feasibility of keeping WW I battleships around for WW II.

Except Chile didn't declare war on anyone in Jan 1943. Having been neutral to that point, it broke off diplomatic relations with all 3 major Axis powers having broken up various spy rings in 1942, and forcing the survivors to flee to Argentina.

Breaking diplomatic relations with another country is a long way short of declaring war.

Substantial numbers of both German & Italian citizens continued to live peacefully in Chile.


On 18 May 1943 it also broke diplomatic relations with Hungary. Romania,Bulgaria & Vichy France.

Chile did declare war on Japan in April 1945.

Timeline for it all here.

I would expect that the Chileans would never get to PH in your scenario. You just need to look at Adm King's attitudein 1943/44 to the prospect of a BPF arriving. He only accepted it when ordered by his political masters, then insisted it should be self supporting. He stopped a French TG based around Richelieu and the ships modernised in the US.

So how is the Chilean Navy going to support it's PH TG.

Edit. The RNethN, after the withdrawal from the DEI in early 1942, operated as part of US Seventh Fleet in SWPA under MacArthur.

You are trying to stick old, obsolete hulls and guns into a modern war. The benefits are small and the problems are large.

The Dreadnought era has two main periods. 1906-1922 (16 years) and 1923-1945 (22 years), Note that 1923 to 1939 is 16 years.
Anybody think that 1918 airplanes had any business trying to fight in WW II?
Anybody think that 1918 tanks had any business trying to fight in WW II?
Would anybody even use a 1914 staff car or truck in a WW II Army?

Admiral Beez said:

At least none of the Chilean group is coal-fired.

Click to expand...

and once you have said that you have pretty much exhausted the good points. It is all down hill from there.
Non-standard ammo. Non standard parts. AA armament not even up to 1939 standards unless extensive refit.

Shortround6 said:

You are trying to stick old, obsolete hulls and guns into a modern war. The benefits are small and the problems are large.

Click to expand...

You use them like the WWI era battleships were used historically, as convoy escorts and for shore bombardment? For such tasks extensive refits are maybe not worth it?

For an actual fleet action, you bring your modern capital ships.

The Dreadnought era has two main periods. 1906-1922 (16 years) and 1923-1945 (22 years), Note that 1923 to 1939 is 16 years.
Anybody think that 1918 airplanes had any business trying to fight in WW II?
Anybody think that 1918 tanks had any business trying to fight in WW II?
Would anybody even use a 1914 staff car or truck in a WW II Army?

Click to expand...

I don't think that's an entirely fair comparison. Tanks and airplanes were more or less brand spanking new inventions at the time, and were thus developing quickly. By comparison, steam powered gunships were much more mature, even though they developed rapidly

z42 said:

You use them like the WWI era battleships were used historically, as convoy escorts and for shore bombardment? For such tasks extensive refits are maybe not worth it?

For an actual fleet action, you bring your modern capital ships.

Click to expand...

z42 said:

I don't think that's an entirely fair comparison. Tanks and airplanes were more or less brand spanking new inventions at the time, and were thus developing quickly. By comparison, steam powered gunships were much more mature, even though they developed rapidly

Click to expand...

It took 4-5 years for steam turbines to totally eclipse reciprocating engines. In fact the USS New York, Texas and Oklahoma all used VTE engines. Mostly because early direct drive turbines had much less cruising range than VTE expansion engines. There were also major changes in boiler construction in the first 10-12 years of the dreadnought era, not counting oil fuel.
Steam propulsion machinery changed with 1930s ships getting twice the power per ton as mid/late WW I powerplants. Let alone earlier powerplants. British were late to adopt small tube boilers even for coal fired boilers.
There was a lot going on under the decks, which allowed for more power from smaller machinery spaces which allowed for more armament and/or more protection on the same size ship. When used on a somewhat larger ship the increase in the ship's fighting power was huge.

