Effectiveness of the P-38

[PAT303]

IIRC some of the 49th FG losses out of the 19 they lost were also landing accidents, engine failures etc., but it happened during or right after the raid so it counts.

Most of the Spit V's lost were from the same reasons, difference is they did shoot down Japanese aircraft.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Suggest, if you can, get hold of the post Operation TORCH analysis reports of operations conducted by USN aviation and USAAF units against their respective adversaries. They go into the level of pre-operational training and level of preparedness of all the units involved and deliver some fairly critical assessments about how combat worthy and operationally ready a number of the units were. The reports are less than glowing about the standard of general airmanship displayed by many of the pilots, with essentials such as navigation and fuel management getting attention as well as the number of aircraft lost to non-operational reasons eg. take off and landing accidents, engine failures due to improper engine handling.
The overall percentage of USN and USAAF pilots who had actual previous air combat experience in an equivalent situation was quite low, and one failing that was noted was that the differences in tactics between Luftwaffe and Italian Air Force units that some had gained experience against, was different to the tactics they encountered against Vichy French units - they went into combat with misconceptions about what they would encounter and how they would respond, plus an over optimistic assessment about the supposed low levels of enemy personnel morale and equipment they could expect to come up against.

There were also some very critical assessments made about the level of technical and supply support made, including the levels of general maintenance equipment and consumable spares, often including basics such as spark plugs, oil and air filters, cleaning rags and cleaning materials generally, where the tempo of operational flying in a relatively harsh environment generated a corresponding higher requirement for servicing and maintenance. Aircraft being grounded and unavailable for operations due to lack of basic spares, tools and consumables, and then underestimation of the number of spare engines, tyres, etc, leading to longer term availability issues.

Yes, some individual units did better, but the overall assessment was that there were a number of areas of training related to operational combat flying that needed to be improved, have more time spent on them, and where possible the general standard of basic flying skills in operational critical aspects such as navigation, fuel and engine management, gunnery etc, all needed urgent attention.

I think all that is true, difficulty just flying (take off and landing, basic navigation) was commonplace with all the Allied units and it was very hard to prepare adequately for the overall harsh conditions and very skilled enemy pilots (including the Italians) and good Axis aircraft, flak etc. I should have made this clearer, because it's an important nuance. I don't mean to give the impression that the US pilots arrived with superlative training or fully prepared, the issue pointed out by some of the Commonwealth peers is that the Americans showed up with a lot of training by comparison to what they had before they went into combat, especially time on type (time flying the type of aircraft they would be using in combat) compared to the first waves of Commonwealth in Theater who were so hastily thrown into the breach, which was the typical case across every front.

British and Commonwealth pilots often had very little 'time on type' training with the aircraft they were going to be using (if any) no gunnery training, which led to Clive Caldwell, the same guy who was pushing for the use of fighters as fighter-bombers, to devise a system of shooting at running shadows on the ground in lieu of drogue shooting with target tugs, just so they could have some practice for aiming their guns.

For some reason, the DAF units were also not initially flying 'finger four' or wingmen formations, flying instead with the 'Vic' of three planes. This was in spite of the fact that finger four had already been adapted back in the UK during the Battle of Britain. There was also some problems with radios and radio communications. This started changing in Mid 1942 around the same time the first American fighter units showed up.

But when the Americans arrived the British, Australian and South African units were the ones with the combat experience, and several units came in early to fly with the British just as you described below...

Some of this fed back to USAAF units being formed in the USA and heading to the UK for the 9th Air Force. A significant number of pilots arrived in the UK before their aircraft and were put through a program of additional operational training that included attachments to RAF front line Squadrons and flying a number of operational sorties with those Squadrons to gain relevant first hand experience. In many cases those attachments were of around four to five weeks duration, with the types of flying conducted structured to be similar to that a newly posted RAF pilot would undertake when first posted to an operational squadron.

57th FG (three squadrons) actually arrived in Theater in July 1942, did some work up and then started flying missions attached to the British Kittyhawk squadrons starting in August and September 1942. Pilots who were going to be wing leaders were flying as wingmen to British pilots. So by the time of Torch these guys had some experience, and some of what they learned filtered back to command and the pilots from the other groups.

Interestingly when reviewing the sortie activity of the USAAF pilots involved, the basics were done for ALL the USAAF pilots, irrespective of rank and experience. A number of the more senior USAAF pilots and specialist officers also attended specialist courses at the RAF's Central Gunnery School, Fighter Leaders Course, School of Army Co-operation, and similar, as well as visits to the HQs of their equivalent RAF units for a more in depth exposure to the RAF's operational planning, command and control arrangements in the UK.

It was identified, that similar to what happened with RAF and Commonwealth aircrew when arriving back in the UK newly qualified as service pilots/aircrew from overseas, there was a need for additional training to cover any areas of inadequacy in their general aircrew training received so far, to provide experience in flying in the conditions as existed in the UK and over Europe - particularly in relation to weather, general visibility and the tight controls over aircraft movements, as well as being given access to the most recent information in relation to enemy aircraft performance and tactics. As many discovered, flying and navigation over the UK was definitely more complicated by a range of factors than flying over the wide open spaces and safer flying conditions of the USA or Canada or Australia or Southern Rhodesia, etc. That was done before they went to the relevant OTU for their intended final posting and the training they received when they finally actually arrived with an operational squadron.

