Better German naval strategy 1930-1945?

[z42]

Grossly exceeding that 47,250 ton limit destroys AGNA 1935. It is one thing to build ships a few thousand tons over agreed limits, another to build multiple ships of 20,000 tons or more. For raiding in the Atlantic and IO something bigger than a WW2 escort carrier would be required. Hitler was keen to keep Britain onside for as long as possible.

As the AGNA suckered Germany into building a small balanced treaty-style fleet, anything substantially different, such as this what-if scenario, would require the AGNA to be different than it was historically. Or just non-existent, as Germany repudiated the land and air restrictions in the Versailles treaty, they could have repudiated the naval parts as well without any replacement treaty.

 

[z42]

Swarms of subs with properly tested torpedoes would have been way more useful than big naval ships in the early war years. So build way more Type VII and IX instead of Bismarck/Tirpitz and the carrier(s).

Ceteris paribus, I agree. But it never is, is it? With no German heavy surface units to worry about, UK could churn out more ASW escorts, escort carriers etc, and transfer the home fleet capital ships to the Med and the far east.

Further, without a surface fleet, what about the Norway invasion? Well, a surface fleet with CV's instead of big gun ships could maybe work out?

 

[Shortround6]

As the AGNA suckered Germany into building a small balanced treaty-style fleet, anything substantially different, such as this what-if scenario, would require the AGNA to be different than it was historically. Or just non-existent, as Germany repudiated the land and air restrictions in the Versailles treaty, they could have repudiated the naval parts as well without any replacement treaty.

The AGNA didn't sucker Germany into anything.
The Germans were trying to push their limits and seeing where or if the British/French would push back. Push too hard, too soon and the there might have been a military intervention.
Push slow and keep pushing the boundaries out in pieces and each step was easier for the British/French to swallow.

Germans also needed time to regain design/construction expertise. A few foreign based design teams help but are not the same thing.

By 1938-39 everybody knew what was coming, the only question was when.
British were scrambling to build warships. They had designs/ideas for AS escorts but they didn't actually order them until 1939. They were purposely designed to built in commercial dockyards using merchant ship building practices and using merchant ship style machinery. Had German changed style of fleet in 1937-38 there was time for the British to respond.
The last two Hippers were laid down in 1936 and middle of 1937 and they were never finished. Any major changes in the German fleet need to be done in 1936-37.

 

[Denniss]

They still have S+G and the heavy cruisers and could at least try to get 38cm guns on S+G to make them (look) more dangerous
One of the Hippers was transferred to soviets as they wanted it and the other one could have been finished by late 41 or early 42. it was almost completed when halt orders were issued and then came the dumb order to carrier conversion.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The UK had more shipbuilding capacity than the Germans, but it wasn't infinite either. What are they going to give up to respond to German light CV's?

Those flattops must come past the UK. You needn't sacrifice anything, just keep RAF on the ball.

 

[z42]

Those flattops must come past the UK. You needn't sacrifice anything, just keep RAF on the ball.

If so, why did they sacrifice the Hood instead of just sending in the RAF to sink the Bismarck?

Though broadly I agree. As the war progresses and the Allies improve the aerial patrols, getting past the GIUK gap undetected is becoming increasingly untenable for any KM surface ship.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

If so, why did they sacrifice the Hood instead of just sending in the RAF to sink the Bismarck?

Though broadly I agree. As the war progresses and the Allies improve the aerial patrols, getting past the GIUK gap undetected is becoming increasingly untenable for any KM surface ship.

I'm pretty sure everyone here is aware that slow, unarmored escort carriers are a far cry from a 42,000 ton battleship. Admiralty understood it, which is why they sent the Hood, to answer your question.

The Royal Navy need not sacrifice one slipway to counter a small flattop carrying 15 or so aircraft and doing (generously) 24 kts trying to sail between Norway and Scotland.

 

[SaparotRob]

If so, why did they sacrifice the Hood instead of just sending in the RAF to sink the Bismarck?

It was there?

 

[RCAFson]

The lighter DP secondaries would likely be unable to penetrate the citadels of light cruisers. However the Leanders had only 25mm turret armor, so even 10.5cm secondaries should be able to wreck them. So a hail of 10.5 cm shells would quickly mission kill it. Then again, a light cruiser would also be capable of mission killing a PBB as long as the PBB main guns are occupied elsewhere, and the UK would happily trade a mutual mission kill in the south Atlantic.

A fast "PBB2" would have the option to keep out of light battery range and rely on the main guns. However dispatching 3 cruisers at long range would run down the main battery magazines, so.. No magic solutions however you turn it.

