Escort Fighter Performance Comparison

GregP said:

OK, so who is going to fly the Spitfire's current missions while your long-range Spits do their new missions? Were these assets assigned to the RAF or were they USAAF fighters that would NEVER be assigned as defense of the UK? US assets were pursuing US missions, not UK missions except where they happened to coincide.

Basic question is if the SPitfires were not defending the country, who WOULD have been doing so and were they available to UK Fighter Command while the Spits were flitting about elsewhere?

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While the USAAF was still accepting Spitfire fighters for its Mediterranean forces it was not doing so in Britain. Next comes the operational tempo.

The Richard Davis spreadsheet of 8th Air Force bomber activities has 5,577 entries of which 432 are by end 1943. Similarly end December 1943 is page 161 out of 503 pages for Mighty Eighth War Diary. Of the 504 days 17 August 1942 to 31 December 1943 the 8th Air Force dropped bombs on 121 days. There are days when targets in more than one country were attacked, but by country Belgium 7 days, France 64 days, Germany 48 days, Netherlands 11 days, Norway 3, Poland 1. Just Germany is 1 in January 1943, 2 in February, 3 in March, 1 in April, 4 in May, 4 in June, 6 in July, 2 in August, 2 in September, 7 in October 9 in November, 7 in December. Giving 10 days in the third and 23 days in the final quarter of 1943.

Assuming the Spitfire VIII force is not available until end June 1943, reduce the time to the 184 days of the second half of 1943. Belgium 1 day, France 22 days, Germany 33 days, Netherlands 8 days, Norway 3, Poland 1 in 58 days of operations, 1 in 3 and 2 in 11 for Germany.

Fighter Command had something like 48 squadrons of Spitfires on 1 July 1943, rising to 51 by end December and was providing escort to the USAAF heavies to various targets during the time.

Air 20/2001, As of 29 July 1943 the RAF reported 170 Spitfire VIII overseas plus 327 Spitfire IX, along with 179 Spitfire IX in operational squadrons at home, total counting reserves 214 VIII and 579 IX. On 30 September 213 VIII overseas, plus 347 IX, while 307 IX were in home squadrons. Adding reserves, 332 VIII and 1,011 IX.

Spitfire VIII production to end June 1943, 254, halve this 127, at 20 Spitfires per squadron, 6 squadrons. Castle Bromwich, assume the change over to bigger internal tanks costs three months or the 93 that were actually built February to May 1943, the engines being used to convert mark V to IX while waiting. Putting in a three month delay at Castle Bromwich means another 34 Merlin 60 series Spitfires with larger internal fuel from it by end June 1943 on top of the mark VIII from Supermarine as combined production hits over 100 for the month, then combined production is nearly 200 in August, and 300 in November. This leaves 559 Spitfire IX built at Supermarine June 1942 to June 1943, plus conversions, less losses in Britain for the overseas forces before any of the longer range version are allocated.

AIR 16/1036. Dates are 8th Air Force day bombing of targets in Germany.

Date Column is RAF Fighter Command day offensive sorties for the day, 2nd TAF sorties are all types.
17-Jul-43 356
25-Jul-43 680
26-Jul-43 842
28-Jul-43 815
29-Jul-43 742
30-Jul-43 709 11,360 offensive sorties in July, including 2,326 USAAF, plus 4,450 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 2,730 sorties
12-Aug-43 733
17-Aug-43 759 11,320 offensive sorties in August, plus 2,217 USAAF fighter sorties, plus 3,801 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 3,801 sorties
06-Sep-43 1003
27-Sep-43 797 15,898 offensive sorties in September, plus 3,564 USAAF fighter sorties, plus 3,891 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 5,538 sorties
02-Oct-43 448
04-Oct-43 257
08-Oct-43 544
09-Oct-43 483
10-Oct-43 0
14-Oct-43 88
20-Oct-43 482 7,486 offensive sorties in October, plus 3,404 USAAF fighter sorties, plus 2,361 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 2,551 sorties
03-Nov-43 652
05-Nov-43 967
07-Nov-43 701
11-Nov-43 858
13-Nov-43 79
19-Nov-43 363
26-Nov-43 887
29-Nov-43 478
30-Nov-43 208 9,593 offensive sorties in November, plus 3,955 USAAF fighter sorties, plus 1,841 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 4,590 sorties
01-Dec-43 300
11-Dec-43 45
13-Dec-43 173
16-Dec-43 12
20-Dec-43 421
22-Dec-43 472
30-Dec-43 343 4,335 offensive sorties in December, plus 1,292 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 3,820 sorties

