Fast bombers alternatives for 1939-40

[Steamed_Banana]

The Desert War started in June 1940, but presumably "early difficult" dates to some time in 1941 but could be well into 1942 given the aircraft types mentioned. Wellingtons did anti shipping operations and remained the primary strategic bomber in Egypt, supplemented by Halifax and then the USAAF B-24 units started to take over.

"Early difficult" for the Desert air war = began when the Bf 109s of JG 27 (IIRC Sept of 1941) and MC 202s (Nov 41) arrived, IMO. This is when Allied aircraft losses began to really mount.

There is an earlier fascinating phase involving Lysanders and Gladiators fighting CR 32s and BR.20s and a lot of other weird types, and then a bit later Hurricanes fighting G.50s and MC 200s and toward the end of it... a few Bf 110s, but I consider this the era prior to either side taking a very serious interest and casualties among pilots and aircrew on both sides were comparatively low.

The US kept all the A-20A for itself.

The A-20A was almost identical to the British DB-7B / Boston III. The Boston IIIA was also very similar to the A-20C.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Might work in 1943
Maybe you can try an even smaller plane using the engines/turbos from a P-43?

We are reviewing the wisdom of Martin as they designed the B26. Selecting the biggest engine available was extremely wise. We have a conflict between defensive armament and speed. Turbochargers on the Maraudaskito would be nifty, but lots of damage can be done by a fast aircraft at low altitude, as real Mosquitos eventually would demonstrate.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Soviets changed the bomb racks on the A-20 and increased the bomb load to 2,000 kg when taking off from a concrete runway. In general, Soviet aviation considered the nominal bomb load of the A-20 to be underestimated—the aircraft was capable of carrying much more.

The A-20's attributes were speed and range, which was essential at the start of the war in many theaters.

On the Eastern Front, range was not so much of an issue and with sufficient fighter protection, a reduced top speed would be acceptable.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Early A-20s / DB-7s had fairly poor range, which was one of their biggest limitations. Each subsequent version was improved in this regard, the G had decent range. None were really long ranged though.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Early A-20s / DB-7s had fairly poor range, which was one of their biggest limitations. Each subsequent version was improved in this regard, the G had decent range. None were really long ranged though.

Is that really a limitation? If I want maximum speed, I need to identify stuff I do not absolutely need. A tactical bomber can operate from airfields in the vicinity of the battlefield. A light, tactical bomber does not need long range. It can operate from airfields close to the battlefield. A smaller, lighter aircraft will be faster, more manoeuverable, and harder to hit, and more able to survive missions. This is why the small, tactical bombers were largely replaced in the ETO with fighter bombers like P47s and Typhoons.

It would be really nice to have a can of speed and range that I can spray on my aircraft. This does not exist, and there is no free lunch.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Is that really a limitation? If I want maximum speed, I need to identify stuff I do not absolutely need. A tactical bomber can operate from airfields in the vicinity of the battlefield. A light, tactical bomber does not need long range. It can operate from airfields close to the battlefield. A smaller, lighter aircraft will be faster, more manoeuverable, and harder to hit, and more able to survive missions. This is why the small, tactical bombers were largely replaced in the ETO with fighter bombers like P47s and Typhoons.

It would be really nice to have a can of speed and range that I can spray on my aircraft. This does not exist, and there is no free lunch.

yeah I'm not saying it invalidated the aircraft, I'm a fan of the A-20 / DB-7 series, and it did eventually get better as well. I'm just noting that speed was apparently an issue with the type, especially early-on. This is why the British were initially cool to the design when they more or less inherited the French order. It's relatively good performance in North Africa won them over to it's use in Tactical Theaters which they considered secondary or tertiary.

 

[SaparotRob]

It would be really nice to have a can of speed and range that I can spray on my aircraft. This does not exist, and there is no free lunch.

Have ground crews, using spray cans of black paint and white paint, apply balkenkrueze.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Have ground crews, using spray cans of black paint and white paint, apply balkenkrueze.

I'll stick with 130 octane fuel thank you.

 

[GrauGeist]

Early A-20s / DB-7s had fairly poor range, which was one of their biggest limitations. Each subsequent version was improved in this regard, the G had decent range. None were really long ranged though.

The A-20A had a range of 675 miles with a 2,000 pound bomb load with a cruise speed of 295mph. It's max. speed was over 340mph @ 12,000 feet.

For an early war medium bomber, this was going to be hard to beat.

Comparing to the A-20A to the A-20G is actually a step backward. Yes, the G variant had increased range and bombload, but at the cost of it's speed.

So as fighters were getting faster, the A-20 was getting slower.

 

[SaparotRob]

I'll stick with 130 octane fuel thank you.

I always thought 130 octane fuel was carried internally rather than sprayed on.
The things one learns here.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The A-20A had a range of 675 miles with a 2,000 pound bomb load with a cruise speed of 295mph. It's max. speed was over 340mph @ 12,000 feet.

