GregP
Major
Of all the things I've lost, I miss my mind the most ...
Effectiveness of the P-38 (3 Viewers)
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drgondog
Major
Is there a point you wish to offer? The members of this forum can walk and chew gum, research, look at other folk's research and draw conclusions that claims, victory credits vs actual aircraft destroyed and acknowledged - have many sources with different claims of government sponsored authenticity claiming to be 'nuttin but d'trooth'. All more or less, interestingly, contradict each other to varying degrees.
You are free to offer your own version. We will neither laugh or be amazed.
Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
All kinds of sources should be approached cautiously.
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,115
- Sep 29, 2025
!? I never said you should laugh or be amazed, I think (I hope!?) i explicitly said it wasn't meant to "prove" anything. However, I will say that I don't think Shores is very far off the mark in his coverage of the losses on both sides in the Mediterranean Theater, and that he is in fact pretty close to 'd'trooth' as you put it. But maybe I lack the gum chewing skillz of some of the rest of you. I'm not convinced (to put it mildly) that it's impossible to know what planes got shot down or to verify that overclaiming was routine etc.
That post you are referring to is just one example of what amounts to the daily outcomes from a few days of the detailed operational history, which is the kind of data I always find interesting. Maybe some of y'all don't care about that and only care about other perspectives or scales.
I hope somebody appreciated it because it was a pain in the ass to transcribe.The only point is that I wrote my opinion upthread, in a post intended to summarize the P-38 history in what i see as the pivotal year for the type (and many others) of 1943, in an attept to veer from off-topic derails back to the OP. One point i made was that the P-38 was 'doing a bit better' by mid 1943, which was challenged since it was just opinion, so I posted some of the data meant to show how I arrived personally at that opinion.
I'm sure there are some in here who will read exactly the same data and conclude that the Fw 200 Condors actually shot down all of the P-38s in the world during 1943 and also flew bombing missions to the moon and back, taking no casualties in the process, and recovering fine cheese which the German Condor aces enjoyed.
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,115
- Sep 29, 2025
Highlighted this bit of the post you were referring to, in case you missed it.
I have added yellow highlighting to this part of said post, to (perhaps) make it easier to read and understand:
- Thread starter
- #406
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,115
- Sep 29, 2025
Yeah I think I'm going to take a break from the forum for a couple of weeks. I don't think my contributions are appreciated or helping much lately.
Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
I for one appreciate your inputs. I don't like the bile being spewed, but you can easily avoid that by ignoring those who offer it, and not replying in kind.
I don't have the command of detail that many others have, but I'm happy to absorb opinions and impressions as well as datasets and welcome your inputs.
GregP
Major
Especially political sources and sources of knowledge about how women think ...
GregP
Major
I have had those times, too, and took some time to reflect.
When I came back, I didn't seem to look any better in the mirror ... and the mirror was being nice at the time. Years later, it still doesn't like me. So, I make sure to fog it over every morning in the shower.
BarnOwlLover
Staff Sergeant
One problem with sources is that they can contradict each other, or may not tell the whole story. I found that out researching the P-51 Mustang, namely the Merlin variants. One example, most commonly sited initial climb rate is 3450-3500 fpm. Not that impressive for the second half of World War II, right? But that's at (IIRC) near max take off weight and on either military power (61 in/Hg supercharger boost) or the early War Emergency/combat rating of 67 in/Hg. Later in the war when 150 octane fuel became common, Merlin P-51s were being run at 75 or even 80+ in/HG, which, combined with combat weight ratings, could climb at 4400+ fpm. That was likely a bit faster when set up as an interceptor. And that's not getting into the lightweights like the XP-51F/G or the P-51H or the XP-82/P-82B.
Admittedly, I'm not as familiar with the P-38, but the same does apply. One of the best sources for performance info is World War II Aircraft Performance's website. They also do have pilot encounter reports, though these may be of varying accuracy depending on the where and when.
But a few things did work against the P-38, especially in the ETO. Availability and a relatively low production rate/cost was one of them. A P-51 was much cheaper and simpler to build than the much larger, more complex P-38. Even the P-47 was less expensive than the P-38. And it's relative complexity was also an issue for maintenance crews and pilots, namely the peculiarities of high alt. flight, things that often didn't exist in the MTO or Pacific. Here, the Mustang and even Thunderbolt excelled. Not to mention that, as posted, it took a while to get all the bugs worked out on the P-38J and for it to reach it's definitive configuration with fully reliable turbos, remedied cockpit issues and especially powered ailerons.
