Fulmar II versus F4F-4 under 10,000 ft.

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what you guys are saying about wildcat are pefectly valid, but are equally so for the Fulmar. The Fulmar made possible some rather desperate battles which, had they not been fought, may well have changed the war. They frequently fought at odds of eight or 10:1 against them, and whilst they could not claim the numbers shot down of enemy aircraft as the wildcat can rightly claim, they can claim to have been there on time, and to have achieved "mission accomplished". Without the Fulmar, Malta could not have been held, and the troops on Crete would have been lost...both these battles were critical in their own particular ways. Without the Fulmar, the British could not have mounted successful challenges to Mussolinis Mare Nostrum, and because this WAS the key to North Africa, the whole middle east was at risk without these plucky fighters.

I do not believe the Wildcat can be claimed to be supoerior to the A6M at least for the first six months of the wart, but it could hold its own. By sheer grit and determination it was able to achieve its mission in the same style as the Fulmar. What I dont subscribe to, and never will, is that either fighter, or the crews that flew them had an essentially easy time of it, because they were superior in performance and/or numbers to their opponents. They were not superior to their foes, and in the beginning, neither did they enjoy any numerical advantage. Two myths about the allied victories in the first part of the war. The numerical advantages flowed after the critical victories had been won. This was true for most of the actions that the RAF and the FAA fought in until well into 1942 by which time defeat at least had been staved off
 
renrich said:
Compared to the A6M, the F4F was short ranged, did not climb as well, not as maneuverable except at higher speeds but it was more heavily armed and more rugged. The F4F was relatively hard to shoot down with only rifle caliber ammunition.
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Good post Renrich I think you summed it up well.

renrich said:
Was the Wildcat a world beater? Absolutely not! Was it more effective overall as a ship board fighter than the Fullmar, Sea Gladiator, Sea Hurricane, or Seafire. Probably.
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More effective than a Fulmar or Sea Gladiator? Yes
Sea Hurricane? Probably.
Seafire? Doubtful, but of course the Martlet (wildcat) was available earlier

parsifal said:
what you guys are saying about wildcat are pefectly valid, but are equally so for the Fulmar. The Fulmar made possible some rather desperate battles which, had they not been fought, may well have changed the war.
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Yes indeed. The Fulmar wasn't a great fighter. (It wasn't really a fighter at all)
But it was what was available, and it got the job done
 
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Please read my post carefully as I worded it carefully. I am not putting down the beloved Spitfire. It is one of my favorite AC of all time. When I see film or a picture of one my pulse races. I believe it is the most beautiful airplane ever built. The Seafire, of course, did not have the performance of the Spitfire but still outclassed the Wildcat in most areas of performance. But, it was not designed as a ship board fighter and it had lousy landing chracteristics on carriers which the Wildcat handled with aplomb. The Seafire also was not rugged enough to withstand concentrated shipboard use. Deck landing accidents and the other hazards of shipboard operations kept the availability of Seafires low at sea. Thus my careful use of the words, "overall effectiveness" If a fighter can't leave the hangar deck because it is being repaired or is U/S for maintenance, it is not effective.
 
Seafire accident rates are amongst the worst understood and misused stats of the war.

There can be no denying that the type was a lash up conversion of a type that was never intended for the role of shipboard fighter. Principally the narrow track landing gear and the poor forward vision contributed to a high accident rate, particulalry in Deck landings and takeoffs. However this is only part of the problem. According to some reports I have read, a much bigger problem was the small deck size of the carriers they were made to operate from, and the slow speed of these carriers. A big part of the poor reputation arose from the operations off Salerno, when 39 Seafires were written off due to deck landing accidents, whilst shooting down just 2 enemy aircarft (though they did manage to force back over 160 enemy attackers).

I should also say that the very reason the Seafire was adopted....its relative "torqueiness" also gave it unpleasant takeoff characteristics.

These inherent weaknesses all need to be acknowledged, but it a complete bogus claim to try and say the airframe was not strong enough or that the Seafire was not effective. In terms of performance, the Seafire was arguably superior in flight performance to even an F6F and certainly comparable to an A6M5, and definately superior at altitude to both. These qualities were much appreciated and effective in combatting the greatest threat faced by the allied navies in 1945, the Kamikaze strikes.