For an early war medium bomber, this was going to be hard to beat.

I believe I pointed this very thing out upthread. And the number I've seen for the A-20A is 350 mph.

Comparing to the A-20A to the A-20G is actually a step backward. Yes, the G variant had increased range and bombload, but at the cost of it's speed.

So as fighters were getting faster, the A-20 was getting slower.

This was a calculated decision with the A-20G based on adding a lot of additional armament and other features. But at the same time I believe engine power increased, so potentially A-20G could have been a better candidate for improving the speed if you made that your priority.

 

[Howard Gibson]

I always thought 130 octane fuel was carried internally rather than sprayed on.
The things one learns here.

It makes perfect sense to me. The chasing enemy sees flames pouring off your aircraft. He registers his attack as a kill, and you continue on your mission.

 

[SaparotRob]

This is why I come here. It's the minutiae of aviation history that frequently escapes mainstream history.

 

[yulzari]

It makes perfect sense to me. The chasing enemy sees flames pouring off your aircraft. He registers his attack as a kill, and you continue on your mission.

It was an early concept that, post war, resulted in the sporting game of extreme tennis. Played by two players in petrol soaked clothing and fending off a flaming tennis ball………

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

"Early difficult" for the Desert air war = began when the Bf 109s of JG 27 (IIRC Sept of 1941) and MC 202s (Nov 41) arrived, IMO. This is when Allied aircraft losses began to really mount.

There is an earlier fascinating phase involving Lysanders and Gladiators fighting CR 32s and BR.20s and a lot of other weird types, and then a bit later Hurricanes fighting G.50s and MC 200s and toward the end of it... a few Bf 110s, but I consider this the era prior to either side taking a very serious interest and casualties among pilots and aircrew on both sides were comparatively low.



The A-20A was almost identical to the British DB-7B / Boston III. The Boston IIIA was also very similar to the A-20C.

While Allied losses in late 1941 were steep, it's important to remember that by the end of 1942, the Axis had lost several thousand aircraft in the MTO that year alone.

I think it was in von Mellenthin's memoirs that I first read about the "pig-headed eighteens"? RAF strikes post-Alamein to harry the retreat, that informed later CAS/BAI efforts in NW Europe. Correction is welcomed if my memory ain't up to snuff.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

While Allied losses in late 1941 were steep, it's important to remember that by the end of 1942, the Axis had lost several thousand aircraft in the MTO that year alone.

I think it was in von Mellenthin's memoirs that I first read about the "pig-headed eighteens"? RAF strikes post-Alamein to harry the retreat, that informed later CAS/BAI efforts in NW Europe. Correction is welcomed if my memory ain't up to snuff.

Oh there is no doubt, the Axis went from really causing a lot of harm for what became the DAF (and friends) in the last quarter of 1941 through the second quarter of 1942, to by end of the third quarter of 1942 getting their back broken and soon after, basically annihilated.

Part of what was going on the whole time is that the RAF and then yank friends were focused on using air power to destroy the Afrika Korps, while the Luftwaffe was focused on destroying the DAF, but in the process DAF destroyed them in the end. And developed the Close Air Support systems which would later be used in Normandy etc.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Oh there is no doubt, the Axis went from really causing a lot of harm for what became the DAF (and friends) in the last quarter of 1941 through the second quarter of 1942, to by end of the third quarter of 1942 getting their back broken and soon after, basically annihilated.

Part of what was going on the whole time is that the RAF and then yank friends were focused on using air power to destroy the Afrika Korps, while the Luftwaffe was focused on destroying the DAF, but in the process DAF destroyed them in the end. And developed the Close Air Support systems which would later be used in Normandy etc.

Who was it, Conningham iirc, who sorted out ground support in North Africa? Between him and later on Pete Quesada, the Germans on the ground had a tough row to hoe. This is one field where the Brits really got it on the ball.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Who was it, Conningham iirc, who sorted out ground support in North Africa? Between him and later on Pete Quesada, the Germans on the ground had a tough row to hoe. This is one field where the Brits really got it on the ball.

It's a complex story which took place in fits and starts over a couple of yeas, but the DAF eventually worked out a good system.

At the same time as this was happening, their bombing system, based largely around the Ju 87, largely faltered. By mid 1942 North African skies were really too dangerous for Ju-87s, and eventually they switched to using Fw 190s as their main bombers, but these did not have the same kind of lethal accuracy that the Ju 87s had, and they came too late to save the Afrika Korps regardless.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

By mid 1942 North African skies were really too dangerous for Ju-87s, and eventually they switched to using Fw 190s as their main bombers [...]

Sure. -87s were shown deficient absent fighter escort by autumn 1940 outside the 1941-42 usage on the Eastern Front.

What I find interesting is the learning curve each side had. The Allies seemed to understand early that pinpoint attacks weren't productive, while the Germans stuck with them in those areas where they still made hay. The Allies didn't waste much effort on land-attack dive-bombers outside the Vultees over Burma, shifting instead to jabos. The Germans seemed to like their Stukas too much and put good money in after bad.

