By Javier Jordán and Fernando M. Mañas, University of Granada (Spain)
Translated by Peter Billerbeck, University of St Thomas (USA)
Introduction
Is it possible to know if we are before a jihadist judging solely by exterior appearances?
It is, in fact, very difficult to respond to this question in a definitive way. Certain appearances (referring as much to style of dress as observable behavior) can indicate a symptom that an individual is experimenting (o has already completed) a process of jihadist radicalization. That is, a process through which the person incorporates jihadi values and joins active militancy in an individual manner (exceptional "lone wolf" cases) or in a group[1].
But the problem lies in that external appearances usually only constitute weak indications. There is a risk in attempting to catalogue an individual as jihadist through a superficial test for the following reasons:
· Many Muslims that sincerely reject jihadism also dress in a way similar to or observe the same religious practices as jihadists. Therefore, certain customs of jihadists are not exclusive to them, but shared with thousands of people who wish to live their beliefs in a pacifistic and coherent way. For example, it would be unreasonable and erroneous to claim that a particular Muslim is "fundamentalist" (and susceptible to becoming a jihadist) because they fast during Ramadan, abstain from drinking alcohol or observe with regularity the five daily prayer orations. Simply, this Muslim is a person who practices their faith.
· Certain customs, like letting a beard grow long, dressing in a jelaba or even using the tasbih (Islamic rosary), are not only particular to many Muslims but also to individuals who have nothing to do with Islam.
· In the cases of authentic jihadists, some symptoms are apparent during the process of radicalization. Nonetheless, normally is once that individual has been incorporated into a jihadist group (and especially if this group is planning to execute a terrorist action), strives to pay special attention to appearances, avoiding all signs that could be related to radicalism. In extreme cases this can could mean the violation of Islamic norms like the drinking of alcohol or the consumption of pork. The recourse to this strategy does indeed constitute a warning sign, but to discern if the behavior is genuine, it is necessary that security agencies have conducted surveillance on the individual in question for some time.
· The global jihadist movement is not homogenous. Internally, there exists diverse doctrinal currents and as a consequence, the external aspects of their religious and militant practices also vary. At the same time, the behavior of the organizations, networks and subgroups of which they are composed differ from one to another. The decentralized nature of the global jihadist movement, at a macro level, prevents us from talking about a sole modus operandi in what are referred to as "terrorist techniques" and common customs of religious inspiration[2].
· Lastly, the application of the norms and customs also depends on the degree of indoctrination, of radicalization and of actual commitment of the individuals. It is necessary to add that the jihadists experience the incoherencies, weaknesses and contradictions intrinsic to any human being, therefore, at times some of their actions can go against their inner convictions, but this does not mean that they do not possess them.
In spite of these limitations, the attentive observation of certain signs can be useful at the time of initiating or determining the scope of investigations about processes of jihadist radicalization. Above all, noting if some of these signs occur simultaneously in an individual and, especially, if they are witnessed in group behaviors like those that will be detailed in the following pages can be particularly useful. The objective of this Jihad Monitor Occasional Paper consists of compiling and commenting briefly on some of these types of signs.
1. Individual indications
There is a series of signs that have been witnessed in repeated occasions on an individual level. Some make reference to the exterior appearance of the subject and others in relation to their behavior.
1.1 Physical Appearance
In theory these aspects are the easiest to observe but in practice are the least useful when detecting jihadist radicalization, as we have previously mentioned, they can be common to other non-jihadist Muslims or even to persons that have no true relation to Islam. Nevertheless, we mention them because they appear with a certain degree of frequency in subjects that undergo processes of radicalization:
· The individual begins to let their beard grow long, at times shaving the moustache. It is considered a way of imitating the Prophet Mohammed and his first companions, so called "salaf" (ancestors), "returning" thus to the original epoch of Islam. In some cases the length of the beard draws attention, exceeding the length of three fingers which is the maximum that is permitted for example by the tablighi (members of a non-jihadist Islamist revivalist movement); the formal appearance of its followers is thus adjusted to that of Islam at its start[3].
· In some cases cutting the hair very close to the head
· Cutting back the fingernails, avoiding that the upper white part is seen.
· Employs what is considered "traditional Islamic dress": jelaba or wider pants and a traditional hat or turban. If a job or reasons of another type prevent this, the individual will dress this way on holidays or periods of vacation.
