Effectiveness of the P-38 (5 Viewers)

[Thumpalumpacus]

If there were already such tables, it's a safe bet that everyone here would know about it

But while I know some people (to me very mysteriously) discount or down-rate operational history as facts, this is ultimately where the statistics come from, and I think they do 'rate' as useful and valid sources, even if they are incomplete or we can't be 100% certain about them (as we ever can for any historical records). I'm sure someone will count up losses and claims in the Mediterranean soon, and likely CBI as well. Pacific war operational history is still being compiled but that will come too.

I'm not sure why you think I'm discounting op history. I'm not. What I'm pointing out is that that is not conclusive. It'd be nice of you to not misrepresent what I'm writing, thanks.

Once these come out, as I already noted, needless to say people will contest them (sometimes for good and valid reasons, and quite often for crazy / delusional / emotional ones) and we'll be back in the weeds in the operational history anyway.

Until all this happens, we can just ignore operational history and believe that P-38s and F4Us and P-51As shot down 11-1 or 25-1 or whatever ridiculous the propaganda claim says, or we can start to look at it and draw provisional conclusions or at least make observations.

Well it's a good thing I never wrote any of that crap!

Again, it'd be nice of you to not misrepresent what I'm writing.

Potentially that is true, as I've already pointed out, but we also have cases where for example both Ki-43s and A6Ms were operating against the same targets in the same area in the same conditions. You'll never be able to definitively prove anything but you can reach a more informed perception of the realities than was possible 30-40 years ago.

Of course. But until you can pin down the reasons for any differentials, it's not convincing to me.

Thank you so much, I'm delighted to have permission. My opinion wasn't, by the way, necessarily that machine guns are as good as cannon, all things being equal. It's the all-things being equal part. All things aren't equal and that's precisely the difficulty.

You wrote "I don't think, based on this, that we can say that Ki-43s had a particularly harder time shooting down US heavy bombers than most typical fighters did. The A6Ms didn't do particularly better," which is tantamount to saying the two armament layouts are roughly equal in efficiency.

And of course all things aren't equal. That's why ascribing any one cause to subjectively selected cases is fraught with uncertainty.

Let me pose to you a few questions to you then.

Hawker Hurricane Mk IIC with four 20mm cannon. Top speed 330 mph.
P-39Q one 37mm cannon, four .50 caliber machine guns. Top speed 380 mph.
P-51A with 6 .50 caliber machine guns. Top speed 390 mph.

Are any of these better fighters than a Ki-43-I (two machine guns, top speed 308 mph)? I believe the operational history clearly tells us "no".

It depends on what you're trying to do with those planes. I'll bet that Hurricane is much better at destroying ground vehicles. I'll bet that P-51 is better at getting snapshots off that are still heavy in throw-weight. Assuming that the different results are due to plane quality ignores other factors like pilot quality, mission planning and aircraft suitability, and so on.

Hawker Typhoon four 20mm cannon, top speed 412 mph vs Bf 109F2 with one 15mm and two 7.92 mm machine guns top speed 382 mph. Which one was better?

At what?

Spitfire Mk VB two 20mm cannon and four 7.7mm machine guns vs Bf 109F2 with one 15mm and two 7.92mm machine guns. Which was better?

At what?

Hawker Hurricane Mk IIC with four 20mm cannon, vs MC 202 with two 12.7mm and (maybe) two 7.7mm machine guns. Which was better?

At what?

Bf 110 two 20mm cannon and four 7.92 mm machine guns, 360 mph vs Yak 1B with one 12.7mm and one 20mm cannon, top speed 367 mph. Which came out on top?

Depends on what you're trying to do with the planes, what mission profile you're trying to impose upon them, which pilot got a better briefing or a better night's sleep, etc.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

By the way, I think this is amusing considering the extreme push-back I get from mentioning the operational histories (including accusations that i was 'library bragging' etc.) when I learned about most of these books and book series like Bloody Shambles, and Mediterranean Air War, and First Team and Black Cross / Red Star from this very forum. Data from these sources were brought up to me to disprove various claims I was making, so I eventually tracked them down and came to the conclusion that they were very useful sources, and same goes for some newer ones like Claringbould's work on the South Pacific.

Now all the sudden it seems like nobody ever heard of these and feels like a general contempt for the very idea of using operational history as a means of understanding anything about the war...

This is a clear misstatement of what is being told to you -- whether it's deliberate or unintentional, it tells me that further conversation with you will be pointless. So I'll move along and leave you to your unsupported assumptions and circular reasoning. Later, tater ... I'm out.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I'm not sure why you think I'm discounting op history. I'm not. What I'm pointing out is that that is not conclusive. It'd be nice of you to not misrepresent what I'm writing, thanks.

well buddy, I never said it was conclusive, in fact I directly pointed out and stated clearly that it's all provisional etc. So you are putting words in my mouth as well, though I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and assume not intentionally.

Well it's a good thing I never wrote any of that crap!

Again, it'd be nice of you to not misrepresent what I'm writing.

See above

Of course. But until you can pin down the reasons for any differentials, it's not convincing to me.

It doesn't have to

You wrote "I don't think, based on this, that we can say that Ki-43s had a particularly harder time shooting down US heavy bombers than most typical fighters did. The A6Ms didn't do particularly better," which is tantamount to saying the two armament layouts are roughly equal in efficiency.

Only when you include the other factors, obviously. We don't necessarily know what those are but can guess - Ki-43 had better roll and didn't lock up controls at high speed for example. It was even more agile than the A6M.

And of course all things aren't equal. That's why ascribing any one cause to subjectively selected cases is fraught with uncertainty.

There is really never any certainty in history.

It depends on what you're trying to do with those planes. I'll bet that Hurricane is much better at destroying ground vehicles. I'll bet that P-51 is better at getting snapshots off that are still heavy in throw-weight. Assuming that the different results are due to plane quality ignores other factors like pilot quality, mission planning and aircraft suitability, and so on.



At what?



At what?



At what?



Depends on what you're trying to do with the planes, what mission profile you're trying to impose upon them, which pilot got a better briefing or a better night's sleep, etc.

In every case, which prevailed in a direct engagement, typically. Which do you think has a better chance in a dogfight against the other, which in fact historically came out on top in most cases, in aggregate.


Of course we can always say that a pilot who ate a better breakfast, had a good night's sleep, didn't have dysentery, and was better trained would often win. But at some point this becomes absurd, because obviously the aircraft mattered as well. If it really accounted for everything then they could have just kept producing Neuport 17s or Albatros etc. and put all their efforts into better barracks and more training.

