Field Marshall Douglas Haig : the Butcher of the Somme

just to correct your spelling maestro, it's Arthur Currie

Negative Creep said:

I can honestly say I've never heard anyone refer to him as a hero. He seems to be, rightly or wrongly, the personification of wasteful attrition tactics

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I don't know if he was considered a hero as such, but he was considered competent. And a victor. That was until Lloyd George wrote his history of WW1 ("I tried to tell them it was no good but they wouldn't listen" type of stuff). LG's history of WW1, much like Winston Churchill's history of WW2, set the tone of the memory of that war (at least in England). Those that fought in it tended, at the end of it, to be supportive of the effort. It was for a good cause. That perspective has changed over the years to one which sees WW1 as nothing but a slaughter of innocents, Lions led by Donkeys, that sort of thing.

The truth is somewhere in the middle and far more complex.

timshatz said:

I don't know if he was considered a hero as such, but he was considered competent. And a victor. That was until Lloyd George wrote his history of WW1 ("I tried to tell them it was no good but they wouldn't listen" type of stuff). LG's history of WW1, much like Winston Churchill's history of WW2, set the tone of the memory of that war (at least in England). Those that fought in it tended, at the end of it, to be supportive of the effort. It was for a good cause. That perspective has changed over the years to one which sees WW1 as nothing but a slaughter of innocents, Lions led by Donkeys, that sort of thing.

The truth is somewhere in the middle and far more complex.

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I agree with this summary, if you want the personification of the term Butcher most would agree that this applied to Kitchener, not Haig.

Bernhart said:

just to correct your spelling maestro, it's Arthur Currie

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Uh... Thanks.

Glider said:

I agree with this summary, if you want the personification of the term Butcher most would agree that this applied to Kitchener, not Haig.

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Oh, and in how was Kitchener worst than Haig ? He wasn't even commanding the forces directly. Haig was doing most of the job.

Maestro said:

Oh, and in how was Kitchener worst than Haig ? He wasn't even commanding the forces directly. Haig was doing most of the job.

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You can start with the Boer War when he was responsible for the scortched earth policy against the Boers and the setting up of the original concentration camps. These had a death rate of 34%.

At the start of WW1 he was partly responsible for the decision to limit the number of machine guns in British units. Unfortunately for the troops, the British army high command could see no real use for the oil-cooled machine gun demonstrated to them; other officers even regarded the weapon as an improper form of warfare.
When war broke out in August 1914 the Germans had 12,000 at their disposal, a number which eventually ballooned to 100,000, whereas the British had a few hundred.

In the shell crisis of 1915 he was lucky to survive he uproar as he was responsible for munitions, but was popular with the public, hence he survived.

Glider said:

You can start with the Boer War when he was responsible for the scortched earth policy against the Boers and the setting up of the original concentration camps. These had a death rate of 34%.

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I was reffering to WWI, let's keep other conflicts aside.

Glider said:

At the start of WW1 he was partly responsible for the decision to limit the number of machine guns in British units. Unfortunately for the troops, the British army high command could see no real use for the oil-cooled machine gun demonstrated to them; other officers even regarded the weapon as an improper form of warfare.
When war broke out in August 1914 the Germans had 12,000 at their disposal, a number which eventually ballooned to 100,000, whereas the British had a few hundred.

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Yeah... And who suggested it ? Haig ! He was seeing the machine gun as "a much overrated weapon that could be taken by pure grit and determination."

Plus it wasn't Kitchener's idea to send the troops walking slowly across the battlefield... It was Haig's idea.

Rapid rate of fire + slow moving target = slaughter !

It was also Haig's idea to proceed to an heavy shelling in the minutes prior to an assault, warning the ennemy of their arrival.

Now, add that to the equation above and you get a disaster !

Glider said:

In the shell crisis of 1915 he was lucky to survive he uproar as he was responsible for munitions, but was popular with the public, hence he survived.

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You're right on this. I can't argue against that.

The creeping barrage was first used at the Somme in 1916. As an example, from 7th division, XV corps orders, 18 June:

During the advance of the infantry a barrage of artillery fire will be formed in front of the infantry according to the timings shown on the tracings issued to those concerned. The lines shown on the tracings indicate the nearest points on which the guns will fire up to the hour indicated. At the times shown heavy guns will lift their fire direct to the next barrage line. The divisional artillery will move their fire progressively at the rate of 50 yards a minute. Should the infantry arrive at any point before the time fixed for the barrage to lift, they will wait under the best cover available and be prepared to assault directly the lift takes place

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It wasn't in use everywhere on the front, and in many places it proved ineffective, but the intent was certainly there. On the 16 July GHQ issued the following:

One of the outstanding artillery lessons of the recent fighting has been the great assistance afforded by a well-directed field artillery barrage maintained close in front of the advancing infantry. It is beyond dispute that on several occasions where the field artillery has made a considerable "lift," that is to say has outstopped the infantry advance, the enemy has been able to man his parapets with rifles and machine guns. It is therefore of first importance that in all cases infantry should be instructed to advance right under the field artillery barrage, which should not uncover the first objective until the infantry are close up to it (even within 50 or 60 yard)

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despiute the number of deaths laid at the feet of lord haig he is still regarded as somewhat of a hero figure here in the uk

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I haven't heard anyone refer to Haig as a hero, either. In fact he is roundly vilified in the UK, where the perception is the British generals were the worst in the war.

It's unfair imo. Mass casualty assaults were hardly unique to the British army. In fact, by the end of the war, the forces under Haig were the best in the world.