· Tries to have the pants cover until just above the ankles, folding upwards the bottom part if the length exceeds this.
· Refusing to wear shorts to play sports.
· Refusing to have tattoos for religious motives. Nonetheless, an individual that is experiencing a process of radicalization may have them on their body from before.
· Frequently, a small callous is observed on the forehead, which can also serve as proof of strong belief before other Muslims in the practice of salat (prayer). (The mark is produced by contacting the floor with force when prostrating).
· Weight loss, possibly due to changes in eating habits. Some of these individuals practice with more frequency than others voluntary fasting. For example, two individuals implicated in the March 11 plot, Serhane Abdelmajid "the Tunisian" and Moataz Almallah Dabas fasted every Monday and Thursday of the year4. In this sense, it is frequent that they fast six additional days in the month of Chawal (that which immediately follows Ramadan) [4]. However, similar to the others that we have noted, this custom can also be practiced by pious Muslims who are not jihadists.
Lastly, we should note again that it is very frequent that the individual tries to show a much more "Western" aspect and behavior once integrated in an operative cell or if police surveillance is suspected. One of the manuals of al-Qaeda affirms, citing Ibn Taymiyah, that if a Muslim is in a combat or godless area, he is not obligated to have a different appearance from (those around him). The (Muslim) man may prefer or even be obligated to look like them, provided his action brings a religious benefit of preaching to them, learning their secrets and informing Muslims, preventing harm, or some other beneficial goal[5].
Some consider that this strategy of deception and disguise is particular to the takfiri jihadist strain. Within the lexicon, there exists a certain confusion concerning this term. In our judgment, the takfiri strain represents the most radical sub-current within salafist jihadism. A sub current that considers apostates – and not simply weak or lapsed Muslims– all followers of Islam that do not share their ideology. In consequence, the takfiris consider legitimate the killing of the Muslim elderly, women and children which do not support them. It is the most radical derivation which, for example the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé, Algeria) experienced in the mid 1990s[6]. Nevertheless, this disguising is also practiced by less extreme jihadist movements like Al-Qaeda networks and associated groups.
Translated by Peter Billerbeck, University of St Thomas (USA)
Introduction
Is it possible to know if we are before a jihadist judging solely by exterior appearances?
It is, in fact, very difficult to respond to this question in a definitive way. Certain appearances (referring as much to style of dress as observable behavior) can indicate a symptom that an individual is experimenting (o has already completed) a process of jihadist radicalization. That is, a process through which the person incorporates jihadi values and joins active militancy in an individual manner (exceptional "lone wolf" cases) or in a group[1].
But the problem lies in that external appearances usually only constitute weak indications. There is a risk in attempting to catalogue an individual as jihadist through a superficial test for the following reasons:
· Many Muslims that sincerely reject jihadism also dress in a way similar to or observe the same religious practices as jihadists. Therefore, certain customs of jihadists are not exclusive to them, but shared with thousands of people who wish to live their beliefs in a pacifistic and coherent way. For example, it would be unreasonable and erroneous to claim that a particular Muslim is "fundamentalist" (and susceptible to becoming a jihadist) because they fast during Ramadan, abstain from drinking alcohol or observe with regularity the five daily prayer orations. Simply, this Muslim is a person who practices their faith.
· Certain customs, like letting a beard grow long, dressing in a jelaba or even using the tasbih (Islamic rosary), are not only particular to many Muslims but also to individuals who have nothing to do with Islam.
· In the cases of authentic jihadists, some symptoms are apparent during the process of radicalization. Nonetheless, normally is once that individual has been incorporated into a jihadist group (and especially if this group is planning to execute a terrorist action), strives to pay special attention to appearances, avoiding all signs that could be related to radicalism. In extreme cases this can could mean the violation of Islamic norms like the drinking of alcohol or the consumption of pork. The recourse to this strategy does indeed constitute a warning sign, but to discern if the behavior is genuine, it is necessary that security agencies have conducted surveillance on the individual in question for some time.