Reality says that people in the military service, in positions of leadership and down to the squadron level, had to contend with the realities and draw conclusions from outcomes and observations, and not just statistics for things like rate of climb and top speed, and weight of firepower. That is what I'm aiming at here.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

This is a clear misstatement of what is being told to you -- whether it's deliberate or unintentional, it tells me that further conversation with you will be pointless. So I'll move along and leave you to your unsupported assumptions and circular reasoning. Later, tater ... I'm out.

Right back at you "Hitchen's Razor" I'll stick to William of Ockham's version.

 

[SaparotRob]

I like Gillette disposables.

 

[Shortround6]

Now all the sudden it seems like nobody ever heard of these and feels like a general contempt for the very idea of using operational history as a means of understanding anything about the war...

The problem is reconciling the Operational histories with the expected/anticipated results from performance data.
Both sides seldom take pilot skill into account and pilot skill covers a number of things. Pilots with hundreds of hours can still be "green" (little or no combat experience).
Better/more guns is important but simply doubling the guns does not result in double the number of kills.
Many operational reports do not accurately record the altitudes being fought at. A number of times they may give the altitude that fight starts at or the altitude when the enemy is first spotted. Which may be several thousand feet from where fire is first exchanged, let alone hits are made. Some fights started at around 20,000ft or above and didn't end until near the ground. Which speed was the plane flying at??? Trick question, if the planes were banked they were not flying a max level speed at any altitude.

Not saying that the operational histories should be held in contempt (although claims are a bit doubtful). They tell us what happened. Figuring out why is a lot harder.
Pilots who kept their heads down in the cockpit looking at instruments didn't tend to last very long. G meters only showed up in small numbers at the very end of the war. Pilots that were pulling 4 or more Gs for more than a few seconds were on the verge of blacking out as noted by a few pilots in their encounter reports. Steady state Hi G turns were probably rare.
Many pilots flew sort of zig-zag. Bad term but pilot pulled a lot of Gs and came close to blacking out and then eased off the turn just enough to get some/most of his vision back and the tightened the turn again for a few seconds and keep repeating. Individual pilot's G tolerance came into play as did both cockpit layout and the pilot's health. Trying to fight after 2-3 day spell of dysentery is going to make a mockery of minimum turn radius specs.

Performance specs, if detailed enough, tell us what should happen with planes in good condition and with healthy, well trained pilots in "average" weather conditions.
Now the combat reports tell us what happened with planes in both good and poor condition, with pilots in various conditions of health (pilot making the report only knows his own health) with varying degrees of skill and in varying temperatures/weather conditions.
A fair amount of "grey" on both sides of the question.
But ignoring combat reports too much in war time in favor of test results can mean you are not giving your pilots enough performance to give them a good margin enable good results.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It appears that someone doesn't understand what "So I'll move along and leave you to your unsupported assumptions and circular reasoning. Later, tater ... I'm out" means.

This is simple English. You can earn your way back onto my monitor, or you can permanently lose this reader.

That won't be accomplished by meaningless emojis, either. I prefer intelligent communications.

 

[Shortround6]

As mentioned by other/s

Hawker Hurricane Mk IIC with four 20mm cannon. Top speed 330 mph.
P-39Q one 37mm cannon, four .50 caliber machine guns. Top speed 380 mph.
P-51A with 6 .50 caliber machine guns. Top speed 390 mph.

Are any of these better fighters than a Ki-43-I (two machine guns, top speed 308 mph)? I believe the operational history clearly tells us "no".

What are you trying to do?
Unless the Ki-43 dives from above and unless the allied pilots are stupid the Ki 43 pilot cannot force the allied pilots to fight. Unless the Allied pilots are flying bomber escort they don't have to engage the Ki-43-1. In the reverse the Ki-43 cannot leave the battlefield. They can turn to avoid getting shot down by high speed pass (or not high speed in the case of the Hurricane) but they may subject themselves to further attacks before they get out of the area.
Now Hurricane IICs are going to be deadly if they get into a formation of Japanese twin engine bombers. Ki-41s can shoot down allied bombers but not in the numbers that Hurricane pilots could, given equal skill levels. P-39Qs depend a lot on the 37mm cannon for firepower against bombers, against fighters things may not go so well. P-51A has got good firepower against most things even if not great. Hurricanes with four 20mm guns against barges or truck or trains are rather deadly.

Hawker Typhoon four 20mm cannon, top speed 412 mph vs Bf 109F2 with one 15mm and two 7.92 mm machine guns top speed 382 mph. Which one was better?
Spitfire Mk VB two 20mm cannon and four 7.7mm machine guns vs Bf 109F2 with one 15mm and two 7.92mm machine guns. Which was better?

Well, we are now comparing planes from different years with the Typhoon and the 109F2. The Spitfire VB is much closer in timing. The 109F2 was a good airplane for an expert, not so good for low time pilots. 109F2 vrs bombers gets a little iffy. Even the Germans agreed with this as they started putting 20mm cannon in the 109F4 in the summer of 1941(?). If I was trying to shoot down an He 111 or a Ju 88 I want the two 20mm guns in the Spitfire.

Hawker Hurricane Mk IIC with four 20mm cannon, vs MC 202 with two 12.7mm and (maybe) two 7.7mm machine guns. Which was better?
Bf 110 two 20mm cannon and four 7.92 mm machine guns, 360 mph vs Yak 1B with one 12.7mm and one 20mm cannon, top speed 367 mph. Which came out on top?

Back to better for what? The MC 202 is a faster, better turning, better climbing fighter. As a bomber destroyer or straffer it is not not so good.
Are we talking about a 1940 Me 110C or a 110E or a 110F from late 1941? Yak 1B didn't show up until the fall of 1942, about 4-6 months after the 110G starts showing up DB 605 engines. Still can't climb or turn well but I know which plane I would want to fly over the Bay of Biscay or the Med

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The problem is reconciling the Operational histories with the expected/anticipated results from performance data.

Totally agree. I think the operational histories can perhaps help us find or focus on performance specs which we didn't rate previously. For example I notice that in recent years roll rate is starting to be recognized as being more important.

Both sides seldom take pilot skill into account and pilot skill covers a number of things. Pilots with hundreds of hours can still be "green" (little or no combat experience).
Better/more guns is important but simply doubling the guns does not result in double the number of kills.

That is definitely the case, agreed.