So, a big reason for the types failure and poor record of attrition, arises from putting what was perhaps the highest performance aircraft of any of the combatants, on escort carriers. you do not see F6Fs or F4Us being asked to operate from carriers the size and speed the Seafires were asked to operate from. Moreover, crews did eventually work out operating procedures to try and cope with some of these obvious weknesses, but these took time, and at the time of its introduction there simply wasnt time to develop these techniques. In the case of the escort carriers operating the type off Salerno, most of the crews were experienced, but only operating from the Fleet carriers of the RN, which had flight decks roughly 50% larger and top speeds about 50% greater than the escort carriers. These pilots were given no flight conversion training, so were in effect asked to fly a new and unknown type on flat tops that they had never operated from. The results were predictable and disastrous, but does this make the Seafire a failure. No, not in my book, it does however make the FAA alamost cupable in its treatment of its aircraew at that time.

The soundness of the design cannot be found better than to look at the lsafety record of the later Seafires. in particulalr, the Seafire 47 had probably the best safety record of any propellor driven carrier based aircraft, except for the Sea Fury. By the time of their introduction, crews had worked out a few basic tricks and procedures that greatly reduced the accident rates....for example, not to increase boost on takeoff to more than 7lbs, to limit the takeoff effects by Torque, and to actually stick their heads out of the cockpit to improve forward views on landing.

I can find no better example of how small, slow carriers can affect safety than in the case of our own HMAS Melbourne. A very small carrier, about 18000 tons, with a small wrinkly deck and a max speed of about 20 knots, it had a hard time keeping its Skyhawks in the air. Though the A4 could not be judged a hot performer at the time of its use by the RAN, for the diminuative carrier we were using, it was a very hot aircraft, analogous to the Seafires operating from jeep carriers. In a little over ten years of carrier operations, operating under peacetime conditions, we managed to lose over 50% of the aircraft on strength, due to gear failures and overshoots. Does this make the A4 an unsatisfactory or unsafe aircraft, or inneffective......not a bit. The a4 was a fine aircraft, but putting it on a WWII Light Carrier was a very big ask

So, was the seafire less effective than the F4F, well maybe, but then the Seafire fulfilled roles in 1943-45 that the F4F could no longer do...


For the record, this is a prime example of promoting F4F bombast.......
 
For the record, Brown on Seafire IIC; " It was in the critical area of deck landing that the Seafire had significant shortcomings. The view on approach was poor. Speed control was difficult because the airplane was underflapped and too clean aerodynamically. Furthermore, landing gear had too high a rebound ratio and was not robust enough to withstand the high vertical velocities of deck landing." " Never designed for shipboard use, the Seafire was difficult to deck land and it acted like a submarine when ditched." " The Seafire had a top speed of 365 mph at 21500 feet, a service ceiling of 32000 feet and a range of 493 statute miles and carried eight 303 Mgs."

Compare to the Wildcat II by Brown: " For deck landing the Wildcat was superlative. With an approach speed of 90 knots, it offered good forward vision and excellent slow flying characteristics. Robust landing gear was fully capable of absorbing the most punishing vertical velocities and the arresting hook was intelligently located." " Ditching characteristics were excellent and hydrostatically operated flotation bags were fitted in each wing." " The Wildcat II was speedier with a maximum of 328 mph at 19500 feet. Service ceiling was 28000 feet and range was 1150 miles." The Wildcat II carried six 50 cal MGs.

All of the above by the pilot with the most carrier landings of anyone in the world.

For the record, in 1944, 45, many Marine squadrons operated F4Us off of CVEs that had an overall length of 495 feet, a beam of 69 feet and a top speed of 18 knots. In fact, in the final trials to determine the suitability of the Corsair for carrier ops, all the trials were flown on a CVE.
 
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I dont think that I can argue that in 1943-5, the Seafire did not suffer a high accident rate, and that this in part was due to its origins. However, there was nothing inherently wrong with the Seafire conversion, once there was time to iron out its various bugs, and get it off escort carriers. This was demonstrated in spades with the post war experiences with the Seafire 47.