And you do also have to remember that there was the P-38K, which never entered production due to concerns of disrupting production and Lockheed had no other factory where they could phase in the changes without disrupting issues. NAA and Republic did have multiple factories building fighters where different production blocks could be implemented.
Though, I think it would be fair to point out that NAA were prepared to introduce the P-51H as early as the fall of 1944, but the USAAF told them to hold off, due to concerns that it would disrupt production of the D model at the main Inglewood plant, and the P-51D with the higher supercharger boost/engine power levels was sufficient in terms of overall performance to take on known German and Japanese fighters aside from the Me-262 and the Me-163, which were small in number, had their own problems and, as with all types, had relatively few pilots who could get the best out of them.
Sometimes, the best is the enemy of the good, and vice versa.
Admittedly, I'm not as familiar with the P-38, but the same does apply. One of the best sources for performance info is World War II Aircraft Performance's website. They also do have pilot encounter reports, though these may be of varying accuracy depending on the where and when.
But a few things did work against the P-38, especially in the ETO. Availability and a relatively low production rate/cost was one of them. A P-51 was much cheaper and simpler to build than the much larger, more complex P-38. Even the P-47 was less expensive than the P-38. And it's relative complexity was also an issue for maintenance crews and pilots, namely the peculiarities of high alt. flight, things that often didn't exist in the MTO or Pacific. Here, the Mustang and even Thunderbolt excelled. Not to mention that, as posted, it took a while to get all the bugs worked out on the P-38J and for it to reach it's definitive configuration with fully reliable turbos, remedied cockpit issues and especially powered ailerons.
And you do also have to remember that there was the P-38K, which never entered production due to concerns of disrupting production and Lockheed had no other factory where they could phase in the changes without disrupting issues. NAA and Republic did have multiple factories building fighters where different production blocks could be implemented.
Though, I think it would be fair to point out that NAA were prepared to introduce the P-51H as early as the fall of 1944, but the USAAF told them to hold off, due to concerns that it would disrupt production of the D model at the main Inglewood plant, and the P-51D with the higher supercharger boost/engine power levels was sufficient in terms of overall performance to take on known German and Japanese fighters aside from the Me-262 and the Me-163, which were small in number, had their own problems and, as with all types, had relatively few pilots who could get the best out of them.
Sometimes, the best is the enemy of the good, and vice versa.
drgondog
Major
The question I had about what you were posting, was merely what you were attempting via a dump of combat diaries on a day by day basis. You have explained that and I have no issue with your approach. FWIIW I used the same general scheme in providing a month by month recount of the airwar between 8/9th AF and LW. I also stated my sources as a context reference for the reader.
Reasonable folks could make their own judgements about the totals, but have a source to review to understand how I distilled the presented data
The effort is appreciated, not sure what conclusions you expected. If the loss data was via Shores, then you should continue the source presentation to Shores' sources such as Prien, Woods, Caldwell via LW Records or Squadron histories (Prien), etc.That post you are referring to is just one example of what amounts to the daily outcomes from a few days of the detailed operational history, which is the kind of data I always find interesting. Maybe some of y'all don't care about that and only care about other perspectives or scales.
Once again, not clear what you were attempting?
Not with this group.
From my perspective, you managed to step on a rake with Sinclair by over emphasizing 'author' sources in your extensive library and when confronted about your presentation/conclusions you were unable to dive through the author's rendition in arguing with him to pull the author's sources as a contribution. In my own books, I draw conclusions, express opinions and present them, but I always footnote the source to lead a reader questioning my conclusion to the root document source. That said, I have been guilty of deriving a fact based opinion, that is contradictory in 'fact' with another equal or more credible source, that results in changing my mind.
Geoffrey Sinclair, Colin Ford, Dave Lednicer, Calum Douglas and Henning, to name a few, have contributed to higher education.