Many operational reports do not accurately record the altitudes being fought at. A number of times they may give the altitude that fight starts at or the altitude when the enemy is first spotted. Which may be several thousand feet from where fire is first exchanged, let alone hits are made. Some fights started at around 20,000ft or above and didn't end until near the ground. Which speed was the plane flying at??? Trick question, if the planes were banked they were not flying a max level speed at any altitude.

Again, totally agree. Sometimes they give some details about altitude, particularly in individual pilot accounts (which guys like Shores include frequently in their books), but it's spotty at best. We really can't make an accurate picture of the altitude.

Not saying that the operational histories should be held in contempt (although claims are a bit doubtful). They tell us what happened. Figuring out why is a lot harder.

Totally agree. And I think that is the fun part.

Pilots who kept their heads down in the cockpit looking at instruments didn't tend to last very long. G meters only showed up in small numbers at the very end of the war. Pilots that were pulling 4 or more Gs for more than a few seconds were on the verge of blacking out as noted by a few pilots in their encounter reports. Steady state Hi G turns were probably rare.

I saw an interview with a stunt / warbird pilot who flies Corsairs at air shows. He performs a variety of maneuvers in his run - loops, slow rolls, chandelles, etc. but these are probably not as extreme as what would be done in actual combat. And he noted that he could only sustain that level of maneuvering for about 8-10 minutes. That was kind of eye opening to me...

Many pilots flew sort of zig-zag. Bad term but pilot pulled a lot of Gs and came close to blacking out and then eased off the turn just enough to get some/most of his vision back and the tightened the turn again for a few seconds and keep repeating. Individual pilot's G tolerance came into play as did both cockpit layout and the pilot's health. Trying to fight after 2-3 day spell of dysentery is going to make a mockery of minimum turn radius specs.

Agree yet again. I know that in North Africa a few of the top aces were rugby players who had neck muscles which helped stay awake during high G turns and pull-outs. Pulling G was something that apparently a lot of Hurricane and Spitfire pilots weren't sure how far they could push during the BoB.

Performance specs, if detailed enough, tell us what should happen with planes in good condition and with healthy, well trained pilots in "average" weather conditions.

Yes, this assumes though that the specs are accurate to field conditions, and that we are tracking all the specs that really matter. For example, I'm not sure how many G a Ki-43 can pull.

Now the combat reports tell us what happened with planes in both good and poor condition, with pilots in various conditions of health (pilot making the report only knows his own health) with varying degrees of skill and in varying temperatures/weather conditions.
A fair amount of "grey" on both sides of the question.
But ignoring combat reports too much in war time in favor of test results can mean you are not giving your pilots enough performance to give them a good margin enable good results.

Part of the problem was also A) identifying enemy aircraft correctly, which was particularly hard for pilots in the Pacific and CBI, and B) knowing what the performance envelope of the enemy aircraft was, which they often didn't know until enemy aircraft had been captured. And even then such information has to be communicated back to the units. In North Africa they captured several Axis fighters and brought them to the squadrons, Bobby Gibbes describes doing this with a captured Bf 109 - they flew mock combats and let the pilots fly it, so they could understand it's strengths and limitations. I think the Japanese fighters were mysterious for a bit longer, even into 1944 they were still referring to "Oscars" as "Zekes" sometimes.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

As mentioned by other/s

What are you trying to do?
Unless the Ki-43 dives from above and unless the allied pilots are stupid the Ki 43 pilot cannot force the allied pilots to fight. Unless the Allied pilots are flying bomber escort they don't have to engage the Ki-43-1. In the reverse the Ki-43 cannot leave the battlefield. They can turn to avoid getting shot down by high speed pass (or not high speed in the case of the Hurricane) but they may subject themselves to further attacks before they get out of the area.

I would note that this didn't seem to happen until the Spit VIII and P-51D showed up. Maybe a little bit against P-40s and P-38s. Ki-43s seemed to be able to disengage, they also notably chased down P-38s and P-51As for long distances and shot them down (two such examples are mentioned in the operational data I posted from Burma upthread, but this happened several other times). How this worked I really don't know. Pilots of Hurricanes and P-40s, P-51As and P-38s etc. did sometimes manage to pull off energy fighting tactics mind you, but they didn't seem to have the kind of dominance via speed that one might expect.

Now Hurricane IICs are going to be deadly if they get into a formation of Japanese twin engine bombers. Ki-41s can shoot down allied bombers but not in the numbers that Hurricane pilots could, given equal skill levels.

I'd say that is debatable in terms of outcomes, but perhaps also due to tactics. In the Mediterranean, the Hurricane IIC was largely struggling against Axis fighters by 1942, but they still occasionally shot down large numbers of bombers. But I've yet to see examples of that that I can remember in Bloody Shambles. This is maybe because the JAAF seemed to escort their bombers with very large fighter escorts, much more so than was typical in North Africa. And maybe it's because their bombers (like Ki-21s and Ki-48s) were a bit faster.

I don't know, it's a mystery and I'd like to figure it out.

P-39Qs depend a lot on the 37mm cannon for firepower against bombers, against fighters things may not go so well. P-51A has got good firepower against most things even if not great. Hurricanes with four 20mm guns against barges or truck or trains are rather deadly.

That's true for strafing etc., though crazy enough, Ki-43s were used for ground attack too, apparently with some success. And even post-war.

Well, we are now comparing planes from different years with the Typhoon and the 109F2. The Spitfire VB is much closer in timing. The 109F2 was a good airplane for an expert, not so good for low time pilots. 109F2 vrs bombers gets a little iffy. Even the Germans agreed with this as they started putting 20mm cannon in the 109F4 in the summer of 1941(?). If I was trying to shoot down an He 111 or a Ju 88 I want the two 20mm guns in the Spitfire.

It seemed like the F2 or the F4 (which though up-gunned, still has less guns than a Spit VB or VC, let alone a Hurricane IIC) had better outcomes in general, and they shot down a lot of bombers especially early on.

Back to better for what? The MC 202 is a faster, better turning, better climbing fighter. As a bomber destroyer or straffer it is not not so good.
Are we talking about a 1940 Me 110C or a 110E or a 110F from late 1941? Yak 1B didn't show up until the fall of 1942, about 4-6 months after the 110G starts showing up DB 605 engines. Still can't climb or turn well but I know which plane I would want to fly over the Bay of Biscay or the Med

Bf 110 does have a range advantage, no doubt about that.

I'd still rather be in the Yak in a dogfight though.

