Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
To further the above post by SplitRz we can look at a 1943 fighter bomber (service use) that has been held up as example.
A-36 with two 500lb bombs, Gross weight as per load and weight chart in manual. 180 US gals (150 imp) full internal tanks.
1325hp for take-off vs your favorite 1939-40 fighter engine/s ????
232sq ft wing
Now for the interesting part.
Manual says on a sod runway it needs with zero wind, 2400ft (800yds) to lift off and 3200ft (1066yds) to clear 50ft.
However that is at 0 degrees C. Manual says add 10% for every 10 degrees C higher than zero degrees so add 15% for 15 degrees C (59 degrees F)
so 3620 ft (1206yds) just to get off the run way. Adjust further for summer days (or warm spring and fall)
Head winds help but what size were the 1939-40 airfields/runways?
Some lists of the 4 greatest American weapons of WW II some times include the bulldozer
A lot of hyperventilating about the A-36 here is based on a very false premise that anyone was actually suggesting it for 1939-1940.
Let me remind you and SplitRz of the context - the conversation drifted into the potential capabilities of fighter-bombers in general, since the original discussion was hinging on the use of aircraft like Henleys and adapting them to fighter bomber or dive bomber roles. It was alleged that fighter-bombers could not operate without air superiority, which isn't actually true. I brought up the A-36 to point out a particular, glaring, obvious example of a fighter bomber which was used in a very dangerous environment without escort.
This is also true, incidentally, for CAS by fighter bombers (even though this is another discursion and may not really be germane to the original discussion). Even when Cab Rank and it's various precursors were being used in North Africa, the DAF did not, in fact, have air superiority. Early precursors to Cab Rank were already being used at a large scale at 2nd El Alamein in late 1942 and the air above it was very much heavily contested. The DAF took a lot of losses, as did the Luftwaffe, but they (DAF) made it work. And it played an important role in the battle. And in battles prior to that one.
Circling back, the A-36 and other aircraft mentioned were simply part of a discursion into the debate about the capabilities of fighter bombers and dive bombers in general. The "What If" aspect of this thread, going back to the OP, hinges on whether something available could be adapted to the role, which may or may not have required using the aircraft in different ways than it was historically. Nobody is going to win a battle by flying a better target tug. The A-36 was brought up as one example of an effective fighter-bomber adaptation, albeit later in the war.
I hope that clears it up gentlemen.
I brought up the A-36 to point out a particular, glaring, obvious example of a fighter bomber which was used in a very dangerous environment without escort.
It seems that you bought up a strawman type argument.I hope that clears it up gentlemen.
They might have gone to France with the fixed pitch props but I doubt if they kept them very long. It was about 8 months from the start of the war to the start of the BoF. Everything seems to have been a mad scramble but they had been installing DH two position props at the factory in the summer of 1939 (?, they trialed one in the summer of 1938) the Hawlers had started installing at least a few Rotol props in the fall of 1939. Home defense may have had first priority.Hurricanes in France had fixed pitch two-blade props
The tactical concept went from mediocre to bad with the decision to use them as close escorts instead of free range. The Bf 110s could boom and zoom but if you take that way and try to use them as turning fighters it was not going to end well.Up against a Gloster Gladiator, the Bf110s superior performance more than made up for what I regard as a bad tactical concept.
As I understand it, operational experience and feedback in France meant that a rapid modification programme had ensured most (if not all) had been re-equipped with variable props before the peak of the BoB - a matter of a few months.They might have gone to France with the fixed pitch props but I doubt if they kept them very long.
As I understand it was possible to correct the blunder of Air Ministry in short order because they did not re-equip the planes with variable speed props.As I understand it, operational experience and feedback in France meant that a rapid modification programme had ensured most (if not all) had been re-equipped with variable props before the peak of the BoB - a matter of a few months.
I'm not sure its hyperventilation as opposed to head-scratching and some challenge as to why you're using examples of non-contextual aircraft to prove... well... what exactly? (and it seems i'm in company on that front, so maybe your hyperbole is unnecessary)... 1939/40 Fast Bomber. The A-36 doesn't even fly for another two years. I get that we can dip into other periods to see what happens with certain concepts,
but fighter bombers in 1942 onwards exist in a very different front-line world.