· The global jihadist movement is not homogenous. Internally, there exists diverse doctrinal currents and as a consequence, the external aspects of their religious and militant practices also vary. At the same time, the behavior of the organizations, networks and subgroups of which they are composed differ from one to another. The decentralized nature of the global jihadist movement, at a macro level, prevents us from talking about a sole modus operandi in what are referred to as "terrorist techniques" and common customs of religious inspiration[2].
· Lastly, the application of the norms and customs also depends on the degree of indoctrination, of radicalization and of actual commitment of the individuals. It is necessary to add that the jihadists experience the incoherencies, weaknesses and contradictions intrinsic to any human being, therefore, at times some of their actions can go against their inner convictions, but this does not mean that they do not possess them.
In spite of these limitations, the attentive observation of certain signs can be useful at the time of initiating or determining the scope of investigations about processes of jihadist radicalization. Above all, noting if some of these signs occur simultaneously in an individual and, especially, if they are witnessed in group behaviors like those that will be detailed in the following pages can be particularly useful. The objective of this Jihad Monitor Occasional Paper consists of compiling and commenting briefly on some of these types of signs.
1. Individual indications
There is a series of signs that have been witnessed in repeated occasions on an individual level. Some make reference to the exterior appearance of the subject and others in relation to their behavior.
1.1 Physical Appearance
In theory these aspects are the easiest to observe but in practice are the least useful when detecting jihadist radicalization, as we have previously mentioned, they can be common to other non-jihadist Muslims or even to persons that have no true relation to Islam. Nevertheless, we mention them because they appear with a certain degree of frequency in subjects that undergo processes of radicalization:
· The individual begins to let their beard grow long, at times shaving the moustache. It is considered a way of imitating the Prophet Mohammed and his first companions, so called "salaf" (ancestors), "returning" thus to the original epoch of Islam. In some cases the length of the beard draws attention, exceeding the length of three fingers which is the maximum that is permitted for example by the tablighi (members of a non-jihadist Islamist revivalist movement); the formal appearance of its followers is thus adjusted to that of Islam at its start[3].
· In some cases cutting the hair very close to the head
· Cutting back the fingernails, avoiding that the upper white part is seen.
· Employs what is considered "traditional Islamic dress": jelaba or wider pants and a traditional hat or turban. If a job or reasons of another type prevent this, the individual will dress this way on holidays or periods of vacation.
· Tries to have the pants cover until just above the ankles, folding upwards the bottom part if the length exceeds this.
· Refusing to wear shorts to play sports.
· Refusing to have tattoos for religious motives. Nonetheless, an individual that is experiencing a process of radicalization may have them on their body from before.
· Frequently, a small callous is observed on the forehead, which can also serve as proof of strong belief before other Muslims in the practice of salat (prayer). (The mark is produced by contacting the floor with force when prostrating).
· Weight loss, possibly due to changes in eating habits. Some of these individuals practice with more frequency than others voluntary fasting. For example, two individuals implicated in the March 11 plot, Serhane Abdelmajid "the Tunisian" and Moataz Almallah Dabas fasted every Monday and Thursday of the year4. In this sense, it is frequent that they fast six additional days in the month of Chawal (that which immediately follows Ramadan) [4]. However, similar to the others that we have noted, this custom can also be practiced by pious Muslims who are not jihadists.
Lastly, we should note again that it is very frequent that the individual tries to show a much more "Western" aspect and behavior once integrated in an operative cell or if police surveillance is suspected. One of the manuals of al-Qaeda affirms, citing Ibn Taymiyah, that if a Muslim is in a combat or godless area, he is not obligated to have a different appearance from (those around him). The (Muslim) man may prefer or even be obligated to look like them, provided his action brings a religious benefit of preaching to them, learning their secrets and informing Muslims, preventing harm, or some other beneficial goal[5].
Some consider that this strategy of deception and disguise is particular to the takfiri jihadist strain. Within the lexicon, there exists a certain confusion concerning this term. In our judgment, the takfiri strain represents the most radical sub-current within salafist jihadism. A sub current that considers apostates – and not simply weak or lapsed Muslims– all followers of Islam that do not share their ideology. In consequence, the takfiris consider legitimate the killing of the Muslim elderly, women and children which do not support them. It is the most radical derivation which, for example the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé, Algeria) experienced in the mid 1990s[6]. Nevertheless, this disguising is also practiced by less extreme jihadist movements like Al-Qaeda networks and associated groups.