But my point was just to highlight the obvious which you already said in an earlier post - more guns isn't automatically better.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

One possibility vis a vis guns, is that guns in the nose (as we typically see with planes that were armed with only 2 or 3 guns) may have been significantly more accurate than wing guns.

 

[Shortround6]

One possibility vis a vis guns, is that guns in the nose (as we typically see with planes that were armed with only 2 or 3 guns) may have been significantly more accurate than wing guns.

As a long time target shooter (well over 10,000 rounds of high power ammo at 200yds and beyond) and not taking some peoples word for things. I can see more than a few problems with this statement. I do like the word may though
We have the accuracy of the gun.
We have the accuracy of the ammo.
We have the stiffness of the mount/mount system. Not all wings flopped around the same
We have the trajectory of the gun. German MK 108 and MG FF are rather notorious in this regard.
We have the time of flight to different ranges, closely linked to the trajectory but not completely.

Once we get through all the theoretical or test stand data we can talk about practical accuracy.
How much accuracy do I need to hit (or get the number of hits needed) on a 109 fuselage/cockpit vs getting hits into a He 111 fuselage (granted there is a lot of empty space in an He 111 fuselage). Adjust target size to fit the fuselage of your choice. Spitfire or Short Stirling or Ki 43 vs Ki 21 or G4M

you can get a lot of hits in the G4M that would be misses on a Zero. It makes a B-25 look svelte
B-24s and B-17s have a crap ton of target area.
French fighters bolted the 20mm cannon to the engine, Bf 109 bolted the gun to a structure behind the engine and just put the barrel through a tube. The gun never touched the engine. Accuracy could go either way depending on how badly the Hispano engine vibrated. German gun was isolated from the engine vibration.

A lot of these factors may cross over.
Suppose I am trying to get all my shots into a 6 in circle (15cm) at 200yds. If I can hold the gun in an area that is 1 minute of angle I can get a gun and ammo combination that does 2 MOA to actually get all hits in the 3 MOA taget area. If my hold is only 2 MOA I need a 1 MOA gun/ammo to get the desired 3 MAO total.
Sometimes the less accurate gun/ammo is easier to hold (balances better) compared to the theoretical more accurate gun. Or the less accurate gun has a better trigger or a better sight set up. A lot of things that can vary for the same result.

Moving targets are a lot harder.
British may have used loose gun mounts in the wings for more dispersion at times. There was one "pattern" that pointed each of the eight guns in a slightly different direction so at least one gun would be on target. But they could not spend a few more hours practicing?
There were several German aces that liked the one cannon in the fuselage and there were several others that hated it. detailed analysis is rather lacking. One of the anti-single gun aces did say he didn't like it for new pilots. He thought they would be better served by firing more shells per second.

Now the Germans only built a few 109Fs with the same gun in the fuselage as they used in the wings of 109E. When they went to the MG 151/15 they went to a faster firing gun so the reduction in rate of fire was not as bad as it looked. The 15mm gun also has one of the shortest times of flight to the target of any WW II aircraft gun meaning the pilots didn't have to use as much lead on the target for deflection shooting. Neither of these 2 points seems to show up in the quotes. The MG 151/20 fired the same ammo as the MG FF over 100m/s faster so while not as good as the MG 151/15 it still didn't need as much lead as the MG FF did.
When comparing the American .50 cal to the Italian or Japanese 12.7mm guns the American ammo had a MV of 850-880ms depending on bullet and barrel length. The Italian and Japanese ammo had a MV of around 760-770m/s. American bullets were heavier and more streamline so their times of flight were shorter (less lead).
Maybe the shorter time of flight helped cancel out the lack of accuracy from the wing mounts?
Many pilots fired from too great a distance anyway. If the cross-over on the wing guns is set for 300yds and the pilot opens fire at 900yds he is going to miss regardless of where the guns are mounted.

Soviets had a very good 12.7mm gun (heavier bullet than the American and only slightly slower) but the 20mm used poor design shells. Good velocity but light and poorly shaped. The High velocity didn't last long. Get close and all was good. Trying to shoot at 400-500 meters meant that the shells did not arrive on target at the same time.

There is a lot more stuff in air gunnery ballistics that most aviation authors either don't know or figure it is not worth confusing their readers. The Japanese army 12.7mm gun was light for it's power and while it was not as powerful as the American .50 it was lighter and fired a bit faster so it's practical power was about the same for the amount of gun weight.
But two guns was not enough anymore that two .50s would have been enough in the early P-40s.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Great pic of the G4M

 

[GregP]

Not as easy to fudge as the guesses as to how many enemy aircraft were shot down!



Yes but the 'operational losses' are still recorded, and the authors who publish the operational histories have been recording these right alongside those reported as MiA / failed to return, or shot down, or crash landed already for years. The reader can decide how to interpret data like "1 shot down, 2 MiA, 2 crash-landed, 2 engine failure and lost on the way home"

Deciding precisely how to total all this up is always tricky, but you can easily end up with a range based on different types, and that can tell you that even in the above case, they clearly didn't lose 25 aircraft. So we know the claims were inflated... it's just a matter of whether you count the above as 3 real losses, 5, or 7. You can present the outcome as a range if you want to total it up (i.e. in this theoretical example, between 3-7 lost, vs 25 claimed.)



See above. You could use this argument to negate the claims totals too, or any data set.

Fairly ludicrous, first line above. There was almost nobdoy intentionally putting in victories that were false. Yes, there were likely a few. Very damned few.

By far, most were honorable errors, like when two aircraft were shooting at the same aerial victim, and it goes down, with gun camera film from both being used as evidence, from two different angles. Another easy way is a claim from a gunner in a bomber stream. If he is shooting at an enemy aircraft, it is likely that 5 - 8 others are also shooting at the same airplane. Who really got the kill? REALLY tough to say. So, in many cases, all the gunners got a credit. Very easy to overclaim, but each individual claim was honestly sublitted, a very large majority of the time.

Also, if the enemy dived into a cloud, in flames, with pieces falling off, I'd likely submit a claim, too. But, the enemy COULD have recovered.

Last, and not for the first, second, or third time, you need the exact definition of a victory in use at the time, for the kill you are investigating. Sometimes, a ground kill was disallowed, sometimes it was counted. Sometimes an unmanned aircraft, like a V-1, was counted, sometimes not. Sometimes it had to be armed and sometimes not. What about an airplane on-deck, on a carrier thath you sink? It THAT a gound kill? What if you kill the enemy pilot, but his very forgiving airplane lands itself, possibly out of fuel, and it is revivered and flown again. Is THAT a kill?