You could have used the early P40s and Hurribombers (which at least existed in early '41 an could arguably have been developed sooner) as a pertinent example of effective fighter-bomber adaptions
from '40/41, but I assume you didn't, because they clearly weren't anything like 'sef defending' and required escort and top cover to have a reasonable chance of survival?
It looked, and pardon me if I'm being to cynical, like you drifted over to the A36 to try and support a proposition that doesn't seem to have much traction or relevance to a 1939/40 'fast bomber' [the threads title and purpose]- and even then, you used an outlier example of an aircraft.
One that was used on fronts and at a time, unlike 1939/40 when the principal threat to it in the ETA was going to increasingly be flak, not fighter interception (the most important aspect requiring high speed to defend against). Not that the A-36 stayed in service very long either, given the horrendous attrition it suffered after a relatively brief period of peak success in Italy (delivering a single ace in the process....)
"As fighting intensified in all theaters where the A-36A operated, the dive bomber began to suffer an alarming loss rate with 177 falling to enemy action.[13] The main reason for the attrition was the hazardous missions that placed the A-36A "on the deck" facing murderous ground fire. German defenses in southern Italy included placing cables across hill tops to snare the attacking A-36As.[22] Despite establishing a reputation for reliability and performance, the one "Achilles' heel" of the A-36A (and the entire Mustang series) remained the ventral-fuselage location of the radiator/cooling system, leading to many of the losses. By June 1944, A-36As in Europe were replaced by Curtiss P-40s and Republic P-47 Thunderbolts.[5][23]...."
Maybe we assume it performed far better in the PTO? But even that seems an iffy proposition overall:
"A-36As also served with the 311th Fighter Bomber Group in the China-Burma-India theater. The 311th had arrived in Dinjan, India by late summer 1943 after being shipped across the Pacific via Australia.[26] Two squadrons were equipped with the A-36A while the third flew P-51As. Tasked with reconnaissance, dive bombing, attack and fighter missions, the A-36A was outclassed by its main opposition, the Nakajima Ki-43 "Oscar." The light and highly agile Japanese fighter could outmaneuver the A-36A at all altitudes but did have some weak points: it was lightly armed and offered little protection for pilot or fuel tanks. However, the A-36A fought at a significant disadvantage, having to carry out long-range missions often at altitudes above The Hump that meant its Allison engine was below peak performance. In a fighter escort mission over Burma, three A-36As were lost without scoring a single victory. The A-36A CBI missions continued throughout 1943–1944 with indifferent results. "
Its just Wikipedia - but the sources are cited if you want to take up cudgels on that front.
A 'self-defending / too fast to intercept' fighter-bomber/dive bomber that entered service in 1942, beaten into a cocked-hat in the PTO by an opposing fighter that first flew in 1939?
A fighter-bomber completely replaced in post D-Day '44 Europe by, amongst others, Curtis P-40s?
I don't doubt the A-36 achieved great things in its short service life, regardless of the cost to its pilots due to the mission profile. But I don't see how it advances a helpful or relevant contribution to a conceptual 1939/40 fast bomber as per the thread title - let alone following the criteria Tomo set out.
Instead, its a short-range aircraft with a maximum 1000lb bomb-load that doesn't go into service until 2 years after the 'what it' design criteria period and barely lasts the course of the war in front-line service.
Interesting, but ... what conclusions can we draw from it?
It seems that you bought up a strawman type argument.
I believe it was pointed out before that the A-36 used aerodynamics that did not exist in a service aircraft in 1940. This includes airfoil, cooling system, and general fit and finish. An Allison Mustang I was about 25-30mph faster than a P-40 using the same engine and a P-40 was not exactly a slouch for the installed power. Please give altitudes for challenges to this. The P-40E was both too late for 1940 and 1000-2000lbs heavier than most of it's foreign competition that arrived even later (MC 202 or Ki-61)
The Hurricane was towing a parachute.
