Better German naval strategy 1930-1945?

[tomo pauk]

I think one problem with this scenario is that Germany was limited by available slipways, as well as steel production. More ships means less steel for other users like shells, tanks, synthetic fuel plants and whatnot. Sacrifice Bismarck and Tirpitz and use the tonnage for 4 20k ton CV's?

Going with 3 CVs of ~25000 tons + 3 'super twins' might've proved as a bigger threat than the twins + B&T + the never-finished GZ.
Granted, Germans figuring out that main offensive and defensive asset of a CV is it's air group is another kicker - even the big GZ was supposed to be carrying meager airgroup.

 

[Shortround6]

Sacrifice Bismarck and Tirpitz and use the tonnage for 4 20k ton CV's?

Thing is if you don't have the Bismarck and the Tirpitz you don't need the carriers.

You also need more escorts or else your CVs (or at least one) are going to "do a Courageous" (get sunk by submarine).

It was one thing to have an FW 200 or two fly over a convoy, If a Bf 109 flies over a Convoy you KNOW there is a German carrier within about 150 miles. And if you can track it on radar for even a few minutes you have an even better idea of where to look. Granted a Ju 87 will have more range but you get the idea.

I will also note that the Ranger and Wasp were operating at between 19,000 and 20,000 tons when loaded for service. That may be the best you can hope for in regards air group. They were both under 30kts and had light protection, very light.

 

[z42]

Somewhat related, here's a recent video by naval historian Alexander Clarke discussing a what-if scenario with Germany standardizing on Scharnhorst class hulls for BB's and CV's. Essentially replacing the Bismarck, Tirpitz and Graf Zeppelin with these Scharnhorst class hulls, either with 3 twin 15" guns or then built as CV's. The central argument is that the standardization should allow Germany to pump out substantially more ships than they historically managed to do, including 1 or maybe two CV's in service.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79mwNT6Ilx8

 

[don4331]

Z z42 : For a paid historian, I'm actually very disappointed with his getting the facts correct, both on German and British sides.

Raeder was building a Navy with the following 2 objectives:
a. To secure Germany's trade routes to the outside world. (If ship may also disrupt enemy's trade routes, that would be nice addition)
b. To secure the Baltic from North Sea/Baltic powers (Read to prevent France from sailing into Baltic and allowing Poland to annex East Prussia).
bonus
c. To demonstrate to world the capabilities of Germany ingenuity and manufacturing.

In '32, France had started an anti-Panzerschiffe capital ship - Dunkerque with sister laid down couple years later. So, building 2 more Panzerschiffe (D & E) is seen as a waste. And the Scharnhorst class is direct response. When France ups the ante with the Richelieu class, Germany responds with Bismarck class.

Much as the narrator wants to make it anti RN, it wasn't it was anti-French. But the unintended side effect that both Kaiser and Hitler failed to recognize is that RN responds to it (to a certain extent)

Back to the premise of the video - I haven't been able to confirm one way or other if the yard at Blohm & Voss was empty a year earlier, which would allow Bismarck to be started sooner or not. I wished he would have answered that...\\

But when we get into 2nd round of ships - Historic Bismarck/Tirpitz and Graf Zeppelin, the issue becomes schedules slip because the German economy is stretched to limit (e.g. Prinz Eugen takes ~28 months from being laid down to launched vs the ~19 months Admiral Hipper). And Mr. Clarke isn't build the 2 same ships again in 2nd round: His capital ships now have twin 38cm guns - which require new, heavier turrets, additional buoyance added to bow, larger electrical plant, etc. While the carrier needs significant design (and we will note a number of carrier conversions came out heavier than their capital ship predecessors (flight deck isn't exactly light). Also Raeder wasn't in favour of carriers, so wasn't pressing the construction.

So, with his starting the carrier a month after historic, I don't see it finished any sooner. And even if the structure is complete, the carrier won't be commissioned as the crew training (including air crew) won't be done. The cold winter of '39-'40 which froze over German harbours makes it impossible to train (Blucher's issue).

p.s. The RN couldn't order the KGVs until the treaties expired, so no earlier there. And as Kriegsmarine might have 1 capital ship 6 months earlier, I can't foresee any changes to their build schedules.

All that said, we should be able to do a better job in hindsight as we know British Empire is going to declare war upon invasion of Poland, and plan a fleet to hurt RN more versus just opposed NM.