Very many questions and very many ways to make a victory claim confusing to someone who wants a black-and-white definition.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Fairly ludicrous, first line above. There was almost nobdoy intentionally putting in victories that were false. Yes, there were likely a few. Very damned few.

By far, most were honorable errors, like when two aircraft were shooting at the same aerial victim, and it goes down, with gun camera film from both being used as evidence, from two different angles. Another easy way is a claim from a gunner in a bomber stream. If he is shooting at an enemy aircraft, it is likely that 5 - 8 others are also shooting at the same airplane. Who really got the kill? REALLY tough to say. So, in many cases, all the gunners got a credit. Very easy to overclaim, but each individual claim was honestly sublitted, a very large majority of the time.

Also, if the enemy dived into a cloud, in flames, with pieces falling off, I'd likely submit a claim, too. But, the enemy COULD have recovered.

Last, and not for the first, second, or third time, you need the exact definition of a victory in use at the time, for the kill you are investigating. Sometimes, a ground kill was disallowed, sometimes it was counted. Sometimes an unmanned aircraft, like a V-1, was counted, sometimes not. Sometimes it had to be armed and sometimes not. What about an airplane on-deck, on a carrier thath you sink? It THAT a gound kill? What if you kill the enemy pilot, but his very forgiving airplane lands itself, possibly out of fuel, and it is revivered and flown again. Is THAT a kill?

Very many questions and very many ways to make a victory claim confusing to someone who wants a black-and-white definition.

All claims were inflated, intentional or not. It is what happens when you're in a furball with multiple shooters at 250mph, and that's not addressing victory standards for the air force in question.

Expecting humans to reliably track such stuff in the heat of the moment is unreaslitic.

 

[ThomasP]

FWIW

A few of bits of info that might be useful in this discussion:

IJA and IJN fighter pilots were taught the concepts of pretty much all the basic combat maneuvers - including the preference to dive on, make a gunnery pass at the enemy fighter, then regain altitude again (ie boom-and-zoom) - before the war with the US and UK began. This tactic was used quite often against the Chinese, and against the various foreign squadrons like the AVG. The Japanese mostly used the 3-plane formation with a leader and 2 wingmen, however they were somewhat flexible and sometimes used 2 pairs depending on whether the number allowed one tactic or another.

As the war progressed IJA pilots (in particular) were taught to attack US bombers from the front if possible and/or shoot for the cockpit if possible, where 2x 7.7mm/.303 cal or 2x 12.7mm or a combination thereof could be quite effective. Both IJA and IJN fighter pilots were taught to close to as close a range as practical before opening fire. Also, a 3-plane section would usually all attack the same bomber in a short, slightly offset line astern format, increasing the chance of hits on the target and (hopefully) not allowing the bomber gunners time to switch targets while maintaining a near continuous stream of fire.

NOTE Before anyone pooh-poohs the above statements, this is known doctrine from training manuals and post-war interviews (including debriefs by US intel agencies) of Japanese pilots. I also find it interesting that so many people seem to think that when pilots like Boelcke, Galland, etc, say some of the same things it is accepted as gospel, and lauded as so great and explains so much of their success, but when it is said by/about the Japanese pilots it is ignored/discounted as a part of their success.


re range and cruise speeds of the Japanese fighter aircraft

Both the Ki-43-II and A6M2/3/5 were capable of sustained 300 mph TAS rich-mixture cruise (though obviously this decreased their range) and their normal minimum cruise was around 250-280 mph TAS when anywhere they figured they might encounter enemy aircraft. The only time they cruised at particular low speeds was if they were deploying (reinforcing in UK terms) over long distances, on CAP duty (when loiter was really important), or on the return leg to their base or carrier. (NOTE that in the PTO the standard USN/USAAF and RAF/FAA flight profiles were similar to the IJA/IJN in most cases, with low speeds being used for CAP loiter and the return leg flown at best V/weak-mixture cruise for range.) The A6M2 with its centerline DT could cover well over 1000 miles at 250 MPH TAS at 15,000 ft with reserves for combat and loiter. The Ki-43 had similar range when using drop tanks. 280 mph TAS was the approximate maximum weak mixture cruise for both aircraft. I am not sure about the Ki-43, but the A6M2/3 could sustain max speed for 1/2 hour or more without overheating.

These ranges are enough to escort their bombers for most missions, and there are quite a few mentions of A6Ms escorting Betty's and such at altitudes of 20,000 ft or higher. Yes, there were some bombing missions where the ranges were beyond the fighter's practical range, but this was true for the Allies as well. The Allied bombers flew at altitudes higher than 15,000-20,000 ft in the ETO, so it would be considerably more problematic for the early-war Japanese fighters to escort/attack them at such high altitudes. Over Japan, the Ki-43 and A6M both had the altitude capability, but their speed at 25,000-30,000 ft meant that they could usually only make one head-on pass against the B-29s, while against B-17s and B-24s they could usually do 2 or more passes depending on the altitude, formation, etc.


re claimed kill ratios of the USAAF and USN

Despite what appear to be claims to the contrary, the USN did not make any in-depth attempt to validate kills by its pilots. This makes sense to very large degree for several reasons. One reason is simply because it was not important in the grand scheme of things. Having an ace was good for morale, having a bunch of aces was even better. It was also impractical to arrive at accurate numbers without discounting their pilot's claims - and that would be bad for morale. And what purpose would this serve in the eyes of the higher ups - the war was over, the Allies had won. I am not saying that the higher-ups did not think it important at all, just that there were much more important things to deal with.

The actual kill numbers accepted were arrived at by interviewing the squadron commanders (or similar) and asking them if there was any reason to believe any of the claims were not valid. Sometimes the questions would be extended to other squadron mates, or other personnel who were at the fight. What else were they going to do? Send out search parties to scour every square mile of every island in the PTO? Send divers to the bottom of the ocean where the action took place to look for wreckage of aircraft, write down the aircraft serial number, then match the number to particular Japanese and Allied squadrons, then to a particular mission and to a missing Japanese pilot? As has been pointed out in this discussion (and in others on this forum and other forums) when the actual loss of aircraft or pilot in the squadron rosters do not match the enemy claims (eg the supposedly shot down aircraft and pilot are recorded as returned home after the mission), and this sort of thing happens over and over again, there is no rational argument than can be made that the kill claim relative to the actual kill:loss ratio is accurate. This has nothing to do with any attempts at honesty, or deceit on the part of the pilots or the higher-ups, only a lack of numerical accuracy due to one factor or another in the fog of war.