No doubt. There was a very steep learning curve and North Africa was the proving ground where so much of this stuff was fine tuned. IIRC there was an OTU somewhere in North Africa where they got a last round of training before going into combat missions.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

That article is claiming 19 enemy aircraft destroyed and alluding to the P40 being involved in their destruction, from what I know they didn't destroy any of them.

So er, what did then? UFOs? Wallabees?

I don't think dude was 'alluding' the article is pretty clear. The Japanese lost 19 planes, including 7 fighters and 12 of the G4M bombers which was why the bombing campaign had to be paused. Like I said the longer article is around somewhere it has all the claims (much higher than the real losses on both sides) and the actual losses verified based on Japanese and US records. That's really the whole point of the article.

They also shot down one of the elusive Ki-46 Dinah recon planes during this period, about which much ink is spilled.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

That sounds like a churlish fool unwilling to admit they were wrong to me. I don't know why you persist in trying to be so cranky, but it's not a good look.

Quality control insisted on an attempt to see if anything had been learnt, answer is obviously no. I also appreciate some people consider it very rude to be told they are wrong.

You are literally insulting me for correctly pointing out that you said something in error.

You wrote and I quote directly here: Meantime the RAF only had two overseas single seat/single engine fighters, Hurricane and Spitfire

I didn't make any negative assumptions as to why you left them out, I just pointed out that the RAF in fact used several foreign types as well: Buffalo (early days), Mohawk (two squadrons), and large numbers of Thunderbolt (late war) being prominent in the CBI, as well as having the Beaufighter and Mosquito which could be considered in a different category, while P-40 was particularly prominent in Africa, the Middle East and Italy. I didn't try to rake you over the coals, or make assumptions as to why you left these out, in fact I assumed it was just an omission or maybe you meant they only had two native fighter types. I just pointed out the others to show the complete picture.

Gladiator made it to Norway, France, Malta, Middle East, Greece, throw in Middle East Gauntlet, the three Typhoon in the Middle East, then we can wander down the obscure campaigns, like East Africa, looking for what the fighter squadrons actually had. To show the complete picture, or perhaps I have (deliberately) left some out? Like maybe RAF control of land based RN fighter units?

I don't make any negative assumptions as to why you left them out, I don't try to rake you over the coals, or make assumptions as to why you left these out. Patronising isn't it?

Shores entry for 5 Sqn RAF:
"Following long service in India, 5 Squadron had re-equipped with Mohawks at the start of the war with Japan, operating these aircraft over the front untill June 1943. Following conversion to Hurricane IIcs, the unit returned to action in December 1943, remaining operational until September 1944. It then withdrew to Yelahanka to convert to Thunderbolts. Operations recommenced with these aircraft in December, continuing until June 1945."

Shores entry for 155 Sqn RAF:

"The unit formed in India in April 1942, receiving Mohawks during August. These were employed in action from October, moving to Imphal on the central fron in March 1943. The squadron continued to operate these elderly fighters until January 1944, when re-equipment with Spitfire VIII at last occurred. These were then employed over the front until the end of the war."

510 squadron had Mohawk III October 1942 to April 1944, Britain, Communications duties

5 squadron was given Mohawk IV in December 1941 at Dum Dum, in May 1942 moved to Dinjan, in fact parts of 5 and 146 squadrons essentially took over each other's units at the relevant bases, to Agartala in October 1942, Kharagpur in June 1943, to Hurricane

146 squadron had Buffalo and Mohawk March to May 1942, then Hurricane

155 squadron had Buffalo August 1942 to January 1944, St Thomas Mount, then Alipore in October 1942, Agartala in November, Raiyeswarpure February 1943, Imphal March, Agartala June, Imphal September, Alipore January 1944 and Spitfire.

North East India: Agartala, Alipore, Dinjan, Dum Dum, Imphal, Kharagpur, Raiyeswarpure
South India: St Thomas Mount.

Showing they were kept in the front line.

This was all done with fighters that had been manufactured in 1940 or earlier, with as far as I know, little to any supply chain except what they could adapt from other types and scavenge from existing airframes. And they proved viable in combat right until the end. I think that is kind of a noteworthy story, it was one I was not aware of until I read Shores third volume of Bloody Shambles, which I learned about in this forum. One can actually learn things here that you didn't already know

For the record the RAF Mohawk were accepted May to August 1940, any earlier and they would have gone to France.

Again, pointless, empty derision, based on an uncharitable interpretation of someone else's post which lacks all subtlety or nuance.

Like dodging why the numerically similar P-36 and P-38 were given different treatment?

I didn't say the Mohawk was a better fighter than the P-38, it certainly was not.

It seems no other person is needed, we watch someone create claims to then deny them.

I noted that the Mohawk IV, used for quite a long time by the British in the CBI Theater, performed a bit better than most would have expected, (certainly better than I expected) basically achieving parity with the Ki-43 in terms of combat outcomes while proving capable of shooting down JAAF bombers, while the early P-38 performed a bit worse (basically also achieving parity in terms of combat outcomes, though at the same time the P-38 also had superior range and altitude capability. And could carry more ordinance.