The whole idea of an artillery barrage before and attack was used by countless armies and not just an idea by Haig. It is still done in modern times as well.

It was the germans who first cottoned on to how to use artillery in the modern sense. The allies tended to try and eliminate all opposition with their artillery, and would pound a position for weeks to try and eliminate the defences in that sector completely. Certainly the creeping barrage went some way to affording protection to the advancing Infantry, but this was only a part of the issue, and remained a relatively minor aspect to the application of artillery by the allies.

The Germans realized that a better method was to use artillery in a much more concentrated form, their barrages were using less guns, but on a smaller sector of the front. They also relaized that the best way to use artillery was with a rapid barrage lasting just a few minuts, to dislocate the defences, rather than overpower them. A barrage of short duration allowed maximum force to be applied at the decisive point and prevented the movement of reserves by the defnce. Concentrated barrages of small duration meant that the defence was often left dazed and dislocated.

I see Haig as representing a failure for a number reasons. He represented the very worst of British leadership for a number of reasons

1) His total disconnect to the relaities at the front. He did not know (whether by omission or disdain) what was happening to his men at the front, and did not make any attempt to improve morale by visits to the front.

2) His well known failure to embrace technology to find ways around the deadlock. The adoption of tanks was achieved despite Haig, not because of him.

3) His failure to develop methods and training regimes to break the deadlock. Whilst the Australians, the Canadians and some British units developed themselves into "shock" troop status, with the training, techniques and elan to push forward to break defensive positions, the majority of the allied armies remained mass conscipt armies, of relatively low levels of traiing. The idea of professional mass armies was an anathema to Haig, and he resisted this concept tenaciously. In contrast the Germans embraced it, and nearly won the war with it

Ultimately, the war was won by the Royal Navy rather than the British army. Haig failed to realize, fundamentally, that his great offensives were really not winnng anything, and were losing a great deal. I think a better option until proper offensive techniques were worked out, would be to stay on the defensive, rather than throw millions to their deaths, because Haig wanted to fight a war in cerrtain way

Hop said:

The creeping barrage was first used at the Somme in 1916. As an example, from 7th division, XV corps orders, 18 June[...]

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Ah, thanks. You just proved what I suspected... that Canadian historian Norm Christie doesn't tell all the truth.

But what else could I expect from a guy who used the motto of the British Army (For King and country) as the title of his show on Canadian warfare ?

"British and French doctrine treated the common soldier as cannon fodder not to be trusted with personal initiative. Currie convinced Byng this approach was wrong, particularly given the independent nature of Canadians. What Currie envisioned were platoons that could lose commanders and still function. He also reorganized the platoons so riflemen, bombers, and machine gunners were incorporated in one body rather than isolated into separate platoons that were not trained to work together.

The two generals also [I]improved the creeping barrage technique [/I]developed during the Somme where artillery fire progressed a short distance ahead of the advancing infantry. If the artillery adjusted fire forward in accordance to carefully timed lifts it could walk the infantry right into the enemy trenches behind a curtain of protective fire. New explosives and concentration plans were developed to enable the artillery to rip holes in German barbed wire. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew McNaughton invented a means to pre-sight German gun positions so that the Canadian artillery could destroy them quickly in the attack's opening moments. Another Canadian, Brigadier General Raymond Brutinel propagated using machine guns for indirect fire by spraying repeated and concentrated bursts over the heads of the enemy rather than firing at specific targets. The intent was to deny the Germans easy movement inside their own lines. The final requirement Currie and Byng sought before approving the attack was that the RFC gain air superiority over the battlefront. Throughout April 1917 an air war raged overhead as almost 400 Allied fighters tangled daily with a German force that was only about 150 strong but equipped with better planes and arguably more skilled pilots. The attack was set for Easter Sunday, April 8 but soon pushed back to Easter Monday, April 9.

For two preceding weeks the Germans were subjected to a ceaseless barrage by 480 18-pounders and 250 howitzers and heavy guns supplied with 50,000 tons of shells — more than 1 million rounds. On the last day most guns turned against the massive tangles of barbed wire fronting the German line. At dusk on April 8 when the firing slowed the Germans rushed to their defences, but no attack materialized. The Germans stood down.

At 5:30 a.m. on April 9, 983 guns and mortars rained explosives down on the German line for three minutes with Brutinel's machine guns adding to the storm. All four Canadian divisions advanced behind this wall of fire with the leading elements sweeping through large gaps in the barbed wire and into the forward trenches before the defenders emerged from their protective shelters. This first wave had been instructed to immediately move on to the second trench system and leave mopping up to the second wave which took thousands of dazed prisoners still stumbling from their shelters. Meanwhile McNaughton's artillery spotting technique proved itself as the Canadian gunners managed to eliminate 176 of 212 German batteries. Unable to direct artillery against the Canadians the Germans could do little to stem the advance."

and for the very first time

"Heavy guns were calibrated with electronics so they could hit
enemy targets from map coordinates on the first shot but
artillery officer's culture had to change to accept the new
technology. Wear on the gun barrel, topography, wind and
weather had to be considered. A new design of artillery fuses
cut barbed wire defenses allowing infantry to advance across
No-Man's-Land. Geophones and electromagnetic sensors, a
pre-cursor of EM methods, were used to spy on enemy
communication."
Would you believe that prior to t0 Vimy the guns were not calibrated for barrel wear and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew McNaughton was mocked and derided for wasting time in doing so