German logistics, purchase programs and war booty, reality and alternatives 1935-43 (3 Viewers)

[Shortround6]

South African 1950s condensing tender. Narrow gauge rail 3' 6" apart.
Granted it is for engine making around 4000hp.
There are a number of fans in the center of the tender so it draws air through the vents/screens on the sides and exhausts the cooling air out the top.
The steam engine itself uses a fan to draw the air though the firebox and boiler to replace the draft provided by the steam exhaust but I don't think most steam road vehicles did that anyway? They used natural draft and not forced draft?

Comparisons between river boats and/or railroads vs road vehicle gets a little tough. You don't need a lot of power to move a boat/small ship very fast. Railroads have very shallow grades, a 3% grade is considered the practical limit and at 3% the load the locomotive can pull is fraction of what it can pull on level ground.

I just happened to run across a description of a 1930 2-8-0 German locomotive built for burning pulverized Lignite by AEG. I have no idea if they built more than one. Most of the details pertain to the tender and feed arrangements. Like a picture of the single cylinder engine used for powering the conveyer screws (max capacity 4360lb per hour) and the 7hp steam turbine powered fan for primary air. It does not give the locomotive's size or power except to say it was rated for train of 1415tons. Grade not given so assume level. The pulverized coal bunker size (a cylinder) was 6.5ft diameter and 13 feet long.
British fooled around with a few 'coal dust' powered locomotives as early as 1917(?) but that was to use up bituminous (black) coal dust that had fallen through the screens of the collieries.
Germans built 6(?) 2-10-0s in 1930/early 30s much like the 2-8-0 but from a different maker. I don't know how many other experiments were made. The East Germans did try again in the early 1950s.

It seems you can have simple/cheap with lower efficiency or complicated/expensive and decent efficiency.

 

[don4331]

Comparisons between river boats and/or railroads vs road vehicle gets a little tough. You don't need a lot of power to move a boat/small ship very fast. Railroads have very shallow grades, a 3% grade is considered the practical limit and at 3% the load the locomotive can pull is fraction of what it can pull on level ground.

You don't need a lot of power to move a boat (barge) slowly; increase speed and the power curve goes up really fast.

Of course, rivers have several challenges....they often aren't straight, they freeze over in winter, they often don't start and end exactly where you want. But it you can more good, over water is ideal.​

 

[marathag]

Wood is easier to procure than lignite so why not just burn wood

Most of Europe had cut down many trees for Ship building and Charcoal production, so abundant 'Free' Wood hadn't been a thing for Centuries.

Notice my post stopped at 1870 for the Southern RRs?
The easily accessible wood had long since been cut near the depots and stations, away from the where the RR lines passed. So cutting parties had to travel farther away, which took more time and was more costly. Wood wasn't really 'Free' any more

Old Growth forests were disappearing.

1880s, they started converting to coal burning, as mining had picked up after the Civil War, coal price was dropping, availability rising. The US Coal fields in use were for the higher grade, large scale Lignite mining wasn't a thing, yet.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Railways move far greater tonnage than even a fleet of steam lorries justifying the expenditure. You're not going to put these up one every road the lorries could possibly take. Basically as SR noted you are restricted to an out and back operation. See attached document:

"The steam waggon paid best on long journeys of say 20 miles out and 20 miles back home with
loads both ways. The waggon could work a 40 or 50 mile day and be ready for a repeat journey the next
day. Horses could not stand this. In rush hours waggons could cope with the extra work whereas horses
would be working near their limit and could not do more. In terms of ton-miles, the waggon working rate
was reckoned to be 1 1/4 old pence per ton-mile as against 2 3/4 old pence per ton-mile for horses. This latter
figure is considered to be very low, horse costs were often 4 to 6 old pence per ton-mile (ref. 1). However,
reference 14 (a Brewer's working with three to four Sentinel waggons) quotes a figure of 2.6 old pence per
ton-mile and average annual running cost of a waggon at £400 to £430.

Note that is from 1912. The S version of the Sentinel waggon introduced in 1934 was much more sophisticated and would have a greater range for the same expenditure of coal. I was surprised to find that it was a water tube boiler with a superheated and a feedwater heater!
The Sentinel in its final form is an amazing tribute to the perseverance of the British in wringing the last drop of performance out of a technology that was obviously on the way out. Sentinel's main rival Foden saw the writing on the wall and abandoned steam in favor of Gardner diesels in 1931 prodding Britain first commercial successful lorry.

https://blog.japanesecartrade.com/663-foden/

I can't imagine any other country devoting the effort although.