You might consider that you can learn from them - even when you disagree.
special ed
1st Lieutenant
- 7,062
- May 13, 2018
I enter this thread with my own experiences as a general info source. In my "library" I have in excess of two thousand aviation books and sources (I'm not going to count) dating back to the 1950s. Having read most, and read-at the others, I must tell the members that my regrets are that I did not put markers in the pages with something I may want to reference. Although I may remember a comment/situation, I can no longer remember which publication. At 85, I no longer have the time to reread these tomes, as I have models to complete. I am a bit embarrassed about the banana as he appears to be in my immediate area. He, I hope, will learn that a few expensive books does not an expert make.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
You also need to really, really like P-39s.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,267
- Sep 30, 2021
A lot of good advice and some bad flowed across the Atlantic both ways during WWII, the effects sometime lingering all war. Did not stop the western allies, like everyone else, making mistakes, some big. It did save a lot of allied lives. The US looks like it was the least likely to make the same mistake twice.
There are always complications figuring out peace time army strengths given counting reserves. For Britain there was the Indian army where a third of the infantry was British, along with most of the artillery etc. Considered important enough to receive the top graduates from Sandhurst pre WWI, which meant the best academic army officers were in the area where they were most likely to be shot at, the various frontier wars, but least likely to see modern equipment. Then comes the Dominion armed forces.
As of September 1939 the British Army had a nominal 29 division HQ in Britain, 3 in the Middle East, actual strength can be more listed as the 13 divisions that made it to France by end April 1940 but then 3 of them were infantry only, more a work force than combat troops, and other 1939 divisions would never leave Britain. The 7th Armoured Division in the Middle East provided the armour in 1940 while the infantry came from mostly from the Dominions and India. In terms of Division HQ the British army did little expansion in WWII.
In the US in September 1939 the US Army had 5 division HQ, 3 infantry and a cavalry in the US, 1 infantry in Hawaii. After losses, disbandments and reorganisations that would rise to 95 active at peak. It was 9 by end June 1940 when a sense of urgency resulted in expansion to 36 by end April 1941. February to December 1942 the count went from 39 to 76, February to August 1943 it went from 76 to 94, 5th Marine in January 1944 and 6th Marine in August were offset by the disbandment of 2nd Cavalry in May. Each burst of expansion tended to reduce the effective strength of the army for a while. It explains the relatively few US Army deployments overseas in 1942/43.
A lot of the US industrial expansion, particularly in aviation, was financed by Britain and France in 1939/40, not only the actual orders but paying for factories.
Using the treaty numbers as of April 1940 the allies held 21 battleships to 11 German and Japanese, as of end June the RN was outnumbered by Germany + Italy + Japan and was wondering what some of the French battleships might do. The loss of France ensured the RN had to leave the Far East. To change that required understanding German Army doctrine. Apparently until the 1940/41 opportunities appeared the Japanese had no plans for war with European powers, just the USSR and USA, China was just supposed to be gradually absorbed or subordinated, not fight a lot.
The phase lines everyone knows about from Overlord were for supply purposes, as the armies continued to fall short of them disquiet went up. Caen was supposed to fall on D-Day, St Lo within a week, Avranches by around D+19, or 25th June, instead it took until around July 30. Montgomery went with the battle is here, not there, get on with it, as long as most Panzer divisions are holding the line the allies are on top. Ultimately came arrival at the D+365 lines around D+90.
To be cheeky also running lots of day operations post D-Day. Given the available escorts and Bomber Command experience with radar bombing, no deeper than the Ruhr with is near perpetual industrial haze.
Montgomery kept pushing for a ground forces commander in France, which included an offer to serve under Bradley, Eisenhower vetoed both ideas. A first question is what the position would gain the allies, history says not a lot. To stay neutral it comes down to how the army and army group commanders were gaining combat experience in a way Eisenhower could not given the respective duties, plus the expansion from 1 to 3 Army groups. Bradley reflects the regular split on opinions about Montgomery, usually praise when subordinate, usually criticism when parallel or superior. Patton of course was quite confident and quite patriotic (we are the best) and had a very different approach to Montgomery. Never seen Devers opinion of Montgomery though I know Devers and Eisenhower did not get along very well. It would be good to see what General Simpson thought, as 9th Army commander he spent a lot of time under Montgomery's command.
As supreme commander Eisenhower won campaigns, his generals won battles.
The presence of non USN intelligence sources helped break the deadlock between Washington and Hawaii about where the Japanese were going, Johnson or Midway islands. Plus the timing of operations to take Nauru and Ocean islands.