I also have no argument in accepting that the F4F had far superior takeoff and landing capabilities, though I wonder why the Seafire is often criticised for its narrow track undercarriage, and the F4F never gets such criticism for its similarly configured undercart. However, the F4F could not do the jobs that the Seafire was givenm in 1943-5, in anything like the same level of efficiency. At the end of the day, what the Seafire excelled at was just one thing, point defence over the carrier. This was too limited, and the job could be fulfilled, as well as many other roles by the post war Sea Fury. The F4F in the context of 1944-5 was labouring under the same difficulties as the Fulmar had in 1942, being challenged by enemy aircraft of increasing performance and protection. In this regard the high performance of the Seafire, coupled with its heavy 20mm cannon armament meant it could despatch enemy attackers threatening the task group, in very short order. The Wildcat, in 1944-5 could no longer undertake that mission effectively, and so, from the point of view of defending against fast moving kamikazes, was less than ideal. The two squadrons aboard Formidable showed just how well the seafire was at fulfilling this role in April '45 (I think) by despatching well over 30 enemy attackers in less than 30 minutes. No other CAG, American or British ever came close to that level of efficiency. If the CAG had been F4Fs, we would be reading in the history books how, despite valiant efforts by the defending fighters, the carrier was either sunk or disabled by multiple Kamikaze hits.
 
parsifal said:
though I wonder why the Seafire is often criticised for its narrow track undercarriage, and the F4F never gets such criticism for its similarly configured undercart.
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I am not sure that the F4F escaped criticism:

 
There is no doubt, according to Dean, that the Wildcat was a very fine ground looping AC in field operations. However, it's primary occupation and where it's reputation was earned was as a shipboard fighter. Bill Leonard talked about his F4F anti ground looping tactic for field landings. There is also no doubt that the USN needed higher performance fighters to defend the fleet under the Kamikaze threat which is one reason it was recommended to replace the Hellcat with Corsairs as soon as practicable. To me, it is debatable about whether four 20 mms would overall be more effective against Kamikazes than four fifties with much larger ammo capacity, firing time, but that is really irrelevant because the Seafire in 1941, 42, which is when I was referring to the Wildcat as probably the best overall carrier borne Allied fighter, was armed with eight 303s.

Comparison of the 1941-42 Seafire and the Wildcat seems to me to be a fairly straightforward exercise, going by Brown's numbers:
Seafire IIC was somewhat faster by 365 mph versus 328 mph.
Wildcat II was much easier and safer to land.
Wildcat II was more heavily armed
Wildcat II had around twice the range, 1150 miles versus 493 miles
Wildcat II was undoubtedlty more resistant to battle damage, mainly because of air cooled engine
Wildcat II was much more likely to save it's pilot's life in a ditching

As an aside, I once spent a good bit of time with a retired USN pilot, Jim Swope. He was flying Wildcats when the war broke out and was credited with either 9.5 or 10 kills. I believe those kills were in a Hellcat. His last job in the Navy was the project officer of the F111B,
"McNamara's Folly" I asked Jim which airplanes were the toughest to land on a carrier, the Wildcats he first operated from carriers or the modern jets? He said the WW2 airplanes were much more difficult.
 
Greyman said:
Figured I'd do up a little graph.

blue = Fulmar II
red = F4F-4
Click to expand...

Thanks for that, but I just don't believe those speeds for the F4F-4 at 7900lbs.

Looking back again at the comparison with the A6M:

so I would suggest that the numbers should look like this:




since all the test data on actual F4F-4 aircraft shows that they fall considerably short of the SAC figures.
 


In relation to your first paragraph, Seafires that were used operationally were never armed with 8 x 303s. The so-called Seafire I, introduced in February 1942, was only ever used for training, and was a straight adaption of a Spit Mk Va and some Vbs, but most of the trainer versions actually caried 4 x 20mm cannon. These were found unsuitable for the first operational type, and also the main operational types, the Mks II and III, which carried 2 x 20mm Hispano Suiza cannon, and 4 x 303 mg. The MkIII s carried Type V cannon, the Mk IIs carried MkII.

