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Good point I think. Wind, sea & engine noise a given. Plus blood pounding in our ears as this huge plane closes on you. Not easy to be an objective observer.
FW Condor attacking a ship with engines off - thoughts?
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Good point I think. Wind, sea & engine noise a given. Plus blood pounding in our ears as this huge plane closes on you. Not easy to be an objective observer.
The Fw 200C-3 still suffered from structural failure though; it was a problem Fw never resolved. Manoeuvring at low level is an integral part of the role, and if the aircraft suffered failure as a result, it was clearly not entirely suited for the job. In saying that however, the Condor proved an extremely effective aircraft, creating a problem for the British out of proportion to the numbers operated...
...Which brings me to the next issue with the Condor; it wasn't produced in very large numbers and there weren't many operating at any given time. According to Smith and Kay in German Aircraft of The Second World War (Putnam, 1972);
"the machine was never produced in large numbers, 26 Condors being delivered in 1940, 58 in 1941, 84 in 1942, 76 in 1943 and eight in 1944."
At very close range, the limit is the training speed of the gun. If the Condor orbits the ship at fairly low speed it can fire MGs broadside while being a difficult target.
I have been on many ferries around the world and inside or outside there is a perpetual hum when the engines are running, out on deck it is still there at a lower level but then there are other sounds, like the splashing and crashing of the bow or just a breeze in your ears and whistling about the superstructure, this is the base sound level or "level of grass" in wave/oscilloscope terms, it is that level an incoming Fw Condor has to get above before it is noticed. I can easily imagine people on a vessel thinking an FW Condor appearing out of no where with its engines off but then suddenly on full power. Even today it is much easier to hear an aircraft far away when you are up on top of a deserted moor than in a town centre. I have only heard blood in my ears once. I was told, or asked, or challenged, or advised by the Imam at my workplace in Saudi Arabia (hard to know what he meant) to go into the desert and watch the sunrise from one hour before. One morning I did, I drove into the desert for a few miles and stopped, got out of the car and watched the sun come up, in fact the sun couldn't be seen. The thing is you couldn't hear anything so you try harder and harder to hear something or just anything, you start hearing insects you cant see and small lizards that are nowhere near you. But most of all you start hearing your heart beating, the sound of your own breathing and a pulsing buzz in your ears which is the sound the blood flowing (or pounding) around them, a very strange experience and a bit like descriptions of sensory deprivation.
Jeffrey Ethell Collection
Airman
- 72
- Jun 2, 2020
Here is what happens with aircraft noise as it approaches a ship or submarine. What is heard first is not the engine which is a low pitched throbbing drone type sound that merges with or is cancelled out by the wind noise as sub travels at speed on the surface. It is the higher pitched propeller (tip) noise that is heard first. Of course by throttling back to low prop revolutions this prop tip noise is very much reduced. So low pitched drone of engine is only heard when very close to the sub. Next time you are close to a prop driven aircraft flying past check this phenomenon is as I described it.
There are many U-boat action reports where the lookouts described an attacking Sunderland appearing out of nowhere with no engine/prop noise warning of its approach.
James
There are many U-boat action reports where the lookouts described an attacking Sunderland appearing out of nowhere with no engine/prop noise warning of its approach.
James
Surfaced submarines were usually recharging batteries, the people on the coning tower on look out were not in a quiet place to hear all there was to hear.
Doppler effect.
Another thing not considered is that the Condor (and the Sunderland) are large aircraft and their engines do not take too kindly to rapid and sudden power lever movements and cannot just be started with just the push of a button or advance of the power lever. One way of observing how such a thing might have happened is to go to your local airport and watch some tyro pilots doing circuits. When one does a go-round on finals, the engine noise suddenly becomes audible from being almost silent beforehand while the aircraft was on approach during the descent. The engine is not off, it's at lower rpm during the descent and it's likely the attacking Condor would be the same.