I would however point out that the Mohawk IV clearly outperformed all marks of the Hurricane in the CBI.

Excellent, please provide the squadron histories, sorties, missions, claims and actual successes, aggregate Mohawk and Hurricane, for say 1942 and 1943, just cut and paste from the data you so obviously MUST have to make the claim. Adjusting for the different mission profiles, Tac/R tend to Tac/R more losses for example.

AIR 22/401 notes First Mohawk loss to enemy action 1 in September 1942, another 3 in November, no Hurricane losses August to November, the 17 in December to 1 Mohawk. The few losses means it is usually 3 or so months per page, not the usual 1 month. In January 1943 the Mohawk column becomes it and Beaufighter, so it looks like Q1/43 37 Hurricane to 3 Mohawk, April 5 to 3, May 8 to 0, June 6 to 1, July 4 to 0, August 2 to 0, September 2 to 0, October 5 to 1. Mohawks get their own column in November but Hurricanes are joined by Spitfires, 1 to 0. People can remember the adjectives to describe these sorts of losses, the daily figures usually think 2 is a high number. In 1944 the columns become Bomber etc.

So bring on the sortie data.

Aside the USAAF B-24 units were taking casualties every month, the monthly total usually single figures.

By the way if the Mohawks were struggling with spare parts that would mean fewer sorties, perhaps selected missions only?

The file also has cumulative Takoradi figures, week ending in 1941, 3 October Blenheim 568 shipped, 428 arrived, 297 departed, 348 reported arrived Middle East, Hurricane 787 shipped, 620 arrived, 555 departed, 515 reported arrived Middle East, Maryland 80 shipped, 64 arrived, 61 departed, 48 reported arrived Middle East, Tomahawk, 222 shipped, 222 arrived, 221 departed, 179 reported arrived Middle East,

Other goodies include Far East strength every few weeks for most of 1941, you can see the Buffalo arriving, and then the long struggle to make them serviceable.

Otherwise 5 and 155 squadron would have been converted over to Hurri IIs because plenty of those were available while the Mohawk IVs were in short supply.

Double Excellent, the CBI has gone down in the histories of being very short of aircraft. In early 1942 it received lots of aircraft meant for the Middle East, the ferry flights, the RN operations using HMS Indomitable, operations Cross and Churn from Takoradi, perhaps you could give a few words on them? Then in mid 1942 the Middle East crisis did the reverse for a time.

So please publish the CBI holdings of Hurricanes, monthly will be fine, 1942 and 1943, compared with the Hurricane and want to be Hurricane squadrons present and squadrons the command wanted to form but lacked aircraft? How holdings compared with expected wastage rates. The way the local vultures kept knocking fighters out of the sky. Again you MUST have this data to make the claim, so just copy it. Remember books about fighting the Japanese generally exclude a number of units, like those patrolling the North West Frontier.

Now for the off topic diversion, look how much I know moment.

From post war listing, with then current place names. The Indian Air Force was officially constituted on 10 October 1932.

Number 1 squadron was officially formed at Drigh Road, Karachi on 1 April 1933, but in reality it was a squadron headquarters plus a flight with 4 Wapati aircraft. On 1 April 1936 B flight was formed, with a single Wapati and in mid June 1938 C flight was officially formed but with few personnel and no aircraft.

Frontier operations in North Waziristan occurred September to November 1937. Further operations in the North West Frontier were undertaken June to November 1938 and March to June 1939, using the airfield at Miranshah on the Afghan border, around 100 miles from Kabul. In mid 1939 the squadron was based at Ambala, north of Delhi.

In June-July 1939 the squadron cast off the obsolete Wapati and started flying Hawker Hart. On 28 August 1939 it moved to Drigh Road as the local air defence of Karachi. The usual summer operations on the North West Frontier meant the squadron was split, A flight at Drigh Road, C flight to Sandeman, about 180 miles due south of Kabul in June 1940, while B flight was at Miranshah July to September 1940.

North West Frontier operations again occupied the summer of 1941, then in August the squadron was at Drigh Road to convert to Lysanders. At the end of December 1941 the squadron went to Burma, remaining there until the fall of Rangoon on 7 March 1942. It looks like at some time in the 1942/43 period C flight was disbanded.

In June 1942 it began equipping with Hurricanes while based at Risalpur, around 130 miles east of Kabul and continued the usual frontier air operations for the rest of 1942 and 1943, basing a flight at a time at Miranshah and using other airfields like Kohat, 120 miles ESE of Kabul.

On 3 February 1944 the squadron was transferred to Imphal and remained on the Burma front until April 1945 when it returned to frontier operations at Kohat.

Number 2 squadron formed on 1 April 1941 at Peshawar, the last airfield on the Indian side on the road/rail through the Khyber pass, equipped with Wapati. A two flight squadron, it spent the summer of 1941 on the usual frontier operations, rotating through the usual airfields. These duties continued until 7 October 1944 when it was moved to Burma, remaining there until 17 May 1945 when it returned to the North West Frontier. It converted to Hawker Audax in June 1941, Westland Lysander in December 1941 and Hawker Hurricane in December 1942.