So finding an extra or redirecting 100 or so offensive sorties per bomber day in July, rising to no more than twice that in December is quite viable.

drgondog said:

No.
Later in war, Spit squadrons based in UK did interceptions of V-1s, convoy escort, escort over transports shipping supplies to Invasion forces, escort to Netherlands, general UK air Defense. Nothing 'meaningless'..

Later, based on Continent, Meaningful Escort of TAC Air light and medium bombers, air defense, even tactical CAS type sweeps.

Your focus seems to be "'I'm sad that the Spitfire didn't get into the big air battles over Germany" - but the Spits were Everywhere else and making major contributions in wresting air superiority from Axis - just deployed in a complimentary fashion with other air assets available.

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The Spitfire was first and foremost an interceptor and it was arguably the finest interceptor of the war. It should be appreciated that the combination of the Spitfire by day and the Mosquito by night provided an airtight cordon around the British Isles. The Luftwaffe was unable to launch any spoiling attacks on invasion preparations, in fact they couldn't even get recon aircraft over to observe the preparations.
One of the interesting aspects of AWP-1 was that the fighters the US planned to be sent to the UK along with the bombers were tasked with defending the USSAF airbases. This proved unnecessary as the RAF had it well in hand. Having a secure base to fly from was a very underrated benefit to the 8th AF. It should be noted tha AEPD-1 suggested that aadiotanl fighter units would be required to provide bomber support over Germany and for offensive sweeps
I believe if the Luftwaffe was going to have any meaningful impact it would have been at night, but the Mosquito put an end to that by decimating the German bomber force during operation Steinbock.
Any successful offence requires a secure base to launch from and the Spitfire and Mosquito provided that.

Thumpalumpacus said:

I like that he isn't afraid to get into the weeds, and does so by way of explanation that even a dolt like me can understand the issue. I still don't know if he's right or wrong much of the time, but his channel is certainly food for thought.

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In my opinion is that he's lost in the weeds. Lots of misinformation

Geoffrey Sinclair said:

While the USAAF was still accepting Spitfire fighters for its Mediterranean forces it was not doing so in Britain. Next comes the operational tempo.

The Richard Davis spreadsheet of 8th Air Force bomber activities has 5,577 entries of which 432 are by end 1943. Similarly end December 1943 is page 161 out of 503 pages for Mighty Eighth War Diary. Of the 504 days 17 August 1942 to 31 December 1943 the 8th Air Force dropped bombs on 121 days. There are days when targets in more than one country were attacked, but by country Belgium 7 days, France 64 days, Germany 48 days, Netherlands 11 days, Norway 3, Poland 1. Just Germany is 1 in January 1943, 2 in February, 3 in March, 1 in April, 4 in May, 4 in June, 6 in July, 2 in August, 2 in September, 7 in October 9 in November, 7 in December. Giving 10 days in the third and 23 days in the final quarter of 1943.

Assuming the Spitfire VIII force is not available until end June 1943, reduce the time to the 184 days of the second half of 1943. Belgium 1 day, France 22 days, Germany 33 days, Netherlands 8 days, Norway 3, Poland 1 in 58 days of operations, 1 in 3 and 2 in 11 for Germany.

Fighter Command had something like 48 squadrons of Spitfires on 1 July 1943, rising to 51 by end December and was providing escort to the USAAF heavies to various targets during the time.