The 40mm Bofors was a British recommendation. More importantly the language of USN carrier fighter control was RAF Battle of Britain.
Australia and New Zealand were easily more important than Britain even if you just count the local supplies, especially food. Against that the Australians have comments about US command. MacArthur from the start subverted the ordered joint command structures, keeping US units away from Australian command and Australian units in the combat areas under US command. The first US infantry division deployed to New Guinea was National Guard, plenty of reservists, plenty of new people, never trained as a division. The first Australian one was all volunteer, in uniform for over 2 years and combat experienced. MacArthur reacted badly to the near inevitable gap in initial performance.
The Canadians have some comments about how their forces were treated by the British and for the RCN in particular the USN.
The LST design ideas came from the British, refined by the US which is why the US version can be called the LST III, both countries had input into the smaller landing craft designs. The US Marines went their own way with the LVT idea. The British experience of Torch etc. formed part of the feedback. Each landing was done better, which gave Overlord a greater chance of success.
The main British influence on US carrier operations came from the WWI and post WWI exchange of information, after that came fighter direction and of course radars using cavity magnetrons.
The US army division sent to relieve the Marines on Guadalcanal was commanded by Lawton Collins. As a corps commander in Normandy he was one of the few able to cope with Bocage country.
The initial German doctrine was to avoid tank versus tank, use the anti tank guns on enemy tanks, the British were more the other way, the US went with German ideas but moved much of the anti tank firepower to tank destroyers. As the tanks and guns became bigger the Germans moved more towards British ideas, the Panther's gun for example.
Lockheed A turned out B-17 and Ventura
Lockheed B was turning out Hudson, along with transports when it started P-38 production, it took well into 1943 before P-38 became almost all output.
Inglewood was building trainers before B-25 and P-51 production started in 1941, trainers went to Dallas in 1942, B-25 to Kansas City in 1944.
Dallas started trainer production in 1941, B-24 and P-51 in 1943, dropped B-24 in 1944.
In January 1945 the first order had started, to be completed in October, second order to complete in January 1946, third order in July 1946, all up 2,400 formally ordered, 2,500 provisionally ordered.
The Mustang program was trimmed from 14,800 total to 11,300 in April 1945, went up and down a bit, still 10,931 in July (On order plus already accepted)
Only the US could have continued effective fighting into 1946.
There are always complications figuring out peace time army strengths given counting reserves. For Britain there was the Indian army where a third of the infantry was British, along with most of the artillery etc. Considered important enough to receive the top graduates from Sandhurst pre WWI, which meant the best academic army officers were in the area where they were most likely to be shot at, the various frontier wars, but least likely to see modern equipment. Then comes the Dominion armed forces.
As of September 1939 the British Army had a nominal 29 division HQ in Britain, 3 in the Middle East, actual strength can be more listed as the 13 divisions that made it to France by end April 1940 but then 3 of them were infantry only, more a work force than combat troops, and other 1939 divisions would never leave Britain. The 7th Armoured Division in the Middle East provided the armour in 1940 while the infantry came from mostly from the Dominions and India. In terms of Division HQ the British army did little expansion in WWII.
In the US in September 1939 the US Army had 5 division HQ, 3 infantry and a cavalry in the US, 1 infantry in Hawaii. After losses, disbandments and reorganisations that would rise to 95 active at peak. It was 9 by end June 1940 when a sense of urgency resulted in expansion to 36 by end April 1941. February to December 1942 the count went from 39 to 76, February to August 1943 it went from 76 to 94, 5th Marine in January 1944 and 6th Marine in August were offset by the disbandment of 2nd Cavalry in May. Each burst of expansion tended to reduce the effective strength of the army for a while. It explains the relatively few US Army deployments overseas in 1942/43.
A lot of the US industrial expansion, particularly in aviation, was financed by Britain and France in 1939/40, not only the actual orders but paying for factories.
Essentially nothing, beyond the Japanese could launch amphibious operations quicker and with less shipping than the British could. There was not a lot of jungle in China, so the Malayan one could continue to be marked impassable, Singapore needed no landward defences and could draw its water supply from the mainland. Despite a population of around 560,000 and little local food production a siege could be withstood for the time it took for the RN to move from Britain to Singapore. (Malta had a population of around 240,000 and some local food supply)
Using the treaty numbers as of April 1940 the allies held 21 battleships to 11 German and Japanese, as of end June the RN was outnumbered by Germany + Italy + Japan and was wondering what some of the French battleships might do. The loss of France ensured the RN had to leave the Far East. To change that required understanding German Army doctrine. Apparently until the 1940/41 opportunities appeared the Japanese had no plans for war with European powers, just the USSR and USA, China was just supposed to be gradually absorbed or subordinated, not fight a lot.
