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Without an increase in manufacturing I don't see a major change in the results. Twin engine plane carrying two tons or 4 engine plane carrying 4 tons? The 4 engine plane may do a bit better. However I doubt that you are going to get anywhere near an equal number of bombers using 4 engine planes so the "lift/bomb load" per 100 engines built may favor the 4 engine machine but not by a large amount.My own thoughts are that he would have of course pushed for, and perhaps succeeded in, getting more LW heavies in earlier. I think that the German industrial base couldn't really support a large fleet of big bombers, neither in manufacturing nor in support.
My own opinion is that it makes very little difference to the BoB. If the Luftwaffe could hit Belfast Ireland repeatedly then having longer range bombers doesn't give much advantage there. Perhaps having 4 engine bombers that could carry 2 1/2 times what 2 engine bombers could carry at short range may be an advantage, or carry larger bombs. You would need fewer aircrew although ground crew would not be big difference.But if they had some of these heavies around (of whatever design), how might that have affected the Battle of Britain or the invasion of Russia, in your opinion? How would it affect "Blitzkrieg" by taking resources away from close-support aircraft or doctrine? Battle of the Atlantic?
Perhaps having 4 engine bombers that could carry 2 1/2 times what 2 engine bombers could carry at short range may be an advantage, or carry larger bombs. You would need fewer aircrew although ground crew would not be big difference.
All good points but some times the degree of change might not be great due to details and timing.Savings in the aircrew per "ton*mile" (ton of bombs times the distance) would've been the most noticeable improvement IMO. People like pilots, navigators, bomb aimers, radiomen - many hundreds of each. Trained pilots were in great demand in the ww2 Luftwaffe.
Against the historical bomber force, swapping the last 50% of the Do 17s with 4-engined bombers might've meant a big increase of payload capability against the twice the number of the Do 17s, since these carried just a meager bombload. Plus, we also have 1900+ of Do 217s, that if replaced with a decent 4-engined design would've probably meant 1200-1400 heavy bombers made? Similar math can be employed to the Ju 88, or the He 111.
Another advantage of the bigger bombers is that these easily justify the heavier defensive firepower, that is also easier to install on the aircraft.
Four engine bombers using Bramo 323P engines?
1000hp for take-off until they get water injection.
I have no clue were the Germans go with this. A 700-1000sq ft wing for speed or a larger wing (1100-1200sq ft) for lift, bomb load range?
An early 111H had 1200hp engines.
He 111s compete with JU-88s for engines, at least in the first few years.
Germans in 1939-40 have crap for guns. I have no idea why they didn't stick belt feed MG 17s in defensive positions or try to use twin MG 15s.
Germans made the mistake of trying go directly from the manually aimed MG 15 7.9mm machine gun to the remote control turret/barbette skipping the manned turret. There manned turrets look like after thoughts or fall back positions after the gee-whiz remote control stuff failed, but that is somewhat different from the 2 engine vs 4 engine debate.
Germans had an engine problem. They didn't have a good 1300-1600hp engine for much of the war. Or it arrived late.
US had 1600-1700hp bomber engines in 1941. Or turbo 1200hp engines which sort of acted like 1600-1700hp engines at altitude.
British had the XX Merlin or the Hercules in 1941/42.
Germans get the BMW 801 and that is the headliner until they get the Jumo 213.
We have skipped right past the Fw 200.
Given enough time (and big enough orders) there doesn't seem to be any reason that the Fw 200 could not have been more extensively modified to become a late 30s and/or 1940-41-42 bomber.
The B-17E was certainly much modified from the B-17B let alone the Boeing 299.
Boeing used the wings and tail of the early B-17s on the 307 Stratoliner prototype and then used the Modified 307 vertical fin and rudder on the B-17E.
The wing area was close, 1420 sq/ft to 1290sq/ft for the Fw 200 and the wing spans were close Fw 200 had 4 more ft. Weights were not that different, at least on the early B-17s (before the F).
We all know that the Fw 200 needed some beefing up and it might have gained a bit of speed (not a lot) from a smaller fuselage. But they built 276 (?) of them so there wasn't much retooling as they were waiting for Vundar bombers that rarely showed up and never on time. Slap a Band-aid or sticking plaster on the FW 200 and make do.
But you have less power for take-off (until water injection) and power falls off over 10,000-13,000ft depending on which Bramo engine.
Fit larger bomb bay or fit wider/shallower gondola (or fit vertical racks inside?) If they had ordered 300-500 all at once perhaps significant changes could have been made.
Doesn't solve the crappy armament though. Although not any worse than the B-17C before upgrade.
Much of the interior of the Condor, at least in its anti-shipping versions, was taken up with fuel tanks to increase its range (5 large & 1 smaller tank). Items 55 & 52 respectively in the linked drawing. And there was a further fuel tank occupying the centre part of the gondola. Item 47.Fit larger bomb bay or fit wider/shallower gondola (or fit vertical racks inside?) If they had ordered 300-500 all at once perhaps significant changes could have been made.
Doesn't solve the crappy armament though. Although not any worse than the B-17C before upgrade.