Air 20/2001, As of 29 July 1943 the RAF reported 170 Spitfire VIII overseas plus 327 Spitfire IX, along with 179 Spitfire IX in operational squadrons at home, total counting reserves 214 VIII and 579 IX. On 30 September 213 VIII overseas, plus 347 IX, while 307 IX were in home squadrons. Adding reserves, 332 VIII and 1,011 IX.

Spitfire VIII production to end June 1943, 254, halve this 127, at 20 Spitfires per squadron, 6 squadrons. Castle Bromwich, assume the change over to bigger internal tanks costs three months or the 93 that were actually built February to May 1943, the engines being used to convert mark V to IX while waiting. Putting in a three month delay at Castle Bromwich means another 34 Merlin 60 series Spitfires with larger internal fuel from it by end June 1943 on top of the mark VIII from Supermarine as combined production hits over 100 for the month, then combined production is nearly 200 in August, and 300 in November. This leaves 559 Spitfire IX built at Supermarine June 1942 to June 1943, plus conversions, less losses in Britain for the overseas forces before any of the longer range version are allocated.

AIR 16/1036. Dates are 8th Air Force day bombing of targets in Germany.

Date Column is RAF Fighter Command day offensive sorties for the day, 2nd TAF sorties are all types.
17-Jul-43 356
25-Jul-43 680
26-Jul-43 842
28-Jul-43 815
29-Jul-43 742
30-Jul-43 709 11,360 offensive sorties in July, including 2,326 USAAF, plus 4,450 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 2,730 sorties
12-Aug-43 733
17-Aug-43 759 11,320 offensive sorties in August, plus 2,217 USAAF fighter sorties, plus 3,801 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 3,801 sorties
06-Sep-43 1003
27-Sep-43 797 15,898 offensive sorties in September, plus 3,564 USAAF fighter sorties, plus 3,891 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 5,538 sorties
02-Oct-43 448
04-Oct-43 257
08-Oct-43 544
09-Oct-43 483
10-Oct-43 0
14-Oct-43 88
20-Oct-43 482 7,486 offensive sorties in October, plus 3,404 USAAF fighter sorties, plus 2,361 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 2,551 sorties
03-Nov-43 652
05-Nov-43 967
07-Nov-43 701
11-Nov-43 858
13-Nov-43 79
19-Nov-43 363
26-Nov-43 887
29-Nov-43 478
30-Nov-43 208 9,593 offensive sorties in November, plus 3,955 USAAF fighter sorties, plus 1,841 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 4,590 sorties
01-Dec-43 300
11-Dec-43 45
13-Dec-43 173
16-Dec-43 12
20-Dec-43 421
22-Dec-43 472
30-Dec-43 343 4,335 offensive sorties in December, plus 1,292 defensive sorties, plus 2nd TAF 3,820 sorties

So finding an extra or redirecting 100 or so offensive sorties per bomber day in July, rising to no more than twice that in December is quite viable.

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Sure it is, if you want to not fly the missions that were flown in real life. That "what if" never happened, and there is no correct response to discussing it. The guys who ordered the real-world missions didn't change them, and you can't either, except in your what if, which would have been possible, but weren't actually flown. Might have been a good idea, might not have been. Unless you can go and try it out, you can't say for sure. But, yes, it was possible.

I AM sure that changing a small percent of the sorties to something else would likely not have changed the course of the war, but it might have made it longer or shorter by a bit. We can't say which.

Thumpalumpacus said:

I like that he isn't afraid to get into the weeds, and does so by way of explanation that even a dolt like me can understand the issue. I still don't know if he's right or wrong much of the time, but his channel is certainly food for thought.

