Effectiveness of the P-38 (2 Viewers)

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Putting together various references, P-38, 111 gallons combat allowance, 40 gallons reserve, leaving 260 gallons for return. It took 90 gallons from start up to reaching operational height. No more than 90+260=350, call it 400, gallons could be carried externally to increase the range. More could increase the patrol time.

The USAAF calculated the P-38J with 410 gallons internal plus 300 external radius was 650 miles as an Escort fighter accompanying B-17 at 185 mph IAS, Full power (max continuous) climbing to 25,000 feet, Cruise at 210 mph IAS, 300 mph TAS, Tanks dropped when empty or at radius, 15 minutes combat at military power, 5 minutes combat at war emergency power, Return to base at required cruising speed accompanying bombers, 30 minutes fuel reserve. Foggia to Krakow is about 630 miles.

The F-5 was not expected to enter combat, which meant it could usefully carry around 500 gallons of external fuel if it had 410 gallons internal.

According to Richard Davis the 15th Air Force dropped 543 tons of bombs on Poland on 20 August (Dziedzice and Oswiecim/I.G. Farben), P-51 escort, P-38 going to Dubovina in Czechoslovakia, 310.8 on 13 September (Oswiecim/I.G. Farben and Wadowice with P-38 and P-51 escort, 3.5 tons on 12 and 13 November (4958N 1857E and Karvina) from the Brux and Blechammer raids and 286.8 on 18 and 26 December (Rybnik and Oswiecim/I.G. Farben), no details on escorts.

P-51 and P-38 did a fighter sweep to Mielec Poland on 25 July 1944
 
: P-38 Range Analysis / 15th AF Operations over Poland (1944)
"Geoffrey, regarding the fuel management for the P-38J on the Foggia-Krakow run (approx. 630-650 miles radius):
The math holds up, but only on a razor's edge. If we take the 410g internal + 300g external loadout, we are looking at a critical threshold.
  • The Burn: Using 90 gallons just to reach operational ceiling (25,000 ft) leaves the pilot with a shrinking margin.
  • The Return: With 260 gallons earmarked for the trip back, the pilot is forced into strict 'Lindbergh-style' cruise control (210 mph IAS / 300 mph TAS).
  • The Combat Factor: Those 15 minutes at Military Power and 5 minutes at War Emergency Power are the 'burn-or-die' moments. Any extension of the dogfight over targets like Oswiecim (I.G. Farben) or Mielec effectively deletes that 30-minute reserve.
As you noted for the August 20th and September 13th raids, the 15th AF was pushing the P-38 to its absolute limit. The F-5s had it easier without the ammo weight, but for an escorting 'J' model, any headwind on the return leg from Poland meant glided landings or bailouts over the Adriatic.
It wasn't just a mission; it was a 7-hour fuel-leaning marathon. The wing fillets and elevator trim had to be perfect just to minimize drag—every drop of those 111 combat gallons was paid for in sweat."


 
P-38s are generally credited with 165 gal tanks. What was actually available may differ depending on supply and date of the mission. An extra 30 gallons out of 700+gal is not a lot but it is good for around 15-20 minutes at effective cruising speed . 25-30 gal per hour per engine was too low for flying in contested space.

P-38s in Pacific carried one 165 gal tank and one 300 gal tank at times. P-38s sometimes carried one 300 gallon tank and one 1000lb bomb for special missions (rudder trim may have been interesting?)
Special missions may not have been flown at "standard" cruise speeds?
Axis air defenses in Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia may not have required quite as high cruising speeds? (could be very wrong on this one)
Axis air opposition over the Eastern front tapers off in July/Aug/Sept of 1944. Escort fighters can push the mission length a little bit?

300 gal tanks were somewhat available. I doubt they were supplied in the same quantities as the 165 gal tanks. Special combat use only? I have no idea why the P-47s used 150 gal tanks instead of 165 gal tanks or even if there was an actual difference?
 
P-38s are generally credited with 165 gal tanks. What was actually available may differ depending on supply and date of the mission. An extra 30 gallons out of 700+gal is not a lot but it is good for around 15-20 minutes at effective cruising speed . 25-30 gal per hour per engine was too low for flying in contested space.

P-38s in Pacific carried one 165 gal tank and one 300 gal tank at times. P-38s sometimes carried one 300 gallon tank and one 1000lb bomb for special missions (rudder trim may have been interesting?)
Special missions may not have been flown at "standard" cruise speeds?
Axis air defenses in Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia may not have required quite as high cruising speeds? (could be very wrong on this one)
Axis air opposition over the Eastern front tapers off in July/Aug/Sept of 1944. Escort fighters can push the mission length a little bit?

