Exercise Sagebrush

[Zipper730]

This seems like an interesting documentary (courtesy YouTuber Not a Pound for Air to Ground), I'm not sure if it's totally accurate but it is fascinating. From the airpower side of things, it does raise some interesting questions, particularly that fighters weren't allowed to be launched until a radar track was established on an enemy striker.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7L-ml8z2U10


I'm curious if the USSR had similar exercises and what they bore out

BTW: The author erroneously referred to the Invader as the Marauder, perhaps owing to the B-26 designation matching the older aircraft.
A Admiral Beez , Dimlee , GrauGeist , J Joe Broady , M MIflyer , P pbehn , T ThomasP , Thumpalumpacus , T tyrodtom , W wuzak , X XBe02Drvr

 

[Snautzer01]

BTW: The author erroneously referred to the B-26 as the Maurauder instead of the Invader,

Uhmmm. You might want to read that again.

 

[ThomasP]

Three observations.

1. The Soviets had a very well developed Operational Research establishment by the end of WWII, and from what I understand it was roughly equivalent in capability to the Western country's establishments. So I would be surprised if the Soviets did not perform similar studies in one form or another, and arrive at similar conclusions. I think the development of their strategic and tactical Air Forces shows a similar understanding.

2. Exercise Sagebrush was actually an attempt to test the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on the outcome of a tactical war. While the rest of the parameters were perhaps of use in some ways, the main focus was to determine if the theories the Operational Research establishment had come up with were accurate, while the rest of the exercise was mostly for show. It turned out the ideas and fears that had been predicted were valid.

What I mean by the rest of the exercise were mostly for show is that the USAF had been performing intercept exercises against incoming attacks on a regular basis - they already knew the chances of intercepting an incoming bomber or bomber formation. They had also been performing ground exercises on a regular basis - and had the lessons of WWII and Korea as examples of what to do and not to do.

My understanding is that the Operational Research establishment's wargaming had predicted the results (in general) and that Sagebrush was primarily a very visible demonstration of the predictions.

3. While the narrator's comments on the fighter vs interceptor doctrine has some merit, I do not think there is as much there as he implies and is largely due to hindsight. At the time of the exercise and for some time thereafter, it was very unlikely that jet fighters would successfully intercept incoming high performance attack aircraft - the technology was not yet available. The development of the nuclear armed Nike Ajax/Hercules ground-to-air and Genie air-to-air missiles was an outcome of the realization that even with long range detection by early-warning radars there was a little chance of fighters intercepting the bombers before the reached their targets. The attempts to develop Mach 2-3 long range interceptors was one result. The establishment of NORAD was another of the results of operations research and studies like Operation Sagebrush.

The Operational Research establishment predicted that there was even less chance of intercepting high performance attack aircraft (or even lower performance aircraft like the B-26) when in a tactical or grand-tactical environment, and exercises like Sagebrush seemed to support the conclusion.

 

[MIflyer]

I believe the Miss ANG was equipped with Douglas B-26's at that time, and at least some of those aircraft later were used in the Bay of Pigs operation.

 

[Zipper730]

Uhmmm. You might want to read that again.

Yeah, I did and corrected it

Three observations.

1. The Soviets had a very well developed Operational Research establishment by the end of WWII, and from what I understand it was roughly equivalent in capability to the Western country's establishments. So I would be surprised if the Soviets did not perform similar studies in one form or another, and arrive at similar conclusions. I think the development of their strategic and tactical Air Forces shows a similar understanding.

Adds up

2. Exercise Sagebrush was actually an attempt to test the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on the outcome of a tactical war. While the rest of the parameters were perhaps of use in some ways, the main focus was to determine if the theories the Operational Research establishment had come up with were accurate, while the rest of the exercise was mostly for show. It turned out the ideas and fears that had been predicted were valid.

And that would be that an airbase would be toast if the enemy launched nuclear missiles first. It would appear the option would be that, if in doubt, you should always fire first and "use 'em" rather than "lose 'em"?

What I mean by the rest of the exercise were mostly for show is that the USAF had been performing intercept exercises against incoming attacks on a regular basis - they already knew the chances of intercepting an incoming bomber or bomber formation.

From what I recall, during the late 1940's to 1950's they had done simulated interception missions against enemy aircraft with nuclear bombs.

Far as I know (and I could be wrong), these included high altitude attacks by bombers of various sort: If I had to make a guess, the B-29, because it'd approximate the performance of the Tu-4; the B-50, because it was an upgraded B-29; the B-36 because it's ability to penetrate our airspace would approximate the ability to penetrate Soviet airspace; the B-47 because it was a jet-bomber that the USSR would have (or soon have).

I do know there was an exercise with the USN using F2H's which didn't make the USAF look too good.

They had also been performing ground exercises on a regular basis - and had the lessons of WWII and Korea as examples of what to do and not to do.

When it came to the USAF, if I had to make a guess: I'd assume they probably favor scrambles whereby aircraft are quickly launched and race out to the target-area over defensive combat air-patrols; while I wouldn't be surprised if they used defensive CAP's at times: I don't actually know for sure.

I would imagine aircraft like the F-86D, F-94 would be better equipped for the interceptor missions; the F-89 used for a mix of interceptor and defensive CAP missions, and; the F-61 (if available) and F-82's used almost exclusively for defensive CAP.

3. While the narrator's comments on the fighter vs interceptor doctrine has some merit, I do not think there is as much there as he implies and is largely due to hindsight. At the time of the exercise and for some time thereafter, it was very unlikely that jet fighters would successfully intercept incoming high performance attack aircraft - the technology was not yet available.

There is some logic to that, but it should be pointed out that...

1. SAM's were largely conceptualized before we fielded our first nuclear bomb: The idea was basically that even existing bombers required a rather large amount of anti-aircraft artillery to shoot them down; aircraft that would be faster and higher like the B-29, possibly the B-36, and the jets under development would require a prohibitive amount of guns to lay down a sufficient amount of fire to have any prayer of downing a bomber.
2. Early on we'd looked into high-performance day-fighters like the XF-91 and XF-92 and night-fighters like the F-89 (which were originally designed for both offensive/defensive use); and later realized that we'd probably need both speed and all-weather capability (which ultimately gave rise to the F-102).
3. The idea of nuclear tipped SAMs, unguided-rockets, and AAM's seemed largely related to the following...
   • There might have been a belief that the USSR would use massed formations, though it seems some sources didn't appear to take this all that seriously: It would be fair to say that even a small nuclear explosion would cause utter mayhem for formation attacks, however...
   • High closure-rates would sometimes cause the problems with the avionics on the aircraft and/or missile and lead to misses: Proximity fuses helped, but even errors could occur with them. Even a small nuclear weapon would take care of that without any real difficulty.
   • The Genie seemed to also be built under an appeal to simplicity: Guidance systems were new and complicated; rockets have been used in significant numbers since WWII and were comparatively reliable.

The Operational Research establishment predicted that there was even less chance of intercepting high performance attack aircraft (or even lower performance aircraft like the B-26) when in a tactical or grand-tactical environment, and exercises like Sagebrush seemed to support the conclusion.

It would appear, interestingly however, that the first aircraft to commence strikes were the jet-powered aircraft (Canberras).