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I respect much of what he has to say on the technical level, but he went off the rails trying to explain why 'the powers that be conspired to keep P-47 range restricted' when hundreds of B-17/24 crew members were dying and POW. His knowledge of Combat Range, and limitations on such with only increasing external fuel, was sadly limited and confused.

drgondog said:

I respect much of what he has to say on the technical level, but he went off the rails trying to explain why 'the powers that be conspired to keep P-47 range restricted' when hundreds of B-17/24 crew members were dying and POW. His knowledge of Combat Range, and limitations on such with only increasing external fuel, was sadly limited and confused.

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Exactly. I am amazed at how many articles are out there which basically claim "Top Brass" was actively trying to lose the war, (Bodie dips into that territory)

Reluctant Poster said:

Exactly. I am amazed at how many articles are out there which basically claim "Top Brass" was actively trying to lose the war, (Bodie dips into that territory)

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Bodie's primary illness was the 'what if' surrounding the ultimate solution - the mystical Merlin powered P-38K derivative and wailing about the blindness of AAF leaders in failing to see the light. I wonder if he ever realized that Echols was the single most inflential member of the War Production Board, and even he couldn't get behind diverting Packard production in mid 1944 when Kelsey and Hough bootlegged two P-38J and sent them to R-R?

drgondog said:

I respect much of what he has to say on the technical level, but he went off the rails trying to explain why 'the powers that be conspired to keep P-47 range restricted' when hundreds of B-17/24 crew members were dying and POW. His knowledge of Combat Range, and limitations on such with only increasing external fuel, was sadly limited and confused.

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It's apparently not an uncommon view in some quarters. I've run into the sentiment in YouTube comments on videos on WWII aviation-related channels.

Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles lost me when he seemed to say that the B-17 could have regularly carried just about as many bombs to targets as the Lancaster by lugging bombs on its external wing racks, but didn't because reasons by the USAAF leadership.

33k in the air said:

It's apparently not an uncommon view in some quarters. I've run into the sentiment in YouTube comments on videos on WWII aviation-related channels.

Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles lost me when he seemed to say that the B-17 could have regularly carried just about as many bombs to targets as the Lancaster by lugging bombs on its external wing racks, but didn't because reasons by the USAAF leadership.

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The main reason was the effect on range. If you wanted to carry more bombs, you had to give up fuel, crew, or ammunition. If you give up fuel, that means basing your B-17s closer to German air power, not something anyone especially wanted yo do. Nobody wanted to fly with less than the full crew and full ammunition for defense, either, The result is a lower payload.

And basically the racks were only good for one bomb each.
You could lift a pair of 4000lb bombs using the racks.

But you could only lift a pair of 1000lbs using the racks. You could NOT use the racks for four 1000lb bombs.

And the external bombs added drag meaning you needed more fuel to go the same distance.

GregP said:

The main reason was the effect on range. If you wanted to carry more bombs, you had to give up fuel, crew, or ammunition. If you give up fuel, that means basing your B-17s closer to German air power, not something anyone especially wanted yo do. Nobody wanted to fly with less than the full crew and full ammunition for defense, either, The result is a lower payload.

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Yes, but Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles apparently missed this. I pointed out in the comments that external bombs on the B-17 came with drag and handling penalties, but this was ignored.

33k in the air said:

Yes, but Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles apparently missed this. I pointed out in the comments that external bombs on the B-17 came with drag and handling penalties, but this was ignored.

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I understand. Pointing out things that aren't in agreement with a video is something seemingly usually ignored or, at the least, attacked as "you obviously don't understand." Seems to a characteristic of the internet, where faceless replies can be attacked with impunity.

My theory is that if someone comes into power (as in , "becomes the boss") and becomes a jerk or posts something on the internet and becomes a jerk to challenges and/ or disagreements, then they were ALWAYS a jerk, but simply didn't have the power or audience to be one effectively before.

Sometimes people point out exceptions and then go on to claim they were the usual experience. Disagreement is, again, usually attacked. Being a bit familiar with warbirds, having worked on and with them for some 18 years, I see a LOT of incorrect statements about them.