Not if the light cruiser keeps it's distance. What caused HMAS Sydney's demise was the captain's decision to close to within 3k yds. The effective range of a director controlled 6in battery is about 15-18k yds vs 8 to 10k yds for a 10.5cm battery. Yes both gun calibres can shoot farther but the hit rate is abysmally poor beyond the effective ranges.

 

[RCAFson]

If so, why did they sacrifice the Hood instead of just sending in the RAF to sink the Bismarck?

Though broadly I agree. As the war progresses and the Allies improve the aerial patrols, getting past the GIUK gap undetected is becoming increasingly untenable for any KM surface ship.

Bomber command would have gone after Bismarck if she had lingered in a Norwegian fjord for any length of time.

 

[z42]

It was there?

It was there just randomly? Or was it placed in the area explicitly to guard against a escape into the Atlantic by German heavy surface units? And why was the Hood placed there instead of, say, a RAF squadron? Perhaps because, at the time, they didn't believe the RAF would be up to such a task?

 

[z42]

Not if the light cruiser keeps it's distance. What caused HMAS Sydney's demise was the captain's decision to close to within 3k yds. The effective range of a director controlled 6in battery is about 15-18k yds vs 8 to 10k yds for a 10.5cm battery. Yes both gun calibres can shoot farther but the hit rate is abysmally poor beyond the effective ranges.

I'm sure you're correct about the effective ranges.

But to nitpick about the demise of the Sydney, the Kormoran was also equipped with 6" guns. Though I'm sure the Sydney had better directors, so for a longer range engagement the Sydney should definitely have the advantage.

 

[EwenS]

Bomber command would have gone after Bismarck if she had lingered in a Norwegian fjord for any length of time.

Bomber Command went after Tirpitz while she was in and around Trondhiem between Jan & April 1942. 4 raids did exactly no damage for the loss of 13 heavy bombers.

 

[RCAFson]

I'm sure you're correct about the effective ranges.

But to nitpick about the demise of the Sydney, the Kormoran was also equipped with 6" guns. Though I'm sure the Sydney had better directors, so for a longer range engagement the Sydney should definitely have the advantage.

Given the situation caused by Sydney's captain, a 10.5cm battery would have actually been more effective because it would have had a higher rate of fire and, IIRC, Kormoran's 5.9in guns didn't have any AP ammo and couldn't penetrate Sydney's armour belt. Sydney was able to reply and sink Kormoran and sank from the combined effects of dozens of hits that caused fires and from a torpedo hit forward. Sydney was so close that Kormoran's 37mm guns were able to cause havoc on Sydney.

 

[RCAFson]

Bomber Command went after Tirpitz while she was in and around Trondheim between Jan & April 1942. 4 raids did exactly no damage for the loss of 13 heavy bombers.

I suspect that the KM was better prepared by then but I also know that the RAF opposed the use of divebombers and didn't act quickly enough to place tactical strike aircraft in Iceland and also demilitarized many aircraft that could have been used for glide and divebombing KM ships, such as the Hawker Henley and Fairey Battle. OTOH RAF torpedo bombers turned out to be quite useful.

 

[Shortround6]

But to nitpick about the demise of the Sydney, the Kormoran was also equipped with 6" guns. Though I'm sure the Sydney had better directors, so for a longer range engagement the Sydney should definitely have the advantage.

All of the German WW II raiders used pre WW I 15cm guns from Pre-dreadnoughts and/or Dreadnoughts/battle cruisers.
The Germans changed or upgraded the mounts to 30 degrees of elevation. They had gotten more modern shells that were more streamlined.
However they did NOT have power traverse and elevation.
Ammunition supply may have been a bit sketchy. The Dreadnoughts had one ammunition hoist for every gun or every two guns?
The Raiders had ready use ammo lockers and hoists were few or not spaced well. Rate of fire topped out at around 5rpm.

Range finders are not gun directors. Gun directors cover quite a spectrum. But at a MINIMUM they need some sort of range finder. They need a spotting scope/glass. AND they need a way to get data to the guns. Shouting range and bearing to gun crews (or telephone) is not it. The guns need follow the pointer systems and even better, a repeater system that sends a signal back to the director so that the director officer knows the gun/s have been laid (aimed) according to orders.
We haven't even gotten to plotting table/predictors to "guess" where the target it going to be in 45-70 seconds of flight time.

Then there is the whole minimum salvo thing. Most gunnery officers figured you need a 4 shot salvo. If you get one outlier out 4 shots you can usually discount it and go for the 3 shots as the center of the group. 3 shots is not much better than 2 shots.