As has been pointed out by others the Germans did experiment with steam vehicles prewar. Henschel in particular as a major steam locomotive manufacturer. Here is a list of prewar vehicles:

Steamtrucks & -busses - Hanomag-Henschel.net

This page is about the research by Henschel from Kassel with Warren Doble from 1930 until 1937 on the use of steam for road vehicles.

www.hanomag-henschel.net

Of particular note is the Sentinel S6 which they equipped with a mechanical stoker. I would like to the particulars of that installation. Here are some images of Henschel steam powered vehicles

Erdmann & Rossi Doble-Henschel - COACHBUILD.com

Coachbuild.com FORUM - THE COACHBUILDERS ENCYCLOPEDIA

www.coachbuild.com

 

[Reluctant Poster]

WW2 CLASH - THE LOGISTICS THAT SUPPORT THE BLITZKRIEG

A 1941 German Panzer division had 14.373 men and required 30 tons of supplies per day when inactive to 700 tons per day in heavy fighting

ww2clash.com

Interesting post on German logistics

 

[tomo pauk]

The US bombing survey report dealing with the German fuel everything says this:
By August, 1944, gas generators had been put on about 100,000 vehicles and were consuming about 155,000,000 cu ft of wood, and quantities of other fuel equivalent to 78,000,000 cu ft of wood, per year. About 500,000 tons of gasoline were saved this way in 1944.

(military saved about 130,000 tons, rest was civilian saving; 1000 cu ft = ~28.3 m^3)

For the comparison, German military consumed about 100,000 tons of motor gasoline per month in the 5 most intense months of combat in 1940 (May, June, August, September, October). They used a lot of aviation gasoline and diesel as separate categories, though*.

The report also says this before the previous quote:
When the Caucasus offensive failed, the government required most classes of civilians to use gas generators, many of which burned wood, although some burned anthracite coal and other fuels.

So basically the era of 1935-42 was a prime time for the gas-generation to be introduced en masse, and save hefty amount of fuel for the Germans. Even if the start is in 1939, by 1942/43 huge amounts of fuel could've been saved.

* military consumption also included another ~90,000 tons of AvGas and ~30,000 tons of diesel per month average for these 5 months

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Most of Europe had cut down many trees for Ship building and Charcoal production, so abundant 'Free' Wood hadn't been a thing for Centuries.

The fact Germany had been reforesting for a long time. The extent of Germany's forests at the end of WWII was almost as much as it is today and that's after (as posted by Tomo Pauk):
"By August, 1944, gas generators had been put on about 100,000 vehicles and were consuming about 155,000,000 cu ft of wood, and quantities of other fuel equivalent to 78,000,000 cu ft of wood, per year. About 500,000 tons of gasoline were saved this way in 1944."

"Forests cover 32 percent (11.4 million hectares) of Germany's territory, making it one of Europe's most forested countries. Since World War II, the forest area has been expanded by more than 1.5 million hectares, and home to some 90 billion trees, which translates to 1,000 trees per capita."

https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Publications/german-forests.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7

 

[tomo pauk]

The extent of Germany's forests at the end of WWII was almost as much as it is today and that's after
....
"Forests cover 32 percent (11.4 million hectares) of Germany's territory, making it one of Europe's most forested countries. Since World War II, the forest area has been expanded by more than 1.5 million hectares, and home to some 90 billion trees, which translates to 1,000 trees per capita."

For the expansionist Nazi Germany, casting the sight on the forests in the neighboring countries would've not be out of ordinary.
Ardennes, Czech & Austrian forests, these in Poland, in the Baltic states - a lot of material to burn even before Norwegian and the forests of the Soviet Union and in the Balkans are considered.

 

[z42]

For the expansionist Nazi Germany, casting the sight on the forests in the neighboring countries would've not be out of ordinary.
Ardennes, Czech & Austrian forests, these in Poland, in the Baltic states - a lot of material to burn even before Norwegian and the forests of the Soviet Union and in the Balkans are considered.

Problem might not be as much the existence of forests, but the availability of manpower to harvest and transport it. Logging at the time was back-breaking work, and with able-bodied men either at the front or tied up in other necessary jobs, who's going to do it? Mountainous terrain and lack of roads, like in much of Norway for instance, make it even more difficult.

Not saying wood gas generators weren't useful, but a massive increase in usage compared to the historical might be difficult to achieve in practice.

 

[tomo pauk]

Logging at the time was back-breaking work, and with able-bodied men either at the front or tied up in other necessary jobs, who's going to do it?

Germans found a way for the loggers to help them save the equivalent of 500 thousands of tons of gasoline in 1943. Possibly/probably, finding these people in, say, 1939 would've been even easier. Once foreign territories are captured, people there will far more likely do the logging there, than serve in the German-aligned military.
Granted, not putting the Jews and others in the concentration camps with the desire of extermination was an option, but that will never happen with Nazis at the helm.

Mountainous terrain and lack of roads, like in much of Norway for instance, make it even more difficult.

See Northern Poland, Baltic countries, Belarus and North Ukraine - pretty much flat and wooded.
Producer gas trucks can help out in the wooded areas, especially in these that are not flat.