The reason behind this is to not over-rev/over-torque your engines during descent and low speed, which can and does happen. Even turbo-prop airline pilots over-rev/over-torque their engines on descent and a combination of low pitch angle and power being produced can do this if its not managed properly. Our Condor pilots are not going to be diving hell-for-leather but initiating a controlled descent within the aircraft's engines' parameters - nothing like over stressing your own engines during an attack and one or two failing and you crash in the sea...
Another thing not considered is that the Condor (and the Sunderland) are large aircraft and their engines do not take too kindly to rapid and sudden power lever movements and cannot just be started with just the push of a button or advance of the power lever. One way of observing how such a thing might have happened is to go to your local airport and watch some tyro pilots doing circuits. When one does a go-round on finals, the engine noise suddenly becomes audible from being almost silent beforehand while the aircraft was on approach during the descent. The engine is not off, it's at lower rpm during the descent and it's likely the attacking Condor would be the same.
The reason behind this is to not over-rev/over-torque your engines during descent and low speed, which can and does happen. Even turbo-prop airline pilots over-rev/over-torque their engines on descent and a combination of low pitch angle and power being produced can do this if its not managed properly. Our Condor pilots are not going to be diving hell-for-leather but initiating a controlled descent within the aircraft's engines' parameters - nothing like over stressing your own engines during an attack and one or two failing and you crash in the sea...
MiTasol
1st Lieutenant
The report says the sea was rough so presumably the Condor crew saw that and then possibly considered that the Bofors was a minor risk with the gunners aim being negated by the pitching of the vessel
glennasher
Senior Airman
I remember the first time I saw a photo of a Condor, and it had a broken back. That particular photo may be the most printed photo of the Condor ever made. I'm not sure I've ever seen another "intact" Condor photo, come to think of it. Sometimes it's hard to reconcile that they were a pretty good and effective aircraft, but after reading about the havoc they wrought on the Murmansk convoys, you have to throw away those first impressions.
I think for what they achieved and the number in operation at any given time, it was an impressive effort despite the aircraft's obvious drawbacks - and its strengths obviously contributed to this success, long range, heavy offensive and defensive armament. It's a bit like the Handley Page Halifax, it was a success despite itself.
In hindsight it was a stroke of genius and classic German improvisation to convert the Fw 200, but, just like most compromises it came at a price.
In hindsight it was a stroke of genius and classic German improvisation to convert the Fw 200, but, just like most compromises it came at a price.
"It seemed certain that there was to be no salvation for any ship. The nearer the surviving ships came to their goal, the White Sea, the more determined the enemy's attack became; in each man a new struggle developed—a struggle between the will to survive and the will to win through.
A single Focke-Wulf 200 found the 5,345-ton freighter Bellingham(Captain S. Mortensen) at about half-past two that morning, accompanied only by the British rescue ship Rathlin about a mile ahead of her. Both ships were in the open sea and heading straight for Archangel, with about twelve more hours to go. Bellingham's crew first sighted the giant four-engined reconnaissance bomber on their starboard quarter. Their eyes were so strained from lack of sleep, the glare of the ice-barrier and the constant search for the enemy that at first they thought the approaching speck was just a bird; but its course was too steady, its intent too obvious for that.
'General Quarters' was sounded on the under-armed freighter, as the huge bomber circled once round its prey, losing height, and then vanished in a cloud bank astern.
The next time it appeared it had increased speed and was heading in to the ship, straight as an arrow, on its port quarter. The ship's Second Officer tried to fire the Lewis gun on the bridge, but it jammed at once, so he dived for cover in the steel wheelhouse. Bellingham opened a crackling fire with her three puny 0.50-calibre machine-guns and a Browning, but the bomber seemed to shake off the tiny bullets, and came roaring on only a few feet above the waves, its 115-foot wingspan darkening the sea as it raced towards the ship. The plane's own 20-millimetre cannon had begun firing now in an attempt to drive the ship's gunners away from their guns.