Most of the WW II British AMC and Boarding vessels used similar ex WW I 6in guns and simple fire control. Usually with less elevation and thus limited range.

 

[EwenS]

Politically Iceland's position in WW2 was complicated. An independent country but sharing a monarch with Denmark, it declared its neutrality. Britain then invaded it in May 1940 which the Govt duly protested. The Prime Minister of Iceland ordered that the population to treat the British with the "politeness due to guests".

Kingdom of Iceland - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Reykjavik airport (a grass field) was completely inadequate when occupied and had to be reconstructed. It was given concrete runways starting in Oct 1940 but construction conditions were terrible (they had to be built over sunken oil barrels). It was Sept 1941 before it was fit enough to take large aircraft like Wellingtons.

As a result Kaldadarnes was the first airfield to open when the Battles of 98 squadron moved in during Aug 1940, but it was June 1941 before it formally opened as an RAF station w hen the Hudsons of 269 squadron moved in, and July before its 3 runways were completed. It was also prone to winter flooding, the damage from which caused its closure in Nov 1943.

A flying boat base was established at Reykjavik in July 1940 to be used by detachments of Sunderlands from Oban & Sullom Voe, until the whole of 204 squadron arrived and stayed between April & July 1941. A further flying boat base at Akureyri on the north coast was opened in July 1941.

The airfields that eventually formed Keflavik International Airport were constructed by US engineers in 1942/43.

Until 1943 the RAF was short of torpedo bombers. In Sept 1939 there were 2 squadrons of Vildebeests. Beauforts only began to appear in Nov 1939 to replace the Vildebeests, which didn't disappear until April 1940. By mid-1941 there were 5 squadrons to cover everything from the Bay of Biscay to the Norwegian Sea. Such was the shortage of Beauforts in 1942 as units were sent to the Med & Far East that Hampden squadrons had to be transferred from Bomber Command in April 1942 to fill the gaps. It was late 1942 before Torbeaus started to become available.

Sumburgh in the Shetlands to Trondheim is about 500 miles which rules out using obsolete aircraft like the Battle & Henley to attack KM heavy ships based there in the early part of the war.

 

[Shortround6]

hey still have S+G and the heavy cruisers and could at least try to get 38cm guns on S+G to make them (look) more dangerous

The could not build the 38cm guns in time to complete the ships. The S+G were scary enough to British and French. They were faster than any of the old BBs and Repulse and Renown were questionable. Renown started refit in Sept 1936, Repulse never got the new/better refit. ONLY the Hood was fast enough and 'dangerous' enough to really fight the twins as they stood. Fitting the 3 twin 38cm turrets would have prompted the British to make a few drastic changes of her own. Like speed up a Lion? kind of depends on when.

so, why did they sacrifice the Hood instead of just sending in the RAF to sink the Bismarck?

It was there just randomly? Or was it placed in the area explicitly to guard against a escape into the Atlantic by German heavy surface units? And why was the Hood placed there instead of, say, a RAF squadron? Perhaps because, at the time, they didn't believe the RAF would be up to such a task?

Bismarck was trying to stay 800-1000 miles away from England until she could get close France for air support.
Also weather in that area of the Ocean is iffy at best and often downright bad.
The big ships sucked up too much oil to stay anywhere as guard ships. The British had enough cruisers to rotate them in and out for fueling.
The Victorious, after early strikes, was short of fuel and could not stay in pursuit, neither could Prince of Wales.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Hood Sunk 24 May, Bismarck 27 May,

The airstrike from Victorious against Bismarck was small because the hangar held 48 Hurricanes stored without outer wings.

RN Carrier movements to Gibraltar.
Furious depart Liverpool 12 May with 64 Hurricanes, Furious and Ark Royal fly off 48 of them on 21 May, of these 42 flown on to Egypt. (1 returned UK on Furious)
Argus depart Greenock 22 May with 29 Hurricanes, Furious and Ark Royal fly off 44 Hurricanes on 6 June, of these 19 flown on to Egypt.
Victorious depart Rosyth 31 May, joining WS.8X, with 48 Hurricanes, Victorious and Ark Royal fly them off on 14 June, of these 43 flown on to Egypt.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It was there just randomly? Or was it placed in the area explicitly to guard against a escape into the Atlantic by German heavy surface units? And why was the Hood placed there instead of, say, a RAF squadron? Perhaps because, at the time, they didn't believe the RAF would be up to such a task?

You entirely ignored my point that escort carriers are much easier to sink than battleships. Care to take a swipe at it, or are you tapping out?

Also, to handle this fearsome escort carrier, what ships or other assets do you think the RN must sacrifice?