That's only for ETO/MTO, obvs. The RAF in Burma and USMC in the Solomons campaign got some mileage out of DBs. Faster and more defensible seemed to trump scary and sometimes useful.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Sure. -87s were shown deficient absent fighter escort by autumn 1940 outside the 1941-42 usage on the Eastern Front.

That is a persistent myth. They were unsuitable for the Battle of Britain, and took heavy losses flying in big static formations, often without sufficient fighter cover, but the BoB was by no means the end of the Stuka story. They were absolutely lethal in the battles in North Africa - right up to Kasserine Pass, and even more so in Russia, arguably. In fact I would argue that they were key to probably most of the armored breakthroughs the Germans made from 1940 - late 42, and some in 43. They were also absolutely devastating in the convoy fights in the Med. It was not until the Allies began to seriously contest (and extend) air superiority after mid 1942 that the day of the Stuka came to it's twilight due to losses becoming unsustainable and their ability to drop bombs 'in peace' diminished to almost nothing.

What I find interesting is the learning curve each side had. The Allies seemed to understand early that pinpoint attacks weren't productive, while the Germans stuck with them in those areas where they still made hay. The Allies didn't waste much effort on land-attack dive-bombers outside the Vultees over Burma, shifting instead to jabos. The Germans seemed to like their Stukas too much and put good money in after bad.

I think it's a mistake to underestimate the impact, figuratively and literally, of the Stuka. There is something to be said for precision bombing, and the Stuka could achieve that. They were used to enable armored breakthroughs from the Battle of France right up to 2nd El Alamein, albeit with increasing casualties.

The Luftwaffe fighter units like JG.27 were initially (late 41 and very early 42) very dominant, but as the DAF approached parity, they really focused first and foremost on running up their scores (especially for the experte). They had a pretty bad relationship with the Stuka and other bomber (Ju-88 mainly) units in North Africa, because they didn't like to linger to protect the bombers. Rather they would hit and run / BnZ attacks and try to pick off Allied fighters. Left to their own devices, JU 87 pilots would jettison their bombs (sometimes over their own troops), emit smoke, and corkscrew around in tight turns evading enemy fighters as best they could. This worked to a point to save their lives but also meant they were no longer hitting targets nearly as often. The German fighter groups in North Africa also didn't do very well against Allied bombers under escort after a certain point, for similar reasons. In Shores he has interview excerpts with several German pilots who talk about all this at some length. This all led to serious tensions between Luftwaffe and Wermacht in Theater. Not sure how it played out in Russia.

That's only for ETO/MTO, obvs. The RAF in Burma and USMC in the Solomons campaign got some mileage out of DBs. Faster and more defensible seemed to trump scary and sometimes useful.

It's a complex story, IMO. Most early dive bombers were quite slow and that made them vulnerable. On the other hand their precision was extremely valuable against critical targets like shipping. Survival rates between SBDs flown by US Navy pilots compared to the same plane flown by USMC or USAAF pilots were dramatically different, and the difference seems to be largely down to training.

Even some quite obsolete dive bombers were used effectively by the British in the North Sea area and around Norway several times through the war.

It seems that only the Germans (with the Ju 87) and the Soviets (with the the underrated and pretty fast Pe-2, and later the better and also pretty fast Tu-2) engaged in the wholesale front line battlefield use of dive bombers for the land war, with the partial exception as you note of the Vengeance in Burma and India - which I think is a bit underrated honestly, and the A-36 in Italy though that was in pretty small numbers.

Fighter bombers / Jabos were a pretty good substitute for a variety of reasons, P-40s, F4Us, Fw 190s, P-47s and P-38s, Typhoons and Tempests all proved pretty good at it, bombing accurately and carrying fairly heavy bomb loads. P-51s eventually as well though arguably a bit more vulnerable, though I think the A-36 (speaking of fast bombers) was really underrated for a while and had an important niche in the fighting in Italy. Older mark Bf 109s were used in this role too as were Hurricanes, Spitfires, Ki-43s, CR.42s, I-153s, Bf 110s, and Re 2000 series fighters, to varying degrees of success. Fighter-bombers, when doing 'shallow angle' dive bombing (45 degree etc.) could hit targets much more often than most level-bombers, and certainly had a better survival rate than SBDs / A-24s or Ju 87s by the mid-war (for land targets anyway).

And yet that extra bit of precision that came with true high-angle dive bombing really mattered, is my conclusion. It meant the difference for example from sending two or three strikes to take out that bridge vs a dozen, or taking out 60% of the enemy flak guns prior to the bigger bombing attack vs 10% of them. Or hitting warships rather than just unprotected merchant ships. Stuff like that.

But the upgrade path for dive bombers proved to be very troubled. Many design programs broke up on those rocks...

The few that came through intact and were really promising basically arrived far too late, like two years too late.