Added new information -apologies for 88mm instead of 75mm data.
I have tried to register in tank.net but unfortunately, they generally don´t accept new memberships in the moment.
I am just writing here in order to offer some thoughts about the discussion of IS-2 obr.44 armour vs KWK43 88mm/71 using APCBC. Particularely with regard to the aspect of the upper front plate (glacis plate) versus penetration or its alleged immunity. It has been suggested by Bojan -citing the later Yugo trials on T.54 glacis plates whiches the 88mm APCBC couldn´t penetrate- that the upper front plate of the IS-2 mod. 44 (100/110mm @ 60 deg) was correspondingly also immune to penetration at any range from 88mm firing either APCBC or APCR.
In this context, direct evidence is hard to come by but the IS-3 penetration trials are significant for the question, as it details also include -among others- the penetration of 88mm vs IS2 for both, upper and lower front plate. Being a russian source, it has primary source character and should not be rejected easily as holding no reference to IS-2, people who compiled the report only notified the results but they indeed had access to all results, not just the few we know today. While the document deals primarely with IS3 in order to demonstrate the improvements attained by russian tank design in beating the high performance german 88mm KWK43 /PAK43, it also contains valuable data for the IS2, too and is more likely to make use of the latest APCBC ammo (Pgr 39/43) captured in Germany than earlier documents deteailing penetration of IS85 or T34.
I quote the relevant passage:
Нос корпуса
Выбранная конструкция носовой части корпуса танка ИС-3 аначительно увеличивает снарядостой-кость этого узла по сравнению с носовой частью серийного корпуса ИС-2, за исключением передней наколонной част и крыши корпуса.
Верхние лобовые листы корпуса ИС-3 полностъю зацицают экипаж от 88мм немецких бронебойных снарядов с дистанция 100 метров и более, при любых углах обстрела.
Верхний лобовой лист корпуса ИС-2/Уралмашзавода/ непробивается толъко дистанции 600 метров и далее.
The bold lines demonstrate that the soviets did considered the glacis of the IS-2 to be proof from 88mm at distances of 600m and more -suggesting that inside this range it was very vulnerable.
A later page detailing the lower front plate says that the IS-3 was able to repell 88mm from larger distances than 300m while the same aspect on the IS-2 could be penetrated at 5100m (!).
This soviet era source points out that the frontal glacis plate of IS-2 can be penetrated by 88mmL71 APCBC inside within 600m while the lower plate can be penetrated in excess of 5000m, the huge difference entailed in both numbers (600m vs 5100m) is a valuable secondary information and in effect rules out the possibility that the IS obr.43 is referred to here in source instead of the IS-2 obr.44. The IS-2 obr. 43 had 30 deg sloped 120mm plate (from the vertical) for the "step" on the glacis and a similarely 30 deg declined lower front plate of 100mm. Thus minimal differences in striking velocity are required to penetrate both plates at similar angle (~680m/s lower front plate vs 750m/s upper front plate for the 88mmL71 using Pgr.39 using official WaPrüf penetration curves for post 1943 APCBC on german RHA). Only the IS-2 obr. 44 had the required difference in upper and lower front plate (110/100mm@ 60 deg glacis vs 100/90mm @ 30 deg lower front plate) to explain the distance discrepiancy mentioned in the soviet prooving ground report.
This doesn´t explain why the T54 glacis wasn´t penetrated at all even from close range. It doesn´t need to. The T54 is a younger, more advanced metallurgical design. It benefitted from all late war research conducted and the data gathered in Germany and abroad which helped to produce the best plates for a specific purpose.
It is also necessary in this context, and I think overdue, to make clear - having compiled sufficient body of evidence- to suggest that plate hardness is not important at all under high obliquity impact. While against vertical plates and even moderately declined ones armour plates of high BHN levels significantly improve the ballistic resistence (sometimes, if the plate is able to shatter some of the older, or weaker capped and all uncapped projectiles by a very considerable margin - shatter yields in a ~1/3 raise in necessary striking velocity to perforate plate), they don´t do it at 60 deg. I have the results of systematic penetration trials conducted with different BHN level good RHA armour plate (even mild steel) at varying obliquities to proove this. Differences in ballistic resistence drop to being negliable against extremely sloped plate. (a gain in 30kg/mm^2 tensile strength equals only about 5% gain in resistence at 60 deg as opposed to 25% for a vertical plate)
More important than hardness is that the armour plate -be it cast or RHA- is entirely free of flaws, has a fine grain size and -orientation and contains no internal laminations and remains ductile under dynamic impact stress. Overly hard armour plates tend to be more brittle and flaw affected than ductile ones in comparison. The decision, f.e. to make the PzIII, PzIV and TIGER-I´s vertical armour plates very hard but the HETZER´s and TIGER-II very oblique sloped frontal plates comparably soft in fact represents a sensible and correct application of ballistic research carried out in Germany in the early 40´s (compare Lilienthal report 166). Soft but highly sloped armour improves toughness under impact and allows the plate to stretch making deflections and ricochet more likely. A harder front plate, as was practice in soviet union still at the end of ww2 would likely even have reduced the level of ballistic protection here, such as mentioned also in US Watertown reports for impact under high obliquity.
Flaws in armour plate may result in roughly 1/3 loss (25% to 40%) in effective thickness and explain why ,f.e. a 28mm s.PzB.41. was able to pierce the lower front plate of an IS-85 (with stepped hull and 100mm cast carmour) in one documented case 1944, a performance which is well beyond the scope of the certified penetration of 67mm@ 30 deg and short range credited to this weapon. Also the failure of lower plate armour at distances of ~5km as cited by russian IS-3 document can be seen as a strong indication of the existence of such flaws in armourplate. Armour plate of the period was hardly ever systematically tested at very high obliquity (60 deg realm) before well after end of ww2. A flawfree, and soft armour plate (~205 to 220 BHN) would probably have eleminated the vulnerability of the glacis of the IS-2 mod.44 against 88mm KWK but as it is, the frontal aspect appears not to be impenetrable from medium and close range while the lower front plate, which makes for roughly 40% exposed frontal hull target area, is virtually penetrable by this gun using late model Pgr 39,1 at any realistic fighting range.
hope it helps,
delc