300 gal tanks were somewhat available. I doubt they were supplied in the same quantities as the 165 gal tanks. Special combat use only? I have no idea why the P-47s used 150 gal tanks instead of 165 gal tanks or even if there was an actual difference?
Specifically both the '150' and '300' gal drop tanks were designed by Lockheed, but the actual capacities were 165-gal and 330-gal respectively. P-47 and P-51 could carry the 150/165 on the wing pylons. The C/L 150-gal tank for the P-47 was the flat tank.

Absolutely correct about 'standard' cruising speeds. The FAREP data that Geoffrey produced cited 'cruising speed' to be assumed at 210mph IAS at 25,000 feet. Escort was defined as staying with bombers for 150mi to the target and 150mi back before breaking escort.
Further the prime directive was that while the 'cruise speed' of 210mph IAS, that their course speed was that of the 150mph IAS cruise speed of the bombers.

Other inserted assumptions for Range Calcs was that 'cruise speed' was that which 60% power could achieve.
 
I'm kind of surprised to read that the cruising speeds were so low when flying over Europe, given the numbers often quoted when discussing theoretical Japanese fighter use in Europe or Mediterranean Theaters. Especially in light of the relatively high cruising speeds of these aircraft...
 
: P-38 Range Analysis / 15th AF Operations over Poland (1944)
"Geoffrey, regarding the fuel management for the P-38J on the Foggia-Krakow run (approx. 630-650 miles radius):
The math holds up, but only on a razor's edge. If we take the 410g internal + 300g external loadout, we are looking at a critical threshold.
  • The Burn: Using 90 gallons just to reach operational ceiling (25,000 ft) leaves the pilot with a shrinking margin.
  • The Return: With 260 gallons earmarked for the trip back, the pilot is forced into strict 'Lindbergh-style' cruise control (210 mph IAS / 300 mph TAS).
  • The Combat Factor: Those 15 minutes at Military Power and 5 minutes at War Emergency Power are the 'burn-or-die' moments. Any extension of the dogfight over targets like Oswiecim (I.G. Farben) or Mielec effectively deletes that 30-minute reserve.
As you noted for the August 20th and September 13th raids, the 15th AF was pushing the P-38 to its absolute limit. The F-5s had it easier without the ammo weight, but for an escorting 'J' model, any headwind on the return leg from Poland meant glided landings or bailouts over the Adriatic.
It wasn't just a mission; it was a 7-hour fuel-leaning marathon. The wing fillets and elevator trim had to be perfect just to minimize drag—every drop of those 111 combat gallons was paid for in sweat."


Neither the P-38, nor P-47 best cruise speed was 300mph TAS with 2x165-gal wing tanks. The drag forced optimal cruise speed to approximately 250mph TAS at 25,000 feet. Similar results for P-51 with 2x108-gal wing tanks. Absent tanks the same economical cruise settings validated in testing raised back to the 300mph TAS range.

What Geoffrey could have pointed out referring to FAREP assumptions is that while 20 minutes (5 WEP, 15 MP) combat is also assumed, that factoid obviously was in every pilot's mind if fuel was marginal for an extended fight. Simply, a 5 minute fight was rare and most were at MP.

The range charts were based on 60% power settings for the fighters. Extensive state side testing in 1944 refined both the FAREP assumptions. Field experience also dictated inbound cruise speeds based on the perceived and briefed threats. Pacific cruise requirements were far more benign relative to inbound threats.

Lindbergh-style' of cruise settings were optimal for cruising at 5,000 to 10,000 feet over water at low MP and RPM to optimize fuel consumption vs miles-per-gallon - but fatal at 25,000 feet in ETO.

The actual operational planning and execution departed from FAREP assumptions on many features of an escort mission. As experience was gained in both take-off procedures (4vs2), formation assembly, switch to external tanks for climb and inbound cruise, shorter escort legs as required to plan R/V and B/E waypoints, etc - all pointed to much better fuel consumption estimates.

Probably a bit pessimistic to rely on FAREP estimates, but they were intended to be conservative.
 