I bet FlyboyJ (a maintainer) could disagree with a lot of posts, too. Sometimes, it just isn't worth the time and/or effort to do so.

GregP said:

I understand. Pointing out things that aren't in agreement with a video is something seemingly usually ignored or, at the least, attacked as "you obviously don't understand." Seems to a characteristic of the internet, where faceless replies can be attacked with impunity.

My theory is that if someone comes into power (as in , "becomes the boss") and becomes a jerk or posts something on the internet and becomes a jerk to challenges and/ or disagreements, then they were ALWAYS a jerk, but simply didn't have the power or audience to be one effectively before.

Sometimes people point out exceptions and then go on to claim they were the usual experience. Disagreement is, again, usually attacked. Being a bit familiar with warbirds, having worked on and with them for some 18 years, I see a LOT of incorrect statements about them.

I bet FlyboyJ (a maintainer) could disagree with a lot of posts, too. Sometimes, it just isn't worth the time and/or effort to do so.

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Agree Greg -

Oh, I've mellowed a bit in my old age but will still throw the BS flag up on occasion, but sometimes I see things with regards to aircraft maintenance written by folks with no real background in the industry and, well....

Shortround6 said:

For some reason the MK VIIIs didn't seem to get the rear tanks ? or only got one tank instead of two?
MK VIIIs had 120-123 gallons of internal.
MK XIVs went back to 85 gallons in fuselage tanks instead of the 96 in the MK VIII.

How many MK XIVs got rear fuselage tanks?

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The Mk VIII was out of production before rear tanks started to be fitted. The Supermarine factories switched to the XIV. Castle Bromwich never produced the VIII
The top fuel tank was reduced in capacity to make room for the oil tank which no longer fit under the nose
All FR XIVs had the 33 gallon rear tank. They accounted for something like 1/2 the production.

NevadaK said:

I understand that, but I'm a little confused as to why? In 1943, the P-47 and P-38 were already in use. The big missing piece is the Mustang which has the range necessary to provide coverage at the full range of the bomber force. The failures of the USAAC bombing campaign in 1943 are due to more than just the lack of escort fighters beyond the 400 mile range arc. The small size of the force itself contributed to the high loss rates. If you take a look at the graphic I added to my earlier post and the ones below, escort fighter coverage occurred in a series of zones. The Spitfire and P-47 were well used in the 200 and 400 mile arcs (ok, slightly shorter). Beyond that required a plane with really long range and that was the P-38 and Mustang. It seems to me that trying to give a Spitfire that kind of range is, in essence, trying to make it a Mustang.View attachment 680993View attachment 680994

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There is a bit of an error in that graphic. The P-38 was able to reach that far until the leading edge tanks were added in January 1944.

Reluctant Poster said:

All FR XIs had the 33 gallon rear tank. They accounted for something like 1/2 the production.

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FR XI?
Did you mean FR XIV?

wuzak said:

FR XI?
Did you mean FR XIV?

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Yes

33k in the air said:

Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles lost me when he seemed to say that the B-17 could have regularly carried just about as many bombs to targets as the Lancaster by lugging bombs on its external wing racks, but didn't because reasons by the USAAF leadership.

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I'm not sure how much surplus range the B-17's carried, but the only hope they could have had would have been fitting the plane with Tokyo-tanks, plumbing the wing for a drop-tank on those external pylons; then stuffing as many bombs in the bay as they could and hope the main landing gear legs didn't give out during the takeoff run.

FLYBOYJ said:

Oh, I've mellowed a bit in my old age but will still throw the BS flag up on occasion

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Having a good bullshit detection device is highly important.

Zipper730 said:

Having a good bullshit detection device is highly important.

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NevadaK said:

Now, why am i getting called out for dog piling here? Especially since I also linked an article from the highly esteemed Royal Aeronautical Society covering what had been tried and so forth. Jeez.

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It wasn't aimed specifically at you, NevadaK. Just to add information to the thread and repeat it because it hadn't sunk in...