Here is a link to an intersting website that does a pretty good analysis of various aircraft armaments. It gives a "score", to each of the weapon types

WORLD WAR 2 FIGHTER GUN EFFECTIVENESS

In summary, it rates the firepower of the Seafires 2 x 20mm cannons and 4 x 303 Brownings at 480 for the early mks and 580 for the later marks. In comparison the F4F4 with its 6 x 50s has a firepower rating of 360, considerably less than the Seafire. The F4f-3 with only four guns (but admittedly more ammo per gun) will be even worse....I estimate about half the firepower of the Seafire. And this tremendous firepower shows in the rapidity that the Seafire could undetake carry out its mission

I am not sure about Dean as a source, but I used Tony Williams contemporary flight test data sheets (these are the actual fight tests done at the time....in other words the primary sources). If we look at the two key performace indicators, level speed and time to height (10000 ft which is a much better way of looking at climb performance), we find the F4f coming off a very poor second.

The time to heights are particularly revealing, the Wilcat needs 5.7 minutes to reach 10000 feet, whilst the Seafire II needs just 3.25 minutes. In terms of level speed at various altitudes there are similar disparities. The F4f level speed capabilities in a fully armed, fully fuelled fighter configuration had the following level flight characteristics:

High speed at sea level (MPH) 278
High speed at 5500 ft. (MPH)* 295
High speed at 6800 ft. (MPH)* 294
High speed at 13,000 ft. (MPH)* 313
High speed at 14,200 ft. (MPH)* 312
High speed at max. engine rated alt. 19,000 ft (MPH) 330
High speed at airplane critical alt. 22,000 ft. (MPH) 326


The roughly compartable figures for the Seafire II are:

0 315
2,000 324.5
5,100 342.5
8,000 338.5
12,000 336.5

At the relevant altitudes, there is a roughly 40mph difference in top level speeds. Moreover that high speed, I will wager the Spitfire will be much more manouverable in the horizontal plane, because of its much better aerodynamic shape, and large wing. And bear in mind that the Seafire II was not the main operational type. Only 230 were built, and by early '43 had been replaced by the Seafire Mk III (with an extra 400hp), which was the main type used in all the main campaigns that the Seafire was used. The performance differential is about 30% worse for the climb data, and the level speeds differences increases to about 70 mph difference. In terms of dive speed, whilst the Wildcat did have a good divespeed, I will again wager it could not match the diving capabilities of the Spit. Some land based spits were able to touch the sound barrier in a dive, the Seafire could not have been far behind that. I very much doubt the Wildcat could come even close to that..

Put another way, we are comparing a donkey to a racehorse by 1944.......

Your figures for range dont stack up either. The Seafire II had an maximum mrange of 710 miles to 790 for the Wildcat, with the Wildcat supposedly having a ferry range of 1150miles, though I cant find any instances of that range ever being used, wheras I can find some instances of the Spits 710 being used. The 493 mile figure you are quoting appears more akin to the Spit I figure.

In terms of max operational range, ther was actually very little difference between the two types. Wildcats could not escort SBDs beyond 200 miles, whereas, the Seafire IIIs at the end of the war were escorting strikes as far away as 195miles from their carriers. This was achieved by switching to the US type Drop tanks , which the Seafire had the power to do. A wildcat did not have the horsepower to carry these larger tanks.

And dont forget also that the Seafire was rated to at least carry a 500 lb bomb, whilst the Wildcat could mange a measely 100 under the centreline and 2 x 60lb under the wings.Thats 500:220lb .

There is no evidence to support the F4f resisting battle damage better than the spit. In terms of armouring, there was actually a lot less armour fitted to the Wildcat than there was in the Seafire. I can give you the figures if you need them. I am unsure about the armour distribution....which one was better I dont know...
 
RCAFson said:
I just don't believe those speeds for the F4F-4 at 7900lbs.
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Well, the data is what it is. The Bureau of Aeronautics - Navy Department performance test is missing a lot of key information (unlike the Fulmar II performance data) but it's the closest we have at the moment.
 
To begin with I qualified my post by saying I am going by Brown,(Eric). All I am doing is quoting him and he said that the Seafire IIC was armed with eight 303s. He also gave the Vmax and range numbers. He also said the IIC had an initial rate of climb of 2950 fpm. He also said the Seafire IIC entered operational service in mid 1942.

The figures on the Wildcat II also came from Brown and he said the Wildcat had a rate of climb of 3300 FPM. To me, that sounds better than the Seafire II but I do not know where he got those numbers and which Wildcat it was or what load it had so I initially did not quote them.