To expand on the point about the 'obsolete' Japanese types:
The case of the A6M2-N 'Rufe' victories on February 16, 1945 (Kashima/Konoike area), is a perfect cautionary tale. Even though the F6F Hellcat was technically superior in every measurable metric, the Rufe pilots managed to exploit the Zero's core DNA—extreme low-speed maneuverability. When American pilots underestimated these floatplanes and allowed themselves to be drawn into a slow, horizontal dogfight, the 'paper' advantages of the Hellcat vanished. It's a reminder that in air combat, 'obsolete' only means 'less margin for error,' not 'harmless.'
Furthermore, look at the Kuril Islands conflict after August 15th. While the world was celebrating V-J Day, Ki-43 Hayabusas from the 54th Sentai were still operational. On August 18th, during the Battle of Shumshu, these 'obsolete' Oscars were actively contesting the Soviet landings, proving they could still deliver ordnance and pose a threat to surface targets and transport aircraft long after the official surrender broadcast.
The technical gap between a P-38 or F6F and a Rufe/Oscar in 1945 was massive, but these late-war kills prove that situational awareness and tactical discipline (or lack thereof) often outweighed engine horsepower."



In aerial combat, the victor is most often he who is able to fly to his plane's strengths while denying the enemy the same thing. That, of course, relies upon pilot skill, which is the point I was trying to make above -- the quality of the plane is only one factor in its historical tallies.
 
Pilot skill, tactics, numerical advantages, maintenance, luck, weather, types of missions, preliminary advantages or disadvantages in terms of altitude or awareness of the enemy (which can also be a factor of pilot skill, simple luck, planning or trained tactics, weather, or sometimes all of the above), the use (and availability / reliability) of radios, mechanical issues, were all often important factors in combat outcomes. Performance and other salient traits of the aircraft may have only really mattered or played a role somewhere around half to one third of the time (just a guess).
 
I'm kind of surprised to read that the cruising speeds were so low when flying over Europe, given the numbers often quoted when discussing theoretical Japanese fighter use in Europe or Mediterranean Theaters. Especially in light of the relatively high cruising speeds of these aircraft...
210 IAS was actually 300mph true, depending on the conversion factor used. And the "standard" altitude was 25,000ft.

Now find out cruise at 25,000ft of most Japanese fighters?
Ki-43 II maxed out at 329mph at 13,125ft. At 21,650ft it was down to 320mph true.
Cruise in one source is given as 273mph at 16,405ft........except that the same source says range of 1006 miles is at 257mph but altitude is not given.
The big question is how did they figure the range?
USAAC figured the P-40B was good for 1010 miles of range on 120 US gal of gas at 202mph at 15,000ft.
However...........this was 'calculated'
It required magical levitating the P-40B with a warmed engine to 15,000ft, getting it up to 202mph and then starting the engine and flying the plane calculating when the engine would stop running. Hardly a realistic range but it is the official characteristics sheets.

Japanese fighters could and did escort Japanese bombers over long distances. But the Japanese bombers were not flying at high altitudes until they got close to the target areas.
many Japanese bombers cruised at 240mph or below,
Granted the Ki-43 is sort of a worst case but low airspeed was a real problem which is why the US kept the escorting fighters at a higher speed than the bombers so they could react faster and not just be additional targets for the interceptors.
 
Pilot skill, tactics, numerical advantages, maintenance, luck, weather, types of missions, preliminary advantages or disadvantages in terms of altitude or awareness of the enemy (which can also be a factor of pilot skill, simple luck, planning or trained tactics, weather, or sometimes all of the above), the use (and availability / reliability) of radios, mechanical issues, were all often important factors in combat outcomes. Performance and other salient traits of the aircraft may have only really mattered or played a role somewhere around half to one third of the time (just a guess).
That may be true. I have one Osprey book on the P-39 vs the A6M over New Guinea in 1942 and while I am not sure I trust the book to be 100% accurate it has some interesting take always. According to the authors analysis The USAAC lost 44 P-39s in combat of which 15-16 are attributed to A6M.
However, they claim the P-39s suffered 14 operational losses.
the Americans claimed that P-39s shot down 95 A6Ms. They didn't, Japanese records show only 15 losses to P-39s. Accurate numbers are hard. The US operating other fighters in the area in 1942. Japanese also admit to 13 A6Ms operational losses.
It appears that the P-39s and A6Ms were shooting each other down in nearly equal numbers and were suffering nearly equal operational losses.
However, the book does not give the numbers of each aircraft involved in area over the year.
It also does not, in the statistics section, explain what happened to the other 29 P-39s lost to make up the 44 loss total? Other Japanese fighter types? Bomber guns? AA fire?

I am probably going to catch crap about this but most fighter aircraft were probably a lot closer to a 1:1 or 2:1 ratio against other fighters than anywhere near 11:1. There are some exceptions.
And most ratios are not for fighter to fighter but fighter vs everything. Fighters are supposed to shoot down bombers and transports at a high ratio.
B-17s and B-24s were sort of an exception. Most WW II bombers were single engine or twin engine and had not very good guns one or two 7.62-8mm machine guns in directions they had any field of fire.
Comparing like to like gets hard.