Incidentally, despite stories to the contrary, the Japanese did not destroy any significant number of their squadron records, though it did happen when the Japanese forces were forced to retreat and there was no time or load carrying ability for transport. A significant number of squadron records were lost due to sinking of carriers and destruction of the base installations holding the records. Most such records were confiscated by the Allies in a similar manner to what happened in Europe. Some records were destroyed by order of the Allies after the war. Some of this was due to the attempt at demilitarization of the Japanese society, in a similar manner to the demilitarization/deNazification of Germany, and some of it was due to operational studies, and some of this was in order to control the narrative after the war.

As mentioned up-thread, the accounting in the ETO and to a degree the MTO was a bit easier due to most of the action being more localized and over land. Yet even in the ETO, as time marches on and more and more records are found and analyzed, we still find evidence in the squadron records that seriously change the kill:loss claims. Again, this has nothing to do with any attempt at honesty or deceit on the part of the pilots or higher-ups, only a lack of numerical accuracy due to one factor or another in the fog of war. The population density in Europe means that most of the shot down aircraft that crashed on land and were unaccounted for have been found, though 1 or 2 are still found each year. In the vast open ocean and remote islands and jungles of the PTO and CBI there are still 1 or 2 found each year.

Note that most of the confiscated records were returned at a later date, when and if depending on the nature and perceived importance. Some are still classified and have not been released due to their declassification "not being in the [US] national interest".


re the G loads of Japanese aircraft and WWII aircraft in general

Japanese pre- and early-war fighters (and I think medium bombers as well) were designed along the lines of the British in terms of structural strength, though with lighter operational weights in general. Their Specifications contained similar requirements in many cases, and used very similar terms, expressions, and values,

The aircraft with the best sustained G in WWII were only capable of a little over 3G without loss of speed or altitude. Some of the early-war aircraft that could do this were the Spitfire, Bf109F, Ki-43-II, and the A6M2/3.

bleh

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Fairly ludicrous, first line above. There was almost nobdoy intentionally putting in victories that were false. Yes, there were likely a few. Very damned few.

There were many errors, mainly due to 'Fog of War'. Very few were intentional.

By far, most were honorable errors, like when two aircraft were shooting at the same aerial victim, and it goes down, with gun camera film from both being used as evidence, from two different angles. Another easy way is a claim from a gunner in a bomber stream. If he is shooting at an enemy aircraft, it is likely that 5 - 8 others are also shooting at the same airplane. Who really got the kill? REALLY tough to say. So, in many cases, all the gunners got a credit. Very easy to overclaim, but each individual claim was honestly sublitted, a very large majority of the time.

Totally agree - in fact more than one person may have hit a given target.

Also, if the enemy dived into a cloud, in flames, with pieces falling off, I'd likely submit a claim, too. But, the enemy COULD have recovered.

It could also, as a damaged plane, be shot at again and again by other fighters on the same side.

Last, and not for the first, second, or third time, you need the exact definition of a victory in use at the time, for the kill you are investigating. Sometimes, a ground kill was disallowed, sometimes it was counted. Sometimes an unmanned aircraft, like a V-1, was counted, sometimes not. Sometimes it had to be armed and sometimes not. What about an airplane on-deck, on a carrier thath you sink? It THAT a gound kill? What if you kill the enemy pilot, but his very forgiving airplane lands itself, possibly out of fuel, and it is revivered and flown again. Is THAT a kill?

You can count what happened, that's the first part. Tallying it up by various means or according to various rationales can happen later.

Very many questions and very many ways to make a victory claim confusing to someone who wants a black-and-white definition.

All true, but none of this changes the fact that overclaiming was rampant in every air force (including naval etc.) for every country, and that it's much easier to count your own losses than the losses you think you inflicted on the enemy.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

FWIW

A few of bits of info that might be useful in this discussion:

IJA and IJN fighter pilots were taught the concepts of pretty much all the basic combat maneuvers - including the preference to dive on, make a gunnery pass at the enemy fighter, then regain altitude again (ie boom-and-zoom) - before the war with the US and UK began. This tactic was used quite often against the Chinese, and against the various foreign squadrons like the AVG. The Japanese mostly used the 3-plane formation with a leader and 2 wingmen, however they were somewhat flexible and sometimes used 2 pairs depending on whether the number allowed one tactic or another.

As the war progressed IJA pilots (in particular) were taught to attack US bombers from the front if possible and/or shoot for the cockpit if possible, where 2x 7.7mm/.303 cal or 2x 12.7mm or a combination thereof could be quite effective. Both IJA and IJN fighter pilots were taught to close to as close a range as practical before opening fire. Also, a 3-plane section would usually all attack the same bomber in a short, slightly offset line astern format, increasing the chance of hits on the target and (hopefully) not allowing the bomber gunners time to switch targets while maintaining a near continuous stream of fire.

NOTE Before anyone pooh-poohs the above statements, this is known doctrine from training manuals and post-war interviews (including debriefs by US intel agencies) of Japanese pilots. I also find it interesting that so many people seem to think that when pilots like Boelcke, Galland, etc, say some of the same things it is accepted as gospel, and lauded as so great and explains so much of their success, but when it is said by/about the Japanese pilots it is ignored/discounted as a part of their success.

Yes, to add to this - the IJN in particular focused on 'boom and zoom' tactics, and only resorted to turn-fighting when the situation 'devolved'.

The Japanese Army Air Force used a captured B-17 to practice their head-on attack system in 1942, there is a mention of this in Bloody Shambles, I'll see if I can find it. It is notable that the newer mark B-17s and B-24s with the chin / nose turrets somewhat derailed this tactic when they arrived in Theater.

re range and cruise speeds of the Japanese fighter aircraft

Both the Ki-43-II and A6M2/3/5 were capable of sustained 300 mph TAS rich-mixture cruise (though obviously this decreased their range) and their normal minimum cruise was around 250-280 mph TAS when anywhere they figured they might encounter enemy aircraft. The only time they cruised at particular low speeds was if they were deploying (reinforcing in UK terms) over long distances, on CAP duty (when loiter was really important), or on the return leg to their base or carrier. (NOTE that in the PTO the standard USN/USAAF and RAF/FAA flight profiles were similar to the IJA/IJN in most cases, with low speeds being used for CAP loiter and the return leg flown at best V/weak-mixture cruise for range.) The A6M2 with its centerline DT could cover well over 1000 miles at 250 MPH TAS at 15,000 ft with reserves for combat and loiter. The Ki-43 had similar range when using drop tanks. 280 mph TAS was the approximate maximum weak mixture cruise for both aircraft. I am not sure about the Ki-43, but the A6M2/3 could sustain max speed for 1/2 hour or more without overheating.