 

[EwenS]

The RN, USN and IJN all discovered that taking an existing capital ship / cruiser hull as the basis of an aircraft carrier was, ton for ton, not as efficient as designing and building a ship from the keel up as an aircraft carrier. For the KM to do so in the mid-1930s would simply to be to repeat the recognised mistakes of others. They had after all had the opportunity to visit HMS Furious and the IJN Akagi before starting work on the Graf Zeppelin design.

 

[Shortround6]

I don't know where the change over to "mass production" that allows "substantially more ships" comes from compared to the Historic build.
What I mean is how many ships do you have to built or or build at the same time to get a measurable decrease in cost or decrease in man hours per ship?
An extra one or two is not going to do it. Especially if there are changes in armament and upper hulls (carriers).

The US Navy was about as mass produced as you could get but a lot of that was not just hull types/design but Machinery and auxiliaries. US was ordering diesel electric generators by the scores and using them in different ships for example. A lot of other detail parts were common.

Hulls are not that difficult. After armament for large Cruisers and Battleships the next bottle necks are armor and main engines (boilers and turbines) which sometimes need several years from ordering to installation.
The Germans were not ordering enough big ships even if they ordered another 2-3 to really get much in the way of a mass production benefit.

Part of the US "mass" production was that they had bigger building blocks in the machinery area. They used larger boilers but fewer of them. Tends to simplify things in the machinery areas, a lot less piping and fittings.

 

[z42]

Raeder was building a Navy with the following 2 objectives:
a. To secure Germany's trade routes to the outside world. (If ship may also disrupt enemy's trade routes, that would be nice addition)
b. To secure the Baltic from North Sea/Baltic powers (Read to prevent France from sailing into Baltic and allowing Poland to annex East Prussia).
bonus
c. To demonstrate to world the capabilities of Germany ingenuity and manufacturing.

In '32, France had started an anti-Panzerschiffe capital ship - Dunkerque with sister laid down couple years later. So, building 2 more Panzerschiffe (D & E) is seen as a waste. And the Scharnhorst class is direct response.

With you so far.

When France ups the ante with the Richelieu class, Germany responds with Bismarck class.

Yes, though with the nitpick that the Richelieus were a response to the new Italian 15" Littorio-class battleships, not to the Scharnhorsts per se.

However, I'm sure that as the Bismarcks are being built, it becomes clear to the German command that conflict with the UK is, if not inevitable, at least increasingly likely.

Much as the narrator wants to make it anti RN, it wasn't it was anti-French.

In defense of the narrator, I think the framing is WWII as it happened, not what the KM high command was planning in the 1930'ies.

And Mr. Clarke isn't build the 2 same ships again in 2nd round: His capital ships now have twin 38cm guns - which require new, heavier turrets, additional buoyance added to bow, larger electrical plant, etc.

One of the ideas behind the Scharnhorst class AFAIU was that the triple 28cm turrets could relatively easily be swapped out for twin 38 cm ones. Indeed Gneisenau went in for such a refit during WWII, though it never emerged from that thanks to incessant RAF bombing.

While the carrier needs significant design (and we will note a number of carrier conversions came out heavier than their capital ship predecessors (flight deck isn't exactly light). Also Raeder wasn't in favour of carriers, so wasn't pressing the construction.

So, with his starting the carrier a month after historic, I don't see it finished any sooner. And even if the structure is complete, the carrier won't be commissioned as the crew training (including air crew) won't be done. The cold winter of '39-'40 which froze over German harbours makes it impossible to train (Blucher's issue).

Timing is probably one of the big issues in any German carrier plans. RN, USN and IJN were operating CV's since roughly the end of WWI, they had a couple of decades to work out doctrine, test various approaches etc. Sure the KM could to some extent learn from the mistakes of the others, but having the first carrier commissioned in February 1940 (per Dr Clarke's presentation) means an awfully short and steep learning curve if they want to do some successful operations before the KM surface fleet is largely consigned to being holed up in harbors and fjords.

p.s. The RN couldn't order the KGVs until the treaties expired, so no earlier there.

