P-38?

I think so too. Also, McGuire didn't drop his drop tanks, which he had always stressed to his pilots was the first thing to do when entering combat.

 

[PAT303]

Even over Darwin, with good tactics using very "altitude anemic" P-40Es the 49th FG managed to cause enough havoc to Japanese bombers coming in at 25,000+ ft to force a pause in their bombing campaign. This case has famously been given a pretty close look such as you can read in this article.

Interesting article, it claims 19 Japanese aircraft were shot down over Darwin, how many from P40s?.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Interesting article, it claims 19 Japanese aircraft were shot down over Darwin, how many from P40s?.

If you are alluding to the flak, I'm not sure but part of the reason they were flying those raids at 27,000 ft was to avoid the AA guns at Darwin.

IIRC some of the 49th FG losses out of the 19 they lost were also landing accidents, engine failures etc., but it happened during or right after the raid so it counts.

There used to be a link to the article he used as the basis for this shorter piece, but the link is dead now. You can probably track that down somewhere or the actual losses can be found in other sources with a little effort. I believe the article is an accurate summary, though there have also been others on the same subject with more detail.

I should also note, this was a count of the losses in the raids that took place during the period from April - September 1942 when the 49th FG was protecting Darwin (with major raids on March 4, June 13-16, and August 23). Various other units took over that duty subsequently, the later infamous period when No .1 Wing RAAF was protecting Darwin (with RAF and RAAF piloted Spitfires), and facing a whole different set of problems, came later, starting in January - February 1943 though the next series of big raids happened a bit after they arrived.

 

[ColFord]

Green as in hadn't seen combat but the P-40 units were very well trained by Allied standards at the time, as noted in interviews by some of the Commonwealth DAF pilots, the Americans had about a 4 month intensive workup which included significant gunnery training. Some of the US squadrons (notably from 57th FG) were also embedded with RAF units prior to Torch so they could learn the lessons of combat in the Theater. I suspect this is part of why the US P-40 FG did so well in the MTO.

Suggest, if you can, get hold of the post Operation TORCH analysis reports of operations conducted by USN aviation and USAAF units against their respective adversaries. They go into the level of pre-operational training and level of preparedness of all the units involved and deliver some fairly critical assessments about how combat worthy and operationally ready a number of the units were. The reports are less than glowing about the standard of general airmanship displayed by many of the pilots, with essentials such as navigation and fuel management getting attention as well as the number of aircraft lost to non-operational reasons eg. take off and landing accidents, engine failures due to improper engine handling.
The overall percentage of USN and USAAF pilots who had actual previous air combat experience in an equivalent situation was quite low, and one failing that was noted was that the differences in tactics between Luftwaffe and Italian Air Force units that some had gained experience against, was different to the tactics they encountered against Vichy French units - they went into combat with misconceptions about what they would encounter and how they would respond, plus an over optimistic assessment about the supposed low levels of enemy personnel morale and equipment they could expect to come up against.

There were also some very critical assessments made about the level of technical and supply support made, including the levels of general maintenance equipment and consumable spares, often including basics such as spark plugs, oil and air filters, cleaning rags and cleaning materials generally, where the tempo of operational flying in a relatively harsh environment generated a corresponding higher requirement for servicing and maintenance. Aircraft being grounded and unavailable for operations due to lack of basic spares, tools and consumables, and then underestimation of the number of spare engines, tyres, etc, leading to longer term availability issues.

Yes, some individual units did better, but the overall assessment was that there were a number of areas of training related to operational combat flying that needed to be improved, have more time spent on them, and where possible the general standard of basic flying skills in operational critical aspects such as navigation, fuel and engine management, gunnery etc, all needed urgent attention.

Some of this fed back to USAAF units being formed in the USA and heading to the UK for the 9th Air Force. A significant number of pilots arrived in the UK before their aircraft and were put through a program of additional operational training that included attachments to RAF front line Squadrons and flying a number of operational sorties with those Squadrons to gain relevant first hand experience. In many cases those attachments were of around four to five weeks duration, with the types of flying conducted structured to be similar to that a newly posted RAF pilot would undertake when first posted to an operational squadron. Interestingly when reviewing the sortie activity of the USAAF pilots involved, the basics were done for ALL the USAAF pilots, irrespective of rank and experience. A number of the more senior USAAF pilots and specialist officers also attended specialist courses at the RAF's Central Gunnery School, Fighter Leaders Course, School of Army Co-operation, and similar, as well as visits to the HQs of their equivalent RAF units for a more in depth exposure to the RAF's operational planning, command and control arrangements in the UK.

It was identified, that similar to what happened with RAF and Commonwealth aircrew when arriving back in the UK newly qualified as service pilots/aircrew from overseas, there was a need for additional training to cover any areas of inadequacy in their general aircrew training received so far, to provide experience in flying in the conditions as existed in the UK and over Europe - particularly in relation to weather, general visibility and the tight controls over aircraft movements, as well as being given access to the most recent information in relation to enemy aircraft performance and tactics. As many discovered, flying and navigation over the UK was definitely more complicated by a range of factors than flying over the wide open spaces and safer flying conditions of the USA or Canada or Australia or Southern Rhodesia, etc. That was done before they went to the relevant OTU for their intended final posting and the training they received when they finally actually arrived with an operational squadron.

 

[PAT303]

If you are alluding to the flak, I'm not sure but part of the reason they were flying those raids at 27,000 ft was to avoid the AA guns at Darwin.

IIRC some of the 49th FG losses out of the 19 they lost were also landing accidents, engine failures etc., but it happened during or right after the raid so it counts.

There used to be a link to the article he used as the basis for this shorter piece, but the link is dead now. You can probably track that down somewhere or the actual losses can be found in other sources with a little effort. I believe the article is an accurate summary, though there have also been others on the same subject with more detail.

I should also note, this was a count of the losses in the raids that took place during the period from April - September 1942 when the 49th FG was protecting Darwin (with major raids on March 4, June 13-16, and August 23). Various other units took over that duty subsequently, the later infamous period when No .1 Wing RAAF was protecting Darwin (with RAF and RAAF piloted Spitfires), and facing a whole different set of problems, came later, starting in January - February 1943 though the next series of big raids happened a bit after they arrived.

That article is claiming 19 enemy aircraft destroyed and alluding to the P40 being involved in their destruction, from what I know they didn't destroy any of them.