Now if having a better fighter that only shifts the scales 1/3 of the time against other fighters it may play a very big role in getting arial supremacy.
A5Ms might have been able to shoot down a fair number of Devastators and Vindicators. They may have worked well against F3F biplanes had the US showed up with any.
But the A6M could deal with the F4F fighters on a somewhat equal level and they could shoot down more/better US attack planes for the same number of planes deployed.

As a simple math example if one side has a fighter that can shoot down the enemy fighter/s at a 2:1 ratio and both sides stare with 100 planes at some point, without resupply, the side with the better fighter is going to have 75 left (no operational losses) against 50 (no operational loss) and things for the poorer fighter are going to get bad in hurry. Instead of fairly even fights they are facing fights of 8 planes vrs 12 and the chances of coming out on top get even worse with each combat.
Plug in whatever percentage advantage you wish. Having a better fighter, over time, is going to wind up being an advantage................unless the better fighter is too expensive to build in quantity. But Cheap fighters need to be built in large quantities, and you need lots of pilots to fly them.

Other take away from the P-39 vs A6M book. Out of the 44 P-39s lost just over 1/2 pilots survived (although not all were recovered in Allied territory) while of the 15 A6Ms lost only one pilot survived. Results don't show up right away but the Japanese were losing expertise/experience at a faster rate.
 
That may be true. I have one Osprey book on the P-39 vs the A6M over New Guinea in 1942 and while I am not sure I trust the book to be 100% accurate it has some interesting take always. According to the authors analysis The USAAC lost 44 P-39s in combat of which 15-16 are attributed to A6M.
However, they claim the P-39s suffered 14 operational losses.
the Americans claimed that P-39s shot down 95 A6Ms. They didn't, Japanese records show only 15 losses to P-39s. Accurate numbers are hard. The US operating other fighters in the area in 1942. Japanese also admit to 13 A6Ms operational losses.
It appears that the P-39s and A6Ms were shooting each other down in nearly equal numbers and were suffering nearly equal operational losses.

Based on Claringboulds books, I don't think this is actually true. My guess would be that between P-39s and A6Ms, was about 1-2.5 or 1-2 in favor of the Japanese in 1942, which may have dropped to around 1-1.5 at some point in 1943 (as both tactics and aircraft performance improved). P-39s also engaged less often because they were so short-ranged. I don't believe I've ever found a US P-39 fighter squadron or fighter group which achieved parity with Japanese fighters. The P-39s did shoot some zeros down however, including one one occasion some Tainan air group pilots who they caught taking off at Lae.

By contrast, F4Fs went about 1-1 more or less steadily in 1942 and 43, P-40 units started at about 1-2 and this improved to more like 1.5-1 in the Allied favor by 1943. P-38s were initially about 1-1 from late 1942 through mid 1943 and crept up into 1.5-1 by mid-year. Same for F4Us going from early to later 1943. This is just a guess of course...

But! I can fairly easily count up the losses in Clarindboulds accounts to verify this so we can find out the exact ratio, maybe I'll start a new thread for that. He includes both operational and combat losses. He has helpful tables in the back of each book which give you the dates of each combat loss on either side, which you can then look up in the book.

However, the book does not give the numbers of each aircraft involved in area over the year.
It also does not, in the statistics section, explain what happened to the other 29 P-39s lost to make up the 44 loss total? Other Japanese fighter types? Bomber guns? AA fire?

I'll start a new thread on that.

I am probably going to catch crap about this but most fighter aircraft were probably a lot closer to a 1:1 or 2:1 ratio against other fighters than anywhere near 11:1. There are some exceptions.

Totally agree

And most ratios are not for fighter to fighter but fighter vs everything. Fighters are supposed to shoot down bombers and transports at a high ratio.

Yes, this is very true, and it's the reason why most fighter groups had positive victory ratios, though what types of enemy planes they encountered varied a lot by Theater and Operational area.

For example, 325th Fighter Group were credited with shooting down 133 enemy aircraft 'confirmed' in the Med while flying the P-40 from April - Oct 1943, which included 95 Bf 109s, 26 MC. 202s, 3 Fi 156 'Storch', 2 Ju-52s, and 7 Me 323s. So that's 90% enemy fighters. If you include their time flying P-47 and P-51, it's 529 confirmed victories of which 5 IAR-80, 3 MC 205, 39 MC 202, 2 G.55, 2 Re 2001, 4 Me 410, 1 Me 262, 315 Bf 109, 92 Fw 190 for 87% fighters. And that's because they mainly flew escort missions.