Very interesting, thanks for the detail there.

These ranges are enough to escort their bombers for most missions, and there are quite a few mentions of A6Ms escorting Betty's and such at altitudes of 20,000 ft or higher. Yes, there were some bombing missions where the ranges were beyond the fighter's practical range, but this was true for the Allies as well. The Allied bombers flew at altitudes higher than 15,000-20,000 ft in the ETO, so it would be considerably more problematic for the early-war Japanese fighters to escort/attack them at such high altitudes. Over Japan, the Ki-43 and A6M both had the altitude capability, but their speed at 25,000-30,000 ft meant that they could usually only make one head-on pass against the B-29s, while against B-17s and B-24s they could usually do 2 or more passes depending on the altitude, formation, etc.

The big limiting factor on altitude was what bombers could see. In certain Theaters, fog, clouds, rainstorms etc. obscured the ground and really prevented accurate high altitude bombing. The nature of the target could affect this a lot as well. Major ports and airfields, refineries or factories are relatively hard to hide, but ships, AAA and artillery guns, military units, small anchorages, and smaller military installations are much easier to conceal and can't easily be hit from high altitude.

The worst Theater for visibility was the Aleutians and North Pacific, arguably. After that the South Pacific, New Guinea basically had a minor hurricane every single day somewhere around the coast, and dozens of thunderstorms broke out just about everywhere. Solomons weren't much different. Burma varied somewhat by season (operations are basically winter and spring- it rains steadily through the Monsoon season from May to October severely limiting air activity) but was often concealed by cloud cover and everything was jungle, making it hard to spot targets. Mediterranean Theater may have been the best in this sense with the clearest skies, making heavy bomber raids against Axis airfields, once these became possible, particularly devastating, though smaller tactical and operational targets were still very hard to pinpoint and really needed to be targeted by dive bombers, low altitude bomber / strafers, or fighter-bombers. NW Europe was of course also often cloudy or cloud-covered, but was clear enough, often enough, to at least allow Strategic bombing of major industrial targets like factories, or barring that, entire cities. Once the tactical war started though in Italy and then Normandy etc., once again identifying targets required getting low. Russia and Eastern Europe were also frequently covered by a lower altitude cloud layer, depending on the season.

All of these factors meant that bombers didn't usually have the luxury of bombing from 25,000+ feet even if they had the capability. Quite often a low cloud layer, and / or the simple necessity to fly close to the target in order to see and identify it required bombers to operate much lower, 10-15,000 ft for level bombers, often right down to Sea Level for dive bombers, fighter-bombers, and strafers / low-level bombers. This in turn meant that the fighters were often engaged at low to medium altitude in pretty much every Theater except during the Strategic bombing campaigns late in the war.

re claimed kill ratios of the USAAF and USN

Despite what appear to be claims to the contrary, the USN did not make any in-depth attempt to validate kills by its pilots. This makes sense to very large degree for several reasons. One reason is simply because it was not important in the grand scheme of things. Having an ace was good for morale, having a bunch of aces was even better. It was also impractical to arrive at accurate numbers without discounting their pilot's claims - and that would be bad for morale. And what purpose would this serve in the eyes of the higher ups - the war was over, the Allies had won. I am not saying that the higher-ups did not think it important at all, just that there were much more important things to deal with.

The actual kill numbers accepted were arrived at by interviewing the squadron commanders (or similar) and asking them if there was any reason to believe any of the claims were not valid. Sometimes the questions would be extended to other squadron mates, or other personnel who were t the fight. What else were they going to do? Send out search parties to scour every square mile of every island in the PTO? Send divers to the bottom of the ocean where the action took place to look for wreckage of aircraft, write down the aircraft serial number, then match the number to particular Japanese and Allied squadrons, then to a particular mission and to a missing Japanese pilot? As has been pointed out in this discussion (and in others on this forum and other forums) when the actual loss of aircraft or pilot in the squadron rosters do not match the enemy claims (eg the supposedly shot down aircraft and pilot are recorded as returned home after the mission), and this sort of thing happens over and over again, there is no rational argument than can be made that the kill claim relative to the actual kill:loss ratio is accurate. This has nothing to do with any attempts at honesty, or deceit on the part of the pilots or the higher-ups, only a lack of numerical accuracy due to one factor or another in the fog of war.

I agree but would push back on this slightly - commanders and planners did want to know how many enemy aircraft were shot down. It's fine to credit pilots with victories, (and the JAAF became particularly lax about this, probably for morale reasons, especially later in the war) but for planning and allocation of reinforcements and resources it helps a lot to know. The Soviets at one point were requiring recovery of aircraft identity plates to verify claims. US, UK and German units were (eventually) using gun cameras (not sure if Italian and Japanese did this). They often had specific criteria which could be fairly strict to validate a 'confirmed' vs a 'probable' or a 'damaged'. But even with these measures in place, overclaiming was a constant. Ratios seemed to vary from around 2-1 to as high as 10-1, tending to be higher in bigger battles, and also depending on the experience of the unit and how strict the criteria were.

The Germans prosecuted some pilots for fake claims, the Japanese were at least suspicious of some pilots in this regard as well. Historians debate it, but intentional overclaiming seems to have been fairly rare.

Incidentally, despite stories to the contrary, the Japanese did not destroy any significant number of their squadron records, though it did happen when the Japanese forces were forced to retreat and there was no time or load carrying ability for transport. A significant number of squadron records were lost due to sinking of carriers and destruction of the base installations holding the records. Most such records were confiscated by the Allies in a similar manner to what happened in Europe. Some records were destroyed by order of the Allies after the war. Some of this was due to the attempt at demilitarization of the Japanese society, in a similar manner to the demilitarization/deNazification of Germany, and some of it was due to operational studies, and some of this was in order to control the narrative after the war.

As mentioned up-thread, the accounting in the ETO and to a degree the MTO was a bit easier due to most of the action being more localized and over land. Yet even in the ETO, as time marches on and more and more records are found and analyzed, we still find evidence in the squadron records that seriously change the kill:loss claims. Again, this has nothing to do with any attempt at honesty or deceit on the part of the pilots or higher-ups, only a lack of numerical accuracy due to one factor or another in the fog of war. The population density in Europe means that most of the crashed aircraft that crashed on land and were unaccounted for have been found, though 1 or 2 are still found each year. In the vast open ocean and remote islands and jungles of the PTO and CBI there are still 1 or 2 found each year.