Then the miracle happened. One of the ship's machine-gun bullets must have punctured a sensitive spot in the bomber's fuselage, for when it still had a hundred yards to come, its starboard outer and port inner engines began to smoke, and flames began to tear two gaping holes in the fuselage.
One of the plane's cannon shells split a block of wood some fifteen inches above the head of one of the gunners, and another exploded the ship's ammonia tank. There were three explosions astern of the ship, where the bombs had fallen about twenty yards away, knocking one of the machine-gunners on to the deck below.
As the Second Officer looked over the edge of the wheelhouse, the German bomber thundered past only a few feet away and just above him; he saw its rear-gunner crouching in his Perspex gun-turret at the rear, directing his cannon along the length of the ship, obviously unaware that the plane's fuselage was now a mass of flames. The crackle of the ship's machine-guns died away. Before the astounded American seamen's eyes, the Focke-Wulf suddenly lost height and ploughed into the sea two hundred yards off the Bellingham's port bow, breaking up at once, while a pillar of black smoke shot up out of the floating wreckage.
The American's gun crew were 'shouting like a carnival full of children' at this unexpected victory. White fumes were billowing out of Bellingham's engine-room from the burst ammonia tank, driving the choking engine-room crew on deck; two of the men had been blinded by the gas.
The rescue ship Rathlin turned back, but the Americans waved them away and sent a party below decks with respirators to man the engines. Rathlin moved over to the wreckage of the German bomber to pick up its crew, but all six men were floating outside in the water, perished.
Fifteen minutes later, the two ships were under way again. Now there were only 160 miles to go to Cape Svyatoi Nos and the entrance to the White Sea."
(The Destruction of Convoy PQ 17 by David Irving, 1968, 1981).
According to the source notes, this episode was based on the following documents:
1. Diary of Bellingham's Second Officer, I. J. Anderson, 8 July.
2. Bellingham's Armed Guard Report.
As per "Fw 200 Condor Units of World War 2" by Chris Goss, one FW 200 of I/KG40 was lost on 8th July 1942.
Bellingham was on her way home in QP-14 when she was sunk by U-435. Luckily, all crew and passengers (survivors from other PQ-17 ships) survived. 26 of them were rescued by Rechlin.
A single Focke-Wulf 200 found the 5,345-ton freighter Bellingham(Captain S. Mortensen) at about half-past two that morning, accompanied only by the British rescue ship Rathlin about a mile ahead of her. Both ships were in the open sea and heading straight for Archangel, with about twelve more hours to go. Bellingham's crew first sighted the giant four-engined reconnaissance bomber on their starboard quarter. Their eyes were so strained from lack of sleep, the glare of the ice-barrier and the constant search for the enemy that at first they thought the approaching speck was just a bird; but its course was too steady, its intent too obvious for that.
'General Quarters' was sounded on the under-armed freighter, as the huge bomber circled once round its prey, losing height, and then vanished in a cloud bank astern.
The next time it appeared it had increased speed and was heading in to the ship, straight as an arrow, on its port quarter. The ship's Second Officer tried to fire the Lewis gun on the bridge, but it jammed at once, so he dived for cover in the steel wheelhouse. Bellingham opened a crackling fire with her three puny 0.50-calibre machine-guns and a Browning, but the bomber seemed to shake off the tiny bullets, and came roaring on only a few feet above the waves, its 115-foot wingspan darkening the sea as it raced towards the ship. The plane's own 20-millimetre cannon had begun firing now in an attempt to drive the ship's gunners away from their guns.
Then the miracle happened. One of the ship's machine-gun bullets must have punctured a sensitive spot in the bomber's fuselage, for when it still had a hundred yards to come, its starboard outer and port inner engines began to smoke, and flames began to tear two gaping holes in the fuselage.
One of the plane's cannon shells split a block of wood some fifteen inches above the head of one of the gunners, and another exploded the ship's ammonia tank. There were three explosions astern of the ship, where the bombs had fallen about twenty yards away, knocking one of the machine-gunners on to the deck below.