B-17s and B-24s were sort of an exception. Most WW II bombers were single engine or twin engine and had not very good guns one or two 7.62-8mm machine guns in directions they had any field of fire.
Comparing like to like gets hard.

Now if having a better fighter that only shifts the scales 1/3 of the time against other fighters it may play a very big role in getting arial supremacy.
A5Ms might have been able to shoot down a fair number of Devastators and Vindicators. They may have worked well against F3F biplanes had the US showed up with any.
But the A6M could deal with the F4F fighters on a somewhat equal level and they could shoot down more/better US attack planes for the same number of planes deployed.

Ratios with F4F seem to be about equal, consistently. FM2 did a bit better though that was very late in the game.

As a simple math example if one side has a fighter that can shoot down the enemy fighter/s at a 2:1 ratio and both sides stare with 100 planes at some point, without resupply, the side with the better fighter is going to have 75 left (no operational losses) against 50 (no operational loss) and things for the poorer fighter are going to get bad in hurry. Instead of fairly even fights they are facing fights of 8 planes vrs 12 and the chances of coming out on top get even worse with each combat.

yes, agreed again. 1.5-1 doesn't sound like much but it ads up quickly.

Plug in whatever percentage advantage you wish. Having a better fighter, over time, is going to wind up being an advantage................unless the better fighter is too expensive to build in quantity. But Cheap fighters need to be built in large quantities, and you need lots of pilots to fly them.

That's true if the cheaper fighter is less effective. Quickly googling tells me that a P-51C cost around $50,000, a P-38 cost about $97,000 (more than that early on). Can we say that a P-38 was twice as good?

Other take away from the P-39 vs A6M book. Out of the 44 P-39s lost just over 1/2 pilots survived (although not all were recovered in Allied territory) while of the 15 A6Ms lost only one pilot survived. Results don't show up right away but the Japanese were losing expertise/experience at a faster rate.

Pilot survival was indeed a problem for the Japanese, particularly earlier in the war though it continued to be an issue. Loss rates were basically as I noted, and in the Solomons and New Guinea favored the Japanese for a long time, but pilot and aircrew losses eventually started to skew in favor of the Allies. I can post numbers on that too Claringbould counts them.
 
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210 IAS was actually 300mph true, depending on the conversion factor used. And the "standard" altitude was 25,000ft.

Now find out cruise at 25,000ft of most Japanese fighters?
Ki-43 II maxed out at 329mph at 13,125ft. At 21,650ft it was down to 320mph true.
Cruise in one source is given as 273mph at 16,405ft........except that the same source says range of 1006 miles is at 257mph but altitude is not given.
The big question is how did they figure the range?
USAAC figured the P-40B was good for 1010 miles of range on 120 US gal of gas at 202mph at 15,000ft.
However...........this was 'calculated'
It required magical levitating the P-40B with a warmed engine to 15,000ft, getting it up to 202mph and then starting the engine and flying the plane calculating when the engine would stop running. Hardly a realistic range but it is the official characteristics sheets.

P-40s were usually listed as having about 700-800 mile range, depending on exact type (some versions with fuel tanks removed had less), which translated to around a 200-250 mile combat radius, or less depending on loadout.

Japanese fighters could and did escort Japanese bombers over long distances. But the Japanese bombers were not flying at high altitudes until they got close to the target areas.
many Japanese bombers cruised at 240mph or below,

I wonder which you mean specifically. JAAF types like the Ki-21, Ki-48 and Ki-49 were all pretty fast, with top speeds around 300 mph. Some single-engined types like the Ki-51 were much slower. I know cruise speed varies a lot and is subject to debate. Twin engined Japanese bombers seemed to typically cruise around 20,000 ft but 25,000 or higher wasn't unusual, notably for the Japanese navy types.

Max speed for the Ki-48-IIa was 314 mph at 18,400 ft and ceiling is listed as 33,100 ft, with a range of 1,500 miles carrying a 1700 lb bomb load.

The Ki-48 was probably the most frequently used bomber by the JAAF.

The IJN (as you noted quite stout and also large wingspan) G4M was slower with a top speed of 266 mph at 13,800 ft, but had a ceiling of 28 - 29,000 ft.

Granted the Ki-43 is sort of a worst case but low airspeed was a real problem which is why the US kept the escorting fighters at a higher speed than the bombers so they could react faster and not just be additional targets for the interceptors.

Ki-43s were being used in kind of fighter-sweep mode by 1943, often in very large numbers escorting relatively few bombers.
 