They were looking to the future but what they needed in 1936-1939 was as you say.What they did miss out on was a long range maritime component which did need large aeroplanes but who would plan in 1936 to have German Atlantic maritime sorties flown from the Bay of Biscay and northern Norway? Certainly they would not countenance any plan to do those sorties from Germany. The existing planned medium bombers could adequately cover the needs of the Baltic and North Sea.
Thank you.Much of the interior of the Condor, at least in its anti-shipping versions, was taken up with fuel tanks to increase its range (5 large & 1 smaller tank). Items 55 & 52 respectively in the linked drawing. And there was a further fuel tank occupying the centre part of the gondola. Item 47.
The question is what does that really gain the Luftwaffe?
Yes the Do 17 and Ju 88 were short ranged. But the He 111 was not (for the time) Paris was under 200 miles from the German Border and London was bit under 300 miles from Germany if the Germans overflew Belgium and Holland. If the Germans can pull off 400 mile round trips they can bomb Cherbourg< Rennes, Nantes (?) 30 miles from Saint Nazaire and get to within 30-50 miles of much of the French coast north of Bordeaux. They can also even by dog legging around Switzerland cover the south coast from the Italian border to Beziers (east of Sete).
They still have to figure out escort for daylight.
+1 on that.Germans can start a 2nd generation 1-2 years later and fly a 4 engine He 177 at the end of 1939/Jan 1940 and perhaps get into production in 1941 and have several hundred by 1942.
This affects the Russian campaign how?
And how effective is it?
The Remote turrets don't work in 1942. And designing a bomber in 1939 that requires you to capture 500-700 miles of Russian territory to even get close to some major Russian targets is a huge gamble. Tankograd was about 900 miles from Moscow. Ural Bomber was drug induced.
Anyone interested in questions like this should read Cajus Bekker's "Luftwaffe War Diaries" where Appendix 11 is the 1954 statement "by Field-Marshal Kesselring on the Subject of Luftwaffe Policy and the Question of a German Four-engined Bomber." Copies of that book seem to be not very widespread, so I'll type it out in full.
We are aware of the secret German training grounds in Soviet Union, that meant the German military in the 1920s was kept well informed, and without the need to cater to the geriatric high officers (as it was the case with France), was free to explore and perfect the new stuff. Secrecy meant that Entente was still oblivious of the new stuff being developed, meaning that Germans were actually the ones having both numerical advantage in military hardware come 1938, as well as in the main topic: how to use all these shiny machines.Unless one is aware of the actual situation obtaining in the nineteen-thirties, false conclusions will be reached. The situation can be summarised as follows:
"1. The Luftwaffe had to be created out of nothing, for the previous decade was entirely unproductive.
"2. Up till mid-1935 all practical endeavour had to be carried out in secrecy, thus retarding its efficacy.
Implying that the prevailing shortage of raw materials and fuel, as it happened in ww2, was also present in the 1930s is a huge misinformation attempt by Albert Kesslering."3. To convert their designs into concrete results, both air-frame and aero-engine manufacturers needed time.
"4. Both of them had much to learn by experience before they were in a position to delver really serviceable products.
"5. Development and production were handicapped by the prevailing shortage of raw materials and fuel.
"6. Despite all its growing pains the aviation industry was confronted with the need for converting from relatively light to relatively heavy production (i.e. bombers).
"7. Such a process was also essential to a programme of general training, especially at a time when blind-flying, bad-weather flying, etc., were viewed as 'mumbo-jumbo'.
"8. With aircraft planning (e.g. that of the 'Ural bomber') years ahead of the contemporary political situation, the political programme adjusted itself to the available technical wherewithal. This sufficed for a war in Western Europe with its implicit limitations on air strategy.
"The following conclusions emerge. Even if the role of the Luftwaffe had been viewed as a strategic one, and a well thought-out production programme devised to cover it, by 1939 there would still have been no strategic Luftwaffe of any real significance. Even the U.S.A., which, untroubled by war, was in a position to conduct large-scale planning, only began to deploy strategic bombers in 1943.
"For this reason it was too much to expect Germany to possess a strategic air force as early as 1940 or 1941. Even if suitable aircraft had been available - itself hardly within the bounds of possibility - we should certainly not have had them, or trained crews to fly them, in the numbers necessary for a successful and decisive air operation. It is even questionable, to say the least, whether output could have kept pace with losses.
You should consider adding dive bombing capability to the strategic bomber.The Urals are really big place. Unless somebody has some German documents outlining what they meant the "Ural" thing is certainly up in the air.
What was possible vs what was practical are two different things. The US with their goal of strategic bombing built the XB-15 as sort of a proof of concept example.
Flying in 1937 it had a max range of 5000 miles, it also needed 33 hours at 153mph to fly that distance using two (?) crews flying in shifts.
If you wanted to carry bombs things changed.
Range 3400 miles with 2511 pounds of bombs.
By late WW II B-17s had grown to a max weight very close to the old XB-15 and the B-17 wasn't much newer in concept/construction.
The Germans still need to solve the long range navigation problem. The beams don't work at long range.
The big bombers have more room for manned turrets. The Germans just have develop them. The German turrets seem to show up late and poorly.
Now maybe the Fw 200S (super) can carry 6000lbs inside (50% more than an He111 and 3 times what the Do-17Z can carry) and carry them further. But in 1940 how far do you need to carry them and 5-7 7.9mm machine guns are not going to protect the bomber very well.