As the Second Officer looked over the edge of the wheelhouse, the German bomber thundered past only a few feet away and just above him; he saw its rear-gunner crouching in his Perspex gun-turret at the rear, directing his cannon along the length of the ship, obviously unaware that the plane's fuselage was now a mass of flames. The crackle of the ship's machine-guns died away. Before the astounded American seamen's eyes, the Focke-Wulf suddenly lost height and ploughed into the sea two hundred yards off the Bellingham's port bow, breaking up at once, while a pillar of black smoke shot up out of the floating wreckage.
The American's gun crew were 'shouting like a carnival full of children' at this unexpected victory. White fumes were billowing out of Bellingham's engine-room from the burst ammonia tank, driving the choking engine-room crew on deck; two of the men had been blinded by the gas.
The rescue ship Rathlin turned back, but the Americans waved them away and sent a party below decks with respirators to man the engines. Rathlin moved over to the wreckage of the German bomber to pick up its crew, but all six men were floating outside in the water, perished.
Fifteen minutes later, the two ships were under way again. Now there were only 160 miles to go to Cape Svyatoi Nos and the entrance to the White Sea."
(The Destruction of Convoy PQ 17 by David Irving, 1968, 1981).
According to the source notes, this episode was based on the following documents:
1. Diary of Bellingham's Second Officer, I. J. Anderson, 8 July.
2. Bellingham's Armed Guard Report.
As per "Fw 200 Condor Units of World War 2" by Chris Goss, one FW 200 of I/KG40 was lost on 8th July 1942.
Bellingham was on her way home in QP-14 when she was sunk by U-435. Luckily, all crew and passengers (survivors from other PQ-17 ships) survived. 26 of them were rescued by Rechlin.
I'm prepared to be corrected but it appears the USAAF didn't have success attacking shipping with B17 and the famous Norden computing bombsight. This is clearly because they attacked Japanese manoeuvrable fast warships from great height. When the Luftwaffe installed their own computing bombsight on the other hand Fw 200, the Lofte 7 computing bombsight, from 1942 onwards they appear to have been just as accurate at 12000-16000ft as they were at low level so long as the targets were merchant ships.
I'm somewhat curious about US use of the Norden to attack Japanese shipping;
Had the Luftwaffe had the Lofte or other "Norden like' sight in 1940 they would have been able to attack with almost complete impunity. As far as I can tell the Lofte 7B entered service in 1942 but there was a Lotfe 7A going back to 1940, this unit lacking gyro-stabilisation. (like wise the British SABS-I lacked stabilisation until the SABS-II). This didn't work well.
The Wikipedia entry on the Lotfe is very poor both in terms of history and technical aspects: it repeats the incorrect assumption that German espionage copied the Norden. The design engineer for Zeiss says he never new or saw of the Norden until he was presented with a captured one. See "American Raiders" which is the story of US intelligence teams investigating German tech after WW2. The Lofte was a different more compact design with the optics and computing mechanism integrated into one small unit that was easy to maintain in calibration. The sighting head was at the end of a short 30 cm or so telescope that protruded from the bottom of Luftwaffe bombers.
There is no 'mystery' in the computing mechanism of these sights. They use the same techniques as used in Anti Aircraft Predictors, Computer Predictors, and Naval Computers (or Admiralty plotting tables as the RN knew these computers). The USN Buro of Ord did a tremendous job of using technology from their Ford 'range keeping clocks' (as they knew these computers) but the knowledge was available to the Germans as well as British from their own Torpedo, FLAK and Naval Gunfire computers. It seems USN engineers simply integrated the ideas first.
The principle is simple. The bomb aimer adjust the speed of pair of electric motors to track the target. The speed setting mechanism is 'linearized' by a basic computing mechanism (trigonometric and logarithmic cams plus differentials to add/subtract or rather multiply/divide if a log) that takes into account lay angle and altitude. Once the speed is set right the optics would track closely and only minor speed adjustments are made. The output is actually in cartesian form. The difference between air speed and heading gives the head and cross wind which can be offset from tables or a cam.