Just checking Claringbould's numbers from "South Pacific Air War Volume VI" which series covers Japanese vs Allied combat mainly in the New Guinea area and nearby, and in the appendix (pp 212-213) shows losses including from the previous 5 volumes from 8 Dec 1941-31 March 1943.

These are both combat and operational losses.

By fighter type (Allied - meaning USAAF, USN / USMC, and RAAF).
Airacrobra* - 98 lost (mainly between 1 May and 8 Sept 1942 when 80 Airacobras were lost)
P-40E - 64 lost (mainly between Mar-April 1942, and Sept-Dec 1942 when 40 P-40s were lost)
F4F - 30 lost (almost all May 1942 during the Battle of Coral Sea)
P-38 - 13 lost (only active from 9 Sept 1942 - 31 Mar 1943)
F-4 Lightning - 5 lost
Beaufighter - 9 lost (June 42-Mar 43)

*includes P-39 and P-400

Total Allied fighters losses were 219, total Allied losses including bombers were 574. Worst period for the Allies was May-June 1942

By fighter type (Japanese JAAF and IJN)
A6M - 130 lost
Ki-43 - 29 lost (only between Dec 42 and 31 March 1943)
A6M2-N* - 5 lost
A5M - 6 lost (May-June 1942)
F1M* - 5 lost (May-Jun 1942)

* Float planes

Total Japanese fighter losses were 175, total Japanese losses including bombers were 348. Worst period for the Japanese was May 1942 during the Battle of Coral Sea and Sept 42 - March 43 when 109 fighters were lost)

As I said I'll start another thread to look at the Airacobra vs A6M combat specifically, hopefully tonight or tomorrow.
 
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P-40s were usually listed as having about 700-800 mile range, depending on exact type (some versions with fuel tanks removed had less), which translated to around a 200-250 mile combat radius, or less depending on loadout.



I wonder which you mean specifically. JAAF types like the Ki-21, Ki-48 and Ki-49 were all pretty fast, with top speeds around 300 mph. Some single-engined types like the Ki-51 were much slower. I know cruise speed varies a lot and is subject to debate. Twin engined Japanese bombers seemed to typically cruise around 20,000 ft but 25,000 or higher wasn't unusual, notably for the Japanese navy types.

Max speed for the Ki-48-IIa was 314 mph at 18,400 ft and ceiling is listed as 33,100 ft, with a range of 1,500 miles carrying a 1700 lb bomb load.

The Ki-48 was probably the most frequently used bomber by the JAAF.

The IJN (as you noted quite stout and also large wingspan) G4M was slower with a top speed of 266 mph at 13,800 ft, but had a ceiling of 28 - 29,000 ft.



Ki-43s were being used in kind of fighter-sweep mode by 1943, often in very large numbers escorting relatively few bombers.

B-17s before the Gs could make just over 300mph top speed and do that at around 25,000ft.
They rarely, if ever, operated at those speeds/altitudes. Running light (bombs and fuel part gone) some B-17s could hit around 320mph.
Yes "book" numbers and actual operational numbers varied considerably.

The Ki-48 is sort of a paper tiger. It's ability to carry both bombs and fuel is a little suspect. It also used the Sakae engine and had the same problems with it. Not a reliability problem but the problem of range as it's range numbers are at slow speed (217mph/350kph) in very lean mixture. Trying to cruise fast means rather large change in range.
Bomb load is also a bit iffy. Most sources say max load is 800kg but there is some confusion. The Japanese managed to stuff in an 800kg HE load when they converted them to suicide planes but most sources do not say how they fit in 800kg of normal bombs. Most sources do not mention external bombs. Ki-48 I carried six 50kg bombs normally, eight max or four 100kg bombs? Ki-48 is said to have carried 400kg normal load. Not a good return for two engines and 4 men. The higher speed Ki-48 doesn't start to show up until the summer of 1942 and a 314mph bomber at 5600 meters is not really all that great. Might outrun F4Fs. Out running P-40s is harder especially at lower altitudes. For most of the war the defensive armament was little better than a WW I biplane. A single 7.7mm (.303) machine gun that fired at 670-750rpm from a 69 round pan magazine was located in 3 positions.

If you want 1500 miles of range out of Ki-48 you are flying slow and you are not carrying a 1700lb bomb load.