Note that most of the confiscated records were returned at a later date, when and if depending on the nature and perceived importance. Some are still classified and have not been released due to their declassification "not being in the [US] national interest".

They do have archives of Japanese records which are mentioned as the sources by Shores, Claringbould etc. and can in fact now be searched fairly easily with the help of LLM software tools etc. There are some gaps as you note, but they seem to be substantially complete for most units and for long periods of time.

re the G loads of Japanese aircraft and WWII aircraft in general

Japanese pre- and early-war fighters (and I think medium bombers as well) were designed along the lines of the British in terms of structural strength, though with lighter operational weights in general. Their Specifications contained similar requirements in many cases, and used very similar terms, expressions, and values,

The aircraft with the best sustained G in WWII were only capable of a little over 3G without loss of speed or altitude. Some of the early-war aircraft that could do this were the Spitfire, Bf109F, Ki-43-II, and the A6M2/3.

bleh

Even pulling G and losing altitude could be recovered, via dive and zoom climb, maneuvers like what came later to be called 'Low Yo Yo' etc. Dogfights tended to spiral down to the ground one way or another eventually, and that is when the life or death race often began.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

If I may.
Japanese have had the engines of greater power in series production, before Homare materialized. Nakajima was making the Ha 41 and the Ha 109 in quick succession. These engines were doing 30-40% better power than the Sakae of the day (the Ha 109 was very close to what the BMW 801 was doing), and were pretty light and compact. Price of these engines was a bit greater than of the Sakae family (25000 yen vs. 20000, by some time of 1942), but the 'no free lunch' rule applies as ever. That IJA had not put the ever greater emphasis on these engines is just the IJA's mistake, nobody else's.
IJA also made a mistake when they approved the Ki-45 - aircraft that used two 14 cyl engines to bring one cannon to the fight, in the time the Zero was bringing two cannons to the fight with just one engine. There was no extra/super performance or firepower offered by the Ki 45 in order to be worth it, while it required twice the engines and fuel when compared to Zero.
Japanese resources would've been better spent with a Ha-41/-109 powered fighter (it does not need to be Ki 44). Install the alcohol-water add-on to the 109, as well as the better exhausts and were in the spitting distance vs. the Homare operating under restricted settings. The resulting fighter would've cost them less to own and operate than the Ki-45, while being a better fighter overall.

There is also the Kinsei, the engine similar to the Ha-41/-109 family, that again it took forever (until 1945) to be installed on a fighter. A mistake by both IJA and IJN.

IJN also made a mistake by not speccing the J2M to be 1st and foremost the carrier-borne design, and with the 'normal' Kasei. The Gekko, Saiun and the fancy floatplanes were a fancy luxury.

Mitsubishi in 1944 made more than 2000 of the Ha 42 engines (and 700+ in 1945), that were making around 2000 HP and were not picky about the fuel, yet these were not powering a no-nonsense fighter the Japanese needed badly.

tl;dr - while Japanese were sometimes behind the 'West', a lot of the problems (= no having the more modern fighters by mid-war) was of their own making.

This is all fair, and there are certainly elements of a 'self-own'. I'm curious as to why it took so long to develop newer aircraft types with more powerful engines, to put better and more powerful engines into fighters, but these kinds of (to me somewhat mysterious) lags seemed to be almost universal with everybody. The Germans are always considered top notch, but where was the Bf 109 replacement? Where was the Stuka replacement? (you could argue that the Fw 190 fit this niche for both, but it didn't quite work out as perfect in the long run). Where was an effective long range fighter for the Germans?

As for the US, this thread is partly about the very prolonged "teething" problems with the P-38, and the US also had similar issues with the P-47 and the F4U initially. Even the P-51, in it's initial Allison- engined variant, turned out to be best suited as a niche low-level recon plane until the Merlin engine was fitted (this lack of early success itself is something of a mystery to me). For much of 1943 the US was basically relying on Wildcats and P-40s to hold the line while the newer types worked out their many bugs.

And along these lines, as for the Ki-45, pretty much every air force also had issues with failed (or you might say more politely, very painfully long to mature) designs that they put a lot of effort into for relatively little result. The Germans had the Me 210 and the He 177, the US had the P-39 and the SB2C Helldiver, the British had the Defiant, the Barracuda, and the Typhoon. The Italians had the Breda Ba-88 and the Piaggio P.108. The Soviets had the LaGG-3 and the MiG 3.

Some of these worked well in roles not originally intended. The Bf 110 failed as a long range 'destroyer' or heavy fighter, but worked out well as a night fighter. The P-39 (9,500 produced!) largely failed in US and Western-Allied service but worked well for the Soviets. The Typhoon never worked out as a fighter but eventually did fairly well as a CAS fighter-bomber in spite of all it's many flaws etc. The LaGG-3 was eventually made into the successful La 5 (probably saving Lavochkin's life in the process). etc.

Aircraft design was always a bit of a crap shoot during the war. But I'd say in the Ki-61, N1K1/N1K2, J2M, Ki-100, Ki-84 etc. (for fighters) and also I'd note bombers like the B7N and Ki-67, the Japanese actually came up with some quite good, world-class late-war designs, they just either arrived much too late, or they struggled to get them into the field quickly enough and / or in sufficient numbers, and of sufficient reliability with maintenance and logistics issues which were always very challenging especially in Tropical conditions in the islands or say, Burma.

I think some of the float plane designs incidentally, did turn out to be pretty useful, but maybe that's best for another thread.

 

[tomo pauk]

Aircraft design was always a bit of a crap shoot during the war. But I'd say in the Ki-61, N1K1/N1K2, J2M, Ki-100, Ki-84 etc. (for fighters) and also I'd note bombers like the B7N and Ki-67, the Japanese actually came up with some quite good, world-class late-war designs, they just either arrived much too late, or they struggled to get them into the field quickly enough and / or in sufficient numbers, and of sufficient reliability with maintenance and logistics issues which were always very challenging especially in Tropical conditions in the islands or say, Burma.

I think some of the float plane designs incidentally, did turn out to be pretty useful, but maybe that's best for another thread.

Nobody have had the monopoly on making the mistakes.

I've disagreed with the stipulation made in post #486 here, namely the stipulation that Japanese didn't have had anything to choose between the light, timely and weak Sakae and the too late and troublesome (if powerful) Homare.