It's possible to elaborate by adding a mechanism that tracks the target as the bomber changes heading as a battleship does, which goes beyond mere stabilisation.
The abandonment of the dive bombing requirement for the He 177 seems to have come in 1942, the same time the Lotfe was ready.
I'm somewhat curious about US use of the Norden to attack Japanese shipping;
Had the Luftwaffe had the Lofte or other "Norden like' sight in 1940 they would have been able to attack with almost complete impunity. As far as I can tell the Lofte 7B entered service in 1942 but there was a Lotfe 7A going back to 1940, this unit lacking gyro-stabilisation. (like wise the British SABS-I lacked stabilisation until the SABS-II). This didn't work well.
The Wikipedia entry on the Lotfe is very poor both in terms of history and technical aspects: it repeats the incorrect assumption that German espionage copied the Norden. The design engineer for Zeiss says he never new or saw of the Norden until he was presented with a captured one. See "American Raiders" which is the story of US intelligence teams investigating German tech after WW2. The Lofte was a different more compact design with the optics and computing mechanism integrated into one small unit that was easy to maintain in calibration. The sighting head was at the end of a short 30 cm or so telescope that protruded from the bottom of Luftwaffe bombers.
There is no 'mystery' in the computing mechanism of these sights. They use the same techniques as used in Anti Aircraft Predictors, Computer Predictors, and Naval Computers (or Admiralty plotting tables as the RN knew these computers). The USN Buro of Ord did a tremendous job of using technology from their Ford 'range keeping clocks' (as they knew these computers) but the knowledge was available to the Germans as well as British from their own Torpedo, FLAK and Naval Gunfire computers. It seems USN engineers simply integrated the ideas first.
The principle is simple. The bomb aimer adjust the speed of pair of electric motors to track the target. The speed setting mechanism is 'linearized' by a basic computing mechanism (trigonometric and logarithmic cams plus differentials to add/subtract or rather multiply/divide if a log) that takes into account lay angle and altitude. Once the speed is set right the optics would track closely and only minor speed adjustments are made. The output is actually in cartesian form. The difference between air speed and heading gives the head and cross wind which can be offset from tables or a cam.
It's possible to elaborate by adding a mechanism that tracks the target as the bomber changes heading as a battleship does, which goes beyond mere stabilisation.
The abandonment of the dive bombing requirement for the He 177 seems to have come in 1942, the same time the Lotfe was ready.
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Hey Koopernic,
I think you are right re the the problem of bombing at altitude vs point targets. The USN tested the Norden pre-war and concluded that it was only accurate vs point targets to about 10,000 ft when used in combination with their aircraft. (I have never been able to find anything giving details on what they meant by "accurate" in the reports.) I do not know if during the tests the Nordens carried by their multi-engine patrol-bombers were fitted with the gyro-stabilization units or not, but the Nordens tested in their single-engine carrier based bombers (TBD & SB2U) were not. When the British tested the Norden early-war they also concluded that it was only good to about 10,000-12,000 ft under "clear weather" conditions - they had also reached the same conclusion relative to their own sights. I doubt that any system in use during the war would have done any better at higher altitudes.
It was concluded by both the US and UK that the British CSBS was better at "lower" altitudes, partly because it did not require as much straight-and-level flight before drop. Based on your description of the Lofte bomb sight I suspect that the same limitations and advantages would apply.
I think you are right re the the problem of bombing at altitude vs point targets. The USN tested the Norden pre-war and concluded that it was only accurate vs point targets to about 10,000 ft when used in combination with their aircraft. (I have never been able to find anything giving details on what they meant by "accurate" in the reports.) I do not know if during the tests the Nordens carried by their multi-engine patrol-bombers were fitted with the gyro-stabilization units or not, but the Nordens tested in their single-engine carrier based bombers (TBD & SB2U) were not. When the British tested the Norden early-war they also concluded that it was only good to about 10,000-12,000 ft under "clear weather" conditions - they had also reached the same conclusion relative to their own sights. I doubt that any system in use during the war would have done any better at higher altitudes.