We have had discussions, debates, arguments, ad nauseum about the F4F and it's performance. There are a lot of conflicting data out there and I am weary of quoting them and reading about them. . I said that the F4F was overall the best shipboard fighter the Allies had in their quiver in 1941, 1942, early 1943, probably, including the Sea Gladiator, Sea Hurricane, Fulmar and Seafire. Notice I said-overall and probably. All things considered, I stick by that. If one wants to argue that a liquid cooled engined fighter not noted for being particularly rugged is more survivable than an air cooled engined fighter that was noted for being very rugged, so be it. But I believe that goes against common sense. There was a darned good reason the USN did not use liquid cooled engines. I will take their judgment about that matter as reliable all day.

As far as arguing about performance or firepower is concerned, I would rather compare the record of Wildcats against A6Ms and Spitfires( not Seafires) against A6Ms. I believe the Wildcat held up well against the A6M, and perhaps even better than the Spitfire. As far as comparing a donkey to a race horse in 1944, that was not the period being talked about by me. If you want to compare the Seafire to the Hellcat and Corsair, as a ship board fighter, go to it and Good Luck!
 
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In Duels in the Sky, Brown does state that the Seafire IIC has 8 x .303mgs but he also stats that it was a straight conversion from a Spit VC, and we all know that typically the VC has a 2 x 20mm and 4 x .303 armament, but in wings of the Navy he does state that it has the 20mm/.303 armament.

This data is from The Secret years : flight testing at boscombe down 1939-1945.

Flight tests of the F4F-4 (R1830-86) @ 7350lb = 298mph @ 14600ft, 14.6min to 20000 ft, max climb rate = 1580fpm @ 6200 ft
 
Interesting thread. I had always thought that the Americans had rather cornered the market where carrier borne aircraft were concerned by making them tough, reliable and, with the exception of the Corsair, easy to land on a moving piece of metal.
WW2 US Navy Aircraft
And, much as I admire the Spitfire I would not begin to suggest that the SeaFire was a truly succcessfull carrier borne fighter.
I'll have to go and sit down now having typed the last sentence through gritted teeth....
Cheers
John
 
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Nice post, John. Don't grind your teeth too much or you will have to have caps I know all about that. I have little doubt that a one v one between a Seafire and any Wildcat would have the Wildcat as an underdog. Unless they started out on internal fuel and they were more than 150 miles from the carrier and no alternate available. Then, if the Wildcat could avoid for a little while, the Seafire would run out of fuel and the Wildcat could go home.
 
Hi Ren

I thought your original statement was that the Wildcat was more effective than the Seafire, period. Perhaps I misunderstood you. Comparing Wildcat to Seafire in 1942 is a bit of a nonsense, since the Seafire, though declared operational in June 1942, was not really used on operations until November 1942, at Torch.

To properly compare the Seafire to the Wildcat, one really has to compare the best of one, with the best of the other, surely: the best of the Wildcat surely has to be its performance at Midway, whilst the best of the Seafire has to be its operations off Okinawa and the coast of Japan in 1945. If you compare the best of one with the best of the other, take out the emotion, and jingoism, and simply compare performnance and effectiveness AT THE ROLES THEY WERE DESIDNED FOR, and the Spitfire does its job with deadly efficiency. The Wildcat, not so much. But the problem for the Seafire is that it was really too restrictred in role capabaility. It really was a point defence aircraft, though its range issues were addressed to a degree by field mods that saw a larger drop tank than was authorised fitted to their underbelly.

This then brings me to your next post and your comment about what do you do if you are 150 miles from the nearest flattop. Well if we are comparing best to best, then, nothing much happens really....both types had such similar operational ranges,that they must both turn for their alternate bases and just land. In 1945 Seafires were being used to escort strikes as far out as 195 miles range, whilst as far as I know the Wildcat was never used operationally (in a combat role) beyond 200 miles. Your range issue just doesnt hold any water. They are pretty much the same...