Nothing, very different operations, Dieppe showed trying for a port first up was combining the two most difficult army operations, urban warfare plus amphibious assault. There are a range of views about the operation including whether it was necessary at all. The Gooseberry and Mulberry ideas were used in Normandy.
The Anzio lesson learnt was set ambitious first day targets, it meant no need to issue new orders on D+1, it avoided the problems of objectives achieved, now what? Conference time. The Germans proved better at using the time.
The phase lines everyone knows about from Overlord were for supply purposes, as the armies continued to fall short of them disquiet went up. Caen was supposed to fall on D-Day, St Lo within a week, Avranches by around D+19, or 25th June, instead it took until around July 30. Montgomery went with the battle is here, not there, get on with it, as long as most Panzer divisions are holding the line the allies are on top. Ultimately came arrival at the D+365 lines around D+90.
100 Group was formed on 3 December 1943, to control night fighters used to directly attack German night fighters as a form of escort, the numbers expanded in 1944 and the release of the latest radars meant the Mosquito employed had about as big an edge on the average German night fighter as the P-51 had over the Bf109G-6 and Fw190A. The Mosquito panic term began to be used.
To be cheeky also running lots of day operations post D-Day. Given the available escorts and Bomber Command experience with radar bombing, no deeper than the Ruhr with is near perpetual industrial haze.
Agreed, time and again training prepares you but there is always a lot to learn from actually doing it. Post France in 1940 the British did a clear out of the army commanders whose peace time promise did not translate into effective combat command. The US army had to do a lot of that in France in 1944. As an aside, using simulators you can easily tell real pilots from the computer game people, the real pilots brace for the G when they initiate a turn
In 1942 Churchill had a point, the British units were generally better trained and would use equipment better and sooner, the trade off between something now and something bigger and better later, after 1942 it was more the opposite. Churchill, and the British command, also knew the long term trend which is why Eisenhower was in charge of Torch despite minority US involvement, but were not going to give up without a fight. The British plus Canadians largely matched US ground forces in France to end July 1944. During overlord Montgomery was commanding an Army Group for the first time, Dempsey and Bradley armies, compare that to Von Rundstedt and Rommel, the allies were engaging an army that was generally more experienced, from junior NCO up.
Montgomery kept pushing for a ground forces commander in France, which included an offer to serve under Bradley, Eisenhower vetoed both ideas. A first question is what the position would gain the allies, history says not a lot. To stay neutral it comes down to how the army and army group commanders were gaining combat experience in a way Eisenhower could not given the respective duties, plus the expansion from 1 to 3 Army groups. Bradley reflects the regular split on opinions about Montgomery, usually praise when subordinate, usually criticism when parallel or superior. Patton of course was quite confident and quite patriotic (we are the best) and had a very different approach to Montgomery. Never seen Devers opinion of Montgomery though I know Devers and Eisenhower did not get along very well. It would be good to see what General Simpson thought, as 9th Army commander he spent a lot of time under Montgomery's command.
As supreme commander Eisenhower won campaigns, his generals won battles.
The human ability to remember when someone else was wrong better than when we were. Then comes teaching versus experience as the way to learn.
Not control as such. The US and Britain joined forces to crack IJN codes in 1941, each had made about as much progress as the other with little overlap on recoveries. The Australians started their effort as well. By April 1942 warnings about the IJN Indian Ocean attack could be made, in May more details about the Coral Sea operation but that did not stop Admiral Fletcher discovering the unpleasant news the main IJN carrier force was behind him. At Midway the prediction of where the IJN carrier force would be was accurate to 5 minutes, 5 degrees, 5 miles. The 1942? general agreement then saw the British concentrate mainly on European Axis codes.
The presence of non USN intelligence sources helped break the deadlock between Washington and Hawaii about where the Japanese were going, Johnson or Midway islands. Plus the timing of operations to take Nauru and Ocean islands.