The KGV's were ordered in 36/37 and all laid down in 37. I believe the treaties were still in force by then. Japan had refused to sign the second London treaty, causing the signatories to invoke the escalator clause, increasing BB max tonnage from 35000 to 45000 and bumping max gun size from 14" to 16". However the KGV had already been designed and partially ordered by then, so it was too late to take advantage of the bigger limits. Also AFAIK the KGV's were in essence a replacement for the Iron Duke class ships that had been scrapped or demilitarized a few years prior, thus building them wouldn't have caused GB to go over the total capital ship tonnage limit.

All that said, we should be able to do a better job in hindsight as we know British Empire is going to declare war upon invasion of Poland, and plan a fleet to hurt RN more versus just opposed NM.

Well, that's why I started this thread in the first place! Lets hear your suggestions!

 

[z42]

I don't know where the change over to "mass production" that allows "substantially more ships" comes from compared to the Historic build.
What I mean is how many ships do you have to built or or build at the same time to get a measurable decrease in cost or decrease in man hours per ship?
An extra one or two is not going to do it. Especially if there are changes in armament and upper hulls (carriers).

The US Navy was about as mass produced as you could get but a lot of that was not just hull types/design but Machinery and auxiliaries. US was ordering diesel electric generators by the scores and using them in different ships for example. A lot of other detail parts were common.

Yes, I believe the argument was to standardize not only the hulls but also machinery and as much of other equipment as possible. It's not a Liberty-ship scale mass production, certainly, but if they'd, say, manage to produce 6 Scharnhorsts and 2 CV's rather than the historical Scharnhorsts and Bismarcks (+ half-finished Graf Zeppelin), then that's a lot more gray hairs for the RN. It won't make them win the war, obviously, and the numbers might lead to using and thus losing many of them quite early on in a few big battles, but until then they'd arguably be a bigger threat to the Allies than the historical builds. (Assuming they can make their naval aviation work, which is a big if)

 

[EwenS]

The "escalator clause" in the 1936 London Treaty only covered the size of the guns.

"(2) No capital ship shall carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 14 in. (356 mm.); provided however that if any of the Parties to the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament signed at Washington on 6 February 1922, should fail to enter into an agreement to conform to this provision prior to the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, but in any case not later than 1 April 1937, the maximum calibre of gun carried by capital ships shall be 16 in. (406 mm.)."

The increase in ship size from 35,000 tons to 45,000 tons came about because it was then believed that Japan would build 16" ships larger than 35,000 tons. Both the RN and the USN realised from their own studies that you needed more tonnage to get a balanced 16" ship. So negotiations ensued between all parties other than Japan. The US proposed 45,000 tons and stuck to that even though Britain wanted 40,000 tons. So at the end of July 1937, 45,000 tons became the new agreed limit. But Britain still designed the Lions to approx 40,000 tons for various reasons.

The KGVs were intended as replacements for the R class not the Iron Dukes, which with the battlecuiser Tiger had all gone as a result of the 1930 London Treaty.

Britain couldn't wait for a Japanese decision in March 1937, so the first 3 KGVs were ordered in 1936 and the first 2 laid down on 1 Jan 1937, the very first date possible under the Treaties. With time against the RN they chose to build all the 1937 ships as KGVs. By then it had been decided that money would not be spent on modernising the Rs beyond the work done to Royal Oak and other minor upgrades. By 1940 when KGV entered service some of the Rs were in very poor condition.

 

[Shortround6]

Yes, I believe the argument was to standardize not only the hulls but also machinery and as much of other equipment as possible. It's not a Liberty-ship scale mass production, certainly, but if they'd, say, manage to produce 6 Scharnhorsts and 2 CV's rather than the historical Scharnhorsts and Bismarcks (+ half-finished Graf Zeppelin), then that's a lot more gray hairs for the RN. It won't make them win the war, obviously, and the numbers might lead to using and thus losing many of them quite early on in a few big battles, but until then they'd arguably be a bigger threat to the Allies than the historical builds. (Assuming they can make their naval aviation work, which is a big if)

Well that is 8 ships instead of 5 for a 60% increase
Granted perhaps two Bismarcks equal 3 Scharnhorsts if we are being generous.
If we are not the scheme takes a real hit in the head.
The Bismarcks used lower power machinery than the Scharnhorsts and the Graf Z was supposed to have over 40% more power than Bismarck.
You may also need around 4-4,500 tons of armor for the 3rd Scharnhorst.