Expecting a speed advantage that can be partially traded away in the fighter bomber role over other fighters was going to be very hard to come by in 1939-40.
Spitfire and Bf 109F are the only ones that can manage it both are short of fuel for anything but very close missions with external bombs.
Ignoring advances in power to weight of later powerplants, advances in propeller design (really looking at the British here), changes in fuel, changes if flaps or other aerodynamic changes to claim the concept could have been used early seems to calling many of the early designers idiots.
Hurricane Is would have been horrible fighter bombers in 1939-40 even if they had tried.
It really boils down to whether or not you understand the concept of context, the title of a thread [read it out aloud to yourself if that helps] - and whether you can have a reasonable, polite and relevant conversation without strawmen arguments, hair-splitting, tangents, and ad hominem comments within that frame.yes that would in fact be the point, since some were asserting that fighter bombers couldn't survive such raids
Very different how? Faster fighters perhaps? More AAA?
I certainly don't think the A-36 was a perfect fighter-bomber, it was just one which I happen to know worked in very challenging environments. And not the only one that I brought up either.
That was not in fact always the case, particularly in CBI and the Pacific, but the P-40s if not Hurricanes were fairly often sent on unescorted fighter bomber strike missions, or sometimes with a minimal number of their own unit (flight of four) flying as top cover. They did take fairly heavy losses in North Africa, especially up to mid 1942, but they used them this way regardless.
Allow me to assist you in understanding (though something tells me you still won't) - it was an obvious, well known example of a fighter bomber which actually worked as a fast bomber, thus helping to demonstrate that the categorical claim that fighter bombers (or bombers carrying ordinance outside of a bomb bay) couldn't do it. In 1940 the difference is it would not have to be quite that fast.
Uh, the reason A-36 were retired is because wings couldn't ultimately hold up to high angle dive bombing and started falling off, and they had stopped making them so there weren't any replacements
The advantage of the A-36 was partly high cruise speed, but it was largely (compared to P-40s and P-47s) it's bombing accuracy, which also matters a lot in tactical bombing. P-40s and P-47s could also bomb fairly accurately but that extra 10 or 20 degrees of dive angle + the dive brakes seemed to make a difference.
Both A-36 and P-51A did poorly as fighters in the CBI, but I don't think that A-36 took particularly heavy losses on bombing / strike missions.
Well, it turns out the Ki-43 was a much better fighter than the postwar legends had it...
Another fighter (and fighter-bomber) type which was better than the press claims it was...
I think that is mainly because you hate the notion which the A-36 in fact proves correct - that fighter bombers could also do this mission. And did do, through the war.
That really depends on how open you are to drawing any conclusions you didn't already have mate
It really boils down to whether or not you understand the concept of context, the title of a thread [read it out aloud to yourself if that helps] - and whether you can have a reasonable, polite and relevant conversation without strawmen arguments, hair-splitting and tangents, within that frame.
Given you're demonstrating across a number of threads that you can't, I'll take your leave and talk with the grown ups.
Probably yes, but would it have been worse than the single engined light bomber they were using instead, like the Battle? At least they'd lose only one man instead of three for every one of them shot down.Hurricane Is would have been horrible fighter bombers in 1939-40 even if they had tried.
There's at least an argument that a purpose designed two seater light bomber like The Henley *might* have been superiour. It certainly was to the Battle in all important aspects - especially speed - apart from bombload. Its interesting that many of the Henley's proponents after it was cancelled, were those with decent personal and working knowledge of the early war RAF.Probably yes, but would it have been worse than the single engined light bomber they were using instead, like the Battle? At least they'd lose only one man instead of three for every one of them shot down.
I am problem going to chewed out for this but..........................Probably yes, but would it have been worse than the single engined light bomber they were using instead, like the Battle? At least they'd lose only one man instead of three for every one of them shot down.
I think there's a lot of wisdom in this. Especially the last sentence!I am problem going to chewed out for this but..........................
Hurricane I, which is what we are talking about in 1939-40 has a few technical things wrong with it as far as light bomber or fighter bomber goes. Some could have fixed had different decisions have been made at the time/s in question. A few of them apply to the Battle also which is part of the reason for the Battles poor reputation.