Unfortunately most of the Japanese bombers are sort of in the same boat (not counting the Ki-67) but not the same extent.
Early G4Ms could hold 4,900 liters of fuel in the wing, totally unprotected. In fact the wing was the fuel tank. But the usual cruising speed is usually given as 196mph. Obviously there are higher power settings for higher cruise without hurting the engines but range drops. The G4M got at least some protection and more powerful engines but range dropped some.
Some Japanese bombers changed considerably during the war but very few carried any more than 1000kg of bombs and that was rare.
American twins could be fast or they could fly long distances, rarely both.
 
B-17s before the Gs could make just over 300mph top speed and do that at around 25,000ft.
They rarely, if ever, operated at those speeds/altitudes. Running light (bombs and fuel part gone) some B-17s could hit around 320mph.
Yes "book" numbers and actual operational numbers varied considerably.

Real cruise speed for B-17s and B-24s under typical combat loads (including not just bombs but machine gun ammunition etc.) seemed to be quite low, lower than for the US medium bombers, but they could sometimes go faster particularly while egressing / running away in a shallow dive. JAAF pilots often seemed to have trouble intercepting A-20s, and even the B-25s and B-26s even though they weren't nearly as fast.

The Ki-48 is sort of a paper tiger. It's ability to carry both bombs and fuel is a little suspect. It also used the Sakae engine and had the same problems with it. Not a reliability problem but the problem of range as it's range numbers are at slow speed (217mph/350kph) in very lean mixture. Trying to cruise fast means rather large change in range.
Bomb load is also a bit iffy. Most sources say max load is 800kg but there is some confusion. The Japanese managed to stuff in an 800kg HE load when they converted them to suicide planes but most sources do not say how they fit in 800kg of normal bombs. Most sources do not mention external bombs. Ki-48 I carried six 50kg bombs normally, eight max or four 100kg bombs? Ki-48 is said to have carried 400kg normal load. Not a good return for two engines and 4 men. The higher speed Ki-48 doesn't start to show up until the summer of 1942 and a 314mph bomber at 5600 meters is not really all that great. Might outrun F4Fs. Out running P-40s is harder especially at lower altitudes. For most of the war the defensive armament was little better than a WW I biplane. A single 7.7mm (.303) machine gun that fired at 670-750rpm from a 69 round pan magazine was located in 3 positions.

If you want 1500 miles of range out of Ki-48 you are flying slow and you are not carrying a 1700lb bomb load.

The real bomb load for the Ki-48 seemed to vary between around 600 - 1200 lbs, depending on how far the mission was. And looking at it on paper, I really dismissed this aircraft for the exact reasons you mention. But in the operational history it is more impressive. The JAAF learned to escort pretty much all of their bombers with very heavy fighter escort, sometimes you had 30-40 fighters or more (usually Ki-43s, sometimes also Ki-61 or other types) escorting as few as 5 or 6 Ki-48s. Sometimes it was a more substantial number of bombers like 20-30. They also brought in planes like the little-known but fairly important Ki-51 which were used as (apparently pretty accurate) dive bombers. In a similar role for the JAAF as the IJN Aichi D3A Val, you might say. In spite of their small bomb load the Ki-48s seemed to frequently do some damage to Allied airfields and other sites, seemingly they were fairly accurate. Losses were typically fairly low during raids, with a few exceptions.

Ironically, the larger much more heavily armed Ki-49 "Donryu", which had armor and both a 20mm cannon and two heavy machine guns for defense, had an almost tragi-comically bad operational history, suffering serious to catastrophic losses on almost every mission. I honestly don't know if it was just bad-luck or something about this aircraft made it more vulnerable. Handling was said to be pretty bad, while for the Ki-48 it was said to be good.

After reading the operational history, I made a model kit of the Ki-48. I was surprised how small it is. It's about maybe 10% bigger than a P-38, Ki-46, or Pe-2 (which are all about the same size, which is to say, small and thin for twin engine aircraft). The fuselage of the Ki-48 is wider than those three but it is thinner than say, a Vultee Vengeance or a Beaufighter.

Unfortunately most of the Japanese bombers are sort of in the same boat (not counting the Ki-67) but not the same extent.

Well, fortunately for the Allies.

Ki-67 seems to be where they finally got it right, but like so many good Japanese aircraft, it came probably 1.5-2 years too late.

Early G4Ms could hold 4,900 liters of fuel in the wing, totally unprotected. In fact the wing was the fuel tank. But the usual cruising speed is usually given as 196mph. Obviously there are higher power settings for higher cruise without hurting the engines but range drops. The G4M got at least some protection and more powerful engines but range dropped some.
Some Japanese bombers changed considerably during the war but very few carried any more than 1000kg of bombs and that was rare.
American twins could be fast or they could fly long distances, rarely both.