Maybe in the interest of "mass" production you can used the machinery, armor and slips from the Seydlitz and Lutzow (8in Cruiser) but that is not really mass production.
I am not sure what you gain on the Graf Z by using Scharnhorst hulls as far as production goes. You do loose 80ft of waterline length so?????planes? fuel oil? less speed?

The German program was too small for much benefit to be gained from "mass production".

 

[Admiral Beez]

Did the interwar naval treaties restrict Germany from developing LSTs and other amphibious assault ships? If not, German naval strategy should focus on developing this capability for Sealion.

 

[EwenS]

Hitler wanted to avoid war with Britain through the 1930s and even in 1940 hoped for a negotiated peace. So no Operation Sealion was envisaged by the KM until facedcwithbthe reality. And as a continental power it could simply roll across it long land borders into its neighbours territories. The most Germany needed to consider were river crossings.

In the 1930s I don't believe anyone considered carrying out the type of large scale amphibious warfare that emerged in WW2 and which generated a whole range of specialist craft including the ocean going LST(2). In the late 1930s Britain developed the LCA and MLC (later renamed the LCM). Similarly the Japanese developed a range of small craft for delivering troops from ship to shore for its war in China. The IJA also built a 7,000 ton vessel to carry these smaller craft but it was a one off.

Japanese amphibious assault ship Shinshū Maru - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

It needs to be remembered that most nations had access to merchant fleets with vessels that could be quickly adapted as troopships to carry troops to landing sites i.e. vessels that developed into the LSI/APA of WW2. After that only smaller craft were needed to get them ashore. Think Gallipoli from WW1 rather than Normandy.


In relation to the specific question 're LST type vessels there was an exemption in Article VIIIc that could probably have covered them.

"c) Naval surface vessels not specifically built as fighting ships which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way than as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics:​

(1) Mount a gun above 6.1 inch (155 mm) calibre;​

(2) Mount more than four guns above 3 inch (76 mm) calibre;​

(3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes:​

(4) Are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots;​

(5) Are protected by armour plate;​

(6) Are designed or fitted to launch mines;​

(7) Are fitted to receive aircraft on board from the air;​

(8) Mount more than one aircraft-launching apparatus on the centre line; or two, one on each broadside;​

(9) If fitted with any means of launching aircraft into the air, are designed or adapted to operate at sea more than three aircraft."​

 

[EwenS]

One of the ideas behind the Scharnhorst class AFAIU was that the triple 28cm turrets could relatively easily be swapped out for twin 38 cm ones. Indeed Gneisenau went in for such a refit during WWII, though it never emerged from that thanks to incessant RAF bombing.

Unfortunately it was NOT a simple case of replacing one turret with another.

As built S&G were very wet ships i.e. in heavy seas they shipped a lot of water over their bows which entered the forward turret. This was because they came out heavier than originally planned. That was the main reason for adding the Atlantic bow and other early WW2 modifications. They also used an improved version of the 28cm gun and turret used in the Deutschland class with longer range.

The 38cm turrets were each some 300 tonnes heavier than the 28cm turrets they were intended to replace, plus the increased weight of the ammunition (fewer but heavier rounds and charges), plus the added weight of new barbettes to carry them, general strengthening etc, to cope with the increased recoil forces involved. In order to ensure that Gneisenau didn't sink any lower in the water, which would have slowed her down, it was necessary to add some buoyancy to the hull forward. So she was to have her bow lengthened by 10m. I've seen estimates that, all in, her displacement might have risen by 4,000 tons.

During Operation Cerberus, the Channel Dash, 11-13 Feb 1942 Gneisenau was mined and went to Kiel for repair. The damage from that and a collision with a wreck was minor and repaired by the time of the RAF raid. Bombed by the RAF on the night of 26/27 Feb 1942. Unfortunately her magazines had been restocked ahead of her planned deployment to Norway. Hit forward by a single bomb her entire bow section was extensively damaged in the resulting fire, and needed completely rebuilt anyway.