There are some other reasons like poor training and/or doctrine and some of them are just ignorance. Like very few people knew how effective light AA was going to be. Germans guessed better than others but they didn't know despite Spanish war experience.
British and French rather ignored WW I experience or remembered it as too costly and there for not to be repeated. It was too costly to use as a day in/day out substitute for artillery. It was not too costly to use for several days at a time to either push and attack through or to prevent a breakthrough while reinforcements were rushed into threatened areas.
British wanted that short field performance which meant light wing loading which equaled large wings, which means more drag and a bit more structural weight. Battle and Blenheim could fly closer to 60mph than 70 or 70 plus. This made them easy to fly and land but hurt top speed. The flaps didn't offer lot of extra lift. They helped land the planes by using drag and slowing the planes down rather than having them float over the fields if they came in even a little hot. For take off the British hurt the Merlin by giving it that high altitude supercharger. High is relative in 1939-40, Merlin III peaks around 4000ft higher than HS 12Ys or early DB601s but with 87 octane fuel they had to close the throttle to keep from over-boosting the engine and the Merlin III was only good for 880hp for take-off. Which kind of sucks for trying to get even a 500lb bomb load out of small airfield with even the 260sq ft of the Hurricane.
Things the British could have done in 1939/early 1940 that do not require using more modern aerodynamics than the 1935-36 aerodynamics used by the planes (changing structure/shape is going to delay production/service use) is using constant speed props instead of two pitch. Better climb/thrust at low altitudes and less than max speed.
Battle was designed as strategic bomber with a 400 mile radius or over double what the Hurricane could do. It was also designed to fly at 15,000-20,000ft, not sea level or at 1000ft across Belgium. Had the British installed either a medium supercharger gear or a low altitude supercharger gear they could have had somewhere around 1000-1100hp for take-off or combat flying at low altitudes even on 87 octane fuel. Use of 100 octane just adds a couple of hundred HP more. Use the fuel that suits you. It can go either way in the spring/summer of 1940. Please note that were either experimental Merlin's or service engines with both types of gears at the time. Like the Merlin VIII used in the Fulmar. You do have to change production priorities and I am not going to say if that could or could not be done. But the engines either existed or calculations as to power output existed at the time.
No saying that Hooker could have/should have developed the Merlin XX even quicker.
Those are some of the problems I have with the whole Battle vs Hurricane F/B argument. The Battle was never upgraded or given much in the way of protection or extra guns (a few got a single gun firing out through the floor, effect unknown). Hurricane II fighter bombers got the Merlin XX engine with the two speed supercharger, the Rotol propellers, 100 octane fuel and 12lbs of boost, some minimal fuel tank protection and some armor and BP glass. Some really late Hurricane had several hundred pounds of armor around the radiator and cockpit floor against ground fire so comparisons to losses sustained by Battles aren't really valid. That 400hp boost the Merlin XX gave for take-off over the Merlin III in the Hurricane I
was a real game changer as far as getting loads out of crappy airfields but then a 45% increase in power will do that for you
I will note that the Hurricane F/Bs were not doing well in the attacks on France in 1942 and that was the reason that the Whirlwinds were finally given bomb racks. There were only two Hurricane Fighter Bomber squadrons (there were only two fighter bomber squadrons total but that is another story) in operation crossing the channel and such was rate of supply to over seas theaters (or to Russia?) that the existing rate of attrition was going to require at least one of them to disbanded. By mounting bomb racks on the Whirlwinds Fighter command doubled their number of fighter bomber squadrons for cross channel attacks and the reduced work load meant both Hurricane squadrons could remain operational with the reduced need for replacement aircraft. RAF was trying to use small number (not even squadrons size) of fighter bombers as 'bait' for the Luftwaffe while providing several dozen or several scores of non bomb carrying escort.
I tend to like "what ifs" that are about different choices that could have been made using pretty much existing technology of it's time. Jet powered radar equipped night fighters using missiles in 1940 are well into the land of fantasy, not "what if".