Fairey Albacore. Was so awful?

Wild_Bill_Kelso said:

Skip the Barracuda! and the Gannet ... is basically just an ASW plane right?

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Admiral Beez said:

Except for anti-ship torpedo missions, so was the depth charge-armed Swordfish and Albacore. We coldwar aviation fans remember the Gannet as a ASW and AEW bird, but it was a multirole bomber by design. Given the lack of anti-surface ship targets and the improved AA postwar, it makes sense for the Gannet to focus on ASW, but for non-ASW the Gannet could carry 16x RP-3 rockets (under the wings) and 4x MC Mk.18 - Mk.21 500lb bombs internally.

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Nothing wrong with the Barracuda. Just get it into service in 1941 instead of Jan 1943. Besides tweaking the Merlin, there's nothing technically advanced on the Barracuda that precludes its earlier service.

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The Gannet was designed to Spec GR.17/45 on which work began in early Jan 1946 and which was finally issued to Blackburn & Fairey on 11 April 1947.i.e. a General Recce aircraft. It was originally for a 2 seat anti submarine and recce aircraft in areas where enemy fighters were unlikely to be met. It was intended to operate from future escort and trade protection carriers. The specified weapons included:-

No guns
8xRP with 60lb heads or 16xRP with 25lb heads
8 sonobuoys + 1x AS homing torpedo
3xMk.30 "Dealer" passive homing torpedos much development but never entered service)
6xMk. XI depth charges
6x250lb AS bombs
+ 4 flares and 4 smoke floats or marine markers.

These are all typical AS outfits. The term "strike" that is often used in connection with the Gannet refers to its ability to both carry all the tools to search for a submarine AND carry all the weapons required to kill it. It was never a reference to a capability of operating like the SBD, SB2C, or other dive bombers or as a replacement for the anti shipping torpedo bomber of pre-war / WW2. In 1949 it had to be redesigned to take a third seat to carry a dedicated sonobuoy operator. That role was originally allocated to the observer who was also supposed to navigate and operate the radar! The option, that was swiftly rejected, was to operate separate "Hunter" & "killer" aircraft in the same way the USN did in early post-war years with the AS dedicated Grumman Avengers and then AF-2W and AF-2S Guardian aircraft.

Gannet was meant to be the successor to the Barracuda TR.III in the anti submarine role, that is the Barracuda version with centimetric ASV.X in a radome under the rear fuselage. There were 4 squadrons of these at the end of WW2. 815 continued to operate them until May 1953.


The lower capability AS aircraft, a kind of Swordfish replacement, was intended to be the Short Seamew.

Wild_Bill_Kelso said:

Ok lost 3. My 'tricky' memory tells me that they lost more than that number of SB2C

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OK I've now found the details. 240 aircraft launched. 14 aborts returned to carriers. 20 lost to AA and fighters around the 4 groups of Japanese ships spread over a distance of 30-40 miles. Just after time of launch the Japanese fleet was reported 60 miles further west than previously believed, giving a run in of 300-330 miles (sources vary)and a return of an estimated 250. Once the Japanese fleet was located, the strike itself was over in about 20mins.

95 F6F Hellcats (some armed with bombs)
26 SBD Dauntless
51 SB2C Helldiver
54 TBM Avengers (sources vary as to how many carried torpedoes. Anything from 4 to 21)

The losses from ditching or deck crashes were around 80 aircraft per one source I have, but another source gives 76 broken down as follows:-

14 F6F (another source says only 6)
4 SBD
35 SB2C
23 TBD (another source says 28)

BUT
A few points to bear in mind:-

1. The launch process itself took at least 10-15 minutes plus time to form up the air groups before departing for the target (normally about 20 mins, but procedures were changed to shorten this to save fuel). Time, and fuel was saved by not waiting to co-ordinate attacks. Launch order would generally be F6F then SBD/SB2C then TBM.

2. The carriers had to reverse course and increase speed to 22 knots and run eastwards into the wind and away from the Japanese fleet, before landings could begin.

3. The landing on period stretched over 2 hours.

Taken together with 2 above, the gap from the Japanese fleet increased by some 44 nautical miles (50 statute miles) during the landing on process. That can't have helped. Also, note the difference between the actual strike time c20 mins) and the landing on time (2 hours). It shows just how the strike force became strung out on the way home.

4. Some units, including CAG-2 on Hornet, had agreed before take of that, as the strike was at extreme range, in the event of aircraft running short of fuel then groups of aircraft should ditch together with the crews tying their life rafts together to increase the likelihood of rescue. I don't know if it actually occurred that way at all, but it was in the Action Report prepared after the event by CAG-2.

5. Some of these aircraft had suffered battle damage or had wounded pilots, so might not have made it back anyway.

6. As noted previously the two SBD equipped VB squadrons were experienced, having been aboard their carriers for longer than those equipped with the SB2C units.

So there are a range of factors that would have affected just what distance / time individual aircraft would have had to fly during the mission, before considering things like individual aircraft engine performance and pilot skills at ekeing out that fuel.

By dusk on 21 June a massive rescue operation by TF58 ships and floatplanes and PBMs meant that all bar 16 pilots and 22 aircrew were recovered.

It was a lonely night for those 38 men...