Number 3 squadron formed at Peshawar on 1 October 1941, with Hawker Audax, and again was used over the North West Frontier until January 1945. Hurricane fighter bombers replaced the Audax in November 1943. The tour in Burma lasted until the middle of April 1945 after which the squadron returned to the North West Frontier.

Number 4 squadron formed at Peshawar on 1 February 1942 with Lysanders, Hurricanes arriving from June 1943. North West Frontier operations continued until February 1944 when the squadron went to Burma, initially at Feni. On 19 April 1945 the squadron moved to Yalahanka, Bangalore for conversion to Spitfires.

Number 5 squadron not formed as RAF number 5 squadron was in India.

Number 6 squadron formed at Trichinopoly near Madras on 1 March 1943 with Hurricanes. The squadron flew operations over Burma from 30 November 1943 to early June 1944 after which it went to the North West Frontier, Miranshah.

Number 7 squadron formed at Vizagaptam near Madras on 8 March 1943 with Vultee Vengeance. On 10 March 1944 it moved to Kumbhirgram to conduct operations over Burma. it returned to India in mid June 1944 and in November began converting to Hurricanes. A second tour of Burma was undertaken from March to 22 May 1945 after which the squadron moved from Magwe to Kohat on the North West Frontier.

Number 8 squadron was formed at Trichinopoly on 21 June 1943 with Vultee Vengeance. In mid December 1943 the squadron moved to Double Moorings, 3 miles from Chittagong, for operations that continued until 7 July 1944 after which it withdrew to India to convert to Spitfire VIII. On 28 December 1944 the squadron returned to an airfield near Cox's Bazaar, then to Akyab until 23 February 1945 when the squadron was moved to the defence of Calcutta. On 1 August 1945 the squadron commenced operations from Mingaloon, Rangoon.

Number 9 squadron was formed at Lahore on 16 December 1943 with Hurricanes, it moved to Kulaura on 29 March 1944 for operations, which continued to April 1945 after which it was withdrawn to Ranchi for conversion to Spitfire VIII.

Number 10 squadron was formed at Lahore on 29 February 1944 with Hurricanes. In early December it moved to Ramu in Arakan for operations, which continued until 18 April 1945 when it was withdrawn for conversion to Spitfires.

8, 9 and 10 squadrons were part of the post war air force in Burma until early 1946. There were also 5 Volunteer Reserve Coastal Defence Flights, formed at the end of 1940, 2 at Bombay (1 moved to Cochin), 1 each at Karachi, Calcutta and Madras, formed out of the existing flying clubs. They disbanded towards the end of 1942, with 3 and 4 flights seeing action in Burma, 3 flight from January to March 1942 and 4 flight from December 1941 to January 1942.

Pot. kettle. black.

Typing in front of a mirror helps ego, ruins writing. Counted the various corrections to different people's writings?

Ok so you are saying that no Hurricanes were flying as fighter bombers in the Western desert until mid 1942? If that's the case it's news to me.

This reply is to "80 squadron flying Hurricane I fitted with locally improvised bomb racks for 40 pound bombs was used to test fighter bomber operations, first practice 1 November operations starting 20 November 1941, lasted about a month, being re-equipped with Hurricane IIC in January." The whole point being the need to run away from claimed Hurricanes with 250 pound bombs in early 1942. And the attempt to again slip in fictional P-40 fighter bomber operations in early 1942.

I'm repeating the words of RAAF pilot and squadron leader Clive Caldwell said in a postwar interview. Caldwell, rightly or wrongly, is credited with playing a role in the decision to use Kittyhawks as fighter bombers, partly on the basis of his frustration .

The Blenheim was capable of fast cruise, whether it was being used is another matter. Caldwell arrived in mid 1941 and was leading 112 squadron in December, the Middle East Hurricane fighter bomber trials were in December. The RAF was already doing operations in France. The P-40 standard external rack could carry bombs.

The German fighters were apparently more likely to intercept bombers over or near the target area.

Obvious questions, how often did the German fighters operate over allied airspace (beyond the front line)? How often did the allied strikes hit targets behind the axis front line? And has anyone correlated the raid report times for bombing and interception?

I think here you can see the pattern that the Blenheims were still being used a lot in 1941, but this fell off markedly in 1942. The bomber losses in general dropped off quite a bit, while the fighter-bomber losses spiked after May 1942 with both Hurricane and Kittyhawk losses increasing.

Remember all those adjectives about big bomber losses, more for Blenheim. Never backed up by data, now avoided.

The 350th FG appears to be the unit which was using it's P-39s as fighter-bombers and CAS duties in Italy, before converting to P-47s.

It would seem such sorties were not a main duty and not part of 12th Air force, its mission was adjusted as the situation changed and P-47 became available.

As noted the USAAF P-39 units were rapidly passed to the Coastal Air Force, the 350th receiving a few P-38 to help its patrols., in early September 1943 shoot downs were claimed off Bougie Algeria, in mid October off Cape Tenos. The arrival in Sardinia in early November 1943 enabled missions to Italy, remembering the radius of a P-39 carrying a bomb. In late November units of the 350th still formed part of the defence of Bougie Algeria. In early December operating off Southern France, to Corsica in early February 1944 to fly coastal defence flights closer to the French coast (mostly P-39N but also a B-25 and a Hurricane, no P-38). April 1944 used as part of air strikes in Italy pre the allied offensive, as of 1 April it had 1 P-39M, 74 P-39N, 6 P-47D, 1 B-25C, 3 Hurricane IIC, unit split between Sardinia and Corsica. Aside: as of this date French units under French control held 200 aircraft, including 68 P-39N, the USAAF 12th Air Force P-40 units were P-38F and L.