Not saying wood gas generators weren't useful, but a massive increase in usage compared to the historical might be difficult to achieve in practice.

As-is, it was pretty massive with the 100 thousand of cars converted. Perhaps it is not needed that even more is converted, but that the conversions are undertaken earlier, so the cumulative effect on the oil supply is greater over time.

 

[z42]

The US bombing survey report dealing with the German fuel everything says this:
By August, 1944, gas generators had been put on about 100,000 vehicles and were consuming about 155,000,000 cu ft of wood, and quantities of other fuel equivalent to 78,000,000 cu ft of wood, per year. About 500,000 tons of gasoline were saved this way in 1944.

(military saved about 130,000 tons, rest was civilian saving; 1000 cu ft = ~28.3 m^3)

For the comparison, German military consumed about 100,000 tons of motor gasoline per month in the 5 most intense months of combat in 1940 (May, June, August, September, October). They used a lot of aviation gasoline and diesel as separate categories, though*.

The report also says this before the previous quote:
When the Caucasus offensive failed, the government required most classes of civilians to use gas generators, many of which burned wood, although some burned anthracite coal and other fuels.

So basically the era of 1935-42 was a prime time for the gas-generation to be introduced en masse, and save hefty amount of fuel for the Germans. Even if the start is in 1939, by 1942/43 huge amounts of fuel could've been saved.

* military consumption also included another ~90,000 tons of AvGas and ~30,000 tons of diesel per month average for these 5 months

With the caveat of comparing 1940 and 1944 numbers, those 500k tons per years means about 42k per month. So out of a total military liquid fuel consumption of 100k+90k+30k = 220k tons, that's about a 20% increase on top. Compared to the cost and manpower of building 100k wood gas generators, and the wood harvesting and transport to feed them, how does the cost and manpower of an additional 42kton per month synthetic fuel production, and the brown coal extraction and transport to feed them, look? Preferably dispersed, and even better, dispersed in underground locations.

 

[Alexander severus]

For the expansionist Nazi Germany, casting the sight on the forests in the neighboring countries would've not be out of ordinary.
Ardennes, Czech & Austrian forests, these in Poland, in the Baltic states - a lot of material to burn even before Norwegian and the forests of the Soviet Union and in the Balkans are considered.

Let germany found oil fields of matzen in Austria at the Moment of anschluss, and some oil could be gained.. without the sintetic oil,a lot of coal could be exported to Italy for example

 

[tomo pauk]

With the caveat of comparing 1940 and 1944 numbers, those 500k tons per years means about 42k per month. So out of a total military liquid fuel consumption of 100k+90k+30k = 220k tons, that's about a 20% increase on top. Compared to the cost and manpower of building 100k wood gas generators, and the wood harvesting and transport to feed them, how does the cost and manpower of an additional 42kton per month synthetic fuel production, and the brown coal extraction and transport to feed them, look? Preferably dispersed, and even better, dispersed in underground locations.

Similar idea crossed my mind when I was championing the steam trucks - ie. how does the wide-scale steam-ification compares with making the additional synthetic fuel facilities.
The doc referred above (the USBSS Oil division final report) offers some cues about the historical syn fuel facilities. Namely, that they were very expensive, required high grade steel in huge quantities*, and that the allocation of both required materials and manpower was almost always behind the schedule. Shortcoming was also that 8-10 tons of brown coal yielded just one ton of gasoline (granted, that was a high-quality grade).

*quotes:
The oil industry's requirements, moreover, were especially burdensome on the steel industry because alloy steels and special forgings constituted a substantial part of the tonnage needed. Making the large high-pressure vessels required for the hydrogenation plants was a job comparable to manufacturing naval guns. Steel deliveries began to lag as early as 1938 and were 130,000 tons short of allocations when the war begun.
...
Even before Germany went to war, the expansion program was far behind schedule. Several plants (Wanne Eickel, Schwarzheide, Welheim, and the Scholven extension) were completed as planned in 1938, but others (including Luetzkendorf Fischer, Hoesch, and Essener Verein) missed the deadline by from three to six months. Bythe next year, every project except the Gelsenberg plant and the iso-octane plant at Oppau had been delayed from one to nine months. The Luetzkendorf hydrogenation plant was thirteen months behind. Boehlen III and Zeitz I and II, scheduled for completion in December, 1939, and May, 1940, respectively, lagged from 11 to 16 months.
...
Diversion of steel and labor to the production of tanks, submarines, and other materiel curtailed and delayed the oil program, but actual deliveries of steel for the oil projects, between 1 July 1937 and 1 April 1944, were about 4,380,000 tons. This amount of steel would have sufficed to build a battle fleet four times as big as the U. S. Navy was in January, 1940.

tl;dr - The gas producer mods were far less taxing on the supply of the high quality steel than the syn oil factories, and these factories were consuming brown coal as crazy.