Whereas the Ki-21s and Ki-48s often came with very heavy escort, the G4Ms seem to have more often relied more on coming in at higher altitude and arriving at dusk or dawn / pre-dawn to make attacks. At altitude, especially if they managed to arrive by surprise, P-39s, Wildcats, and P-40s often failed to climb up and intercept them in time. Even the Spitfires at Darwin had trouble. This is one area where a P-38 or F4U was very helpful. The navy bombers carried a bit more bomb load, and of course most famously were absolutely lethal with torpedoes. But when they came low to drop torpedoes, as we know the Wildcats and other Allied fighters (esp. P-40s) sometimes wiped them out.
 
Max speed for the Ki-48-IIa was 314 mph at 18,400 ft and ceiling is listed as 33,100 ft, with a range of 1,500 miles carrying a 1700 lb bomb load.
Japanese Wikipedia notes 400-500 kg bomb for the Ki-48-II.
TAIC says 880 lbs max bomb load.

Unless it is about the suicide bombers load-outs, 800 kg bomb load or better was a prerogative of the Japanese heavy bombers, talk G4M and the like.
 
Japanese Wikipedia notes 400-500 kg bomb for the Ki-48-II.
TAIC says 880 lbs max bomb load.

Unless it is about the suicide bombers load-outs, 800 kg bomb load or better was a prerogative of the Japanese heavy bombers, talk G4M and the like.

That is closer to what they actually seemed to carry on most missions as I already noted, though max bomb load is often an 'ideal' figure, that was from English language Wikipedia.

Using Japanese Wikipedia is a good idea I hadn't thought of which is odd since I use it for German, Czech, Polish, French, Italian etc. sources routinely for other eras. 🤔

Definitely going to try that in the future for Japanese related WW2 data... it still isn't definitive but might bring you closer to the mark.
 
In aerial combat, the victor is most often he who is able to fly to his plane's strengths while denying the enemy the same thing. That, of course, relies upon pilot skill, which is the point I was trying to make above -- the quality of the plane is only one factor in its historical tallies.
My father was asked for his opinion regarding attributes to become an ace. You might find the letter interesting. Request from Alex Vraciu who at the time was president of American Fighter Aces Association.
 

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The last part about knowing the aircraft and how to exploit the weaknesses of the enemy types and and mitigate those of your own is one of the key bits. The personality type does also seem to be something of a constant, albeit with a few exceptions.
 
The P-3.8 absolutely showed it could tangle with single-seaters and win.

Didn't make a great impression as a fighter at first, but there were four problems with it when it first arrived in the ETO. Those were, in no particular order:
1) The pilots were green for combat, with no applicable training. That took a bit of time, but ALL people who fly fighters are green when they start, so it wasn't a worse situation than for green pilots flying P-40s except for the twin engine stuff. By way of example, when they first got to Europe, they'd fly into hostile areas at cruise power with the gunsights off. If they were bounced, they'd have to rapidly:
a) Throttle back to avoid overboost.
b) Increase rpm.
c) Throttle up to combat power.
d) turn on the gunsight.

By that time, they were likely already damaged or going down. The simply solution was to come into the area at max continuous and have the gunsights on, but they lost a few before figuring it out.

2) The fuel in the UK was not formulated the same as US fuel. British fuel was uo to 20% aromatics. US fuel was 2% aromatics. That took about 8 - 9 months to figure out because they could not duplicate the issue on the test stand until they got a batch of British fuel. Once the jetting was corrected and everyone was using the same fuel, the issue disappeared. never to reappear.

3) The early Allison intake manifolds were too smooth and the fuel and air separated in them, causing detonation. First, the issue had to be identified and them a solution developed. The solution was to install turbulators inside the manifolds to keep the fuel and air from separating. That took maybe 6 months to implement in the field because they had to identify the issue, develop a solution on the test stand, test it in an airplane, manufacture the new manifolds, ship them to Europe, and change the manifolds in the field.

4) The P-38 flew high in Europe and the early models had a wildly insufficient heater. The tubing run was too long from the engine to the cockpit and the air got cold. The eventual solution was to install an electric heater.

After these four things were fixed, the P-38 was fine but, by that time, the P-51 was in Europe and there was no point supplying two logistics chains, so the bulk of the P-38s went to the MTO, and Pacific areas. It didn't have much trouble fighting whatever it encountered once the issues above were corrected. The only real weakness was a low critical Mach number, and that was not enough of a hindrance to make it a bad fighter.

How bad could it have been?

It was the mount of our two top-scoring aces and 3 of the top 10.

Think hard before calling a bad one.
The last three paragraphs sum it all up. Enough said.
 

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