By end April 1944 the 350th had 1 P-39M, 66 P-39N, 14 P-39Q, 6 P-47D, 3 Hurricane IIC
24 June 1944 now split between Corsica and Italy.
2 September at Tarquinia Italy, 77 P-47D, 14 P-39Q, 1 B-25C, 1 UC-78, 1 L-3, 2 Hurricane IIC, still part of the Coastal Air Force.
30 September, no longer part of the Coastal Air Force, no P-39 on strength.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Most of the Spit V's lost were from the same reasons, difference is they did shoot down Japanese aircraft.

Alas, though they did indeed have a lot of accidents, maintenance problems etc., quite a few were in fact shot down - my understanding is 16 Spitfires were shot down by Japanese aircraft, mostly the A6M and Ki 43 fighters, with another 15 or so lost due to fuel starvation, mechanical breakdown and accidents and so on (during combat) for 31 in total.

The Japanese lost 27 aircraft in combat over Darwin in the same period, including 5 fighters and 16 bombers, 6 recon planes and 1 float plane (and some of these were lost to flak and other reasons). Quite a bit of ink has been spilled on this as well. I recommend the book "Darwin Spitfires: The Real battle for Australia" by Anthony Cooper (2014) if you are interested in knowing anything about this from the real world.

There is also a pretty detailed thread on this very forum as well which includes some of the primary source / wartime documents.

The bottom line though is that in spite of the many very serious maintenance related issues and problems arising due to hasty arrival and inexperience with the Japanese aircraft, the 1st Fighter Wing eventually did fairly well and the Japanese bomber losses in particular forced them to break off the bombing campaign again, so they did their job.

Perhaps amusingly (at least to me) the commander here was the same Clive Caldwell who was so influential in the North African Theater. I actually think he did a pretty good job though he made some mistakes initially (like using the 'Big Wing' tactics which weren't suitable here for a number of reasons) and had to really scramble to make some changes, while also dealing with identifying and fixing problems with aircraft, ammunition, guns, etc.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Quality control insisted on an attempt to see if anything had been learnt, answer is obviously no. I also appreciate some people consider it very rude to be told they are wrong.

Pot. Kettle. Black.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

One thing seems obvious to me, the P-38 would have been a better candidate for the defense of Darwin than either P-40E or Spit V, due to loiter time, speed at altitude, climb rate at higher altitude, concentration of firepower etc.

 

[PAT303]

So er, what did then? UFOs? Wallabees?

I don't think dude was 'alluding' the article is pretty clear. The Japanese lost 19 planes, including 7 fighters and 12 of the G4M bombers which was why the bombing campaign had to be paused. Like I said the longer article is around somewhere it has all the claims (much higher than the real losses on both sides) and the actual losses verified based on Japanese and US records. That's really the whole point of the article.

They also shot down one of the elusive Ki-46 Dinah recon planes during this period, about which much ink is spilled.

Your not answering the question, how many of the 19 Japanese claims were made by P40's, the article is trying to make the claim the P40's were responsible by referencing to the 19 losses, I'm pretty sure the Dinah kills were from MkV/MkVIII's.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Your not answering the question, how many of the 19 Japanese claims were made by P40's, the article is trying to make the claim the P40's were responsible by referencing to the 19 losses, I'm pretty sure the Dinah kills were from MkV/MkVIII's.

In 1942? As far as I know all of the Allied air to air combat victories over Darwin during the period covered in that article (March to August 1942) were by the P-40Es of 49th Fighter Group. I wasn't aware there were any Spitfires in Australia that early, let alone Spitfire VIII. If there were Spitfires flying in combat between March and August 1942 please show me a source, I'd love to see some evidence of it. That would change my understanding of the timelines considerably. I think the only other significant fighter presence in the area in mid 1942 were a couple of US P-39 units and some P-39s lent to the Australians, plus some Wirraways and such.

By the way 49th FG shot down several Ki-46s after they moved to New Guinea and so did 23rd FG in China, using P-40s. They were hard to shoot down but by no means impossible.

 

[PAT303]

In 1942? As far as I know all of the Allied air to air combat victories over Darwin during the period covered in that article (March to August 1942) were by the P-40Es of 49th Fighter Group. I wasn't aware there were any Spitfires in Australia that early, let alone Spitfire VIII. If there were Spitfires flying in combat between March and August 1942 please show me a source, I'd love to see some evidence of it. That would change my understanding of the timelines considerably. I think the only other significant fighter presence in the area in mid 1942 were a couple of US P-39 units and some P-39s lent to the Australians, plus some Wirraways and such.

By the way 49th FG shot down several Ki-46s after they moved to New Guinea and so did 23rd FG in China, using P-40s. They were hard to shoot down but by no means impossible.