Long range fire was also changing almost by the year in the first decade or so. The HMS Dreadnought had completed with a 9ft rangefinder.
The British conducted trials with a gun director in 1912 with the Orion and Thunderer. Very successful although somewhat primitive. By Aug 1914 8 Ships had been fitted but by Jutland on 2 British Dreadnoughts had not been fitted. These were main armament only. It took several more years for director control to extend down to secondary batteries and searchlights.
And this was 1st and perhaps 2nd generation equipment.
In the Nevada class the central fire control station was placed below the main armored deck. Actually the main armored deck was placed over the top of the central fire control station by raising the the main armor deck up one deck. These ships were laid down in 1912 and completed in 1916. The preceding New York and Texas were completed with the central fire control station above the armored deck as this was fitted during construction. The directors in tops or on the conning tower were the eyes and fed information to the central firing control station.
As expected fighting ranges increased, often faster than the ships could be constructed, and bigger guns were mounted and thicker armor was used some ships actually were obsolete when completed in some of the smaller navies due to building time.
Some nations dreadnoughts were limited due to construction/doctrine. The French Bretagne class was completes with 12 degree elevation and a max range of 14,500 meters.
although the Lorraine's rear turret was changed to 18 degrees in 1917 but the other turrets and her sisters were not changed until after 1918 due to other work in the dockyards. Between the wars the elevation was finally changed to 23 degrees and max range of 23,700meters which compares badly with the French 8in cruisers (28,000 meters?)
Many navies went a little overboard with long range gunnery during the 1920s and early 30s. The ability to actually see an enemy ship at over 30,000 meters due to weather was exceedingly rare. Seeing does not mean hitting. Time of flight of the shells at long range could exceed 60 seconds and accurate ranging and course setting was essential to order to predict future enemy position. Very good fire control equipment was needed.
Ships, as the Germans found out, had a central nervous system (fire control) that could be damaged/ knocked out rendering the ship mission killed even if the guns still would fire, the engines would still drive the ship at speed and the hull would still keep the ship afloat. But the ship could no longer effectively defend her self.

We have not even looked at what a 3rd rate AA suite was like on some of these ships in some of the these old ships. Eight heavy AA guns in some of the British and American ships were bad enough, trying to use an old ship with only four heavy AA guns and a scattering of light AA is asking for trouble in any but the most heavily occupied airspace. That or you need to station special AA ships near the antique to guard her which really makes her a poor bargain.
Or you give her a quicky refit at the expense of one or two other ships not getting refits with better AA.
The US spent a crap load of money on some of the old Pearl Harbor ships.
USS Tennessee

Yes, better AA than an KGV, but that was 1944, not 1939-41.

I believe a lot of the stuff raised/repaired/recommissioned at PH was due to the "powers that be" being really ticked off.
"Oh yeah? We'll decide when we get rid of these ships!"
I have my usual documentation.

z42 said:

You use them like the WWI era battleships were used historically, as convoy escorts and for shore bombardment? For such tasks extensive refits are maybe not worth it?

For an actual fleet action, you bring your modern capital ships.



I don't think that's an entirely fair comparison. Tanks and airplanes were more or less brand spanking new inventions at the time, and were thus developing quickly. By comparison, steam powered gunships were much more mature, even though they developed rapidly

Click to expand...

I know that this is a broad brush statement but for the first half of the war, fleet actions were normally fought using early battleships as the 'Modern Battleships' were not normally ready for action, until the second half of the war. The German Navy being the biggest exception to the rule probably because they didn't have any old WW1 capital ships, therefore almost be definition, anything they had was almost certainly going to be new.

SaparotRob said:

I believe a lot of the stuff raised/repaired/recommissioned at PH was due to the "powers that be" being really ticked off.
"Oh yeah? We'll decide when we get rid of these ships!"
I have my usual documentation.

Click to expand...

As for the old Pacific Fleet ships on 7 Dec 1941 not all were that heavily damaged with half back in service by the end of Feb 1942.

Colorado - missed PH altogether due to being in West Coast refit
Pennsylvania - repaired and back at sea by end of Feb 1942
Maryland - salvaged & repaired / modernised by end of Feb 1942
Tennessee - repaired & back at sea by end of Feb 1942. Full modernisation undertaken Oct 1942-May 1943
Nevada - salvaged before end of April 1942 and back in service by end of the year.
California - salvage and repairs / modernisation took until Jan 1944
West Virginia - salvage & repairs / modernisation took until July 1944
Oklahoma - total loss
Arizona - total loss

It was mostly those battleships that were single moored or had been moored outboard on Battleship Row at PH that came off worst.





The 3 New Mexicos were transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific in Jan 1942 to bolster the Pacific Fleet's 4 available old battleships from Feb 1942.