The 40mm Bofors was a British recommendation. More importantly the language of USN carrier fighter control was RAF Battle of Britain.
Australia and New Zealand were easily more important than Britain even if you just count the local supplies, especially food. Against that the Australians have comments about US command. MacArthur from the start subverted the ordered joint command structures, keeping US units away from Australian command and Australian units in the combat areas under US command. The first US infantry division deployed to New Guinea was National Guard, plenty of reservists, plenty of new people, never trained as a division. The first Australian one was all volunteer, in uniform for over 2 years and combat experienced. MacArthur reacted badly to the near inevitable gap in initial performance.
The Canadians have some comments about how their forces were treated by the British and for the RCN in particular the USN.
Switching leadership and more realistic deployments helped. The rapid US "bug out" enabled British units heading to the combat to pick up lots of useful equipment, it also apparently convinced General Harold Alexander US troops were not that good, an opinion he did not change. US involvement in the remaining fighting was kept limited as a result. Sicily was more the redemption, the planning for which was close to a master class of Montgomery annoying everyone, while keeping the main role for 8th Army. By the way General Anderson who commanded the 1st British Army in Tunisia was also not rated that well.
Harris notes British losses of heavy bombers attacking Germany at night in 1945 came to around 1.5%, the USAAF statistical digest says 8th AF heavy bomber losses were around 1.2% of effective and 1% of airborne sorties.
Airborne almost nothing, the initial ideas were from the Germans. The February 1942 Bruneval raid was the first real British paratroop success. 1st British airborne division formed in November 1941, the US 82nd Airborne formed in March 1942.
The LST design ideas came from the British, refined by the US which is why the US version can be called the LST III, both countries had input into the smaller landing craft designs. The US Marines went their own way with the LVT idea. The British experience of Torch etc. formed part of the feedback. Each landing was done better, which gave Overlord a greater chance of success.
The main British influence on US carrier operations came from the WWI and post WWI exchange of information, after that came fighter direction and of course radars using cavity magnetrons.
Essentially none, all armies were building their infantry formations based on squads that had an automatic weapon, the Germans the MG 38/42 the British the Bren, the US the BAR. The Bazooka was a nice addition for the infantry, as anti tank guns became heavier they were harder to move and hide so it made more sense to make them self propelled, but that could leave the infantry vulnerable.
The US army division sent to relieve the Marines on Guadalcanal was commanded by Lawton Collins. As a corps commander in Normandy he was one of the few able to cope with Bocage country.
British armoured warfare was their main problem. The tank brigades understood their tasks and worked well with the infantry. The armoured brigades/divisions kept rejecting combined arms tactics and suffered accordingly, it took until 1944 to finally make the tactics standard. The 1940 crisis delayed the appearance of the 6 pounder gun by more than a year, which should have pushed combined arms tactics even more to compensate for the gap in tank firepower as the Germans moved from 37mm to 50mm guns.
The initial German doctrine was to avoid tank versus tank, use the anti tank guns on enemy tanks, the British were more the other way, the US went with German ideas but moved much of the anti tank firepower to tank destroyers. As the tanks and guns became bigger the Germans moved more towards British ideas, the Panther's gun for example.
The forward Observation Officer idea and authority. The initial siege of Tobruk required British guns work with Australian infantry near instantly. The way to do this was have people from the artillery alongside the infantry and able to call in fire. As it was used came evidence pairing infantry and artillery units worked even better. As it became standard the FOO was given authority to call in more than just the guns from his unit, so able to quickly deliver a lot of firepower. The US adopted it. The Germans had decentralised their artillery trading speed and firepower and never caught up to the western allied tactics.
I would amend that to the US as a whole was way behind the curve, leading to a major defeat off the US coast in 1942.
Yes and no, certainly behind the Germans and the experienced British, but facing an unknown quantity in the IJN caution was preferred, and somewhat justified given torpedo problems.
Good data, what would be useful is a calendar month's results, which could be compared to things like the Statistical Digest and take the analysis from there.
And then throw the progress away again.
None of the P-38, P-39 or P-40 had a second line until the P-38 in 1945, the P-47 was to have 3 lines, the P-51 one until changes were made. Sort of shows the USAAF thinking on fighter force composition. Implementation of new blocks was a production management issue, not a number of production lines issue, if anything more lines complicated things.