Only asking because the claims were three times that number, FYI I'm a huge fan of the P40, it wasn't glamorous like the P51 but like the Spitfire Hurricane and Wildcat it did the heavy lifting when it was most needed.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I've come to understand that overclaiming is pretty much a constant, mainly due to 'Fog of War'.

 

[GregP]

I've come to understand that overclaiming is pretty much a constant, mainly due to 'Fog of War'.

And also due to what is defined as a "victory." The definition changes enough to make it alomost completely unclear what a victory actually IS.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

And also due to what is defined as a "victory." The definition changes enough to make it alomost completely unclear what a victory actually IS.

We've discussed this before, I think you overstate that quite a bit. There is always some wiggle room in interpretation of the data, so to speak, but you just need to arrive at a definition and stick to that consistently, for both sides, and that will give you a fairly reliable ball-park figure. For me, if an aircraft made it back to base after combat, and landed without crashing, it was not 'shot down'. anything short of that including forced landing on the way home I would note as such - i.e. '3 shot down, 1 forced landing'. Which is what researchers like Shores and Claringbould usually do.

But regardless of how you count them, the variation still isn't that wide, and the ratio of overclaiming is similar. It might be 3-1 or it might be 4-1, but either way it's significant overclaming, almost always on both sides. At least when you are talking about Theaters like North Africa, China / Burma / India, New Guinea or the Solomons, you aren't talking about thousands of planes. There are only so many squadrons operating on each side. So if you know that 64th Sentai only has 40 fighters, or a Luftwaffe Jagdgeschwader 27 similarly has 38 fighters, then it's pretty obvious that claims of 15-20 aircraft shot down per engagement on four occasions in a week are just not true when the unit keeps flying day after day and only 2 or 3 pilots or individual aircraft are missing .

And the same works in reverse, needless to say. Is the US 66th fighter squadron only has 16 aircraft, and it's the only unit engaged in a particular part of Libya on a given day, and the Luftwaffe claim 11 destroyed, but it's flying the next day with 15 of those same aircraft, with the same pilots, it's pretty clear that they were not wiped out. Replacement of aircraft and pilots beyond a certain scale are just not that easy to conceal. It's not David Copperfield commanding these units.

The confusion arises when you have big battles with multiple units engaged, it can be pretty hard to figure out who scored a given victory, though even then, loss reports are usually available for each unit involved. So you may not know if it was 66th FS P-409Ls or 145 Sqn Spitfires or 37th FS P-38Gs who shot down the 5 Bf 109F4s that JG 77 reported as 'shot down' or 'failed to return', but you do still know how many each of those units lost, so anybody who claimed 16 victories was definitely overclaiming .

 

[Shortround6]

Getting back to the P-38 and it's "effectiveness" we faced with,

When? Like Dec 1942 or Dec 1943 or Dec 1944?
Where? North West Europe or North Africa or Burma or the Pacific
What? as in compared to either any possible American (army) or allied planes and then compared what axis planes at the same time.

Then we can look at the intended missions and the actual missions (not always the same).

1942 is rather strange year for the P-38. Production is ramping up but slowly compared to P-39, P-40 and even the P-47.
They built 1478 P-38s in 1942 total but around 140 were the P-322s without turbos that were used as trainers by the US. There were also 214 F-4/F-5 photo recon planes built in 1942 (284 in 1943) and production averaged about over 40% higher in the last 6 months than the 1st 6 months.
The USAAC want the P-38s and wanted them badly but without combat experience it was hard to tell what actual combat effect would be. That they hoped for was better plane than the P-39 or P-40 but all three planes were evolving in 1942.
P-38s go from the P-38E through the P-38F and into the P-38G and the P-38H starts coming out the door in March/April 43 but testing started when?
What is a 1942 P-38?
The same for the P-39. from Jan 1942 to December they gone from the D to the P-39N-1, several of these models are just a propeller change but there are 3 different models of engines.
Much the same for the P-40, from E to N in one year and 4 different engines. The Big change being the Merlin but the Merlin only shows up in small numbers before Nov/Dec 1942.

The US Knows in has a problem, the P-39s and P-40s (without Merlins) cannot fight in the high teens let alone any higher against the Germans even at the start of 1942. Knowledge about the ability to fight the Japanese is a lot slower in coming. P-47 deployment to service units slides from May 1942 to Nov 1942. Early P-47s climb slowly. They are fast at over 20,000ft and compared to just about everything else their rate of climb at 20-30,000ft is not too bad.

Kind of leaves the P-38 by default at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943. It has problems but if you need to fight in the high teens or in the 20,000ft range the USAAC has no other choice.
The Fact that the P-38 has the longest range/radius of any of the US Army fighters in Dec 1942 is another plus.

Now in Dec 1944 the P-38 is in 3rd place. The P-47 and P-51 have taken over as the fighters of choice despite the P-38L being a lot better plane than the P-38G.
On the other hand the Germans are not producing enough better fighters. The late model 109s, while dangerous, are not better performing enough to keep the P-38s from operating. The Fw 190Ds are more dangerous but there are not enough of them.
The Japanese are in worse shape. There are very few Japanese fighters in late 1944 or 45 that can fight the P-38Ls at even odds. Both in performance or numbers. This is actual performance which hurts the Japanese as many of their 1944/45 aircraft failed to meet performance numbers due to quality control.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

You kind of glossed over 1943 but I think that was the big year.