You don't hear much about the old BB in 1942 because they spent much of their time patrolling off the West Coast as a backstop against a Japanese attack getting past the carriers. The other issue was that there were not enough replenishment oilers to keep them with the fleet in the South Pacific. That left only the oldest 3, Arkansas, New York & Texas, in the Atlantic plus new ships working up.

This is the predicted completion dates for the new battleships as at 1 Dec 1941 and 1 May 1942 as passed to FDR:-

North Carolina - working up but with vibration problems
Washington - working up but with vibration problems
South Dakota - June 1942 / commissioned March 1942
Indiana - Oct 1942 / commissioned April 1942
Massachusetts - Oct 1942 / May 1942
Alabama - Oct 1943 / Dec 1942
Iowa - Nov 1943 / April 1943
New Jersey - May 1944 / July 1943
Missouri - Nov 1944 / Nov 1944
Wisconsin - June 1945 / Sept 1944
Illinois - May 1946 / Oct 1945
Kentucky - May 1945 / Dec 1944
Montana - Nov 1946 / May 1946
Ohio - May 1947 / Dec 1946
Maine - Feb 1946 / Feb 1946
New Hampshire - Oct 1946 / Oct 1946
Louisiana - May 1946 / Dec 1945

Glider said:

I know that this is a broad brush statement but for the first half of the war, fleet actions were normally fought using early battleships as the 'Modern Battleships' were not normally ready for action, until the second half of the war. The German Navy being the biggest exception to the rule probably because they didn't have any old WW1 capital ships, therefore almost be definition, anything they had was almost certainly going to be new.

Click to expand...

King George V and Prince of Wales disagree. I would also include Rodney as she was much more advanced than the WWI era battleships.

GrauGeist said:

But that battle was spectacular irony, where those grand Old Ladies, survivors of Pearl Harbor, not only handed the Japanese Navy their ass, but did so in textbook fashion.

Click to expand...

While the idea of the survivors of the Pearl Harbor attack getting their revenge on the Japanese Navy at Surigao is a feel-good story (at least for the Americans) it's not really what happened. The battle was actually a victory by the USN destroyers with limited participation by the battleships and cruisers.

The Japanese started the battle with two battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers. By the time they came into range of the American battleline the destroyers had whittled them down to one battleship, one heavy cruiser and one destroyer. The surviving battleship had received at least two torpedo hits causing significant damage, her speed was down to 12 knots and her two rear turret magazines were flooded, limiting their ammunition supply to the ready use store. The lone destroyer had lost her forward turret during a bombing raid the previous day.

This depleted force faced four heavy cruiser and four light cruisers in addition to the six battleships. It should be emphasized that the loss of the destroyers took away the only real chance the Japanese had to do real damage to the Americans in the form of their type 93 torpedoes.

Crossing the T is a bit of exaggeration, as Morison put it "It was a very short vertical to very broad T". A lone battleship does not constitute a battle line. This was not a tactical triumph akin to Togo at Tsushima or Jellico at Jutland. The Japanese did not have any freedom of maneuver in the narrow straight. They could either go North or South and they had to go North to reach their objective, the landing beaches. The final charge of the Yamashiro is more akin to the death ride of the battlecruisers at Jutland.

Tulley states "Much has been made of the fact that Nishimura's "T" had been crossed, thus limiting the Japanese to firing ahead. But given the circumstances, this doesn't seem to matter that much in retrospect. After all, all of Mogami's turrets were forward, and by 0355 Yamashiro had lost the use of No. 4 turret , and also of Nos. 5 and 6, whose magazine were flooded."

As far as I can find the large expenditure of ammunition by the US battleships did not result in a significant number of hits. "Yamashiro is hit near the forebridge by US West Virginia opening salvo her top side is hit repeatedly by 6-and 8-in cruiser shells." This is the only confirmation of hits by the battleships that I could find.
Even after the massive pummeling she received from the cruisers the Yamashiro was able to turn away and attempt to retreat to the South. The final blow to the Yamashiro was delivered by two torpedos likely launched by the Newcomb.
The amount of ammunition expended by the cruisers is staggering. The left flank cruisers Denver, Columbia, Minneapolis, Portland, Louisville alone ezpended about 3,100 rounds

Reluctant Poster said:

King George V and Prince of Wales disagree. I would also include Rodney as she was much more advanced than the WWI era battleships.