Lockheed A turned out B-17 and Ventura
Lockheed B was turning out Hudson, along with transports when it started P-38 production, it took well into 1943 before P-38 became almost all output.
Inglewood was building trainers before B-25 and P-51 production started in 1941, trainers went to Dallas in 1942, B-25 to Kansas City in 1944.
Dallas started trainer production in 1941, B-24 and P-51 in 1943, dropped B-24 in 1944.
Do you have more details on this? Were the engines available? P-51H are first mentioned in January 1944 on a new contract. By April 1944 the order schedule is 617 by end 1945, 383 later, as of August all 1,000 by November 1945, plus a second order which will follow the first, by December 1944 the second order to be finished in May 1946.
In January 1945 the first order had started, to be completed in October, second order to complete in January 1946, third order in July 1946, all up 2,400 formally ordered, 2,500 provisionally ordered.
The Mustang program was trimmed from 14,800 total to 11,300 in April 1945, went up and down a bit, still 10,931 in July (On order plus already accepted)
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,115
- Sep 29, 2025
Ok I can't resist making one last parting comment since y'all decided to opine on me personally.
So did I, right at the top of that post.
If you still can't understand what I was 'attempting' after I spelled it out very clearly three times, then I have to conclude that you just aren't trying.
I didn't even say that was 'my' library, i was pointing out several authors and specific sources who I know are respected around here because I've seen many people reference them including in this thread (and I don't mean by me).
There is a lot of great knowledge in here, I have learned a lot from this forum over many years as a lurker before I actively posted, and subsequently after i started posting as well. Probably a third of my own 'library' comes in one way or another from this forum. But let me just share with my possible neighbor mr "Special Ed" - I share your sentiment, and right back at you 'padnuh', because several of you people are just embarrassing.
(By the way colored 'postit' notes can be a good way to mark your books for future reference without damaging them. Can be done incrementally every time you go back to look something up or re-read.)
There is also a fair amount of confusion in any forum like this since people come from every part of the world and background, but this also gives room for people with a malicious streak to jam their chisels in and try to make a spurious point while ginning up some pointless debate. When you try to give a little grace to the people who may just misunderstand something (or who you might not understand initially), you open yourself up to that nonsense from the childishly vindictive ones.
To be clear,
When one or two people start throwing mud, you either leave the room for a while or you will end up with mud all over you, and all over everyone else. I am not the one throwing mud in here. Some of y'all do it on a regular basis especially to people who aren't part of your little circle of those who "contributed to higher education" in your estimation.
Which is why a lot of threads here start out interesting and collegial but end up in kindergarten food fights. Which among old men, is embarrassing.
See you in February
.
So did I, right at the top of that post.
If you still can't understand what I was 'attempting' after I spelled it out very clearly three times, then I have to conclude that you just aren't trying.
I didn't even say that was 'my' library, i was pointing out several authors and specific sources who I know are respected around here because I've seen many people reference them including in this thread (and I don't mean by me).
There is a lot of great knowledge in here, I have learned a lot from this forum over many years as a lurker before I actively posted, and subsequently after i started posting as well. Probably a third of my own 'library' comes in one way or another from this forum. But let me just share with my possible neighbor mr "Special Ed" - I share your sentiment, and right back at you 'padnuh', because several of you people are just embarrassing.
(By the way colored 'postit' notes can be a good way to mark your books for future reference without damaging them. Can be done incrementally every time you go back to look something up or re-read.)
There is also a fair amount of confusion in any forum like this since people come from every part of the world and background, but this also gives room for people with a malicious streak to jam their chisels in and try to make a spurious point while ginning up some pointless debate. When you try to give a little grace to the people who may just misunderstand something (or who you might not understand initially), you open yourself up to that nonsense from the childishly vindictive ones.
To be clear,
- I never said I had a better library than anyone else here. I'm certain that mine is lesser to middling range compared to the average poster here, to be clear.
- I never said that pilot memoirs are always or automatically correct. I have no idea where anyone got that (I don't think they actually did).
- I never said that primary sources always overrule secondary sources.
- I never said that primary sources are always correct (or don't contradict one another). I'm very well aware of that. Even 'archive' sources do so routinely.
- I never said that secondary sources always overrule primary sources, needless to say.
- I am not making a 'mea culpa' in any respect. I'm reacting to the dysfunction of a few of you in here, not me and not most of the people contributing to the threads.