In late 1942 there were a handful of very skilled P-38 pilots in two or three squadrons in the Pacific who were able to accomplish substantial gains for the Allied cause. But the overall effect was limited. The average P-38 pilot was not necessarily doing better than pilots of older types, but they could still fly missions that other types couldn't do (or do as well).

In 1943 is the long tipping point of the war. Initially you still have a lot of P-38F and G, but by the second half of the year better model P-38s (H in May and then J by August) are coming out, more squadrons are flying them (I think from 3 in 1942 to 6 and then maybe ten or more by the end of the year?), tactics have been improved, more pilots know how to make better use of their advantages. They are still probably close to parity on average vs Japanese planes, but they can fight in places where the older US fighter types could not, and they can intercept bombers better. In the Pacific the P-38 was joined by other new fighters - first the USMC F4U squadrons, and in November, Hellcats are showing up in raids on Tarawa and Rabaul. By the end of the year the Japanese are starting to take serious losses in air combat.

In the Med the P-38 had trouble initially but they were not an utter catastrophe. All of the Allied units in that Theater had some trouble in early 1943, but P-38s were still in action all year and by the middle to the end of the year the Allies were becoming ascendant in the Theater with the invasion of Sicily in July and mainland Italy in September, coinciding with Italy's first surrender.

In the CBI P-38 units were a minor presence starting only late in the year (November with the 459th FS as far as I can determine). They had a minimal impact in 1943 but they were as in other Theaters extending the effective strike range of Allied forces, and augmented by the arrival of the Spitfire Mk VIII with British forces, were starting to be a headache for the JAAF.

I don't know enough about the 8th AF experiences to opine on that. I gather they were flying missions from October and that there were many problems? Maybe y'all can fill that part in.

By early 1944, the major problems with the P-38 seemed to have been largely addressed. But the politics of the moment and certain specific performance metrics dictated that the P-51 was chosen to be the main escort fighter. Where the P-38 was still in action at this point, (Italy / Southern Europe and the Pacific and in the CBI) it was now typically effective, I would say. It offered some capabilities that other Allied fighters didn't have and it's issues were ironed out.

 

[GregP]

We've discussed this before, I think you overstate that quite a bit. There is always some wiggle room in interpretation of the data, so to speak, but you just need to arrive at a definition and stick to that consistently, for both sides, and that will give you a fairly reliable ball-park figure. For me, if an aircraft made it back to base after combat, and landed without crashing, it was not 'shot down'. anything short of that including forced landing on the way home I would note as such - i.e. '3 shot down, 1 forced landing'. Which is what researchers like Shores and Claringbould usually do.

But regardless of how you count them, the variation still isn't that wide, and the ratio of overclaiming is similar. It might be 3-1 or it might be 4-1, but either way it's significant overclaming, almost always on both sides. At least when you are talking about Theaters like North Africa, China / Burma / India, New Guinea or the Solomons, you aren't talking about thousands of planes. There are only so many squadrons operating on each side. So if you know that 64th Sentai only has 40 fighters, or a Luftwaffe Jagdgeschwader 27 similarly has 38 fighters, then it's pretty obvious that claims of 15-20 aircraft shot down per engagement on four occasions in a week are just not true when the unit keeps flying day after day and only 2 or 3 pilots or individual aircraft are missing .

And the same works in reverse, needless to say. Is the US 66th fighter squadron only has 16 aircraft, and it's the only unit engaged in a particular part of Libya on a given day, and the Luftwaffe claim 11 destroyed, but it's flying the next day with 15 of those same aircraft, with the same pilots, it's pretty clear that they were not wiped out. Replacement of aircraft and pilots beyond a certain scale are just not that easy to conceal. It's not David Copperfield commanding these units.

The confusion arises when you have big battles with multiple units engaged, it can be pretty hard to figure out who scored a given victory, though even then, loss reports are usually available for each unit involved. So you may not know if it was 66th FS P-409Ls or 145 Sqn Spitfires or 37th FS P-38Gs who shot down the 5 Bf 109F4s that JG 77 reported as 'shot down' or 'failed to return', but you do still know how many each of those units lost, so anybody who claimed 16 victories was definitely overclaiming .

There's the rub, define it and stick to it. The USAAF and USN/USMC weren't able to do that. The Axis weren't able to do that, either. What counted as a victory early in the war might not be counted later, and vice versa. Early on, they didn't count ground victories. Later, they did, the USAAFF first and then, only sometimes, the USN/USMC.

Romania had very creative ways to give victory credits. 3 point for a 4 or 6-engined aircraft. 2 points for a 2 or 3-engined aircraft. 1 point for a sinbgle-engine aircraft. Points were also awarded for shared victories. What flavor do you want today?

 

[Steamed_Banana]

There's the rub, define it and stick to it. The USAAF and USN/USMC weren't able to do that. The Axis weren't able to do that, either. What counted as a victory early in the war might not be counted later, and vice versa. Early on, they didn't count ground victories. Later, they did, the USAAFF first and then, only sometimes, the USN/USMC.