Returning to your comment about how the Wildcat was the best naval fighter available to the Allies in 1941-2, I would qualify that by saying it was the best allround fighter available to the allies until well into 1943. There is a subtle, but significant difference to note here. I am basically saying the naval fighter has a number of roles it must fulfil. Obviously it must be able to defend the carrier that it is based on, but it must also be able to escort its own strike aircraft to maximise the threat to enemy carriers (anb other surface forces). For the british, the issue was complicated even further. Because of the limited capacities of its carriers (and the limited number as well), and the need to have extensive recon capabilities (because the possibility of surface raiders was much greater) the ability to undertake the spotter role was also considered important. Finally, though not apparent in 1942,as the war progressed and the allies switched from a purely defensive role, to an offensive posture and the threat from enemy air attack receded, the ability to support amphibious operations by providing CAS becomes an issue as well. But CAS was less important than the others in 1942.

The Wildcat was probably the best compromise available to the USN in 1942, which had more opportunity to operate both defensively and offensively in '42, but the same cannot be said for the RN. The RN in 1942 was much more on the defensive, at least in ETO and MTO, and laboured greatly with a very limited number of carriers and billets to fighters over their ships. That and the nature of their operations meant that the defensive role was far more important to them than the offensive role. And in the defensive role, frankly, the Wildcat was not the best available for the British. In the context of the challenges being faced by the RN, the most important role in 1942 was the ability to kill bombers, and not kill enemy fighters. Against unarmoured targets, it was simply the number of guns being carried rather than the overall firepower, and in this, 8, or even 12 303s is better than 6, or possibly only even 4 50s. The 50s had better armour piercing capabilities, but against an unarmoured target this was not required. A 20mm cannon trumps both, with approximately 5 times the destructive power per round compared to the 50cal, and about double that compared to the 303. Outright performance was a "nice to have" feature in the bomber destroyer role, but not essential. The ability to regain altitude quickly, to despatch a large number of attacking waves of bombers was also very important. As for manouverability, well not so important, and to a degree counterproductive. The overwhelming technique used by the allies in CAP roles was the diving pass, foolwed by another diving pass and so on. The ability to manouvre in the horizontal plan might be important in engaging enemy fighters, but in the context of engaging large numbers of attacking bombers it was not so important. The tactics used by the allies in the latter half of 1942 emphasised the diving pass, so manouvre in the horizontal is just not so important. The ability to dive and climb is more important.

So, if the role is defensive, and the targtets are unprotected bombers, or possibly some armoured ones as well I would rate, in the context of RN needs of the time the following attributes from most important to least

1) Firepower 20mm was probably a better allround weapon
2) The ability to dive and climb
3) Good or reasonable endurance
4) The ability to undertake other roles, principally spotting, ground support and ASW
5) The ability to manouvre in the horizontal
6) Armour and self sealing tanks


If you mull through all of that, you are not led necessarily to the Wilcat. It becomes a toss up between the Sea Hurricane or the Fulmar II. I personally think the Sea Hurricane is the best, follwed by the Wildcat, with the Fulmar offering serious chanllenge to that
 
 
In 1940, the Fulmar I was probably the all round best "available" Allied carrier fighter.

In 1941/42 the Sea Hurricane was the all round best, having superior speed, climb and manoeuvrability compared to the F4F-3/4. The -4 had the useful addition of folding wings and nominally longer range. I say nominally because the the F4F-4's poor climb rate probably meant a lot of time spent at military power during it's extended climbs to altitude.

In 1942 the Fulmar II had a longer range than the F4F-4, slightly better climb to 10,000 ft and an extra pair of eyes. The Fulmar II could double as a dive bomber, but had the disadvantage of being ~20 mph slower under 10,000 ft and had much poorer performance above 12000ft. There is an abundance of material available that suggests that the F4F-4's performance advantage over the Fulmar II was marginal, under 10000ft, and that actual F4F-4 performance was much lower than official USN figures.

The Seafire II had all the advantages of the Sea Hurricane but was not suited to escort carrier operations, and did not have folding wings. The Seafire's range was equal to the F4F-4 and its performance was still vastly superior when equipped with the SS 30 gallon slipper tank. The Seafire III was a better all round naval fighter, but with a weak landing gear, yet the F4F-4's LG, while not weak was tricky to master and also resulted in a high accident rate and the F4F-4's poor power to weight ratio and small wing must have made TO on a CVE exiting.
 
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