When one or two people start throwing mud, you either leave the room for a while or you will end up with mud all over you, and all over everyone else. I am not the one throwing mud in here. Some of y'all do it on a regular basis especially to people who aren't part of your little circle of those who "contributed to higher education" in your estimation.
Which is why a lot of threads here start out interesting and collegial but end up in kindergarten food fights. Which among old men, is embarrassing.
See you in February
.
Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
Shoot this thread already.
drgondog
Major
A master class in history. I learned more in five minutes regarding differences in assets and applied tactics of the British Army than I brought to the table.
As an aside, my comment about Bomber Command losses in 1945 was not about loss rate per sortie but some very good LW night fighter successes continuing in 1945 despite excellent capabilities of the Mosquito in the escort/intruder role. I have opinions regarding why escorting RAF Bomber Command at night in 1945 was still far more difficult than the daylight US experience.
But, as the XP-51F was only in final stages of fabrication and not flight tested, there were still concerns by Mat.Cmd. regarding structural integrity of the '75ST' aluminum applications as it was pre-production Alcoa and home grown at NAA.
Mat.Cmd. did agree to the NA-126 P-51H but it was a complete re-design save the wing of the XP-51F and XP-51G/H and design features such as moving header tank aft of cockpit and retaining the oil cooler/aftercooler heat exchange approach. That said, the long flat 85gal fuse tank was replaced with an upright 50gal tank, which combined with the added wing fuel of the NA-117, closely approached a P-51D. Given the lower weight, near similar Range performance with only 14 gallons less fuel with just 24ST aluminum as primary structure, the innovative but risky 75ST (per MC) was replaced as primary structure.
The fuselage of NA-126 was stretched 13 inches, all aft of the firewall. The wing was moved ~ 6 in further aft with the aft wing station of the mount located at approximately the back of the pilot's seat, fuel tank located there, and radios and header tank aft of the fuel tank.
As an aside, my comment about Bomber Command losses in 1945 was not about loss rate per sortie but some very good LW night fighter successes continuing in 1945 despite excellent capabilities of the Mosquito in the escort/intruder role. I have opinions regarding why escorting RAF Bomber Command at night in 1945 was still far more difficult than the daylight US experience.
Geoffrey, the NA-117 P-51H was 'doable' in fall 1944 because it was to be the production version of XP-51G with projection into V-1650-9 to replace the Merlin RM 14 SM. The NA-117 P-51H Specification was delivered in October 1943 when the entire debate regarding minimum internal fuel for all 1944 P-51 deliveries was finally reaching conclusion. I have not found proof that it was proposed with the final wing fuel cell design, as the Specification focused on armament, engine, external load and general features, but was told anecdotally by Ed Horkey that the left wing cell was increased from 75gal to 100gal to mitigate lack of fuselage fuel tank. Combined with right wing fuel cell with 105gal, it was a 30 gal lower fuel quantity with nearly the same projected combat radius.
But, as the XP-51F was only in final stages of fabrication and not flight tested, there were still concerns by Mat.Cmd. regarding structural integrity of the '75ST' aluminum applications as it was pre-production Alcoa and home grown at NAA.
Mat.Cmd. did agree to the NA-126 P-51H but it was a complete re-design save the wing of the XP-51F and XP-51G/H and design features such as moving header tank aft of cockpit and retaining the oil cooler/aftercooler heat exchange approach. That said, the long flat 85gal fuse tank was replaced with an upright 50gal tank, which combined with the added wing fuel of the NA-117, closely approached a P-51D. Given the lower weight, near similar Range performance with only 14 gallons less fuel with just 24ST aluminum as primary structure, the innovative but risky 75ST (per MC) was replaced as primary structure.
The fuselage of NA-126 was stretched 13 inches, all aft of the firewall. The wing was moved ~ 6 in further aft with the aft wing station of the mount located at approximately the back of the pilot's seat, fuel tank located there, and radios and header tank aft of the fuel tank.
BarnOwlLover
Staff Sergeant
Not related to the main topic, but is there a reason why the left wing fuel tank was always at least somewhat smaller than the right wing's fuel tank?
I've love to see a technical cutaway of a P-51H and a XP-51F/G for comparison someday.
I've love to see a technical cutaway of a P-51H and a XP-51F/G for comparison someday.