Romania had very creative ways to give victory credits. 3 point for a 4 or 6-engined aircraft. 2 points for a 2 or 3-engined aircraft. 1 point for a sinbgle-engine aircraft. Points were also awarded for shared victories. What flavor do you want today?

I think the implication here that you have to follow a given nation or military branches' definition of a victory is false, because they still record the number of enemy aircraft they believe were 'confirmed' destroyed in the air. That's the number of victory claims. If you want to use the Romanian system you can, if you want to count 'ground kills' you can, but that doesn't necessarily mean you are required to do so as a modern researcher. I can understand why the Romanians wanted to give more credit to 4 engine bomber victories during the war, since that was the threat to the refineries etc. The USAAF was counting 'ground kills' for a while in the hopes of encouraging fighter pilots to take more risks in strafing enemy airfields for a while (at great peril, I might add). But I believe that reverted after the war. And in the internal records, regardless, they did record claims broken down by air to air and 'ground' in the daily mission records.

Much more interesting, regardless, is the actual number of losses on both sides. That is what tells us what really happened.

And it also tells us that overclaiming happened in every Theater, and by every air force or military branch flying aircraft. Usually at a fairly high rate.

I also should mention, I get the impression sometimes when we are having this discussion that you are thinking in terms of total victories (vs actual losses) for the entire war by branch of service or such, but I'm not sure anyone has even attempted that seriously to date. But on the level of an individual battle or campaign, within a particular Theater, it seems to be in reach.

 

[GregP]

I think the implication here that you have to follow a given nation or military branches' definition of a victory is false, because they still record the number of enemy aircraft they believe were 'confirmed' destroyed in the air. That's the number of victory claims. If you want to use the Romanian system you can, if you want to count 'ground kills' you can, but that doesn't necessarily mean you are required to do so as a modern researcher. I can understand why the Romanians wanted to give more credit to 4 engine bomber victories during the war, since that was the threat to the refineries etc. The USAAF was counting 'ground kills' for a while in the hopes of encouraging fighter pilots to take more risks in strafing enemy airfields for a while (at great peril, I might add). But I believe that reverted after the war. And in the internal records, regardless, they did record claims broken down by air to air and 'ground' in the daily mission records.

Much more interesting, regardless, is the actual number of losses on both sides. That is what tells us what really happened.

And it also tells us that overclaiming happened in every Theater, and by every air force or military branch flying aircraft. Usually at a fairly high rate.

I also should mention, I get the impression sometimes when we are having this discussion that you are thinking in terms of total victories (vs actual losses) for the entire war by branch of service or such, but I'm not sure anyone has even attempted that seriously to date. But on the level of an individual battle or campaign, within a particular Theater, it seems to be in reach.

It isn't "false" in any way. Nobody claims a victory unless it meets the requirments of his/her air force FOR a victory. The scores are only those that the review boards, if any are used, think meet the criteria for a victory in that particular air force, at that particular time.

What in the world are you thinking? The definition of a victory is at the heart of the scores!

 

[Steamed_Banana]

It isn't "false" in any way. Nobody claims a victory unless it meets the requirments of fis air force FOR a victory. The scores are only tyhose that the review boards, if any are used, think meet the criteria for a victory in that particular air force, at thath particular time.

What in the world are you thinking? The definition of a victory is at the heart of the scores!

I'm saying the data as to how many aircraft that airforce believed they shot down is recorded as such. You can count that any way you want to in a modern analysis. You don't have to use the criteria used at the time if it counts a particular type of aircraft as two or three or four victories, or if it counts shared victories as a whole victory for multiple pilots, or if it counts destruction of an aircraft on the ground as a victory. It's pretty simple.

 

[GregP]

I'm saying the data as to how many aircraft that airforce believed they shot down is recorded as such. You can count that any way you want to in a modern analysis. You don't have to use the criteria used at the time if it counts a particular type of aircraft as two or three or four victories, or if it counts shared victories as a whole victory for multiple pilots, or if it counts destruction of an aircraft on the ground as a victory. It's pretty simple.

If you don't use the criteria at the time, you are left with claims submitted to one standard and a reviewed by someone with less than full understanding of the claims at the end, sometimes over 80 years later.

If you think that has any validity at all, then please don't do any research that draws conclusions from historic data since you apparently don't understand that historic data, as far as numbers go, is collected to very specific criteria. Any data NOT meeting the criteria for a victory is classified as they classified it at that time.

Sometimes a true victory was called "probable" or "damaged" because the action met the criteria used at that time for those categories. Later, if the criteria changed which, in the case of the U.S.A., they did, there was no effort expended to go back and correct earlier scores to match the new criteria. So, any victories were victories at the time they were awarded, not necessarily later or even after the war was over. Later still, in the 1960s and beyond, people bagan getting almost stupid about what they wanted to call a victory or not, depending on what their objective at the time was.

Case in point was the tremendous effort to discredit Greg Boyington just so Joe Foss could have a good South Dakota Governor's campaign, It seems to have worked since most texts now quote Boyinbgton as having fewer victories because they only count his victories in the service of the U.S.A. (as if the AVG weren't stood up and operated with US equipment), but somehow don't apply that to US citizens who fought for the RAF, RCAF, or RAAF.

Using the data without knowing what it stands for is a basic error.