It was at that point that it was decided that she was to be given the previously planned 38cm turrets and was transferred to Gotenhafen to be repaired and reconstructed. Arriving in April 1942, she was decommissioned in July. All work on her was suspended in Jan 1943 following the Battle of the Barents Sea when Hitler ordered all the big ships decommissioned, something which Donitz later persuaded him to reverse in part. And there she lay until scuttled in March 1945 as a blockship. Her turrets were removed for use in coastal defences. C turret still exists as a museum in Norway.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If there was ever an era where Germany needed better naval strategy it's 1898-1912, where the Tirpitz plan needlessly provoked an otherwise neutral to pro-German, anti-French Britain. Pushing an otherwise splendid isolationist Britain into the arms of the Russians and French, all for the sake of needless lines of battleships and shiny buttons was an asinine move by Germany.

In the 1930s and in WW2, Germany needed more and better uboats to slow the convoys. Move asap away from the small Type II to much larger submarines. Even the 220ft long, 770 ton workhorse Type VII is too small, when at the same time the RN were operating 270ft, 1300 ton T-class. The French and Italian boats were also larger, not to mention the big USN and IJN boats. Germany needs uboats that can remain at sea for long periods with sufficient armament, fuel, food and crew amenities.

And skip the battleships and put that steel, copper, etc, into uboats, plus hundreds of more tanks, trucks, and whatever helps with Barbarossa. If there's no Deutschlands, Scharnhorsts or Bismarcks it will be interesting to see what the Royal Navy builds. Will Ark Royal, the Illustrious and KGV classes be built as per history? Are the Revenge class decomissioned into reserve? And can Germany take Norway with only the Hippers, CLs and DDs?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

If there was ever an era where Germany needed better naval strategy it's 1898-1912, where the Tirpitz plan needlessly provoked an otherwise neutral to pro-German, anti-French Britain.

In the 1930s and in WW2, Germany needed mor and better uboats to slow the convoys. Skip the battleships and put that steel, copper, etc, into uboats, plus hundreds of more tanks, trucks, and whatever helps with Barbarossa.

If there's no Deutschlands, Scharnhorsts or Bismarcks it will be interesting to see what the Royal Navy builds. Will Ark Royal, the Illustrious and KGV classes be built as per history? Are the Revenge class decomissioned into reserve? And can Germany take Norway with only the Hippers, CLs and DDs?

If Germany focuses on U-boats, Admiralty will certainly build up escorts.

 

[EwenS]

If Germany focuses on U-boats, Admiralty will certainly build up escorts.

See post #3 and the limits imposed by AGNA 1935.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

See post #3 and the limits imposed by AGNA 1935.

The Germans had a bad habit of tearing up agreements. But if they do so here with subs, the RN will surely build up ASW assets, which point of mine isn't obviated.

 

[Admiral Beez]

But if there's one thing that needs to change in German naval strategy to make the greatest impact, it's in secure communications between HQ and the uboats. So, in the 1930s the Naval Intelligence Service instructs the B-Dienst to thoroughly investigate the Enigma device for design and operational vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities of the Enigma Machine

If by the time WW2 starts, the navy's encryption has addressed many of the vulnerabilities listed above, the German navy will be much harder to counter.

Another related change that would have a big impact is greater independence and communication blackouts for ships and uboats on operations. Had Lutjens kept his mouth shut, Bismarck might have made Brest, for example. So, instead of micromanaging the uboats, the boats are sent out into known convoy routes to conduct independent ops. Wolf packs wouldn't be as organized.

 

[EwenS]

The Germans had a bad habit of tearing up agreements. But if they do so here with subs, the RN will surely build up ASW assets, which point of mine isn't obviated.

The Wiki article on AGFA 1935 is well referenced and sets out the politics surrounding it for all sides (British, German and lastly the French who viewed it as a slap in the face). It also refers to what the RN felt most threatened by in a Dec 1934 study - Kreuzekrkeg - a combination of panzerschiff, cruisers and U-boats operating in task forces.

Anglo-German Naval Agreement - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

That of course that led on to Plan Z in 1939:-

Plan Z - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Wiki article on AGFA 1935 is well referenced and sets out the politics surrounding it for all sides (British, German and lastly the French who viewed it as a slap in the face). It also refers to what the RN felt most threatened by in a Dec 1934 study - Kreuzekrkeg - a combination of panzerschiff, cruisers and U-boats operating in task forces.

Anglo-German Naval Agreement - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

That of course that led on to Plan Z in 1939:-

Plan Z - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Right, I'm aware of all that. None of that contradicts my point, at all -- that if the KM focused on subs, Admiralty would surely build up ASW assets.

You appear to have missed the point that this is a what-if thread.