Click to expand...

Be fair, I did say that it was a broad brush statement and these examples were seriously outnumbered by the older Battleships.

Regarding your comment about the Rodney and presumably Nelson. I would argue that they were no more advanced and in many ways were behind when compared with the fully modernised older battleships in particular Queen Elisabeth, Valiant, Warspite, and Renown. They were of course more modern than the other ex WW1 battleships plus Repulse and Hood.

Reluctant Poster said:

Crossing the T is a bit of exaggeration, as Morison put it "It was a very short vertical to very broad T". A lone battleship does not constitute a battle line. This was not a tactical triumph akin to Togo at Tsushima or Jellico at Jutland. The Japanese did not have any freedom of maneuver in the narrow straight. They could either go North or South and they had to go North to reach their objective, the landing beaches. The final charge of the Yamashiro is more akin to the death ride of the battlecruisers at Jutland.

Click to expand...

Nishimura "made the T"

Reluctant Poster said:

While the idea of the survivors of the Pearl Harbor attack getting their revenge on the Japanese Navy at Surigao is a feel-good story (at least for the Americans) it's not really what happened. The battle was actually a victory by the USN destroyers with limited participation by the battleships and cruisers.

The Japanese started the battle with two battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers. By the time they came into range of the American battleline the destroyers had whittled them down to one battleship, one heavy cruiser and one destroyer. The surviving battleship had received at least two torpedo hits causing significant damage, her speed was down to 12 knots and her two rear turret magazines were flooded, limiting their ammunition supply to the ready use store. The lone destroyer had lost her forward turret during a bombing raid the previous day.

This depleted force faced four heavy cruiser and four light cruisers in addition to the six battleships. It should be emphasized that the loss of the destroyers took away the only real chance the Japanese had to do real damage to the Americans in the form of their type 93 torpedoes.

Crossing the T is a bit of exaggeration, as Morison put it "It was a very short vertical to very broad T". A lone battleship does not constitute a battle line. This was not a tactical triumph akin to Togo at Tsushima or Jellico at Jutland. The Japanese did not have any freedom of maneuver in the narrow straight. They could either go North or South and they had to go North to reach their objective, the landing beaches. The final charge of the Yamashiro is more akin to the death ride of the battlecruisers at Jutland.

Tulley states "Much has been made of the fact that Nishimura's "T" had been crossed, thus limiting the Japanese to firing ahead. But given the circumstances, this doesn't seem to matter that much in retrospect. After all, all of Mogami's turrets were forward, and by 0355 Yamashiro had lost the use of No. 4 turret , and also of Nos. 5 and 6, whose magazine were flooded."

As far as I can find the large expenditure of ammunition by the US battleships did not result in a significant number of hits. "Yamashiro is hit near the forebridge by US West Virginia opening salvo her top side is hit repeatedly by 6-and 8-in cruiser shells." This is the only confirmation of hits by the battleships that I could find.
Even after the massive pummeling she received from the cruisers the Yamashiro was able to turn away and attempt to retreat to the South. The final blow to the Yamashiro was delivered by two torpedos likely launched by the Newcomb.
The amount of ammunition expended by the cruisers is staggering. The left flank cruisers Denver, Columbia, Minneapolis, Portland, Louisville alone ezpended about 3,100 rounds

Click to expand...

At 3:53, West Virginia opened up with her radar directed main batteries and landed hits on Yamashiro. She fired 93 shells total.
At 3:55, California opened fire with her radar directed main batteries, firing a total of 63 rounds.
Also at 3:55, Tennessee opened fire with her radar directed batteries, laying down 69 rounds.
Maryland ranged visually, laying down 48 rounds into the mix.

So the engagement, while not being "text book" perfect, inflicted considerable damage to the Japanese as they approached the USN"s battle line.

And it was satisfying.

And to be fair, after all those years of gunnery training, the BB crews were eager to have a good time.

Frog said:

And to be fair, after all those years of gunnery training, the BB crews were eager to have a good time.

Click to expand...

Add revenge to the list, as they remembered their shipmates and sister ships lost at Pearl Harbor.

I believe some of Arizona's guns were mounted on one of the BBs there. I just can't recall which one.