It was concluded by both the US and UK that the British CSBS was better at "lower" altitudes, partly because it did not require as much straight-and-level flight before drop. Based on your description of the Lofte bomb sight I suspect that the same limitations and advantages would apply.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
On the otherhand, Major Benn, 43rd BG 64rd BS 5th AF in the PTO used B-17s (later B-25s) effectively against Japanese shipping by "skip-bombing".
Timmy P3B FCO
Airman
- 14
- Aug 13, 2013
if the Condor is descending rapidly to attack a ship with bombs, it would be wise to throttle back so the airframe doesn't overspeed.
As the plane descends it will accelerate due to gravity and if I understand the Condor, it was an airliner with a semi weak airframe.
I would imagine you are looking for wakes for there was very little radar available
The plane if doing a visual search looking for ship wakes would be much better off being high up (5000-10000')
Keep in mind, at 200', you only have 32 miles of visual/radar range due to curvature of earth, 5000' your visual range is huge
at 200 mph you are doing a mile every 18 seconds, not a lot of time to plan and react before you are over target
If a ship is creating a wake, at 10,000', it is easy to spot and also it gives the Condor time to set up for attack (warn crew, arm bombs(?), plan attack)
I was aircrew in P3B's and P3C's and several lives ago, we chased submarines. If we were doing a radar/visual search at 1000'-5000' and needed to get down low, the pilots would throttle back and drop very quickly by pushing nose over. The plane built speed up very quickly.
Timmy
As the plane descends it will accelerate due to gravity and if I understand the Condor, it was an airliner with a semi weak airframe.
I would imagine you are looking for wakes for there was very little radar available
The plane if doing a visual search looking for ship wakes would be much better off being high up (5000-10000')
Keep in mind, at 200', you only have 32 miles of visual/radar range due to curvature of earth, 5000' your visual range is huge
at 200 mph you are doing a mile every 18 seconds, not a lot of time to plan and react before you are over target
If a ship is creating a wake, at 10,000', it is easy to spot and also it gives the Condor time to set up for attack (warn crew, arm bombs(?), plan attack)
I was aircrew in P3B's and P3C's and several lives ago, we chased submarines. If we were doing a radar/visual search at 1000'-5000' and needed to get down low, the pilots would throttle back and drop very quickly by pushing nose over. The plane built speed up very quickly.
Timmy
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Hi Timmy! VP-65 1996-2002, AD2. I also worked at Lockheed and was on the P-3C program, saw the last 130 built.
Timmy P3B FCO
Airman
- 14
- Aug 13, 2013
Hey there!
While at VP31 (NAS Moffett) while transitioning from P3B's to P3C's, I flew with VP-91 for hours (keep flight pay) and flew in the very last P3C ever built many times
BuNO. 163285?
Timmy
VP-92 NAS Brunswick
1991-2007
InFlightTech/ArmOrd P3C
Radio Operator P3B
While at VP31 (NAS Moffett) while transitioning from P3B's to P3C's, I flew with VP-91 for hours (keep flight pay) and flew in the very last P3C ever built many times
BuNO. 163285?
Timmy
VP-92 NAS Brunswick
1991-2007
InFlightTech/ArmOrd P3C
Radio Operator P3B
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Actually 163295 (5824 Lockheed production number). It was delivered in April of 1990. 2 months later myself and about 5000 other people were laid off as the Burbank facility was closing down By that time however, P-3 production was moved to Plant 42 in Palmdale.
Can you tell us more about wake spotting? How long could a wake be for say a tanker, destroyer, trawler. I imagine the art of wake spotting developed by WW2
