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If you read a little more carefully, you would have seen that I did not deny that the US would have used more ships. What I did say was that we would not bring every carrier we had in for the conflict, which is not to say the British would have either. I'm saying that there would be a taskforce centered around a Carrier consisting of assault ships, destroyers, missile cruisers, and any other support ships that might be deemed neccessary for the operation. As per the quip about our units already stationed in the Gulf before the start of GW:1, what relevance is that? If the US went to the Falklands Conflict in lieu of Britain, then we would have relied just as much on our sea borne troops.The United States would have used more ships and planes to re-take the Falklands than Great Britain did
I also admire the Argentinians, although not for what they were going to do, but rather for keeping up the fight, even with some out-dated units.
In 1979 during a short stint with Garrett AiResearch in Phoenix, we were
working to sell the TPE-331 turboprops for use on the Pucara. I got to
fly with the chief test pilot (I wish I could remember his name) who was
an amazing stick and had a very thick German accent
In order to avoid the high concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots were forced to swoop in and launch their bombs from a low altitude at the very last moment. The Argentines lost nearly twenty aircraft in these attacks, including several Pucarás on the ground.
While undoubtedly a brave effort of the air force, the late releasing of bombs meant that many never exploded, as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. The problem was that—like many other items never used before by the Argentine Armed Forces in such ways—there was a problem in the way the bombs were armed. Days before the war ended, the problem was solved and the iron bombs exploded regardless of the altitude from which they were dropped, as seen on the 8 June attack.
Political pressure from above to not risk the LPD forced Mike Clapp (Commander Amphibious Forces) to alter this plan. Two lower-value LSLs would be sent, but without suitable beaches to land, Intrepid's landing craft would need to accompany them to unload. A complicated operation across several nights with Intrepid and Fearless (her sister ship) sailing half-way to dispatch their craft was devised. The attempted overland march by half the Welsh Guards had failed, possibly as they refused to march light and attempted to carry their equipment. They returned to San Carlos and were landed direct to Bluff Cove when Fearless dispatched her landing craft. Sir Tristram sailed on the night of 6 June and was joined by Sir Galahad at dawn on 7 June.
Anchored 1200 feet apart in Port Pleasant, the landing ships were near Fitzroy, the ordered landing point. The landing craft should have been able to unload the ships to here relatively quickly, but confusion over the ordered disembarkation point (the first half of the Guards going direct to Bluff Cove) resulted in the senior Welsh Guards infantry officer aboard insisting his troops be ferried the far longer distance direct to Port Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. The intention was for the infantrymen to march via the recently repaired Bluff Cove bridge (destroyed by retreating Argentinian combat engineers) to their destination, a journey of around seven miles.
The longer journey time of the landing craft taking the troops direct and the squabbling over how the landing was to be performed caused enormous delay in unloading. It had disastrous consequences. Without escorts, having not yet established their air defence and still almost fully laden the two LSLs in Port Pleasant were sitting targets for two waves of Argentinian-FAA A-4 Skyhawks.
The disaster at Port Pleasant (although often known as Bluff Cove) would provide the world with some of the most sobering images of the war as TV news video footage showed Navy helicopters hovering in thick smoke to winch survivors from the burning landing ships.
The Sea Harriers were outnumbered by the available Argentinian aircraft and were on occasion decoyed away by the activities of the Escuadrón Fénix or civilian jet aircraft used by the Argentine Air Force. They had to operate without a fleet early warning systems such as AWACS that would have been available to a full NATO fleet in which the Royal Navy had expected to operate.
The result was that the Sea Harriers could not establish complete air superiority and prevent Argentine attacks during day or night, nor could they stop the daily flights of C-130 Hercules transports to the islands.
The 1982 Falklands War almost ended badly for the British had not the Argentine bomb fitters failed to properly fuse bombs for A-4 SkyHawks and Mirage III jets. Our days of being lucky at sea are about to end.